philosophy of right-第25章

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a　sense　we　give　to　this　expression。　Any　hope　we　may　have　of　transcending　finite　ends　is　foolish　and　empty
conceit。　'Even　the　highest　is　existent　for　our　conduct　only　in　a　shape　that　is　limited　and　finite。'　Rightly
understood；　this　is　Platonic　doctrine；　and　a　true　remark　in　rejection　of　what　he　has　referred　to　earlier；　the　empty
striving　towards　the　（abstract）　infinite。　But　to　say　that　the　highest　is　existent　in　a　limited　and　finite　shape；　like
the　ethical　order　（and　that　order　is　in　essence　actual　life　and　action）；　is　very　different　from　saving　that　the
highest　thing　is　a　finite　end。　The　outward　shape；　the　form　of　finitude；　in　no　way　deprives　the　content　of　ethical
life　of　its　substantiality　and　the　infinity　inherent　within　it。　Solger　continues：　'And　just　for　this　reason　the
highest　is　in　us　as　negligible　as　the　lowest　and　perishes　of　necessity　with　us　and　our　nugatory　thoughts　and
feelings。　The　highest　is　truly　existent　in　God　alone；　and　as　it　perishes　in　us　it　is　transfigured　into　something
divine；　a　divinity　in　which　we　would　have　had　no　share　but　for　its　immediate　presence　revealed　in　the　very
disappearance　of　our　actuality；　now　the　mood　to　which　this　process　directly　comes　home　in　human　affairs　is
tragic　irony。'　The　arbitrary　name　'irony'　would　be　of　no　importance；　but　there　is　an　obscurity　here　when　it　is　said
that　it　is　'the　highest'　which　perishes　with　our　nothingness　and　that　it　is　in　the　disappearance　of　our　actuality
that　the　divine　is　first　revealed；　e。g。　again　（ibid。；　p。　91）：'We　see　heroes　beginning　to　wonder　whether　they　have
erred　in　the　noblest　and　finest　elements　of　their　feelings　and　sentiments；　not　only　in　regard　to　their　successful
issue；　but　also　to　their　source　and　their　worth；　indeed；　what　elevates　us　is　the　destruction　of　the　best　itself。'
（The　just　destruction　of　utter　scoundrels　and　criminals　who　flaunt　their　villainy　—　the　hero　of　a　modern　tragedy
Die　Schuld；　is　one　—　has　an　interest　for　criminal　law；　but　none　at　all　for　art　proper　which　is　what　is　in　question
here。）　The　tragic　destruction　of　figures　whose　ethical　life　is　on　the　highest　plane　can　interest　and　elevate　us
and　reconcile　us　to　its　occurrence　only　in　so　far　as　they　come　on　the　scene　in　opposition　to　one　another
together　with　equally　justified　but　different　ethical　powers　which　have　come　into　collision　through　misfortune；
because　the　result　is　that　then　these　figures　acquire　guilt　through　their　opposition　to　an　ethical　law。　Out　of　this
situation　there　arises　the　right　and　wrong　of　both　parties　and　therefore　the　true　ethical　Idea；　which；　purified　and
in　triumph　over　this　one…sidedness；　is　thereby　reconciled　in　us。　Accordingly；　it　is　not　the　highest　in　us　which
perishes；　we　are　elevated　not　by　the　destruction　of　the　best　but　by　the　triumph　of　the　true。　This　it　is　which
constitutes　the　true；　purely　ethical；　interest　of　ancient　tragedy　（in　romantic　tragedy　the　character　of　the　interest
undergoes　a　certain　modification）。　All　this　I　have　worked　out　in　detail　in　my　Phenomenology　of　Mind　。　But　the
ethical　Idea　is　actual　and　pregnant　in　the　world　of　social　institutions　without　the　misfortune　of　tragic　clashes
and　the　destruction　of　individuals　overcome　by　this　misfortune。　And　this　Idea's　（the　highest's）　revelation　of
itself　in　its　actuality　as　anything　but　a　nullity　is　what　the　external　embodiment　of　ethical　life；　the　state；　purposes
and　effects；　and　what　the　ethical　self…consciousness　possesses；　intuits；　and　knows　in　the　state　and　what　the
thinking　mind　comprehends　there。　

The　culminating　form　of　this　subjectivity　which　conceives　itself　as　the　final　court　of　appeal　—　our
topic　here　—　can　be　nothing　except　what　was　implicitly　present　already　in　its　preceding　forms；
namely　subjectivity　knowing　itself　as　the　arbiter　and　judge　of　truth；　right；　and　duty。　It　consists　then
in　this；　that　it　knows　the　objective　ethical　principles；　but　fails　in　self…forgetfulness　and
self…renunciation　to　immerse　itself　in　their　seriousness　and　to　base　action　upon　them。　Although
related　to　them；　it　holds　itself　aloof　from　them　and　knows　itself　as　that　which　wills　and　decides
thus；　although　it　may　equally　well　will　and　decide　otherwise。　You　actually　accept　a　law；　it　says；　and
respect　it　as　absolute。　So　do　1；　but　I　go　further　than　you；　because　I　am　beyond　this　law　and　can
make　it　to　suit　myself　It　is　not　the　thing　that　is　excellent；　but　I　who　am　so；　as　the　master　of　law　and
thing　alike；　I　simply　play　with　them　as　with　my　caprice；　my　consciously　ironical　attitude　lets　the
highest　perish　and　I　merely　hug　myself　at　the　thought。　This　type　of　subjectivism　not　merely
substitutes　a　void　for　the　whole　content　of　ethics；　right；　duties；　and　laws　—　and　so　is　evil；　in　fact
evil　through　and　through　and　universally　—　but　in　addition　its　form　is　a　subjective　void；　i。e。　it　knows
itself　as　this　contentless　void　and　in　this　knowledge　knows　itself　as　absolute。　

In　my　Phenomenology　of　Mind；　I　have　shown　how　this　absolute　self…complacency　fails　to　rest　in
a　solitary　worship　of　itself　but　builds　up　a　sort　of　community　whose　bond　and　substance　is；　e。g。；
the　'mutual　Asseveration　of　conscientiousness　and　good　intentions；　the　enjoyment　of　this　mutual
purity'；　but　is　above　all　'the　refreshment　derived　from　the　glory　of　this　self…knowledge　and
self…expression；　from　the　glory　of　fostering　and　cherishing　this　experience'。　I　have　shown　also　how
what　has　been　called　a　'beautiful　soul'　—　that　still　nobler　type　of　subjectivism　which　empties　the
objective　of　all　content　and　so　fades　away　until　it　loses　all　actuality　—　is　a　variation　of　subjectivism
like　other　forms　of　the　same　phenomenon　akin　to　the　series　of　them　here　considered。　What　is　said
here　may　be　compared　with　the　entire　section　（C）；　'Conscience'；　in　the　Phenomenology；
especially　the　part　dealing　with　the　transition　to　a　higher　stage　—　a　stage；　however；　there　different
in　characters　

Addition：　Representative　thinking　may　go　further　and　pervert　the　evil　will　into　a　show　of
goodness。　Although　it　cannot　alter　the　nature　of　evil；　it　can　invest　it　with　a　show　of　goodness。　Since
every　action　has　a　positive　aspect；　and　since　the　category　of　good　as　opposed　to　evil　is　likewise
reduced　to　positivity；　I　may　claim　that　my　action　in　its　bearing　on　my　intention　is　good。　Thus　evil
has　good　linked　with　it　not　only　in　my　consciousness　but　also　if　we　look　at　my　action　on　its　positive
side。　When　self…consciousness　gives　out；　to　others　only；　that　its　action　is　good；　this　form　of
subjectivism　is　hypocrisy。　But　if　it　goes　so　far　as　to　claim　that　the　deed　is　good　in　its　own　eyes
also；　then　we　have　a　still　higher　peak　of　the　subjectivism　which　knows　itself　as　absolute。　For　this
type　of　mind　absolute　good　and　absolute　evil　have　both　vanished；　and　the　subject　is　therefore　at
liberty　to　pass　himself　off　at　discretion　as　anything　he　likes。　This　is　the　position　of　the　absolute
sophistry　which　usurps　the　office　of　lawgiver　and　rests　the　distinction　between　good　and　evil　on　its
own　caprice。　The　chief　hypocrites　are　the　pious　ones　（the　Tartuffes）　who　are　punctilious　in　every
ritual　observance　and　may　even　be　religious　to　all　appearance；　while　yet　they　do　just　as　they
please。　There　is　little　mention　of　hypocrites　nowadays；　partly　because　the　accusation　of　hypocrisy
seems　to　be　too　harsh；　partly；　however；　because　hypocrisy　in　its　naive　form　has　more　or　less
disappeared。　This　downright　falsehood；　this　veneer　of　goodness；　has　now　become　too　transparent
not　to　be　seen　through；　and　the　divorce　between　doing　good　with　one　hand　and　evil　with　the　other
no　longer　occurs；　since　advancing　culture　has　weakened　the　opposition　between　these　categories。　

Instead；　hypocrisy　has　now　assumed　the　subtler　form　of　Probabilism；　which　involves　the　agent's
attempt　to　represent　a　transgression　as　something　good　from　the　point　of　view　of　his　private
conscience。　This　doctrine　can　only　arise　when　the　moral　and　the　good　are　determined　by　authority；
with　the　result　that　there　are　as　many　reasons　as　there　are　authorities　for　supposing　that　evil　is
good。　Casuist　theologians；　Jesuits　especially；　have　worked　up　these　cases　of　conscience　and
multiplied　them　ad　infinitum。　

These　cases　have　now　been　elaborated　to　such　a　high　degree　of　subtlety　that　numerous　clashes
have　arisen　between　them；　and　the　opposition　between　good　and　evil　has　become　so　weak　that　in
single　instances　they　appear　to　turn　into　one　another。　The　only　desideratum　now　is　probability；　i。e。
something　approximately　good；　something　which　may　be　supported　by　any　single　reason　or
authority。　Thus　the　special　characteristic　of　this　attitude　is　that　its　content　is　purely　abstract；　it　sets
up　the　concrete　content　as　something　inessential　or　rather　abandons　it　to　bare　opinion。　On　this
principle；　anyone　may　have　committed　a　crime　and　yet　have　willed　the　good。　For　example；　if　a
bad　character　is　murdered；　the　positive　side　of　the　action　may　be　given　out　to　be　the　withstanding
of　evil　and　the　will　to　diminish　it。　

Now　the　next　step　beyond　Probabilism　is　that　it　is　no　longer　a　question　of　someone　else's
statement　or　authority；　it　is　a　question　only　of　the　subject　himself；　i。e。　of　his　own　convictions
conviction　which　alone　is　able　to　make　a　thing　good。　The　defect　here　is　that　everything　is　supposed
to　fall　within　the　orbit　of　conviction　alone　and　that　the　absolutely　right；　for　which　this　conviction
should　be　only　the　form；　no　longer　exists。　It　is　certainly　not　a　matter　of　indifference　whether　I　do
something　by　habit　and　custom　or　because　I　am　actuated　throughout　by　the　truth　which　underlies
these。　But　objective　truth　is　still　different　from　my　conviction；　because　conviction　lacks　the
distinction　between　good　and　evil。　Conviction　always　remains　conviction；　and　the　bad　could　only
be　that　of　which　I　am　not　convinced。　

Now　while　this　obliteration　of　good　and　evil　implies　a　very　lofty　attitude；　there　is　involved　in　this
attitude　the　admission　that　it　is　subject　to　error；　and　to　that　extent　it　is　brought　down　from　its
pedestal　into　mere　fortuitousness　and　seems　undeserving　of　respect。　Now　this　form　of　subjectivism
is　irony；　the　consciousness　that　this　principle　of　conviction　is　not　worth　much　and　that；　lofty
criterion　though　it　be；　it　is　only　caprice　that　governs　it。　This　attitude　is　really　a　product　of　Fichte's
philosophy；　which　proclaims　that　the　Ego　is　absolute；　i。e。　is　absolute　certainty；　the　'universal
self…hood'　which　advances　through　a　course　of　further　development　to　objectivity。　Of　Fichte
himself　it　cannot　property　be　said　that　he　made　subjective　caprice　a　guiding　principle　in　ethics；　but；
later　on；　this　principle　of　the　mere　particular；　in　the　sense　of　'particular　self…hood'；　was　deified　by
Friedrich　von　Schlegel　with　reference　to　the　good　and　the　beautiful。　As　a　result；　he　made　objective
goodness　only　an　image　of　my　conviction；　receiving　support　from　my　efforts　alone；　and　dependent
for　its　appearance　and　disappearance　on　me　as　its　lord　and　master。　If　I　relate　myself　to　something
objective；　it　vanishes　at　the　same　moment　before　my　eyes；　and　so　I　hover　over　a　pit　of
nothingness；　summoning　shapes　from　the　depths　and　annihilating　them。　This　supreme　type　of
subjectivism　can　emerge　only　in　a　period　of　advanced　culture　when　faith　has　lost　its　seriousness；