philosophy of right-第17章

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Addition：　In　dealing　with　formal　right；　I　said　＇see　§　38＇　that　it　contained　prohibitions　only；　that
hence　a　right　action；　strictly　so　called；　was　purely　negative　in　character　in　respect　of　the　will　of
others。　In　morality；　on　the　other　hand；　my　will　has　a　positive　character　in　relation　to　the　Will　of
others；　i。e。　the　universal　will　is　implicitly　present　within　what　the　subjective　will　effects。　To　effect
something　is　to　produce　something　or　to　alter　what　already　exists；　and　such　changes　have　a
bearing　on　the　will　of　others。　The　concept　of　morality　is　the　inner　relation　of　the　will　to　itself。　But
here　it　is　not　only　one　will；　on　the　contrary　its　objectification　implies　at　the　same　time　the
cancellation　of　the　single　will；　and　therefore；　in　addition；　just　because　the　character　of
one…sidedness　vanishes；　the　positing　of　two　wills　and　a　positive　bearing　of　each　on　the　other。　So
far　as　rights　are　concerned；　it　makes　no　difference　whether　someone　else's　will　may　do　something
in　relation　to　mine；　when　I　give　my　will　an　embodiment　in　property。　In　morality；　however；　the
welfare　of　others　too　is　in　question；　and　this　positive　bearing　cannot　come　on　the　scene　before　this
point。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　113。　

The　externalisation　of　the　subjective　or　moral　will　is　action。　Action　implies　the
determinate　characteristics　here　indicated：　＇a＇　in　its　externality　it　must　be　known
to　me　as　my　action；　＇b＇　it　must　bear　essentially　on　the　concept　as　an　'ought'　＇see　§
131＇；　＇c＇　it　must　have　an　essential　bearing　on　the　will　of　others。　

Remark：　It　is　not　until　we　come　to　the　externalisation　of　the　moral　will　that　we　come　to　action。
The　existence　which　the　will　gives　to　itself　in　the　sphere　of　formal　rights　is　existence　in　an
immediate　thing　and　is　itself　immediate；　to　start　with；　it　neither　has　in　itself　any　express　bearing　on
the　concept；　which　is　at　that　point　not　yet　contrasted　with　the　subjective　will　and　so　is　not
distinguished　from　it；　nor　has　it　a　positive　bearing　on　the　will　of　others；　in　the　sphere　of　right；
command　in　its　fundamental　character　is　only　prohibition　（see　§　38）。　In　contract　and　wrong；　there
is　the　beginning　of　a　bearing　on　the　will　of　others；　but　the　correspondence　established　in　contract
between　one　will　and　another　is　grounded　in　arbitrariness；　and　the　essential　bearing　which　the　will
has　there　on　the　will　of　the　other　is；　as　a　matter　of　rights；　something　negative；　i。e。　one　party　retains
his　property　（the　value　of　it）　and　allows　the　other　to　retain　his。　On　the　other　hand；　crime　in　its
aspect　as　issuing　from　the　subjective　will；　and　the　question　of　the　mode　of　its　existence　in　that　will；
come　before　us　now　for　consideration　for　the　first　time。　

The　content　of　an　action　at　law　（actio）；　as　something　determined　by　legal　enactment；　is　not
imputable　to　me。　Consequently；　such　an　action　contains　only　some　of　the　moments　of　a　moral
action　proper；　and　contains　them　only　Incidentally。　The　aspect　of　an　action　in　virtue　of　which　it　is
properly　moral　is　therefore　distinct　from　its　aspect　as　legal。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　114。　

The　right　of　the　moral　will　involves　three　aspects：　

　　　　　（a）　The　abstract　or　formal　right　of　action；　the　right　that　the　content　of　the
　　　　　action　as　carried　out　in　immediate　existence；　shall　be　in　principle　mine；　that
　　　　　thus　the　action　shall　be　the　Purpose　of　the　subjective　will。　
　　　　　（b）　The　particular　aspect　of　the　action　is　its　inner　content　＇a＇　as　I　am　aware
　　　　　of　it　in　its　general　character；　my　awareness　of　this　general　character
　　　　　constitutes　the　worth　of　the　action　and　the　reason　I　think　good　to　do　it　…　in
　　　　　short　my　Intention。　＇b＇　Its　content　is　my　special　aim；　the　aim　of　my
　　　　　particular；　merely　individual；　existence；　i。e。　Welfare。　
　　　　　（c）　This　content　（as　something　which　is　inward　and　which　yet　at　the　same
　　　　　time　is　raised　to　its　universality　as　to　absolute　objectivity）　is　the　absolute　end
　　　　　of　the　will；　the　Good　—　with　the　opposition　in　the　sphere　of　reflection；　of
　　　　　subjective　universality；　which　is　now　wickedness　and　now　conscience。　

Addition：　If　an　action　is　to　be　moral；　it　must　in　the　first　place　correspond　with　my　purpose；
since　the　moral　will　has　the　right　to　refuse　to　recognise　in　the　resulting　state　of　affairs　what　was　not
present　inwardly　as　purpose。　Purpose　concerns　only　the　formal　principle　that　the　external　will　shall
be　within　me　as　something　inward。　On　the　other　hand；　in　the　second　moment　of　the　moral　sphere；
questions　may　be　asked　about　the　intention　behind　the　action；　i。e。　about　the　relative　worth　of　the
action　in　relation　to　me。　The　third　and　last　moment　is　not　the　relative　worth　of　the　action　but　its
universal　worth；　the　good。　

In　a　moral　action；　then；　there　may　be　a　breach　first　between　what　is　purposed　and　what　is　really
effected　and　achieved；　secondly；　between　what　is　there　externally　as　a　universal　will　and　the
particular　inner　determination　which　I　give　to　it。　The　third　and　last　point　is　that　the　intention　should
be　in　addition　the　universal　content　of　the　action。　The　good　is　the　intention　raised　to　be　the　concept
of　the　will。　

　　　　　　　i　Purpose　&　Responsibility
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　115。　

The　finitude　of　the　subjective　will　in　the　immediacy　of　acting　consists　directly　in
this；　that　its　action　presupposes　an　external　object　with　a　complex　environment。
The　deed　sets　up　an　alteration　in　this　state　of　affairs　confronting　the　will；　and　my
will　has　responsibility　in　general　for　its　deed　in　so　far　as　the　abstract　predicate
'mine'　belongs　to　the　state　of　affairs　so　altered。　

Remark：　An　event；　a　situation　which　has　been　produced；　is　a　concrete　external　actuality　which
because　of　its　concreteness　has　in　it　an　indeterminable　multiplicity　of　factors。　Any　and　every　single
element　which　appears　as　the　condition；　ground；　or　cause　of　one　such　factor；　and　so　has
contributed　its　share　to　the　event　in　question；　may　be　looked　upon　as　responsible　for　the　event；　or
at　least　as　sharing　the　responsibility　for　it。　Hence；　in　the　case　of　a　complex　event　（e。g。　the　French
Revolution）　it　is　open　to　the　abstract　Understanding　to　choose　which　of　an　endless　number　of
factors　it　will　maintain　to　be　responsible　for　it。　

Addition：　I　am　chargeable　with　what　lay　in　my　purpose　and　this　is　the　most　important　point　in
connection　with　crime。　But　responsibility　contains　only　the　quite　external　judgement　whether　I　have
or　have　not　done　some　thing。　It　does　not　follow　that；　because　I　am　responsible；　the　thing　done
may　be　imputed　to　me。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　116。　

It　is；　of　course；　not　my　own　doing　if　damage　is　caused　to　others　by　things　whose
owner　I　am　and　which　as　external　objects　stand　and　are　effective　in　manifold
connections　with　other　things　（as　may　also　be　the　case　with　my　self　as　a　bodily
mechanism　or　as　a　living　thing）。　This　damage；　however；　is　to　some　extent
chargeable　to　me　because　the　things　that　cause　it　are　in　principle　mine；　although　it
is　true　that　they　are　subject　to　my　control；　vigilance；　&c。；　only　to　an　extent
varying　with　their　special　character。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　117。　

The　freely　acting　will；　in　directing　its　aim　on　the　state　of　affairs　confronting　it；　has
an　idea　of　the　attendant　circumstances。　But　because　the　will　is　finite；　since　this
state　of　affairs　is　presupposed；　the　objective　phenomenon　is　contingent　so　far　as
the　will　is　concerned；　and　may　contain　something　other　than　what　the　will's　idea
of　it　contains。　The　will's　right；　however；　is　to　recognise　as　its　action；　and　to　accept
responsibility　for；　only　those　presuppositions　of　the　deed　of　which　it　was
conscious　in　its　aim　and　those　aspects　of　the　deed　which　were　contained　in　its
purpose。　The　deed　can　be　imputed　to　me　only　if　my　will　is　responsible　for　it　…　this
is　the　right　to　know。　

Addition：　The　will　has　confronting　it　a　state　of　affairs　upon　which　it　acts。　But　in　order　to　know
what　this　state　of　affairs　is　I　must　have　an　idea　of　it；　and　the　responsibility　is　truly　mine　only　in　so
far　as　I　had　knowledge　of　the　situation　confronting　me。　Such　a　situation　is　a　presupposition　of　my
volition　and　my　will　is　therefore　finite；　or　rather；　since　my　will　is　finite；　it　has　a　presupposition　of　this
kind。　As　soon　as　my　thinking　and　willing　is　rational；　I　am　no　longer　at　this　level　of　finitude；　since　the
object　on　which　I　act　is　no　longer　an　'other'　to　me。　Finitude；　however；　implies　fixed　limits　and
restrictions。　I　have　confronting　me　an　'other'　which　is　only　contingent；　something　necessary　in　a
purely　external　way；　its　path　and　mine　may　meet　or　diverge。　Nevertheless；　I　am　nothing　except　in
relation　to　my　freedom；　and　my　will　is　responsible　for　the　deed　only　in　so　far　as　I　know　what　I　am
doing。　Oedipus；　who　killed　his　father　without　knowing　it；　cannot　be　accused　of　parricide。　The
ancient　penal　codes；　however；　attached　less　weight　to　the　subjective　side　of　action；　to　imputability；
than　we　do　nowadays。　That　is　why　sanctuaries　were　instituted　in　ancient　times　for　harbouring　and
protecting　the　fugitive　from　vengeance。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　118。　

Further；　action　is　translated　into　external　fact；　and　external　fact　has　connections　in
the　field　of　external　necessity　through　which　it　develops　itself　in　all　directions。
Hence　action　has　a　multitude　of　consequences。　These　consequences　are　the
outward　form　whose　inner　soul　is　the　aim　of　the　action；　and　thus　they　are　the
consequences　of　the　action；　they　belong　to　the　action。　At　the　same　time；
however；　the　action；　as　the　aim　posited　in　the　external　world；　has　become　the
prey　of　external　forces　which　attach　to　it　something　totally　different　from　what　it
is　explicitly　and　drive　it　on　into　alien　and　distant　consequences。　Thus　the　will　has
the　right　to　repudiate　the　imputation　of　all　consequences　except　the　first；　since　it
alone　was　purposed。　

Remark：　To　determine　which　results　are　accidental　and　which　necessary　is　impossible；　because
the　necessity　implicit　in　the　finite　comes　into　determinate　existence　as　an　external　necessity；　as　a
relation　of　single　things　to　one　another；　things　which　as　self…subsistent　are　conjoined　in　indifference
to　one　another　and　externally。　The　maxim：　'Ignore　the　consequences　of　actions'　and　the　other：
'Judge　actions　by　their　consequences　and　make　these　the　criterion　of　right　and　good'　are　both　alike
maxims　of　the　abstract　Understanding。　The　consequences；　as　the　shape　proper　to　the　action　and
immanent　within　it；　exhibit　nothing　but　its　nature　and　are　simply　the　action　itself；　therefore　the　action
can　neither　disavow　nor　ignore　them。　On　the　other　hand；　however；　among　the　consequences　there
is　also　comprised　something　interposed　from　without　and　introduced　by　chance；　and　this　is　quite
unrelated　to　the　nature　of　the　action　itself。　

The　development　in　the　external　world　of　the　contradiction　involved　in　the　necessity　of　the　finite　is
just　the　conversion　of　necessity　into　contingency　and　vice　versa。　From　this　point　of　view；　therefore；
acting　means　surrendering　oneself　to　this　law。　It　is　because　of　this　that　it　is　to　the　advantage　of　the
criminal　if　his　action　has　comparatively　few　bad　consequences　（while　a　good　action　must　be
content　to　have　had　n