personal memoirs-1-第18章

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Guntown；　thus　rendering　abortive　the　plans　for　bagging　a　large

portion　of　his　army。



General　Beauregard's　evacuation　of　Corinth　and　retreat　southward　were

accomplished　in　the　face　of　a　largely　superior　force　of　Union　troops；

and　he　reached　the　point　where　he　intended　to　halt　for　reorganization

without　other　loss　than　that　sustained　in　the　destruction　of　the　cars

and　supplies　at　Booneville；　and　the　capture　of　some　stragglers　and

deserters　that　fell　into　our　hands　while　we　were　pressing　his　rear

from　General　Pope's　flank。　　The　number　of　these　was　quite　large；　and

indicated　that　the　enemy　was　considerably　demoralized。　　Under　such

circumstances；　an　energetic　and　skillfully　directed　pursuit　might　not

have　made　certain　the　enemy's　destruction；　but　it　would　largely　have

aided　in　disintegrating　his　forces；　and　I　never　could　quite

understand　why　it　was　not　ordered。　　The　desultory　affairs　between

rear　and　advance　guards　seemed　as　a　general；　thing　to　have　no

particular　purpose　in　view　beyond　finding　out　where　the　enemy　was；

and　when　he　was　found；　since　no　supporting　colums　were　at　hand　and　no

one　in　supreme　control　was　present　to　give　directions；　our

skirmishing　was　of　little　avail　and　brought　but　small　reward。



A　short　time　subsequent　to　these　occurrences；　Colonel　Elliott　was

made　a　brigadier…general；　and　as　General　Pope　appointed　him　his

Chief…of…Staff；　I；　on　the　11th　of　June；　1862；　fell　in　command　of　the

brigade　by　seniority。　　For　the　rest　of　the　month　but　little　of　moment

occurred；　and　we　settled　down　into　camp　at　Booneville　on　the　26th　of

June；　in　a　position　which　my　brigade　had　been　ordered　to　take　up　some

twenty　miles；　in　advance　of　the　main　army　for　the　purpose　of　covering

its　front。　　Although　but　a　few　days　had　elapsed　from　the　date　of　my

appointment　as　colonel　of　the　Second　Michigan　to　that　of　my

succeeding　to　the　command　of　the　brigade；　I　believe　I　can　say　with

propriety　that　I　had　firmly　established　myself　in　the　confidence　of

the　officers　and　men　of　the　regiment；　and　won　their　regard　by

thoughtful　care。　　I　had　striven　unceasingly　to　have　them　well　fed　and

well　clothed；　had　personally　looked　after　the　selection　of　their

camps；　and　had　maintained　such　a　discipline　as　to　allay　former

irritation。



Men　who　march；　scout；　and　fight；　and　suffer　all　the　hardships　that

fall　to　the　lot　of　soldiers　in　the　field；　in　order　to　do　vigorous

work　must　have　the　best　bodily　sustenance；　and　every　comfort　that　can

be　provided。　　I　knew　from　practical　experience　on　the　frontier　that

my　efforts　in　this　direction　would　not　only　be　appreciated；　but

requited　by　personal　affection　and　gratitude；　and；　further；　that　such

exertions　would　bring　the　best　results　to　me。　　Whenever　my　authority

would　permit　I　saved　my　command　from　needless　sacrifices　and

unnecessary　toil；　therefore；　when　hard　or　daring　work　was　to　be　done

I　expected　the　heartiest　response；　and　always　got　it。　　Soldiers　are

averse　to　seeing　their　comrades　killed　without　compensating　results；

and　none　realize　more　quickly　than　they　the　blundering　that　often

takes　place　on　the　field　of　battle。　　They　want　some　tangible

indemnity　for　the　loss　of　life；　and　as　victory　is　an　offset　the　value

of　which　is　manifest；　it　not　only　makes　them　content　to　shed　their

blood；　but　also　furnishes　evidence　of　capacity　in　those　who　command

them。　　My　regiment　had　lost　very　few　men　since　coming　under　my

command；　but　it　seemed；　in　the　eyes　of　all　who　belonged　to　it；　that

casualties　to　the　enemy　and　some　slight　successes　for　us　had　repaid

every　sacrifice；　and　in　consequence　I　had　gained　not　only　their

confidence　as　soldiers；　but　also　their　esteem　and　love　as　men；　and　to

a　degree　far　beyond　what　I　then　realized。



As　soon　as　the　camp　of　my　brigade　was　pitched　at　Booneville；　I　began

to　scout　in　every　direction；　to　obtain　a　knowledge　of　the　enemy's

whereabouts　and　learn　the　ground　about　me。　　My　standing　in　drawing　at

the　Military　Academy　had　never　been　so　high　as　to　warrant　the　belief

that　I　could　ever　prove　myself　an　expert；　but　a　few　practical　lessons

in　that　line　were　impressed　on　me　there；　and　I　had　retained　enough　to

enable　me　to　make　rough　maps　that　could　be　readily　understood；　and

which　would　be　suitable　to　replace　the　erroneous　skeleton　outlines　of

northern　Mississippi；　with　which　at　this　time　we　were　scantily

furnished；　so　as　soon　as　possible　I　compiled　for　the　use　of　myself

and　my　regimental　commanders　an　information　map　of　the　surrounding

country。　　This　map　exhibited　such　details　as　country　roads；　streams；

farmhouses；　fields；　woods；　and　swamps；　and　such　other　topographical

features　as　would　be　useful。　　I　must　confess　that　my　crude　sketch　did

not　evidence　much　artistic　merit；　but　it　was　an　improvement　on　what

we　already　possessed　in　the　way　of　details　to　guide　the　command；　and

this　was　what　I　most　needed；　for　it　was　of　the　first　importance　that

in　our　exposed　condition　we　should　be　equipped　with　a　thorough

knowledge　of　the　section　in　which　we　were　operating；　so　as　to　be

prepared　to　encounter　an　enemy　already　indicating　recovery　from　the

disorganizing　effects　of　his　recent　retreat。



In　the　immediate　vicinity　of　Booneville　the　country　was　covered　with

heavy　forests；　with　here　and　there　clearings　or　intervening　fields

that　had　been　devoted　to　the　cultivation　of　cotton　and　corn。　　The

ground　was　of　a　low　character；　typical　of　northeastern　Mississippi；

and　abounded　in　small　creeks　that　went　almost　totally　dry　even　in

short　periods　of　drought；　but　became　flooded　with　muddy　water　under

the　outpouring　of　rain　peculiar　to　a　semi…tropical　climate。　　In　such

a　region　there　were　many　chances　of　our　being　surprised；　especially

by　an　enemy　who　knew　the　country　well；　and　whose　ranks　were　filled

with　local　guides；　and　great　precautions　as　well　as　the　fullest

information　were　necessary　to　prevent　disaster。　　I　therefore

endeavored　to　familiarize　all　with　our　surroundings；　but　scarcely　had

matters　begun　to　shape　themselves　as　I　desired　when　our　annihilation

was　attempted　by　a　large　force　of　Confederate　cavalry。



On　the　morning　of　July　1；　1862；　a　cavalry　command　of　between　five　and

six　thousand…men；　under　the　Confederate　General　James　R。　Chalmers；

advanced　on　two　roads　converging　near　Booneville。　　The　head　of　the

enemy's　column　on　the　Blackland　and　Booneville　road　came　in　contact

with　my　pickets　three　miles　and　a　half　west　of　Booneville。　　These

pickets；　under　Lieutenant　Leonidas　S。　Scranton；　of　the　Second

Michigan　Cavalry；　fell　back　slowly；　taking　advantage　of　every　tree　or

other　cover　to　fire　from　till　they　arrived　at　the　point　where　the

converging　roads　joined。　　At　this　junction　there　was　a　strong

position　in　the　protecting　timber；　and　here　Scranton　made　a　firm

stand；　being　reinforced　presently　by　the　few　men　he　had　out　as

pickets　on　the　road　to　his　left；　a　second　company　I　had　sent　him　from

camp；　and　subsequently　by　three　companies　more；　all　now　commanded　by

Captain　Campbell。　　This　force　was　dismounted　and　formed　in　line；　and

soon　developed　that　the　enemy　was　present　in　large　numbers。　　Up　to

this　time　Chalmers　had　shown　only　the　heads　of　his　columns；　and　we

had　doubts　as　to　his　purpose；　but　now　that　our　resistance　forced　him

to　deploy　two　regiments　on　the　right　and　left　of　the　road；　it　became

apparent　that　he　meant　business；　and　that　there　was　no　time　to　lose

in　preparing　to　repel　his　attack。



Full　information　of　the　situation　was　immediately　sent　me；　and　I

directed　Campbell　to　hold　fast；　if　possible；　till　I　could　support

him；　but　if　compelled　to　retire　he　was　authorized　to　do　so　slowly；

taking　advantage　of　every　means　that　fell　in　his　way　to　prolong　the

fighting。　　Before　this　I　had　stationed　one　battalion　of　the　Second

Iowa　in　Booneville；　but　Colonel　Edward　Hatch；　commanding　that

regiment；　was　now　directed　to　leave　one　company　for　the　protection　of

our　camp　a　little　to　the　north　of　the　station；　and　take　the　balance

of　the　Second　Iowa；　with　the　battalion　in　Booneville　except　two　sabre

companies；　and　form　the　whole　in　rear　of　Captain　Campbell；　to　protect

his　flanks　and　support　him　by　a　charge　should　the　enemy　break　his

dismounted　line。



While　these　preparations　were　being　made；　the　Confederates　attempted

to　drive　Campbell　from　his　position　by　a　direct　attack　through　an

open　field。　　In　this　they　failed；　however；　for　our　men；　reserving

their　fire　until　the　enemy　came　within　about　thirty　yards；　then

opened　on　him　with　such　a　shower　of　bullets　from　our　Colt's　rifles

that　it　soon　became　too　hot　for　him；　and　he　was　repulsed　with

considerable　loss。　　Foiled　in　this　move；　Chalmers　hesitated　to　attack

again　in　front；　but　began　overlapping　both　flanks　of　Campbell's　line

by　force　of　numbers；　compelling　Campbell　to　retire　toward　a　strong

position　I　had　selected　in　his　rear　for　a　line　on　which　to　make　our

main　resistance。　　As　soon　as　the　enemy　saw　this　withdrawing　he　again

charged　in　front；　but　was　again　as　gallantly　repelled　as　in　the　first

assault；　although　the　encounter　was　for　a　short　time　so　desperate　as

to　have　the　character　of　a　hand…to…hand　conflict；　several　groups　of

friend　and　foe　using　on　each　other　the　butts　of　their　guns。　　At　this

juncture　the　timely　arrival　of　Colonel　Hatch　with　the　Second　Iowa

gave　a　breathing…spell　to　Campbell；　and　made　the　Confederates　so

chary　of　further　direct　attacks　that　he　was　enabled　to　retire；　and　at

the　same　time　I　found　opportunity　to　make　disposition　of　the

reinforcement　to　the　best　advantage　possible；　placing　the　Second　Iowa

on　the　left　of　the　new　line　and　strengthening　Campbell　on　its　right

with　all　the　men　available。



In　view　of　his　numbers；　the　enemy　soon　regained　confidence　in　his

ability　to　overcome　us；　and　in　a　little　while　again　began　his

flanking　movements；　his　right　passing　around　my　left　flank　some

distance；　and　approaching　our　camp　and　transportation；　which　I　had

forbidden　to　be　moved　out　to　the　rear。　　Fearing　that　he　would　envelop

us　and　capture　the　camp　and　transportation；　I　determined　to　take　the

offensive。　　Remembering　a　circuitous　wood　road　that　I　had　become

familiar　with　while　making　the　map　heretofore　mentioned；　I　concluded

that　the　most　effective　plan　would　be　to　pass　a　small　column　around

the　enemy's　left；　by　way　of　this　road；　and　strike　his　rear　by　a

mounted　charge　simultaneously　with　an　advance　of　our　main　line　on　his

front。　　I　knew　that　the　attack　in　rear　would　be　a　most　hazardous

undertaking；　but　in　the　face　of　such　odds　as　the　enemy　had　the

condition　of　affairs　was　most　critical；　and　could　be　relieved；　only

by　a　bold　and　radical　change　in　our　tactics；　so　I　at　once　selected

four　sabre　companies；　two　from　the　Second　Michigan　and　two　from　the

Second　Iowa；　and　placing　Captain　Alger；　of　the　former　regiment；　in

command　of　them；　I　informed　him　that　I　expected　of　them　the　quick　and

desperate　work　that　is　usually　imposed　on　a　forlorn　hope。



To　carry　out　the　purpose　now　in　view；　I　instructed　Ca