philosophy of right-第23章

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that　they　did　not　know　what　they　did　made　their　action　innocent　and　so　took　away　the　need　of　forgiveness。
Pascal　quotes　there　too　Aristotle's　distinction　between　the　man　who　acts　ouk　eidos　and　the　one　who　acts
agnoon；　in　the　former　type　of　ignorance；　his　action　is　not　freely　willed　（here　the　ignorance　depends　on　external
circumstances；　see　above；　§　117）　and　his　action　is　not　imputable　to　him。　But　of　the　latter　Aristotle　says：　'Every
wicked　man　is　ignorant　of　what　he　ought　to　do　and　what　he　ought　to　refrain　from　doing；　and　it　is　this　kind　of
failure　which　makes　men　unjust　and　in　general　bad。。。。　An　ignorant　choice'　between　good　and　evil　'is　the　cause
not　of　the　action's　being　involuntary'　（of　being　non…imputable）　'but　only　of　its　being　wicked'。　Aristotle
evidently　had　a　deeper　insight　into　the　connection　between　knowing　and　willing　than　has　become　common　in　a
superficial　philosophy　which　teaches　that　the　opposite　of　knowledge；　the　heart　and　enthusiasm；　are　the　true
principles　of　ethical　action。　

The　subjective　right　of　self…consciousness　to　know　whether　an　action　is　truly　good　or　evil　in
character　must　not　be　thought　of　as　so　colliding　with　the　absolute　right　of　the　objectivity　of　this
character　that　the　two　rights　are　represented　as　separable；　indifferent　to　one　another；　and　related
only　accidentally。　It　was　such　a　conception　of　their　relation　that　lay　in　particular　at　the　root　of　the
old　questions　about　efficacious　grace。　On　its　formal　side；　evil　is　most　peculiarly　the　individual's
own；　since　（a）　it　is　precisely　his　subjectivity　establishing　itself　purely　and　simply　for　itself；　and　for
that　reason　it　is　purely　and　simply　the　individual's　own　responsibility　（see　§　139　and　the　Remark
thereto）；　（b）　on　his　objective　side　man　accords　with　his　concept　inasmuch　as　he　is　mind；　in　a　word
a　rational　entity；　and　has　in　his　own　nature　as　such　the　character　of　self…knowing　universality。
Therefore　it　means　failing　to　treat　him　with　the　respect　due　to　his　concept　if　his　good　side　is
divorced　from　him；　so　that　the　character　of　his　evil　action　as　evil　is　divorced　from　him　too　and　is
not　imputed　to　him　as　evil。　How　determinate　is　the　consciousness　of　these　moments　in　distinction
from　one　another；　or　to　what　extent　it　has　developed　or　failed　to　develop　in　clarity　so　as　to
become　a　recognition　of　them；　and　to　what　degree　an　evil　action　has　been　done　with　a　conscience
more　or　less　downright　evil　…　all　these　questions　are　the　more　trivial　aspect　of　the　matter；　the
aspect　mainly　concerned　with　the　empirical。　

（b）　Evil　and　doing　evil　with　a　bad　conscience；　however；　is　not　quite　hypocrisy。　Into　hypocrisy
there　enters　in　addition　the　formal　character　of　falsity；　first　the　falsity　of　holding　up　evil　as　good　in
the　eyes　of　others；　of　setting　oneself　up　to　all　appearance　as　good；　conscientious；　pious；　and　so　on
…　conduct　which　in　these　circumstances　is　only　a　trick　to　deceive　others。　Secondly；　however；　the
had　man　may　find　in　his　good　conduct　on　other　occasions；　or　in　his　piety；　or；　in　a　word；　in　good
reasons；　a　justification　in　his　own　eyes　for　the　evil　he　does；　because　he　can　use　these　reasons　to
pervert　its　apparent　character　from　evil　into　good。　His　ability　to　do　this　depends　on　the　subjectivity
which；　as　abstract　negativity；　knows　that　all　determinations　are　subordinate　to　itself　and　issue　from
its　own　will。　

（c）　In　this　perversion　of　evil　into　good　we　may　prima　facie　include　the　form　of　subjectivism　known
as　Probabilism。　Its　guiding　principle　is　that　an　action　is　permissible；　and　may　be　done　with　an　easy
conscience；　provided　that　the　agent　can　hunt　out　any　single　good　reason　for　it；　be　it　only　the
authority　of　a　single　theologian；　and　even　if　other　theologians　are　known　by　the　agent　to　dissent
ever　so　widely　from　that　authority。　Even　in　this　idea　there　is　still　present　the　correct　apprehension
that　authority　and　a　reason　based　on　authority　gives　probability　only；　although　this　is　supposed　to
be　enough　to　produce　an　easy　conscience；　it　is　granted　in　Probabilism　that　a　good　reason　is
inevitably　of　such　a　character　that　there　may　exist　along　with　it　different　reasons　at　least　as　good。
Even　here　we　must　recognise　a　vestige　of　objectivity　in　the　admission　that　it　is　a　reason　which
should　be　the　determining　factor。　But　since　the　discrimination　between　good　and　evil　is　made　to
depend　on　all　those　good　reasons；　including　theological　authorities　too；　despite　the　fact　that　they
are　so　numerous　and　contradictory；　the　implication　is　that　it　is　not　this　objectivity　of　the　thing；　but
subjectivity；　which　has　the　last　word。　This　means　that　caprice　and　self…will　are　made　the　arbiters　of
good　and　evil；　and　the　result　is　that　ethics　as　well　as　religious　feeling　is　undermined。　But　the　fact
that　it　is　private　subjectivity　to　which　the　decision　falls　is　one　which　Probabilism　does　not　openly
avow　as　its　principle；　on　the　contrary；　as　has　already　been　stated；　it　gives　out　that　it　is　some　reason
or　other　which　is　decisive；　and　Probabilism　is　to　that　extent　still　a　form　of　hypocrisy。　

（d）　In　the　stages　of　subjectivism；　the　next　in　ascending　order　is　the　view　that　the　goodness　of　the
will　consists　in　its　willing　the　good；　this　willing　of　the　abstract　good　is　supposed　to　suffice；　in　fact
to　be　the　sole　requisite；　to　make　its　action　good。　As　the　willing　of　something　determinate；　action
has　a　content；　but　good　in　the　abstract　determines　nothing；　and　hence　it　devolves　on　particular
subjectivity　to　give　this　content　its　character　and　constituents。　just　as　in　Probabilism　anyone　who　is
not　himself　a　learned　Révérend　Père　may　have　the　subsumption　of　a　determinate　content　under
the　universal　predicate　'good'　effected　for　him　by　the　sole　authority　of　one　such　theologian；　so　here
every　subject；　without　any　further　qualification；　is　invested　with　this　honour　of　giving　a　content　to
good　in　the　abstract；　or　in　other　words　subsuming　a　content　under　a　universal。　This　content　is　only
one　of　the　many　elements　in　an　action　as　a　concrete　whole；　and　the　others　may　perhaps　entail　its
description　as　'criminal'　and　'bad'。　That　determinate　content　which　1；　as　subject；　give　to　the　good；
however；　is　the　good　known　to　me　in　the　action；　i。e。　it　is　my　good　intention　（see　§　114）。　Thus
there　arises　a　contradiction　between　descriptions：　according　to　one　the　action　is　good；　according
to　the　other　it　is　criminal。　Hence　also　there　seems　to　arise；　in　connection　with　a　concrete　action；　the
question　whether　in　such　circumstances　the　intention　behind　it　is　actually　good。　It　may　generally　be
the　case　that　the　good　is　what　is　actually　intended；　but　this　in　fact　must　always　be　the　case　if　it　is
held　that　good　in　the　abstract　is　the　subject's　determining　motive。　Where　wrong　is　done　through　an
action　which　is　well　intentioned　but　in　other　respects　criminal　and　bad；　the　wrong　so　done　must；　of
course；　also　be　good；　and　the　important　question　would　seem　to　be：　which　of　these　sides　of　the
action　is　really　the　essential　one？　This　objective　question；　however；　is　here　out　of　place；　or　rather　it
is　the　subjective　consciousness　alone　whose　decision　constitutes　objectivity　at　this　point。　Besides；
'essential'　and　'good'　mean　the　same　thing；　one　is　just　as　much　an　abstraction　as　the　other。　Good　is
that　which　is　essential　in　respect　of　the　will；　and　the　essential　in　this　respect　should　be　precisely
this；　that　my　action　be　characterised　as　good　in　my　eyes。　But　the　subsumption　under　the　good　of
any　content　one　pleases　is　the　direct　and　explicit　result　of　the　fact　that　this　abstract　good　is　totally
devoid　of　content　and　so　is　simply　reduced　to　meaning　anything　positive；　i。e。　to　something　which　is
valid　from　some　single　point　of　view　and　which　in　its　immediate　character　may　even　be　valid　as　an
essential　end；　as　for　example　to　do　good　to　the　poor；　to　take　thought　for　myself；　my　life；　my
family；　and　so　forth。　Further；　just　as　the　good　is　the　abstract；　so　the　bad　too　must　be　without
content　and　derive　its　specification　from　my　subjectivity；　and　it　is　in　this　way　also　that　there　arises
the　moral　end　of　hating　and　uprooting　the　bad；　the　nature　of　the　bad　being　left　unspecified。　

Theft；　cowardice；　murder；　and　so　forth；　as　actions；　i。e。　as　achievements　of　a　subjective　will；　have
the　immediate　character　of　being　satisfactions　of　such　a　will　and　therefore　of　being　something
positive。　In　order　to　make　the　action　a　good　one；　it　is　only　a　question　of　recognising　this　positive
aspect　of　the　action　as　my　intention；　and　this　then　becomes　the　essential　aspect　in　virtue　of　which
the　action　is　made　good；　simply　because　I　recognise　it　as　the　good　in　my　intention。　Theft　in　order
to　do　good　to　the　poor；　theft　or　flight　from　battle　for　the　sake　of　fulfilling　one's　duty　to　care　for
one's　life　or　one's　family　（a　poor　family　perhaps　into　the　bargain）；　murder　out　of　hate　or　revenge
（i。e。　in　order　to　satisfy　one's　sense　of　one's　own　rights　or　of　right　in　general；　or　one's　sense　of
another's　wickedness；　of　wrong　done　by　him　to　oneself　or　to　others　or　to　the　world　or　the　nation
at　large；　by　extirpating　this　wicked　individual　who　is　wickedness　incarnate；　and　thereby
contributing　at　least　one's　quota　to　the　project　of　uprooting　the　bad）　…　all　these　actions　are　made
well　intentioned　and　therefore　good　by　this　method　of　taking　account　of　the　positive　aspect　of　their
content。　Only　the　bare　minimum　of　intelligence　is　required　to　discover　in　any　action；　as　those
learned　theologians　can；　a　positive　side　and　so　a　good　reason　for　it　and　a　good　intention　behind　it。
Hence　it　has　been　said　that　in　the　strict　sense　there　are　no　wicked　men；　since　no　one　wills　evil　for
the　sake　of　evil；　i。e。　no　one　wills　a　pure　negative　as　such。　On　the　contrary；　everyone　always　wills
something　positive；　and　therefore；　on　the　view　we　are　considering；　something　good。　In　this
abstract　good　the　distinction　between　good　and　evil　has　vanished　together　with　all　concrete　duties；
for　this　reason；　simply　to　will　the　good　and　to　have　a　good　intention　in　acting　is　more　like　evil　than
good；　because　the　good　willed　is　only　this　abstract　form　of　good　and　therefore　to　make　it　concrete
devolves　on　the　arbitrary　Will　of　the　subject。　

To　this　context　there　also　belongs　the　notorious　maxim：　'The　end　justifies　the　means。'　In　itself　and
prima　facie　this　expression　is　trivial　and　pointless。　Quite　so；　one　may　retort　in　terms　equally
general；　a　just　end　of　course　justifies　the　means；　while　an　unjust　end　does　not。　The　phrase：　so　'If
the　end　is　right；　so　is　the　means'　is　a　tautology；　since　the　means　is　precisely　that　which　is　nothing　in
itself　but　is　for　the　sake　of　something　else；　and　therein；　i。e。　in　the　end；　has　its　purpose　and　worth　…
provided　of　course　it　be　truly　a　means。　

But　when　someone　says　that　the　end　justifies　the　means；　his　purport　is　not　confined　to　this　bare
tautology；　he　understands　by　the　words　something　more　specific；　namely　that　to　use　as　means　to　a
good　end　something　which　in　itself　is　simply　not　a　means　at　all；　to　violate　something　in　itself
sacrosanct；　in　short　to　commit　a　crime　as　a　means　to　a　good　end；　is　permissible　and　even　one's
bounden　duty。　（i）　There　floats　before　the　minds　of　those　who　say　that　the　end　justifies　the　means　a
vague　consciousness　of　the　dialectic　of　the　aforesaid　'po