alcibiades i-第6章
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ALCIBIADES： Yes。
SOCRATES： And sometimes honourable and sometimes not？
ALCIBIADES： What do you mean？
SOCRATES： I am asking if you ever knew any one who did what was
dishonourable and yet just？
ALCIBIADES： Never。
SOCRATES： All just things are honourable？
ALCIBIADES： Yes。
SOCRATES： And are honourable things sometimes good and sometimes not good；
or are they always good？
ALCIBIADES： I rather think； Socrates； that some honourable things are
evil。
SOCRATES： And are some dishonourable things good？
ALCIBIADES： Yes。
SOCRATES： You mean in such a case as the following：In time of war； men
have been wounded or have died in rescuing a companion or kinsman； when
others who have neglected the duty of rescuing them have escaped in safety？
ALCIBIADES： True。
SOCRATES： And to rescue another under such circumstances is honourable； in
respect of the attempt to save those whom we ought to save； and this is
courage？
ALCIBIADES： True。
SOCRATES： But evil in respect of death and wounds？
ALCIBIADES： Yes。
SOCRATES： And the courage which is shown in the rescue is one thing； and
the death another？
ALCIBIADES： Certainly。
SOCRATES： Then the rescue of one's friends is honourable in one point of
view； but evil in another？
ALCIBIADES： True。
SOCRATES： And if honourable； then also good： Will you consider now
whether I may not be right； for you were acknowledging that the courage
which is shown in the rescue is honourable？ Now is this courage good or
evil？ Look at the matter thus： which would you rather choose； good or
evil？
ALCIBIADES： Good。
SOCRATES： And the greatest goods you would be most ready to choose； and
would least like to be deprived of them？
ALCIBIADES： Certainly。
SOCRATES： What would you say of courage？ At what price would you be
willing to be deprived of courage？
ALCIBIADES： I would rather die than be a coward。
SOCRATES： Then you think that cowardice is the worst of evils？
ALCIBIADES： I do。
SOCRATES： As bad as death； I suppose？
ALCIBIADES： Yes。
SOCRATES： And life and courage are the extreme opposites of death and
cowardice？
ALCIBIADES： Yes。
SOCRATES： And they are what you would most desire to have； and their
opposites you would least desire？
ALCIBIADES： Yes。
SOCRATES： Is this because you think life and courage the best； and death
and cowardice the worst？
ALCIBIADES： Yes。
SOCRATES： And you would term the rescue of a friend in battle honourable；
in as much as courage does a good work？
ALCIBIADES： I should。
SOCRATES： But evil because of the death which ensues？
ALCIBIADES： Yes。
SOCRATES： Might we not describe their different effects as follows：You
may call either of them evil in respect of the evil which is the result；
and good in respect of the good which is the result of either of them？
ALCIBIADES： Yes。
SOCRATES： And they are honourable in so far as they are good； and
dishonourable in so far as they are evil？
ALCIBIADES： True。
SOCRATES： Then when you say that the rescue of a friend in battle is
honourable and yet evil； that is equivalent to saying that the rescue is
good and yet evil？
ALCIBIADES： I believe that you are right； Socrates。
SOCRATES： Nothing honourable； regarded as honourable； is evil； nor
anything base； regarded as base； good。
ALCIBIADES： Clearly not。
SOCRATES： Look at the matter yet once more in a further light： he who
acts honourably acts well？
ALCIBIADES： Yes。
SOCRATES： And he who acts well is happy？
ALCIBIADES： Of course。
SOCRATES： And the happy are those who obtain good？
ALCIBIADES： True。
SOCRATES： And they obtain good by acting well and honourably？
ALCIBIADES： Yes。
SOCRATES： Then acting well is a good？
ALCIBIADES： Certainly。
SOCRATES： And happiness is a good？
ALCIBIADES： Yes。
SOCRATES： Then the good and the honourable are again identified。
ALCIBIADES： Manifestly。
SOCRATES： Then； if the argument holds； what we find to be honourable we
shall also find to be good？
ALCIBIADES： Certainly。
SOCRATES： And is the good expedient or not？
ALCIBIADES： Expedient。
SOCRATES： Do you remember our admissions about the just？
ALCIBIADES： Yes； if I am not mistaken； we said that those who acted justly
must also act honourably。
SOCRATES： And the honourable is the good？
ALCIBIADES： Yes。
SOCRATES： And the good is expedient？
ALCIBIADES： Yes。
SOCRATES： Then； Alcibiades； the just is expedient？
ALCIBIADES： I should infer so。
SOCRATES： And all this I prove out of your own mouth； for I ask and you
answer？
ALCIBIADES： I must acknowledge it to be true。
SOCRATES： And having acknowledged that the just is the same as the
expedient； are you not （let me ask） prepared to ridicule any one who；
pretending to understand the principles of justice and injustice； gets up
to advise the noble Athenians or the ignoble Peparethians； that the just
may be the evil？
ALCIBIADES： I solemnly declare； Socrates； that I do not know what I am
saying。 Verily； I am in a strange state； for when you put questions to me
I am of different minds in successive instants。
SOCRATES： And are you not aware of the nature of this perplexity； my
friend？
ALCIBIADES： Indeed I am not。
SOCRATES： Do you suppose that if some one were to ask you whether you have
two eyes or three； or two hands or four； or anything of that sort； you
would then be of different minds in successive instants？
ALCIBIADES： I begin to distrust myself； but still I do not suppose that I
should。
SOCRATES： You would feel no doubt； and for this reasonbecause you would
know？
ALCIBIADES： I suppose so。
SOCRATES： And the reason why you involuntarily contradict yourself is
clearly that you are ignorant？
ALCIBIADES： Very likely。
SOCRATES： And if you are perplexed in answering about just and unjust；
honourable and dishonourable； good and evil； expedient and inexpedient； the
reason is that you are ignorant of them； and therefore in perplexity。 Is
not that clear？
ALCIBIADES： I agree。
SOCRATES： But is this always the case； and is a man necessarily perplexed
about that of which he has no knowledge？
ALCIBIADES： Certainly he is。
SOCRATES： And do you know how to ascend into heaven？
ALCIBIADES： Certainly not。
SOCRATES： And in this case； too； is your judgment perplexed？
ALCIBIADES： No。
SOCRATES： Do you see the reason why； or shall I tell you？
ALCIBIADES： Tell me。
SOCRATES： The reason is； that you not only do not know； my friend； but you
do not think that you know。
ALCIBIADES： There again； what do you mean？
SOCRATES： Ask yourself； are you in any perplexity about things of which
you are ignorant？ You know； for example； that you know nothing about the
preparation of food。
ALCIBIADES： Very true。
SOCRATES： And do you think and perplex yourself about the preparation of
food： or do you leave that to some one who understands the art？
ALCIBIADES： The latter。
SOCRATES： Or if you were on a voyage； would you bewilder yourself by
considering whether the rudder is to be drawn inwards or outwards； or do
you leave that to the pilot； and do nothing？
ALCIBIADES： It would be the concern of the pilot。
SOCRATES： Then you are not perplexed about what you do not know； if you
know that you do not know it？
ALCIBIADES： I imagine not。
SOCRATES： Do you not see； then； that mistakes in life and practice are
likewise to be attributed to the ignorance which has conceit of knowledge？
ALCIBIADES： Once more； what do you mean？
SOCRATES： I suppose that we begin to act when we think that we know what
we are doing？
ALCIBIADES： Yes。
SOCRATES： But when people think that they do not know； they entrust their
business to others？
ALCIBIADES： Yes。
SOCRATES： And so there is a class of ignorant persons who do not make
mistakes in life； because they trust others about things of which they are
ignorant？
ALCIBIADES： True。
SOCRATES： Who； then； are the persons who make mistakes？ They cannot； of
course； be those who know？
ALCIBIADES： Certainly not。
SOCRATES： But if neither those who know； nor those who know that they do
not know； make mistakes； there remain those only who do not know and think
that they know。
ALCIBIADES： Yes； only those。
SOCRATES： Then this is ignorance of the disgraceful sort which is
mischievous？
ALCIBIADES： Yes。
SOCRATES： And most mischievous and most disgraceful when having to do with
the greatest matters？
ALCIBIADES： By far。
SOCRATES： And can there be any matters greater than the just； the
honourable； the good； and the expedient？
ALCIBIADES： There cannot be。
SOCRATES： And these； as you were saying； are what perplex you？
ALCIBIADES： Yes。
SOCRATES： But if you are perplexed； then； as the previous argument has
shown； you are not only ignorant of the greatest matters； but being
ignorant you fancy that you know them？
ALCIBIADES： I fear that you are right。
SOCRATES： And now see what has happened to you； Alcibiades！ I hardly like
to speak of your evil case； but as we are alone I will： My good friend；
you are wedded to ignorance of the most disgraceful kind； and of this you
are convicted； not by me； but out of your own mouth and by your own
argument； wherefore also you rush into politics before you are educated。
Neither is your case to be deemed singular。 For I might say the same of
almost all our statesmen； with the exception； perhaps of your guardian；
Pericles。
ALCIBIADES： Yes； Socrates； and Pericles is said not to have got his wisdom
by the light of nature； but to have associated with several of the
philosophers； with Pythocleides； for example； and with Anaxagoras； and now
in advanced life with Damon； in the hope of gaining wisdom。
SOCRATES： Very good； but did you ever know a man wise in anything who was
unable to impart his particular wisdom？ For example； he who taught you
letters was not only wise； but he made you and any others whom he liked
wise。
ALCIBIADES： Yes。
SOCRATES： And you； whom he taught； can do the same？
ALCIBIADES： True。
SOCRATES： And in like manner the harper and gymnastic…master？
ALCIBIADES： Certainly。
SOCRATES： When a person is enabled to impart knowledge to another； he
thereby gives an excellent proof of his own understanding of any matter。
ALCIBIADES： I agree。
SOCRATES： Well； and did Pericles make any one wise； did he begin by making
his sons wise？
