philosophy of right-第14章

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the　conception　is　thus　for　us　in　due　course　as　follows；　even　although　in　actuality　the　order　should
be　the　same。　Our　process　is　this；　that　the　abstract　forms　reveal　themselves　not　as　self　…　subsistent
but　as　untrue。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Division　of　the　Work。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　33。

According　to　the　stages　in　the　development　of　the　idea　of　the　absolutely　free　will；　

A。　The　will　is　direct　or　immediate；　its　conception　is　therefore；　abstract；　i。e。；
personality；　and　its　embodied　reality　is　a　direct　external　thing。　This　is　the　sphere
of　abstract　or　formal　right。　

B。　The　will；　passing　out　of　external　reality；　turns　back　into　itself。　Its　phase　is
subjective　individuality；　and　it　is　contrasted　with　the　universal。　This　universal　is
on　its　internal　side　the　good；　and　on　its　external　side　a　presented　world；　and　these
two　sides　are　occasioned　only　by　means　of　each　other。　In　this　sphere　the　idea　is
divided；　and　exists　in　separate　elements。　The　right　of　the　subjective　will　is　in　a
relation　of　contrast　to　the　right　of　the　world；　or　the　right　of　the　idea。　Here；
however；　the　idea　exists　only　implicitly。　This　is　the　sphere　of　morality。　

C。　The　unity　and　truth　of　these　two　abstract　elements。　The　thought　idea　of　the
good　is　realised　both　in　the　will　turned　back　into　itself；　and　also　in　the　external
world。　Thus　freedom　exists　as　real　substance；　which　is　quite　as　much　actuality
and　necessity　as　it　is　subjective　will。　The　idea　here　is　its　absolutely　universal
existence；　viz。；　ethical　life。　This　ethical　substance　is　again；　

　　　　　a。　Natural　spirit；　the　family；
　　　　　b。　The　civil　society；　or　spirit　in　its　dual　existence　and　mere　appearance；
　　　　　c。　The　state；　or　freedom；　which；　while　established　in　the　free
　　　　　self…dependence　of　the　particular　will　is　also　universal　and　objective。　This
　　　　　actual　and　organic　spirit　＇a＇　is　the　spirit　of　a　nation；　＇b＇　is　found　in　the
　　　　　relation　to　one　another　of　national　spirits；　and　＇c＇　passing　through　and
　　　　　beyond　this　relation　is　actualised　and　revealed　in　world　history　as　the
　　　　　universal　world…spirit；　whose　right　is　the　highest。　

Note。　It　is　to　be　found　in　the　speculative　logic；　and　here　is　presupposed；　that　a　thing　or　content；
which　is　established　first　of　all　according　to　its　conception；　or　implicitly；　has　the　form　of　direct
existence。　The　conception；　however；　when　it　has　the　form　of　the　conception　is　explicit；　and　no
longer　is　a　direct　existence。　So；　too；　the　principle；　upon　which　the　division　of　this　work　proceeds；
is　presupposed。　The　divisions　might　be　regarded　as　already　settled　by　history；　since　the　different
stages　must　be　viewed　as　elements　in　the　development　of　the　idea；　and　therefore　as　springing　from
the　nature　of　the　content　itself。　A　philosophic　division　is　not　an　external　classification　of　any　given
material；　such　a　classification　as　would　be　made　according　to　one　or　several　schemes　picked　up　at
random；　but　the　inherent　distinctions　of　the　conception　itself。　Morality　and　ethical　life；　which　are
usually　supposed　to　mean　the　same　thing；　are　here　taken　in　essentially　different　meanings。
Meanwhile　even　imaginative　thought　seems　to　make　a　distinction　between　them。　In　the　usage　of
Kant　the　preference　is　given　to　the　term　morality；　and　the　practical　principles　of　his　philosophy　limit
themselves　wholly　to　this　standpoint；　making　impossible　the　standpoint　of　ethical　life；　and　indeed
expressly　destroying　and　abolishing　it。　Although　morality　and　ethics　have　the　same　meaning
according　to　their　etymology；　yet　these　different　words　may　be　used　for　different　conceptions。　

Addition。　When　we　speak　of　right；　we　mean　not　only　civil　right；　which　is　the　usual　significance
of　the　word；　but　also　morality；　ethical　life　and　world…history。　These　belong　to　this　realm；　because
the　conception　taking　them　in　their　truth；　brings　them　all　together。　Free　will；　in　order　not　to　remain
abstract；　must　in　the　first　instance　give　itself　reality；　the　sensible　materials　of　this　reality　are　objects；
i。e。；　external　things。　This　first　phase　of　freedom　we　shall　know　as　property。　This　is　the　sphere　of
formal　and　abstract　right；　to　which　belong　property　in　the　more　developed　form　of　contract　and
also　the　injury　of　right；　i。e。；　crime　and　punishment。　The　freedom；　we　have　here；　we　name　person；
or；　in　other　words；　the　subject　who　is　free；　and　indeed　free　independently；　and　gives　himself　a
reality　in　things。　But　this　direct　reality　is　not　adequate　to　freedom；　and　the　negation　of　this　phase　is
morality。　In　morality　I　am　beyond　the　freedom　found　directly　in　this　thing；　and　have　a　freedom　in
which　this　directness　is　superseded。　I　am　free　in　myself；　i。e。；　in　the　subjective。　In　this　sphere　we
come　upon　my　insight；　intention；　and　end；　and　externality　is　established　as　indifferent。　The　good　is
now　the　universal　end；　which　is　not　to　remain　merely　internal　to　me；　but　to　realise　itself。　The
subjective　will　demands　that　its　inward　character；　or　purpose；　shall　receive　external　reality；　and
also　that　the　good　shall　be　brought　to　completion　in　external　existence。　Morality；　like　formal　right；
is　also　an　abstraction；　whose　truth　is　reached　only　in　ethical　life。　Hence　ethical　life　is　the　unity　of　the
will　in　its　conception　with　the　will　of　the　individual　or　subject。　The　primary　reality　of　ethical　life　is　in
its　turn　natural；　taking　the　form　of　love　and　feeling。　This　is　the　family。　In　it　the　individual　has
transcended　his　prudish　personality；　and　finds　himself　with　his　consciousness　in　a　totality。　In　the
next　stage　is　seen　the　loss　of　this　peculiar　ethical　existence　and　substantive　unity。　Here　the　family
falls　asunder；　and　the　members　become　independent　one　of　another；　being　now　held　together
merely　by　the　bond　of　mutual　need。　This　is　the　stage　of　the　civil　society；　which　has　frequently　been
taken　for　the　state。　But　the　state　does　not　arise　until　we　reach　the　third　stage；　that　stage　of　ethical
life　or　spirit；　in　which　both　individual　independence　and　universal　substantivity　are　found　in　gigantic
union。　The　right　of　the　state　is；　therefore；　higher　than　that　of　the　other　stages。　It　is　freedom　in　its
most　concrete　embodiment；　which　yields　to　nothing　but　the　highest　absolute　truth　of　the
world…spirit。　




First　Part：　Abstract　Right

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　34。

The　absolutely　free　will；　at　the　stage　when　its　concept　is　abstract；　has　the
determinate　character　of　immediacy。　Accordingly　this　stage　is　its　negative
actuality；　an　actuality　contrasted　with　the　real　world；　only　an　abstractly
self…related　actuality　—　the　inherently　single　will　of　a　subject。　Pursuant　to　the
moment　of　the　particularity　of　the　will；　it　has　in　addition　a　content　consisting　of
determinate　aims　and；　as　exclusive　individuality；　it　has　this　content　at　the　same
time　as　an　external　world　directly　confronting　it。　

Addition：　When　I　say　that　'the　absolutely　free　will　at　the　stage　when　its　concept　is　abstract　has
the　determinate　character　of　immediacy'；　what　I　mean　is　this：　when　the　concept　had　fully　realised
itself　and　when　the　embodiment　of　the　concept　had　become　nothing　but　the　unfolding　of　its　own
self；　then　that　state　of　affairs　would　be　the　fully　developed　Idea　of　the　will。　But　at　the　start　the
concept　is　abstract；　which　means　that　all　its　determinations　are　contained　within　it；　but　still　only
contained　within　it；　they　are　only　implicit　and　not　yet　developed　to　be　a　totality　in　themselves。　If　I
say　'I　am　free'；　the　ego　is　still　this　inwardness；　not　confronted　by　an　opposite。　In　morality；　on　the
other　hand；　there　is　opposition　from　the　start；　since　I　stand　in　the　moral　sphere　as　a　single　will
while　the　good　is　the　universal　even　though　it　is　within　myself。　Thus　at　that　level；　the　will　has　in
itself　the　different　factors　of　singularity　and　universality；　and　this　gives　it　its　specific　character。　But；
to　begin　with；　no　such　difference　is　present；　since　at　the　first　stage；　that　of　abstract　unity；　there　is
no　advance　and　no　mediation　and　so　the　will　has　the　form　of　immediacy；　of　mere　being。　The
essential　point　of　view　to　be　taken　here　then　is　that　this　original　indeterminacy　is　itself　a
determinacy。　The　indeterminacy　lies　in　the　fact　that　there　is　as　yet　no　difference　between　the　will
and　its　content；　but　indeterminacy；　opposed　to　the　determinate；　acquires　the　character　of　being
something　determinate。　It　is　abstract　identity　which　here　constitutes　determinacy；　the　will　therefore
becomes　a　single　will；　a　person。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　35。

The　universality　of　this　consciously　free　will　is　abstract　universality；　the
self…conscious　but　otherwise　contentless　and　simple　relation　of　itself　to　itself　in　its
individuality；　and　from　this　point　of　view　the　subject　is　a　person。　Personality
implies　that　as　this　person：　（i）　I　am　completely　determined　on　every　side　（in　my
inner　caprice；　impulse；　and　desire；　as　well　as　by　immediate　external　facts）　and　so
finite；　yet　（ii）　none　the　less　I　am　simply　and　solely　self…relation；　and　therefore　in
finitude　I　know　myself　as　something　infinite；　—　universal；　and　free。　

Remark：　Personality　begins　not　with　the　subject's　mere　general　consciousness　of　himself　as　an
ego　concretely　determined　in　some　way　or　other；　but　rather　with　his　consciousness　of　himself　as　a
completely　abstract　ego　in　which　every　concrete　restriction　and　value　is　negated　and　without
validity。　In　personality；　therefore；　knowledge　is　knowledge　of　oneself　as　an　object；　but　an　object
raised　by　thinking　to　the　level　of　simple　infinity　and　so　an　object　purely　self…identical。　Individuals
and　nations　have　no　personality　until　they　have　achieved　this　pure　thought　and　knowledge　of
themselves。　Mind　fully　explicit　differs　from　the　phenomenal　mind　in　this；　that　at　the　same　level　at
which　the　latter　is　only　self…consciousness　—　a　consciousness　of　self　but　only　one　pursuant　to　the
natural　will　and　its　still　external　oppositions　—　the　former　has　itself；　as　the　abstract　and　free　ego；　for
its　object　and　aim；　and　so　is　personality。　

Addition：　The　abstract　will；　consciously　self…contained；　is　personality。　Man's　chief　glory　is　to　be
a　person；　and　yet　in　spite　of　that　the　bare　abstraction；　'person'；　is　somewhat　contemptuous　in　its
very　expression。　'Person'　is　essentially　different　from　'subject'；　since　'subject'　is　only　the　possibility
of　personality；　every　living　thing　of　any　sort　is　a　subject。　A　person；　then；　is　a　subject　aware　of　this
subjectivity；　since　in　personality　it　is　of　myself　alone　that　I　am　aware。　A　person　is　a　unit　of　freedom
aware　of　its　sheer　independence。　As　this　person；　I　know　myself　to　be　free　in　myself　I　can　abstract
from　everything；　since　nothing　confronts　me　save　pure　personality；　and　yet　as　this　person　I　am
something　wholly　determinate；　e。g。　I　am　of　a　certain　age；　a　certain　stature；　I　occupy　this　space；
and　so　on　through　whatever　other　details　you　like。　Thus　personality　is　at　once　the　sublime　and　the
trivial。；　It　implies　this　unity　of　the　infinite　with　the　purely　finite；　of　the　wholly　limitless　with
determinate　limitation。　It　is　the　sublimity　of　personality　that　is　able　to　sustain　this　contradiction；　a
contradiction　which　nothing　merely　natural　contains　or　could　endure。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　36。

（1）　Pers