philosophy of right-第21章

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indeterminacy　stabilised　…　then　no　transition　is　possible　to　the　specification　of　particular　duties　nor；
if　some　such　particular　content　for　acting　comes　under　consideration；　is　there　any　criterion　in　that
principle　for　deciding　whether　it　is　or　is　not　a　duty。　On　the　contrary；　by　this　means　any　wrong　or
immoral　line　of　conduct　may　be　justified。　

Kant's　further　formulations　the　possibility　of　visualising　an　action　as　a　universal　maxim；　does　lead
to　the　more　concrete　visualisation　of　a　situation；　but　in　itself　it　contains　no　principle　beyond
abstract　identity　and　the　'absence　of　contradiction'　already　mentioned。　

The　absence　of　property　contains　in　itself　just　as　little　contradiction　as　the　non…existence　of　this　or
that　nation；　family；　&c。；　or　the　death　of　the　whole　human　race。　But　if　it　is　already　established　on
other　grounds　and　presupposed　that　property　and　human　life　are　to　exist　and　be　respected；　then
indeed　it　is　a　contradiction　to　commit　theft　or　murder；　a　contradiction　must　be　a　contradiction　of
something；　i。e。　of　some　content　presupposed　from　the　start　as　a　fixed　principle。　It　is　to　a　principle
of　that　kind　alone；　therefore；　that　an　action　can　be　related　either　by　correspondence　or
contradiction。　But　if　duty　is　to　be　willed　simply　for　duty's　sake　and　not　for　the　sake　of　some
content；　it　is　only　a　formal　identity　whose　nature　it　is　to　exclude　all　content　and　specification。　

The　further　antinomies　and　configurations　of　this　never…ending　ought…to…be；　in　which　the
exclusively　moral　way　of　thinking　…　thinking　in　terms　of　relation　…　just　wanders　to　and　fro　without
being　able　to　resolve　them　and　get　beyond　the　ought…to…be；　I　have　developed　in　my
Phenomenology　of　Mind。　

Addition：　While　we　laid　emphasis　above　on　the　fact　that　the　outlook　of　Kant's　philosophy　is　a
high　one　in　that　it　propounds　a　correspondence　between　duty　and　rationality；　still　we　must　notice
here　that　this　point　of　view　is　defective　in　lacking　all　articulation。　The　proposition：　'Act　as　if　the
maxim　of　thine　action　could　be　laid　down　as　a　universal　principle'；　would　be　admirable　if　we
already　had　determinate　principles　of　conduct。　That　is　to　say；　to　demand　of　a　principle　that　it　shall
be　able　to　serve　in　addition　as　a　determinant　of　universal　legislation　is　to　presuppose　that　it　already
possesses　a　content。　Given　the　content；　then　of　course　the　application　of　the　principle　would　be　a
simple　matter。　In　Kant's　case；　however；　the　principle　itself　is　still　not　available　and　his　criterion　of
non…contradiction　is　productive　of　nothing；　since　where　there　is　nothing；　there　can　be　no
contradiction　either。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　136。　

Because　of　the　abstract　characterisation　of　the　good；　the　other　moment　of　the
Idea　…　particularity　in　general　…　falls　within　subjectivity。　Subjectivity　in　its
universality　reflected　into　itself　is　the　subject's　absolute　inward　certainty
（Gewissheit）　of　himself；　that　which　establishes　the　particular　and　is　the
determining　and　decisive　element　in　him；　his　conscience　（Gewissen）。　

Addition：　We　may　speak　in　a　very　lofty　strain　about　duty；　and　talk　of　the　kind　is　uplifting　and
broadens　human　sympathies；　but　if　it　never　comes　to　anything　specific　it　ends　in　being　wearisome。
Mind　demands　particularity　and　is　entitled　to　it。　But　conscience　is　this　deepest　inward　solitude　with
oneself　where　everything　external　and　every　restriction　has　disappeared　…　this　complete　withdrawal
into　oneself。　As　conscience；　man　is　no　longer　shackled　by　the　aims　of　particularity；　and
consequently　in　attaining　that　position　he　has　risen　to　higher　ground；　the　ground　of　the　modern
world；　which　for　the　first　time　has　reached　this　consciousness；　reached　this　sinking　into　oneself。
The　more　sensuous　consciousness　＇For　the　distinction　between　sense…consciousness　and　'more
highly　developed　types　of　consciousness'；　see　Remarks　to　§§　21　and　35。＇　of　earlier　epochs　had
something　external　and　given　confronting　it；　either　religion　or　law。　But　conscience　knows　itself　as
thinking　and　knows　that　what　alone　has　obligatory　force　for　me　is　this　that　I　think。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　137。　

True　conscience　is　the　disposition　to　will　what　is　absolutely　good。　It　therefore　has
fixed　principles　and　it　is　aware　of　these　as　its　explicitly　objective　determinants　and
duties。　In　distinction　from　this　its　content　（i。e。　truth）；　conscience　is　only　the
formal　side　of　the　activity　of　the　will；　which　as　this　will　has　no　special　content　of
its　own。　But　the　objective　system　of　these　principles　and　duties；　and　the　union　of
subjective　knowing　with　this　system；　is　not　present　until　we　come　to　the
standpoint　of　ethical　life。　Here　at　the　abstract　standpoint　of　morality；　conscience
lacks　this　objective　content　and　so　its　explicit　character　is　that　of　infinite　abstract
self…certainty；　which　at　the　same　time　is　for　this　very　reason　the　self…certainty　of
this　subject。　

Remark：　Conscience　is　the　expression　of　the　absolute　title　of　subjective　self…consciousness　to
know　in　itself　and　from　within　itself　what　is　right　and　obligatory；　to　give　recognition　only　to　what　it
thus　knows　as　good；　and　at　the　same　time　to　maintain　that　whatever　in　this　way　it　knows　and　wills
is　in　truth　right　and　obligatory。　Conscience　as　this　unity　of　subjective　knowing　with　what　is　absolute
is　a　sanctuary　which　it　would　be　sacrilege　to　violate。　But　whether　the　conscience　of　a　specific
individual　corresponds　with　this　Idea　of　conscience；　or　whether　what　it　takes　or　declares　to　be
good　is　actually　so；　is　ascertainable　only　from　the　content　of　the　good　it　seeks　to　realise。　What　is
right　and　obligatory　is　the　absolutely　rational　element　in　the　will's　volitions　and　therefore　it　is　not　in
essence　the　particular　property　of　an　individual；　and　its　form　is　not　that　of　feeling　or　any　other
private　（i。e。　sensuous）　type　of　knowing；　but　essentially　that　of　universals　determined　by　thought；
i。e。　the　form　of　laws　and　principles。　Conscience　is　therefore　subject　to　the　judgement　of　its　truth　or
falsity；　and　when　it　appeals　only　to　itself　for　a　decision；　it　is　directly　at　variance　with　what　it　wishes
to　be；　namely　the　rule　for　a　mode　of　conduct　which　is　rational；　absolutely　valid；　and　universal。　For
this　reason；　the　state　cannot　give　recognition　to　conscience　in　its　private　form　as　subjective
knowing；　any　more　than　science　can　grant　validity　to　subjective　opinion；　dogmatism；　and　the
appeal　to　a　subjective　opinion。　In　true　conscience；　its　elements　are　not　different；　but　they　may
become　so；　and　it　is　the　determining　element；　the　subjectivity　of　willing　and　knowing；　which　can
sever　itself　from　the　true　content　of　conscience；　establish　its　own　independence；　and　reduce　that
content　to　a　form　and　a　show。　The　ambiguity　in　connection　with　conscience　lies　therefore　in　this：　it
is　presupposed　to　mean　the　identity　of　subjective　knowing　and　willing　with　the　true　good；　and　so
is　claimed　and　recognised　to　be　something　sacrosanct；　and　yet　at　the　same　time；　as　the　mere
subjective　reflection　of　self…consciousness　into　itself；　it　still　claims　for　itself　the　title　due；　solely　on
the　strength　of　its　absolutely　valid　rational　content；　to　that　identity　alone。　

At　the　level　of　morality；　distinguished　as　it　is　in　this　book　from　the　level　of　ethics；　it　is　only　formal
conscience　that　is　to　be　found。　True　conscience　has　been　mentioned　only　to　indicate　its　distinction
from　the　other　and　to　obviate　the　possible　misunderstanding　that　here；　where　it　is　only　formal
conscience　that　is　under　consideration；　the　argument　is　about　true　conscience。　The　latter　is　part　of
the　ethical　disposition　which　comes　before　us　for　the　first　time　in　the　following　section。　The
religious　conscience；　however；　does　not　belong　to　this　sphere　at　all。　

Addition：　When　we　speak　of　conscience；　it　may　easily　be　thought　that；　in　virtue　of　its　form；
which　is　abstract　inwardness；　conscience　is　at　ties　point　without　more　ado　true　conscience。　But
true　conscience　determines　itself　to　will　what　is　absolutely　good　and　obligatory　and　is　this
self…determination。　So　far；　however；　it　is　only　with　good　in　the　abstract　that　we　have　to　do　and
conscience　is　still　without　this　objective　content　and　is　but　the　infinite　certainty　of　oneself。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　138。　

This　subjectivity；　qua　abstract　self…determination　and　pure　certainty　of　oneself
alone；　as　readily　evaporates　into　itself　the　whole　determinate　character　of　right；
duty；　and　existence；　as　it　remains　both　the　power　to　judge；　to　determine　from
within　itself　alone；　what　is　good　in　respect　of　any　content；　and　also　the　power　to
which　the　good；　at　first　only　an　ideal　and　an　ought…to…be；　owes　its　actuality。　

Remark：　The　self…consciousness　which　has　attained　this　absolute　reflection　into　itself　knows
itself　in　this　reflection　to　be　the　kind　of　consciousness　which　is　and　should　be　beyond　the　reach　of
every　existent　and　given　specific　determination。　As　one　of　the　commoner　features　of　history　（e。g。　in
Socrates；40　the　Stoics；　and　others）；　the　tendency　to　look　deeper　into　oneself　and　to　know　and
determine　from　within　oneself　what　is　right　and　good　appears　in　ages　when　what　is　recognised　as
right　and　good　in　contemporary　manners　cannot　satisfy　the　will　of　better　men。　When　the　existing
world　of　freedom　has　become　faithless　to　the　will　of　better　men；　that　will　fails　to　find　itself　in　the
duties　there　recognised　and　must　try　to　find　in　the　ideal　world　of　the　inner　life　alone　the　harmony
which　actuality　has　lost。　Once　self…consciousness　has　grasped　and　secured　its　formal　right　in　this
way；　everything　depends　on　the　character　of　the　content　which　it　gives　to　itself。　

Addition：　If　we　look　more　closely　at　this　process　of　evaporation　and　see　how　all　specific
determinations　disappear　into　this　simple　concept　and　then　have　to　be　condensed　out　of　it　again；
what　we　find　is　that　it　is　primarily　due　to　the　fact　that　everything　recognised　as　right　and　duty　may
be　proved　by　discursive　thinking　to　be　nugatory；　restricted；　and　in　all　respects　not　absolute。　On　the
other　hand；　just　as　subjectivity　evaporates　every　content　into　itself；　so　it　may　develop　it　out　of　itself
once　more。　Everything　which　arises　in　the　ethical　sphere　is　produced　by　this　activity　of　mind。　The
moral　point　of　view；　however；　is　defective　because　it　is　purely　abstract。　When　I　am　aware　of　my
freedom　as　the　substance　of　my　being；　I　am　inactive　and　do　nothing。　But　if　I　proceed　to　act　and
look　for　principles　on　which　to　act；　I　grope　for　something　determinate　and　then　demand　its
deduction　from　the　concept　of　the　free　will。　While；　therefore；　it　is　right　enough　to　evaporate　right
and　duty　into　subjectivity；　it　is　wrong　if　this　abstract　groundwork　is　not　then　condensed　out　again。
It　is　only　in　times　when　the　world　of　actuality　is　hollow；　spiritless；　and　unstable；　that　an　individual
may　be　allowed　to　take　refuge　from　actuality　in　his　inner　life。　Socrates　lived　at　the　time　of　the　ruin
of　the　Athenian　democracy。　His　thought　vaporised　the　world　around　him　and　he　withdrew　into
himself　to　search　there　for　the　right　and　the　good。　Even　in　our　day　there　are　cases　when　reverence
for　the　established　order　is　more　or　less　lacking；　man　insists　on　having　the　authoritative　as　his　will；
as　that　t