alcibiades i-第5章
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ALCIBIADES： Why； for example； I learned to speak Greek of them； and I
cannot say who was my teacher； or to whom I am to attribute my knowledge of
Greek； if not to those good…for…nothing teachers； as you call them。
SOCRATES： Why； yes； my friend； and the many are good enough teachers of
Greek； and some of their instructions in that line may be justly praised。
ALCIBIADES： Why is that？
SOCRATES： Why； because they have the qualities which good teachers ought
to have。
ALCIBIADES： What qualities？
SOCRATES： Why； you know that knowledge is the first qualification of any
teacher？
ALCIBIADES： Certainly。
SOCRATES： And if they know； they must agree together and not differ？
ALCIBIADES： Yes。
SOCRATES： And would you say that they knew the things about which they
differ？
ALCIBIADES： No。
SOCRATES： Then how can they teach them？
ALCIBIADES： They cannot。
SOCRATES： Well； but do you imagine that the many would differ about the
nature of wood and stone？ are they not agreed if you ask them what they
are？ and do they not run to fetch the same thing； when they want a piece of
wood or a stone？ And so in similar cases； which I suspect to be pretty
nearly all that you mean by speaking Greek。
ALCIBIADES： True。
SOCRATES： These； as we were saying； are matters about which they are
agreed with one another and with themselves； both individuals and states
use the same words about them； they do not use some one word and some
another。
ALCIBIADES： They do not。
SOCRATES： Then they may be expected to be good teachers of these things？
ALCIBIADES： Yes。
SOCRATES： And if we want to instruct any one in them； we shall be right in
sending him to be taught by our friends the many？
ALCIBIADES： Very true。
SOCRATES： But if we wanted further to know not only which are men and
which are horses； but which men or horses have powers of running； would the
many still be able to inform us？
ALCIBIADES： Certainly not。
SOCRATES： And you have a sufficient proof that they do not know these
things and are not the best teachers of them； inasmuch as they are never
agreed about them？
ALCIBIADES： Yes。
SOCRATES： And suppose that we wanted to know not only what men are like；
but what healthy or diseased men are likewould the many be able to teach
us？
ALCIBIADES： They would not。
SOCRATES： And you would have a proof that they were bad teachers of these
matters； if you saw them at variance？
ALCIBIADES： I should。
SOCRATES： Well； but are the many agreed with themselves； or with one
another； about the justice or injustice of men and things？
ALCIBIADES： Assuredly not； Socrates。
SOCRATES： There is no subject about which they are more at variance？
ALCIBIADES： None。
SOCRATES： I do not suppose that you ever saw or heard of men quarrelling
over the principles of health and disease to such an extent as to go to war
and kill one another for the sake of them？
ALCIBIADES： No indeed。
SOCRATES： But of the quarrels about justice and injustice； even if you
have never seen them； you have certainly heard from many people； including
Homer； for you have heard of the Iliad and Odyssey？
ALCIBIADES： To be sure； Socrates。
SOCRATES： A difference of just and unjust is the argument of those poems？
ALCIBIADES： True。
SOCRATES： Which difference caused all the wars and deaths of Trojans and
Achaeans； and the deaths of the suitors of Penelope in their quarrel with
Odysseus。
ALCIBIADES： Very true。
SOCRATES： And when the Athenians and Lacedaemonians and Boeotians fell at
Tanagra； and afterwards in the battle of Coronea； at which your father
Cleinias met his end； the question was one of justicethis was the sole
cause of the battles； and of their deaths。
ALCIBIADES： Very true。
SOCRATES： But can they be said to understand that about which they are
quarrelling to the death？
ALCIBIADES： Clearly not。
SOCRATES： And yet those whom you thus allow to be ignorant are the
teachers to whom you are appealing。
ALCIBIADES： Very true。
SOCRATES： But how are you ever likely to know the nature of justice and
injustice； about which you are so perplexed； if you have neither learned
them of others nor discovered them yourself？
ALCIBIADES： From what you say； I suppose not。
SOCRATES： See； again； how inaccurately you speak； Alcibiades！
ALCIBIADES： In what respect？
SOCRATES： In saying that I say so。
ALCIBIADES： Why； did you not say that I know nothing of the just and
unjust？
SOCRATES： No； I did not。
ALCIBIADES： Did I； then？
SOCRATES： Yes。
ALCIBIADES： How was that？
SOCRATES： Let me explain。 Suppose I were to ask you which is the greater
number； two or one； you would reply 'two'？
ALCIBIADES： I should。
SOCRATES： And by how much greater？
ALCIBIADES： By one。
SOCRATES： Which of us now says that two is more than one？
ALCIBIADES： I do。
SOCRATES： Did not I ask； and you answer the question？
ALCIBIADES： Yes。
SOCRATES： Then who is speaking？ I who put the question； or you who answer
me？
ALCIBIADES： I am。
SOCRATES： Or suppose that I ask and you tell me the letters which make up
the name Socrates； which of us is the speaker？
ALCIBIADES： I am。
SOCRATES： Now let us put the case generally： whenever there is a question
and answer； who is the speaker；the questioner or the answerer？
ALCIBIADES： I should say； Socrates； that the answerer was the speaker。
SOCRATES： And have I not been the questioner all through？
ALCIBIADES： Yes。
SOCRATES： And you the answerer？
ALCIBIADES： Just so。
SOCRATES： Which of us； then； was the speaker？
ALCIBIADES： The inference is； Socrates； that I was the speaker。
SOCRATES： Did not some one say that Alcibiades； the fair son of Cleinias；
not understanding about just and unjust； but thinking that he did
understand； was going to the assembly to advise the Athenians about what he
did not know？ Was not that said？
ALCIBIADES： Very true。
SOCRATES： Then； Alcibiades； the result may be expressed in the language of
Euripides。 I think that you have heard all this 'from yourself； and not
from me'； nor did I say this； which you erroneously attribute to me； but
you yourself； and what you said was very true。 For indeed； my dear fellow；
the design which you meditate of teaching what you do not know； and have
not taken any pains to learn； is downright insanity。
ALCIBIADES： But； Socrates； I think that the Athenians and the rest of the
Hellenes do not often advise as to the more just or unjust； for they see no
difficulty in them； and therefore they leave them； and consider which
course of action will be most expedient； for there is a difference between
justice and expediency。 Many persons have done great wrong and profited by
their injustice； others have done rightly and come to no good。
SOCRATES： Well； but granting that the just and the expedient are ever so
much opposed； you surely do not imagine that you know what is expedient for
mankind； or why a thing is expedient？
ALCIBIADES： Why not； Socrates？But I am not going to be asked again from
whom I learned； or when I made the discovery。
SOCRATES： What a way you have！ When you make a mistake which might be
refuted by a previous argument； you insist on having a new and different
refutation； the old argument is a worn…our garment which you will no longer
put on； but some one must produce another which is clean and new。 Now I
shall disregard this move of yours； and shall ask over again；Where did
you learn and how do you know the nature of the expedient； and who is your
teacher？ All this I comprehend in a single question； and now you will
manifestly be in the old difficulty； and will not be able to show that you
know the expedient； either because you learned or because you discovered it
yourself。 But； as I perceive that you are dainty； and dislike the taste of
a stale argument； I will enquire no further into your knowledge of what is
expedient or what is not expedient for the Athenian people； and simply
request you to say why you do not explain whether justice and expediency
are the same or different？ And if you like you may examine me as I have
examined you； or； if you would rather； you may carry on the discussion by
yourself。
ALCIBIADES： But I am not certain； Socrates； whether I shall be able to
discuss the matter with you。
SOCRATES： Then imagine； my dear fellow； that I am the demus and the
ecclesia； for in the ecclesia； too； you will have to persuade men
individually。
ALCIBIADES： Yes。
SOCRATES： And is not the same person able to persuade one individual
singly and many individuals of the things which he knows？ The grammarian；
for example； can persuade one and he can persuade many about letters。
ALCIBIADES： True。
SOCRATES： And about number； will not the same person persuade one and
persuade many？
ALCIBIADES： Yes。
SOCRATES： And this will be he who knows number； or the arithmetician？
ALCIBIADES： Quite true。
SOCRATES： And cannot you persuade one man about that of which you can
persuade many？
ALCIBIADES： I suppose so。
SOCRATES： And that of which you can persuade either is clearly what you
know？
ALCIBIADES： Yes。
SOCRATES： And the only difference between one who argues as we are doing；
and the orator who is addressing an assembly； is that the one seeks to
persuade a number； and the other an individual； of the same things。
ALCIBIADES： I suppose so。
SOCRATES： Well； then； since the same person who can persuade a multitude
can persuade individuals； try conclusions upon me； and prove to me that the
just is not always expedient。
ALCIBIADES： You take liberties； Socrates。
SOCRATES： I shall take the liberty of proving to you the opposite of that
which you will not prove to me。
ALCIBIADES： Proceed。
SOCRATES： Answer my questionsthat is all。
ALCIBIADES： Nay； I should like you to be the speaker。
SOCRATES： What； do you not wish to be persuaded？
ALCIBIADES： Certainly I do。
SOCRATES： And can you be persuaded better than out of your own mouth？
ALCIBIADES： I think not。
SOCRATES： Then you shall answer； and if you do not hear the words； that
the just is the expedient； coming from your own lips； never believe another
man again。
ALCIBIADES： I won't； but answer I will； for I do not see how I can come to
any harm。
SOCRATES： A true prophecy！ Let me begin then by enquiring of you whether
you allow that the just is sometimes expedient and sometimes not？
ALCIBIADES： Yes。
SOCRATES： And sometimes honourable and sometimes
