alcibiades i-第2章

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Plato。　　The　motive　of　the　piece　may；　perhaps；　be　found　in　that　passage　of

the　Symposium　in　which　Alcibiades　describes　himself　as　self…convicted　by

the　words　of　Socrates。　　For　the　disparaging　manner　in　which　Schleiermacher

has　spoken　of　this　dialogue　there　seems　to　be　no　sufficient　foundation。　　At

the　same　time；　the　lesson　imparted　is　simple；　and　the　irony　more

transparent　than　in　the　undoubted　dialogues　of　Plato。　　We　know；　too；　that

Alcibiades　was　a　favourite　thesis；　and　that　at　least　five　or　six　dialogues

bearing　this　name　passed　current　in　antiquity；　and　are　attributed　to

contemporaries　of　Socrates　and　Plato。　　（1）　In　the　entire　absence　of　real

external　evidence　（for　the　catalogues　of　the　Alexandrian　librarians　cannot

be　regarded　as　trustworthy）；　and　（2）　in　the　absence　of　the　highest　marks

either　of　poetical　or　philosophical　excellence；　and　（3）　considering　that　we

have　express　testimony　to　the　existence　of　contemporary　writings　bearing

the　name　of　Alcibiades；　we　are　compelled　to　suspend　our　judgment　on　the

genuineness　of　the　extant　dialogue。



Neither　at　this　point；　nor　at　any　other；　do　we　propose　to　draw　an　absolute

line　of　demarcation　between　genuine　and　spurious　writings　of　Plato。　　They

fade　off　imperceptibly　from　one　class　to　another。　　There　may　have　been

degrees　of　genuineness　in　the　dialogues　themselves；　as　there　are　certainly

degrees　of　evidence　by　which　they　are　supported。　　The　traditions　of　the

oral　discourses　both　of　Socrates　and　Plato　may　have　formed　the　basis　of

semi…Platonic　writings；　some　of　them　may　be　of　the　same　mixed　character

which　is　apparent　in　Aristotle　and　Hippocrates；　although　the　form　of　them

is　different。　　But　the　writings　of　Plato；　unlike　the　writings　of　Aristotle；

seem　never　to　have　been　confused　with　the　writings　of　his　disciples：　　this

was　probably　due　to　their　definite　form；　and　to　their　inimitable

excellence。　　The　three　dialogues　which　we　have　offered　in　the　Appendix　to

the　criticism　of　the　reader　may　be　partly　spurious　and　partly　genuine；　they

may　be　altogether　spurious；that　is　an　alternative　which　must　be　frankly

admitted。　　Nor　can　we　maintain　of　some　other　dialogues；　such　as　the

Parmenides；　and　the　Sophist；　and　Politicus；　that　no　considerable　objection

can　be　urged　against　them；　though　greatly　overbalanced　by　the　weight

（chiefly）　of　internal　evidence　in　their　favour。　　Nor；　on　the　other　hand；

can　we　exclude　a　bare　possibility　that　some　dialogues　which　are　usually

rejected；　such　as　the　Greater　Hippias　and　the　Cleitophon；　may　be　genuine。　

The　nature　and　object　of　these　semi…Platonic　writings　require　more　careful

study　and　more　comparison　of　them　with　one　another；　and　with　forged

writings　in　general；　than　they　have　yet　received；　before　we　can　finally

decide　on　their　character。　　We　do　not　consider　them　all　as　genuine　until

they　can　be　proved　to　be　spurious；　as　is　often　maintained　and　still　more

often　implied　in　this　and　similar　discussions；　but　should　say　of　some　of

them；　that　their　genuineness　is　neither　proven　nor　disproven　until　further

evidence　about　them　can　be　adduced。　　And　we　are　as　confident　that　the

Epistles　are　spurious；　as　that　the　Republic；　the　Timaeus；　and　the　Laws　are

genuine。



On　the　whole；　not　a　twentieth　part　of　the　writings　which　pass　under　the

name　of　Plato；　if　we　exclude　the　works　rejected　by　the　ancients　themselves

and　two　or　three　other　plausible　inventions；　can　be　fairly　doubted　by　those

who　are　willing　to　allow　that　a　considerable　change　and　growth　may　have

taken　place　in　his　philosophy　（see　above）。　　That　twentieth　debatable

portion　scarcely　in　any　degree　affects　our　judgment　of　Plato；　either　as　a

thinker　or　a　writer；　and　though　suggesting　some　interesting　questions　to

the　scholar　and　critic；　is　of　little　importance　to　the　general　reader。





ALCIBIADES　I



by



Plato　（see　Appendix　I　above）



Translated　by　Benjamin　Jowett





INTRODUCTION。



The　First　Alcibiades　is　a　conversation　between　Socrates　and　Alcibiades。　

Socrates　is　represented　in　the　character　which　he　attributes　to　himself　in

the　Apology　of　a　know…nothing　who　detects　the　conceit　of　knowledge　in

others。　　The　two　have　met　already　in　the　Protagoras　and　in　the　Symposium；

in　the　latter　dialogue；　as　in　this；　the　relation　between　them　is　that　of　a

lover　and　his　beloved。　　But　the　narrative　of　their　loves　is　told

differently　in　different　places；　for　in　the　Symposium　Alcibiades　is

depicted　as　the　impassioned　but　rejected　lover；　here；　as　coldly　receiving

the　advances　of　Socrates；　who；　for　the　best　of　purposes；　lies　in　wait　for

the　aspiring　and　ambitious　youth。



Alcibiades；　who　is　described　as　a　very　young　man；　is　about　to　enter　on

public　life；　having　an　inordinate　opinion　of　himself；　and　an　extravagant

ambition。　　Socrates；　'who　knows　what　is　in　man；'　astonishes　him　by　a

revelation　of　his　designs。　　But　has　he　the　knowledge　which　is　necessary　for

carrying　them　out？　　He　is　going　to　persuade　the　Atheniansabout　what？　　Not

about　any　particular　art；　but　about　politicswhen　to　fight　and　when　to

make　peace。　　Now；　men　should　fight　and　make　peace　on　just　grounds；　and

therefore　the　question　of　justice　and　injustice　must　enter　into　peace　and

war；　and　he　who　advises　the　Athenians　must　know　the　difference　between

them。　　Does　Alcibiades　know？　　If　he　does；　he　must　either　have　been　taught

by　some　master；　or　he　must　have　discovered　the　nature　of　them　himself。　　If

he　has　had　a　master；　Socrates　would　like　to　be　informed　who　he　is；　that　he

may　go　and　learn　of　him　also。　　Alcibiades　admits　that　he　has　never　learned。　

Then　has　he　enquired　for　himself？　　He　may　have；　if　he　was　ever　aware　of　a

time　when　he　was　ignorant。　　But　he　never　was　ignorant；　for　when　he　played

with　other　boys　at　dice；　he　charged　them　with　cheating；　and　this　implied　a

knowledge　of　just　and　unjust。　　According　to　his　own　explanation；　he　had

learned　of　the　multitude。　　Why；　he　asks；　should　he　not　learn　of　them　the

nature　of　justice；　as　he　has　learned　the　Greek　language　of　them？　　To　this

Socrates　answers；　that　they　can　teach　Greek；　but　they　cannot　teach　justice；

for　they　are　agreed　about　the　one；　but　they　are　not　agreed　about　the　other：　

and　therefore　Alcibiades；　who　has　admitted　that　if　he　knows　he　must　either

have　learned　from　a　master　or　have　discovered　for　himself　the　nature　of

justice；　is　convicted　out　of　his　own　mouth。



Alcibiades　rejoins；　that　the　Athenians　debate　not　about　what　is　just；　but

about　what　is　expedient；　and　he　asserts　that　the　two　principles　of　justice

and　expediency　are　opposed。　　Socrates；　by　a　series　of　questions；　compels

him　to　admit　that　the　just　and　the　expedient　coincide。　　Alcibiades　is　thus

reduced　to　the　humiliating　conclusion　that　he　knows　nothing　of　politics；

even　if；　as　he　says；　they　are　concerned　with　the　expedient。



However；　he　is　no　worse　than　other　Athenian　statesmen；　and　he　will　not　need

training；　for　others　are　as　ignorant　as　he　is。　　He　is　reminded　that　he　has

to　contend；　not　only　with　his　own　countrymen；　but　with　their　enemieswith

the　Spartan　kings　and　with　the　great　king　of　Persia；　and　he　can　only　attain

this　higher　aim　of　ambition　by　the　assistance　of　Socrates。　　Not　that

Socrates　himself　professes　to　have　attained　the　truth；　but　the　questions

which　he　asks　bring　others　to　a　knowledge　of　themselves；　and　this　is　the

first　step　in　the　practice　of　virtue。



The　dialogue　continues：We　wish　to　become　as　good　as　possible。　　But　to　be

good　in　what？　　Alcibiades　replies'Good　in　transacting　business。'　　But

what　business？　　'The　business　of　the　most　intelligent　men　at　Athens。'　　The

cobbler　is　intelligent　in　shoemaking；　and　is　therefore　good　in　that；　he　is

not　intelligent；　and　therefore　not　good；　in　weaving。　　Is　he　good　in　the

sense　which　Alcibiades　means；　who　is　also　bad？　　'I　mean；'　replies

Alcibiades；　'the　man　who　is　able　to　command　in　the　city。'　　But　to　command

whathorses　or　men？　and　if　men；　under　what　circumstances？　　'I　mean　to　say；

that　he　is　able　to　command　men　living　in　social　and　political　relations。'　

And　what　is　their　aim？　　'The　better　preservation　of　the　city。'　　But　when　is

a　city　better？　　'When　there　is　unanimity；　such　as　exists　between　husband

and　wife。'　　Then；　when　husbands　and　wives　perform　their　own　special　duties；

there　can　be　no　unanimity　between　them；　nor　can　a　city　be　well　ordered　when

each　citizen　does　his　own　work　only。　　Alcibiades；　having　stated　first　that

goodness　consists　in　the　unanimity　of　the　citizens；　and　then　in　each　of

them　doing　his　own　separate　work；　is　brought　to　the　required　point　of　self…

contradiction；　leading　him　to　confess　his　own　ignorance。



But　he　is　not　too　old　to　learn；　and　may　still　arrive　at　the　truth；　if　he　is

willing　to　be　cross…examined　by　Socrates。　　He　must　know　himself；　that　is　to

say；　not　his　body；　or　the　things　of　the　body；　but　his　mind；　or　truer　self。

The　physician　knows　the　body；　and　the　tradesman　knows　his　own　business；　but

they　do　not　necessarily　know　themselves。　　Self…knowledge　can　be　obtained

only　by　looking　into　the　mind　and　virtue　of　the　soul；　which　is　the　diviner

part　of　a　man；　as　we　see　our　own　image　in　another's　eye。　　And　if　we　do　not

know　ourselves；　we　cannot　know　what　belongs　to　ourselves　or　belongs　to

others；　and　are　unfit　to　take　a　part　in　political　affairs。　　Both　for　the

sake　of　the　individual　and　of　the　state；　we　ought　to　aim　at　justice　and

temperance；　not　at　wealth　or　power。　　The　evil　and　unjust　should　have　no

power；they　should　be　the　slaves　of　better　men　than　themselves。　　None　but

the　virtuous　are　deserving　of　freedom。



And　are　you；　Alcibiades；　a　freeman？　　'I　feel　that　I　am　not；　but　I　hope；

Socrates；　that　by　your　aid　I　may　become　free；　and　from　this　day　forward　I

will　never　leave　you。'



The　Alcibiades　has　several　points　of　resemblance　to　the　undoubted　dialogues

of　Plato。　　The　process　of　interrogation　is　of　the　same　kind　with　that　which

Socrates　practises　upon　the　youthful　Cleinias　in　the　Euthydemus；　and　he

characteristically　attributes　to　Alcibiades　the　answers　which　he　has

elicited　from　him。　　The　definition　of　good　is　narrowed　by　successive

questions；　and　virtue　is　shown　to　be　identical　with　knowledge。　　Here；　as

elsewhere；　Socrates　awakens　the　consciousness　not　of　sin　but　of　ignorance。

Self…humiliation　is　the　first　step　to　knowledge；　even　of　the　commonest

things。　　No　man　knows　how　ignorant　he　is；　and　no　man　can　arrive　at　virtue

and　wisdom　who　has　not　once　in　his　life；　at　least；　been　convicted　of　error。　

The　process　by　which　the　soul　is　elevated　is　not　unlike　that　which

religious　writers　describe　under　the　name　of　'conversion；'　if　we　substitute

the　sense　of　ignorance　for　the　consciousness　of　sin。



In　some　respects　the　dialogue　differs　from　any　other　Platonic　composition。

The　aim　is　more　directly　ethical　and　hortatory；　the　process　by　which　the

antagonist　is　undermined　is　simpler　than　in　other　Platonic　writings；　and

the　conclusion　more　decided。　　There　is　a　good　deal　of　humour　in　the　manner

in　which　the　pride