personal memoirs-1-第41章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！



custom　of　using　the　cavalry　for　the　protection　of　trains　and　the

establishment　of　cordons　around　the　infantry　corps；　and　so　far

subordinating　its　operations　to　the　movements　of　the　main　army　that

in　name　only　was　it　a　corps　at　all；　but　still　I　thought　it　my　duty　to

try。



At　first　General　Meade　would　hardly　listen　to　my　proposition；　for　he

was　filled　with　the　prejudices　that；　from　the　beginning　of　the　war；

had　pervaded　the　army　regarding　the　importance　and　usefulness　of

cavalry；　General　Scott　then　predicting　that　the　contest　would　be

settled　by　artillery；　and　thereafter　refusing　the　services　of

regiment　after　regiment　of　mounted　troops。　　General　Meade　deemed

cavalry　fit　for　little　more　than　guard　and　picket　duty；　and　wanted　to

know　what　would　protect　the　transportation　trains　and　artillery

reserve；　cover　the　front　of　moving　infantry　columns；　and　secure　his

flanks　from　intrusion；　if　my　policy　were　pursued。　　I　told　him　that　if

he　would　let　me　use　the　cavalry　as　I　contemplated；　he　need　have

little　solicitude　in　these　respects；　for；　with　a　mass　of　ten　thousand

mounted　men；　it　was　my　belief　that　I　could　make　it　so　lively　for　the

enemy's　cavalry　that；　so　far　as　attacks　from　it　were　concerned；　the

flanks　and　rear　of　the　Army　of　the　Potomac　would　require　little　or　no

defense；　and　claimed；　further；　that　moving　columns　of　infantry　should

take　care　of　their　own　fronts。　　I　also　told　him　that　it　was　my　object

to　defeat　the　enemy's　cavalry　in　a　general　combat；　if　possible；　and

by　such　a　result　establish　a　feeling　of　confidence　in　my　own　troops

that　would　enable　us　after　awhile　to　march　where　we　pleased；　for　the

purpose　of　breaking　General　Lee's　communications　and　destroying　the

resources　from　which　his　army　was　supplied。



The　idea　as　here　outlined　was　contrary　to　Meade's　convictions；　for

though　at　different　times　since　he　commanded　the　Army　of　the　Potomac

considerable　bodies　of　the　cavalry　had　been　massed　for　some　special

occasion；　yet　he　had　never　agreed　to　the　plan　as　a　permanency；　and

could　not　be　bent　to　it　now。　　He　gave　little　encouragement；

therefore；　to　what　I　proposed；　yet　the　conversation　was　immediately

beneficial　in　one　way；　for　when　I　laid　before　him　the　true　condition

of　the　cavalry；　he　promptly　relieved　it　from　much　of　the　arduous　and

harassing　picket　service　it　was　performing；　thus　giving　me　about　two

weeks　in　which　to　nurse　the　horses　before　the　campaign　opened。



The　interview　also　disclosed　the　fact　that　the　cavalry　commander

should　be；　according　to　General　Meade's　views；　at　his　headquarters

practically　as　one　of　his　staff；　through　whom　he　would　give　detailed

directions　as；　in　his　judgment；　occasion　required。　　Meade's　ideas　and

mine　being　so　widely　divergent；　disagreements　arose　between　us　later

during　the　battles　of　the　Wilderness；　which　lack　of　concord　ended　in

some　concessions　on　his　part　after　the　movement　toward　Spottsylvania

Court　House　began；　and　although　I　doubt　that　his　convictions　were

ever　wholly　changed；　yet　from　that　date　on；　in　the　organization　of

the　Army　of　the　Potomac；　the　cavalry　corps　became　more　of　a　compact

body；　with　the　same　privileges　and　responsibilities　that　attached　to

the　other　corpsconditions　that　never　actually　existed　before。



On　the　4th　of　May　the　Army　of　the　Potomac　moved　against　Lee；　who　was

occupying　a　defensive　position　on　the　south　bank　of　the　Rapidan。

After　detailing　the　various　detachments　which　I　was　obliged　to　supply

for　escorts　and　other　mounted　duty；　I　crossed　the　river　with　an

effective　force　of　about　10；000　troopers。　　In　the　interval　succeeding

my　assignment　to　the　command　of　the　cavalry；　I　had　taken　the　pains　to

study　carefully　the　topography　of　the　country　in　eastern　Virginia；

and　felt　convinced　that；　under　the　policy　Meade　intended　I　should

follow；　there　would　be　little　opportunity　for　mounted　troops　to

acquit　themselves　well　in　a　region　so　thickly　wooded；　and　traversed

by　so　many　almost　parallel　streams；　but　conscious　that　he　would　be

compelled　sooner　or　later　either　to　change　his　mind　or　partially　give

way　to　the　pressure　of　events；　I　entered　on　the　campaign　with　the

loyal　determination　to　aid　zealously　in　all　its　plans。



General　Lee's　army　was　located　in　its　winter　quarters　behind

intrenchments　that　lay　along　the　Rapidan　for　a　distance　of　about

twenty　miles；　extending　from　Barnett's　to　Morton's　ford。　　The　fords

below　Morton's　were　watched　by　a　few　small　detachments　of　Confederate

cavalry；　the　main　body　of　which；　however；　was　encamped　below

Hamilton's　crossing；　where　it　could　draw　supplies　from　the　rich

country　along　the　Rappahannock。　　Only　a　few　brigades　of　Lee's

infantry　guarded　the　works　along　the　river；　the　bulk　of　it　being　so

situated　that　it　could　be　thrown　to　either　flank　toward　which　the

Union　troops　approached。



General　Grant　adopted　the　plan　of　moving　by　his　left　flank；　with　the

purpose　of　compelling　Lee　to　come　out　from　behind　his　intrenchments

along　Mine　Run　and　fight　on　equal　terms。　　Grant　knew　well　the

character　of　country　through　which　he　would　have　to　pass；　but　he　was

confident　that　the　difficulties　of　operation　in　the　thickly　wooded

region　of　the　Wilderness　would　be　counterbalanced　by　the　facility

with　which　his　position　would　enable　him　to　secure　a　new　base；　and　by

the　fact　that　as　he　would　thus　cover　Washington；　there　would　be

little　or　no　necessity　for　the　authorities　there　to　detach　from　his

force　at　some　inopportune　moment　for　the　protection　of　that　city。



In　the　move　forward　two　divisions　of　my　cavalry　took　the　advance；

Gregg　crossing　the　Rapidan　at　Ely's　ford　and　Wilson　at　Germania　ford。

Torbert's　division　remained　in　the　rear　to　cover　the　trains　and

reserve　artillery；　holding　from　Rapidan　Station　to　Culpeper；　and

thence　through　Stevensburg　to　the　Rappahannock　River。　　Gregg　crossed

the　Rapidan　before　daylight；　in　advance　of　the　Second　Corps；　and　when

the　latter　reached　Ely's　ford；　he　pushed　on　to　Chancellorsville；

Wilson　preceded　the　Fifth　Corps　to　Germania　ford；　and　when　it　reached

the　river　he　made　the　crossing　and　moved　rapidly　by　Wilderness

Tavern；　as　far　as　Parker's　Store；　from　which　point　he　sent　a　heavy

reconnoissance　toward　Mine　Run；　the　rest　of　his　division　bivouacking

in　a　strong　position。　　I　myself　proceeded　to　Chancellorsville　and

fixed　my　headquarters　at　that　place；　whereon　the　5th　I　was　joined　by

Torbert's　division。



Meanwhile；　General　Meade　had　crossed　the　Rapidan　and　established　his

headquarters　not　far　from　Germania　ford。　　From　that　point　he　was　in

direct　communication　with　Wilson；　whose　original　instructions　from　me

carried　him　only　as　far　as　Parker's　Store；　but　it　being　found；　during

the　night　of　the　4th；　that　the　enemy　was　apparently　unacquainted　with

the　occurrences　of　the　day；　Meade　directed　Wilson　to　advance　in　the

direction　of　Craig's　Meeting　House；　leaving　one　regiment　to　hold

Parker's　Store。　　Wilson　with　the　second　brigade　encountered　Rosser's

brigade　of　cavalry　just　beyond　the　Meeting　House；　and　drove　it　back

rapidly　a　distance　of　about　two　miles；　holding　it　there　till　noon；

while　his　first　brigade　was　halted　on　the　north　side　of　Robinson's

Run　near　the　junction　of　the　Catharpen　and　Parker's　Store　roads。



Up　to　this　time　Wilson　had　heard　nothing　of　the　approach　of　the　Fifth

Corps；　and　the　situation　becoming　threatening；　he　withdrew　the　second

brigade　to　the　position　occupied　by　the　first；　but　scarcely　had　he

done　so　when　he　learned　that　at　an　early　hour　in　the　forenoon　the

enemy's　infantry　had　appeared　in　his　rear　at　Parker's　Store　and　cut

off　his　communication　with　General　Meade。　　Surprised　at　this；　he

determined　to　withdraw　to　Todd's　Tavern；　but　before　his　resolution

could　be　put　into　execution　the　Confederates　attacked　him　with　a

heavy　force；　and　at　the　same　time　began　pushing　troops　down　the

Catharpen　road。　　Wilson　was　now　in　a　perplexing　situation；　sandwiched

between　the　Confederates　who　had　cut　him　off　in　the　rear　at　Parker's

store　and　those　occupying　the　Catharpen　road；　but　he　extricated　his

command　by　passing　it　around　the　latter　force；　and　reached　Todd's

Tavern　by　crossing　the　Po　River　at　Corbin's　bridge。　　General　Meade

discovering　that　the　enemy　had　interposed　at　Parker's　store　between

Wilson　and　the　Fifth　Corps；　sent　me　word　to　go　to　Wilson's　relief；

and　this　was　the　first　intimation　I　received　that　Wilson　had　been

pushed　out　so　far；　but；　surmising　that　he　would　retire　in　the

direction　of　Todd's　Tavern　I　immediately　despatched　Gregg's　division

there　to　his　relief。　　Just　beyond　Todd's　Tavern　Gregg　met　Wilson；　who

was　now　being　followed　by　the　enemy's　cavalry。　　The　pursuing　force

was　soon　checked；　and　then　driven　back　to　Shady　Grove　Church；　while

Wilson's　troops　fell　in　behind　Gregg's　line；　somewhat　the　worse　for

their　morning's　adventure。



When　the　Army　of　the　Potomac　commenced　crossing　the　Rapidan　on　the

4th；　General　J。　E。　B。　Stuart；　commanding　the　Confederate　cavalry；

began　concentrating　his　command　on　the　right　of　Lee's　infantry；

bringing　it　from　Hamilton's　crossing　and　other　points　where　it　had

been　wintering。　　Stuart's　force　at　this　date　was　a　little　more　than

eight　thousand　men；　organized　in　two　divisions；　commanded　by　Generals

Wade　Hampton　and　Fitzhugh　Lee。　　Hampton's　division　was　composed　of

three　brigades；　commanded　by　Generals　Cordon；　Young；　and　Rosser；

Fitzhugh　Lee's　division　comprised　three　brigades　also；　Generals　W。　H。

F。　Lee；　Lomax；　and　Wickham　commanding　them。



Information　of　this　concentration；　and　of　the　additional　fact　that

the　enemy's　cavalry　about　Hamilton's　crossing　was　all　being　drawn　in；

reached　me　on　the　5th；　which　obviated　all　necessity　for　my　moving　on

that　point　as　I　intended　at　the　onset　of　the　campaign。　　The

responsibility　for　the　safety　of　our　trains　and　of　the　left　flank　of

the　army　still　continued；　however；　so　I　made　such　dispositions　of　my

troops　as　to　secure　these　objects　by　holding　the　line　of　the　Brock

road　beyond　the　Furnaces；　and　thence　around　to　Todd's　Tavern　and

Piney　Branch　Church。　　On　the　6th；　through　some　false　information；

General　Meade　became　alarmed　about　his　left　flank；　and　sent　me　the

following　note：



〃HEADQUARTERS　ARMY　OF　THE　POTOMAC；

〃May　6；　1864。1　o'clock　P。　M。

〃MAJOR…GENERAL　SHERIDAN；

〃Commanding　Cavalry　Corps



〃Your　despatch　of　11。45　a。m。；　received。　　General　Hancock　has　been

heavily　pressed；　and　his　left　turned。　　The　major…general　commanding

thinks　that　you　had　better　draw　in　your　cavalry；　so　as　to　secure　the

protection　of　the　trains。　　The　order　requiring　an　escort　for　the

wagons　to…night　has　been　rescinded。



〃A。　A。　HUMPHREYS；

〃Major…General；　Chief…of…Staff。〃





On　the　morning　of　the　6th　Custer's　and　Devin's　brigades　had　been

severely　engaged　at　the　Furnaces　before　I　received　the　above　note。

They　had　been　most　successful　in　repulsing　the　enemy's　attacks；

however；　and　I　felt　that　the　line　taken　up　could　be　held；　but　the

despatch　from　Gener