personal memoirs-1-第51章

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the　enemy；　and　then　move　by　the　shortest　routes　to　the　intersection

of　the　Petersburg　and　Lynchburg；　and　the　Richmond　and　Danville

railroads；　and　destroy　both　these　roads　to　the　greatest　extent

possible；　continuing　their　destruction　until　driven　from　it　by　such

attacks　of　the　enemy　as　you　can　no　longer　resist。　　The　destruction　of

those　roads　to　such　an　extent　that　they　cannot　be　used　by　the　enemy

in　connection　with　Richmond　during　the　remainder　of　the　campaign　is

an　important　part　of　the　plan　of　campaign。　　The　latest　information

from　Major…General　Hunter　represents　him　to　be　a　few　miles　west　of

Lynchburg。　　He　may　endeavor　to　form　a　junction　with　this　army；　you

will　communicate　with　him　if　practicable；　and　have　delivered　to　him

verbally　the　contents　of　the　following　copy　of　a　communication　from

Lieutenant…General　Grant　to　the　major…general　commanding　this　army。

Lieutenant　Brooks；　who　will　accompany　your　expedition　part　of　the

way；　should　be　informed　where　General　Hunter　will　probably　be　found。



〃The　success　of　your　expedition　will　depend　upon　the　secrecy　with

which　it　is　commenced；　and　the　celerity　with　which　its　movements　are

conducted；　your　command　will；　therefore；　have　with　it　the　lightest

supplies　and　smallest　number　of　wheels　consistent　with　the　thorough

execution　of　the　duty；　the　supplies　of　the　section　of　country　you

will　operate　in　being　taken　into　account。　　Upon　the　completion　of　the

work　assigned　you；　you　will　rejoin　this　army。



〃The　chief　quartermaster　was　directed　yesterday　to　supply　you　with

the　implements　and　material　for　the　destruction　of　railroads　obtained

for　General　Sheridan。



＇Signed＇　〃A。　A。　HUMPHREYS；

〃Major…General；　Chief…of…Staff。〃







〃HEADQUARTERS　CAVALRY　FORCES；

Mount　Sinai　Church；　June　21；　18646　P。M。



〃MAJOR…GENERAL　HUMPHREYS；〃

〃Chief…of…Staff。

〃The　instructions　of　the　major…general　commanding；　of　this　date；　are

received。　　I　shall　march　in　obedience　thereto　at　2　A。　M。　to…morrow。

Before　starting　I　would　like　to　know　if　our　infantry　forces　cover　the

Weldon　road。



〃I　propose　striking　the　Southside　road　first　at　Sutherland　Station；

or　some　point　in　that　vicinity；　tearing　up　the　track　sufficiently　to

delay　railroad　communication　ten　or　twelve　hours。　　At　this　place　I

shall　detach　a　force　to　strike　the　Richmond　and　Danville　road；　by　a

rapid　march；　at　the　nearest　point；　tearing　up　the　track　at　every

practicable　point　between　there　and　Burkeville。



〃From　Sutherlands　I　shall　move　the　main　body　of　my　command　by　the

Great　road　（breaking　the　railroad　at　every　convenient　point）　directly

to　Burkeville；　which；　if　we　succeed　in　capturing；　will　afford　us　the

opportunity　of　prosecuting　our　work　with　great　advantage。　　As　soon　as

I　have　made　dispositions　for　communicating　with　Hunter　and　done　all

the　damage　possible；　I　shall　move　with　all　possible　rapidity　for

Danville　and　Grenboro'。



〃Circumstances　must；　however；　is　a　great　degree　control　our　movements

after　leaving　Burkeville。



〃If　Sheridan　will　look　after　Hampton；　I　apprehend　no　difficulty；　and

hope　to　be　able　to　do　the　enemy　great　damage。　　The　ammunition　issued

to　my　command　is　very　defective。　　The　implements　for　destroying　roads

have　not　yet　arrived；　but　I　learn　from　General　Ingalls　that　they　will

certainly　be　here　early　to…morrow。



＇Signed＇　J。　H。　WILSON；

〃Brigadier…General　Commanding。





The　moment　I　received　orders　from　General　Meade　to　go　to　the　relief

of　Wilson；　I　hastened　with　Torbert　and　Gregg　by　way　of　Prince　George

Court　House　and　Lee's　Mills　to　Ream's　Station。　　Here　I　found　the

Sixth　Corps；　which　Meade　had　pushed　out　on　his　left　flank　immediately

on　hearing　of　Wilson's　mishap；　but　I　was　too　late　to　render　any

material　assistance；　Wilson　having　already　disappeared；　followed　by

the　enemy。　　However；　I　at　once　sent　out　parties　to　gather

information；　and　soon　learned　that　Wilson　had　got　safe　across　the

Nottoway　at　Peter's　bridge　and　was　making　for　the　army　by　way　of

Blunt's　bridge；　on　the　Blackwater。



The　benefits　derived　from　this　expedition；　in　the　destruction　of　the

Southside　and　Danville　railroads；　were　considered　by　General　Grant　as

equivalent　for　the　losses　sustained　in　Wilson's　defeat；　for　the

wrecking　of　the　railroads　and　cars　was　most　complete；　occasioning　at

this；　time　serious　embarrassment　to　the　Confederate　Government；　but　I

doubt　if　all　this　compensated　for　the　artillery　and　prisoners　that

fell　into　the　hands　of　the　enemy　in　the　swamps　of　Hatcher's　Run　and

Rowanty　Creek。　　Wilson's　retreat　from　the　perilous　situation　at

Ream's　station　was　a　most　creditable　performancein　the　face　of　two

brigades　of　infantry　and　three　divisions　of　cavalryand　in　the

conduct　of　the　whole　expedition　the　only　criticism　that　can　hold

against　him　is　that　he　placed　too　much　reliance　on　meeting　our

infantry　at　Ream's　station；　seeing　that　uncontrollable　circumstances

might；　and　did；　prevent　its　being　there。　　He　ought　to　have　marched　on

the　28th　by　Jarrett's　Station　to　Peter's　bridge；　on　the　Nottoway；　and

Blunts　bridge　on　the　Blackwater；　to　the　rear　of　the　Army　of　the

Potomac。



When　the　safety　of　Wilson's　command　was　assured；　I　was　ordered　back

to　Light　House　Point；　where　I　had　gone　into　camp　after　crossing　the

James　River　to　rest　and　recruit　my　command；　now　very　much　reduced　in

numbers　by　reason　of　casualties　to　both　horses　and　men。　　It　had　been

marching　and　fighting　for　fifty　consecutive　days；　and　the　fatiguing

service　had　told　so　fearfully　on　my　animals　that　the　number　of

dismounted　men　in　the　corps　was　very　large。　　With　the　exception　of

about　four　hundred　horses　that　I　received　at　the　White　House；　no

animals　were　furnished　to　supply　the　deficiencies　which　had　arisen

from　the　wearing　marches　of　the　past　two　months　until　I　got　to　this

camp　at　Light　House　Point；　here　my　needs　were　so　obvious　that　they

could　no　longer　be　neglected。



I　remained　at　Light　House　Point　from　the　2d　to　the　26th　of　July；

recuperating　the　cavalry；　the　intensely　warm　weather　necessitating

almost　an　entire　suspension　of　hostilities　on　the　part　of　the　Army　of

the　Potomac。　　Meanwhile　fifteen　hundred　horses　were　sent　me　here；　and

these；　with　the　four　hundred　already　mentioned；　were　all　that　my

troops　received　while　I　held　the　personal　command　of　the　Cavalry

Corps；　from　April　6　to　August　1；　1864。　　This　was　not　near　enough　to

mount　the　whole　command；　so　I　disposed　the　men　who　could　not　be

supplied　in　a　dismounted　camp。



By　the　26th　of　July　our　strength　was　pretty　well　restored；　and　as

General　Grant　was　now　contemplating　offensive　operations　for　the

purpose　of　keeping　Lee's　army　occupied　around　Richmond；　and　also　of

carrying　Petersburg　by　assault　if　possible；　I　was　directed　to　move　to

the　north　side　of　the　James　River　in　conjunction　with　General

Hancock's　corps；　and；　if　opportunity　offered；　to　make　a　second

expedition　against　the　Virginia　Central　railroad；　and　again　destroy

the　bridges　on　the　North　Anna；　the　Little　and　the　South　Anna　rivers。



I　started　out　on　the　afternoon　of　the　26th　and　crossed　the　Appomattox

at　Broadway　landing。　　At　Deep　Bottom　I　was　joined　by　Kautz's　small

division　from　the　Army　of　the　James；　and　here　massed　the　whole

command；　to　allow　Hancock's　corps　to　take　the　lead；　it　crossing　to

the　north　bank　of　the　James　River　by　the　bridge　below　the　mouth　of

Bailey's　Creek。　　I　moved　late　in　the　afternoon；　so　as　not　to　come

within　the　enemy's　view　before　dark；　and　after　night…fall　Hancock's

corps　passed　me　and　began　crossing　the　pontoon…bridge　about　2　o'clock

in　the　morning。



By　daylight　Hancock　was　across；　the　cavalry　following。　　Soon　a

portion　of　his　corps　attacked　the　enemy's　works　on　the　east　side　of

Bailey's　Creek；　and；　aided　by　the　cavalry　moving　on　its　right；

captured　four　pieces　of　artillery。　　This　opened　the　way　for　Hancock

to　push　out　his　whole　corps；　and　as　he　advanced　by　a　wheel；　with　his

left　as　a　pivot；　the　cavalry　joined　in　the　movement；　pressing　forward

on　the　New　Market　and　Central　or　Charles　City　roads。



We　did　not　go　far　before　we　found　the　enemy's　infantry　posted　across

these　two　roads　behind　a　strong　line　of　intrenchments　on　the　west

bank　of　Bailey's　Creek。　　His　videttes　in　front　of　Ruffin's　house　on

the　New　Market　road　were　soon　driven　in　on　their　main　line；　and　the

high　ground　before　the　house　was　immediately　occupied　by　Torbert　and

Gregg；　supported　by　Kautz's　division。　　By　the　time　the　cavalry　line

was　formed　the　Confederate　General　Kershaw；　with　his　own　division　of

infantry　and　those　of　Wilcox　and　Heath；　advanced　to　attack　us。

Directing　the　most　of　his　troops　against　the　cavalry；　which　was　still

mounted；　Kershaw　drove　it　back　some　distance　over　the　high　ground。

When　it　reached　the　eastern　face　of　the　ridge；　however；　it　was

quickly　dismounted；　and　the　men　directed　to　lie　down　in　line　of

battle　about　fifteen　yards　from　the　crest；　and　here　the　onset　of　the

enemy　was　awaited。　　When　Kershaw's　men　reached　the　crest　such　a

severe　fire　was　opened　on　them；　and　at　such　close　quarters；　that　they

could　not　withstand　it；　and　gave　way　in　disorder。　　They　were　followed

across　the　plain　by　the　cavalry；　and　lost　about　two　hundred　and　fifty

prisoners　and　two　battle…flags。　　The　counter　attack　against　the

infantry　by　Torbert　and　Gregg　re…established　our　line　and　gave　us　the

victory　of　Darbytown；　but　it　also　demonstrated　the　fact　that　General

Lee　had　anticipated　the　movement　around　his　left　flank　by

transferring　to　the　north　side　of　the　James　a　large　portion　of　his

infantry　and　W。　H。　F。　Lee's　division　of　cavalry。



This　development　rendered　useless　any　further　effort　on　Hancock's

part　or　mine　to　carry　out　the　plan　of　the　expedition；　for　General

Grant　did　not　intend　Hancock　to　assault　the　enemy's　works　unless

there　should　be　found　in　them　but　a　very　thin　line　of　infantry　which

could　be　surprised。　　In　such　event；　Hancock　was　to　operate　so　that

the　cavalry　might　turn　the　Confederates　on　the　Central　or　Charles

City　road；　but　the　continually　increasing　force　of　the　enemy　showed

this　to　be　impracticable。　　The　long　front　presented　by　Hancock's

corps　and　the　cavalry　deceived　General　Lee；　and　he　undoubtedly

thought　that　nearly　all　of　Grant's　army　had　been　moved　to　the　north

side　of　the　James　River；　and　to　meet　the　danger　he　transferred　the

most　of　his　own　strength　to　the　same　side　to　confront　his　adversary；

thinning　the　lines　around　Petersburg　to　reinforce　those　opposing　us

on　the　Central　and　New　Market　roads。　　This　was　what　Grant　hoped　Lee

would　do　in　case　the　operations　of　Hancock　and　myself　became

impracticable；　for　Grant　had　an　alternative　plan　for　carrying

Petersburg　by　assault　in　conjunction　with　the　explosion　of　a　mine

that　had　been　driven　under　the　enemy's　works　from　the　front　of

Burnside's　corps。



Now　that　there　was　no　longer　a　chance　for　the　cavalry　to　turn　the

enemy's　left；　our　attention　was　directed　to　keeping　up　the　deception

of　Lee；　and　o