philosophy of right-第13章

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expression　may　point　to　the　content　of　the　will；　and　is　then　of　about　the　same　meaning　as
capricious；　the　subjective　content　then　is　that　which　belongs　merely　to　the　subject。　In　this　sense
bad　acts　are　merely　subjective。　Further；　the　pure；　empty　I　may　be　called　subjective；　as　it　has　only
itself　as　an　object；　and　possesses　the　power　of　abstraction　from　all　further　content。　Subjectivity
has；　moreover；　a　wholly　particular　and　correct　meaning　in　accordance　with　which　anything；　in
order　to　win　recognition　from　me；　has　to　become　mine　and　seek　validity　in　me。　This　is　the　infinite
avarice　of　subjectivity；　eager　to　comprehend　and　consume　everything　within　the　simple　and　pure　I。

Similarly　we　may　take　the　objective　in　different　ways。　By　it　we　may　understand　anything　to　which
we　give　existence　in　contrast　to　ourselves；　whether　it　be　an　actual　thing　or　a　mere　thought；　which
we　place　over　against　ourselves。　By　it　also　we　understand　the　direct　reality；　in　which　the　end　is　to
be　realised。　Although　the　end　itself　is　quite　particular　and　subjective；　we　yet　name　it　objective　after
it　has　made　its　appearance。　Further；　the　objective　will　is　also　that　in　which　truth　is；　thus；　God's　will；
the　ethical　will　also；　are　objective。　Lastly；　we　may　call　the　will　objective；　when　it　is　wholly
submerged　in　its　object；　as；　e。g。；　the　child's　will；　which　is　confiding　and　without　subjective
freedom；　and　the　slave's　will；　which　does　not　know　itself　as　free；　and　is　thus　a　will…less　will。　In　this
sense　any　will　is　objective；　if　it　is　guided　in　its　action　by　a　foreign　authority；　and　has　not　yet
completed　the　infinite　return　into　itself。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　27。

The　absolute　character　or；　if　you　like；　the　absolute　impulse　of　the　free　spirit　（§
21）　is；　as　has　been　observed；　that　its　freedom　shall　be　for　it　an　object。　It　is　to　be
objective　in　a　two…fold　sense：　it　is　the　rational　system　of　itself；　and　this　system　is
to　be　directly　real　（§　26）。　There　is　thus　actualised　as　idea　what　the　will　is
implicitly。　Hence；　the　abstract　conception　of　the　idea　of　the　will　is　in　general　the
free　will　which　wills　the　free　will。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　28。

The　activity　of　the　will；　directed　to　the　task　of　transcending　the　contradiction
between　subjectivity　and　objectivity；　of　transferring　its　end　from　subjectivity　into
objectivity；　and　yet　while　in　objectivity　of　remaining　with　itself；　is　beyond　the
formal　method　of　consciousness　（§　8）；　in　which　objectivity　is　only　direct
actuality。　This　activity　is　the　essential　development　of　the　substantive　content　of
the　idea　（§　21）。　In　this　development　the　conception　moulds　the　idea；　which　is　in
the　first　instance　abstract；　into　the　totality　of　a　system。　This　totality　as　substantive
is　independent　of　the　opposition　between　mere　subjective　end　and　its　realisation；
and　in　both　of　these　forms　is　the　same。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　29。

That　a　reality　is　the　realisation　of　the　free　will；　this　is　what　is　meant　by　a　right。
Right；　therefore；　is；　in　general；　freedom　as　idea。　

Remark：　In　the　Kantian　doctrine　（Introduction　to　Kant's　Theory　of　Right）；　now　generally
accepted；　〃the；　highest　factor　is　a　limitation　of　my　freedom　or　caprice；　in　order　that　it　may　be　able
to　subsist　alongside　of　every　other　individual's　caprice　in　accordance　with　a　universal　law。〃　This
doctrine　contains　only　a　negative　phase；　that　of　limitation。　And　besides；　the　positive　phase；　the
universal　law　or　so…called　law　of　reason；　consisting　in　the　agreement　of　the　caprice　of　one　with　that
of　another；　goes　beyond　the　well…known　formal　identity　and　the　proposition　of　contradiction。　The
definition　of　right；　just　quoted；　contains　the　view　which　has　especially　since　Rousseau　spread
widely。　According　to　this　view　neither　the　absolute　and　rational　will；　nor　the　true　spirit；　but　the　will
and　spirit　of　the　particular　individual　in　their　peculiar　caprice；　are　the　substantive　and　primary　basis。
When　once　this　principle　is　accepted；　the　rational　can　announce　itself　only　as　limiting　this　freedom。
Hence　it　is　not　an　inherent　rationality；　but　only　a　mere　external　and　formal　universal。　This　view　is
accordingly　devoid　of　speculative　thought；　and　is　rejected　by　the　philosophic　conception。　In　the
minds　of　men　and　in　the　actual　world　it　has　assumed　a　shape；　whose　horror　is　without　a　parallel；
except　in　the　shallowness　of　the　thoughts　upon　which　it　was　founded。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　30。

Right　in　general　is　something　holy；　because　it　is　the　embodiment　of　the　absolute
conception　and　self…conscious　freedom。　But　the　formalism　of　right；　and　after　a
while　of　duty　also；　is　due　to　distinctions　arising　out　of　the　development　of　the
conception　of　freedom。　In　contrast　with　the　more　formal；　abstract　and　limited
right；　there　is　that　sphere　or　stage　of　the　spirit；　in　which　spirit　has　brought　to
definite　actuality　the　further　elements　contained　in　the　idea。　This　stage　is　the
richer　and　more　concrete；　it　is　truly　universal　and　has　therefore　a　higher　right。　

Remark：　Every　step　in　the　development　of　the　idea　of　freedom　has　its　peculiar　right；　because　it
is　the　embodiment　of　a　phase　of　freedom。　When　morality　and　ethical　life　are　spoken　of　in
opposition　to　right；　only　the　first　or　formal　right　of　the　abstract　personality　is　meant。　Morality；
ethical　life；　a　state…interest；　are　every　one　a　special　right；　because　each　of　these　is　a　definite
realisation　of　freedom。　They　can　come　into　collision　only　in　so　far　as　they　occupy　the　same　plane。
If　the　moral　standpoint　of　spirit　were　not　also　a　right　and　one　of　the　forms　of　freedom；　it　could　not
collide　with　the　right　of　personality　or　any　other　right。　A　right　contains　the　conception　of　freedom
which　is　the　highest　phase　of　spirit；　and　in　opposition　to　it　any　other　kind　of　thing　is　lacking　in　real
substance。　Yet　collision　also　implies　a　limit　and　a　subordination　of　one　phase　to　another。　Only　the
right　of　the　world…spirit　is　the　unlimited　absolute。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　31。

The　scientific　method　by　which　the　conception　is　self…evolved；　and　its　phases
self…developed　and　self…produced；　is　not　first　of　all　an　assurance　that　certain
relations　are　given　from　somewhere　or　other；　and　then　the　application　to　this
foreign　material　of　the　universal。　The　true　process　is　found　in　the　logic；　and　here
is　presupposed。　

Remark：　The　efficient　or　motive　principle；　which　is　not　merely　the　analysis　but　the　production　of
the　several　elements　of　the　universal；　I　call　dialectic。　Dialectic　is　not　that　process　in　which　an　object
or　proposition；　presented；　to　feeling　or　the　direct　consciousness；　is　analysed；　entangled；　taken
hither　and　thither；　until　at　last　its　contrary　is　derived。　Such　a　merely　negative　method　appears
frequently　in　Plato。　It　may　fix　the　opposite　of　any　notion；　or　reveal　the　contradiction　contained　in　it；
as　did　the　ancient　scepticism；　or　it　may　in　a　feeble　way　consider　an　approximation　to　truth；　or
modern　half…and…half　attainment　of　it；　as　its　goal。　But　the　higher　dialectic　of　the　conception　does
not　merely　apprehend　any　phase　as　a　limit　and　opposite；　but　produces　out　of　this　negative　a
positive　content　and　result。　Only　by　such　a　course　is　there　development　and　inherent　progress。
Hence　this　dialectic　is　not　the　external　agency　of　subjective　thinking；　but　the　private　soul　of　the
content；　which　unfolds　its　branches　and　fruit　organically。　Thought　regards　this　development　of　the
idea　and　of　the　peculiar　activity　of　the　reason　of　the　idea　as　only　subjective；　but　is　on　its　side
unable　to　make　any　addition。　To　consider　anything　rationally　is　not　to　bring　reason　to　it　from　the
outside；　and　work　it　up　in　this　way；　but　to　count　it　as　itself　reasonable。　Here　it　is　spirit　in　its
freedom；　the　summit　of　self…conscious　reason；　which　gives　itself　actuality；　and　produces　itself　as
the　existing　world。　The　business　of　science　is　simply　to　bring　the　specific　work　of　the　reason；
which　is　in　the　thing；　to　consciousness。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　32。

The　phases　of　the　development　of　the　conception　are　themselves　conceptions。
And　yet；　because　the　conception　is　essentially　the　idea；　they　have　the　form　of
manifestations。　Hence　the　sequence　of　the　conceptions；　which　arise　in　this　way；　is
at　the　same　time　a　sequence　of　realisations；　and　are　to　be　by　science　so
considered。　

Remark：　In　a　speculative　sense　the　way；　in　which　a　conception　is　manifested　in　reality；　is
identical　with　a　definite　phase　of　the　conception。　But　it　is　noteworthy　that；　in　the　scientific
development　of　the　idea；　the　elements；　which　result　in　a　further　definite　form；　although　preceding
this　result　as　phases　of　the　conception；　do　not　in　the　temporal　development　go　before　it　as
concrete　realisations。　Thus；　as　will　be　seen　later；　that　stage　of　the　idea　which　is　the　family
presupposes　phases　of　the　conception；　whose　result　it　is。　But　that　these　internal　presuppositions
should　be　present　in　such　visible　realisations　as　right　of　property；　contract；　morality；　etc。；　this　is　the
other　side　of　the　process；　which　only　in　a　highly　developed　civilisation　has　attained　to　a　specific
realisation　of　its　elements。　

Addition。　The　idea　must　always　go　on　determining　itself　within　itself；　since　at　the　beginning　it　is
only　abstract　conception。　However；　this　initial　abstract　conception　is　never　given　up；　but　only
becomes　inwardly　richer；　the　last　phase　being　the　richest。　The　earlier　and　merely　implicit　phases
reach　in　this　way　free　self…dependence；　but　in　such　a　manner　that　the　conception　remains　the　soul
which　holds　everything　together；　and　only　through　a　procedure　immanent　within　itself　arrives　at　its
own　distinctions。　Hence　the　last　phase　falls　again　into　a　unity　with　the　first；　and　it　cannot　be　said
that　the　conception　ever　comes　to　something　new。　Although　the　elements　of　the　conception　appear
to　have　fallen　apart　when　they　enter　reality；　this　is　only　a　mere　appearance。　Its　superficial　character
is　revealed　in　the　process；　since　all　the　particulars　finally　turn　back　again　into　the　conception　of　the
universal。　The　empirical　sciences　usually　analyse　what　they　find　in　pictorial　ideas；　and　if　the
individual　is　successfully　brought　back　to　the　general；　the　general　property　is　then　called　the
conception。　But　this　is　not　our　procedure。　We　desire　only　to　observe　how　the　conception
determines　itself；　and　compels　us　to　keep　at　a　distance　everything　of　our　own　spinning　and
thinking。　But　what　we　get　in　this　way　is　one　series　of　thoughts　and　another　series　of　realised　forms。
As　to　these　two　series；　it　may　happen　that　the　order　of　time　of　the　actual　manifestations　is　partly
different　from　the　order　of　the　conception。　Thus　it　cannot；　e。g。；　be　said　that　property　existed
before　the　family；　and　yet；　in　spite　of　that　it　is　discussed　before　the　family　is　discussed。　The
question　might　also　be　raised　here；　Why　do　we　not　begin　with　the　highest；　i。e。；　with　concrete　truth
？　The　answer　is；　because　we　desire　to　see　truth　in　the　form　of　a　result；　and　it　is　an　essential　part　of
the　process　to　conceive　the　conception　first　of　all　as　abstract。　The　actual　series　of　realisations　of
the　conception　is　thus　for　us　in　due　course　as　follows；　even　although　in　actuality　the　order　should
be