philosophy of right-第27章

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principle　determines　nothing　—　（see　§　134）　is　therefore　comprised　in　the　systematic　development
of　the　circle　of　ethical　necessity　which　follows　in　this　Third　Part。　The　difference　between　the
exposition　in　this　book　and　the　form　of　a　'doctrine　of　duties'　lies　solely　in　the　fact　that；　in　what
follows；　the　specific　types　of　ethical　life　turn　up　as　necessary　relationships；　there　the　exposition
ends；　without　being　supplemented　in　each　case　by　the　addition　that　'therefore　men　have　a　duty　to
conform　to　this　institution'。　

A　'doctrine　of　duties'　which　is　other　than　a　philosophical　science　takes　its　material　from　existing
relationships　and　shows　its　connection　with　the　moralist's　personal　notions　or　with　principles　and
thoughts；　purposes；　impulses；　feelings；　&c。；　that　are　forthcoming　everywhere；　and　as　reasons　for
accepting　each　duty　in　turn；　it　may　tack　on　its　further　consequences　in　their　bearing　on　the　other
ethical　relationships　or　on　welfare　and　opinion。　But　an　immanent　and　logical　'doctrine　of　duties'　can
be　nothing　except　the　serial　exposition　of　the　relationships　which　are　necessitated　by　the　Idea　of
freedom　and　are　therefore　actual　in　their　entirety；　to　within　the　state。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　149。

The　bond　of　duty　can　appear　as　a　restriction　only　on　indeterminate　subjectivity　or
abstract　freedom；　and　on　the　impulses　either　of　the　natural　will　or　of　the　moral
will　which　determines　its　indeterminate　good　arbitrarily。　The　truth　is；　however；
that　in　duty　the　individual　finds　his　liberation；　first；　liberation　from　dependence　on
mere　natural　impulse　and　from　the　depression　which　as　a　particular　subject　he
cannot　escape　in　his　moral　reflections　on　what　ought　to　be　and　what　might　be；
secondly；　liberation　from　the　indeterminate　subjectivity　which；　never　reaching
reality　or　the　objective　determinacy　of　action；　remains　self…enclosed　and　devoid　of
actuality。　In　duty　the　individual　acquires　his　substantive　freedom。　

Addition：　Duty　is　a　restriction　only　on　the　self…will　of　subjectivity。　It　stands　in　the　way　only　of
that　abstract　good　to　which　subjectivity　adheres。　When　we　say：　'We　want　to　be　free'；　the　primary
meaning　of　the　words　is　simply：　'We　want　abstract　freedom'；　and　every　institution　and　every　organ
of　the　state　passes　as　a　restriction　on　freedom　of　that　kind。　Thus　duty　is　not　a　restriction　on
freedom；　but　only　on　freedom　in　the　abstract；　i。e。　on　unfreedom。　Duty　is　the　attainment　of　our
essence；　the　winning　of　positive　freedom。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　150。

Virtue　is　the　ethical　order　reflected　in　the　individual　character　so　far　as　that
character　is　determined　by　its　natural　endowment。　When　virtue　displays　itself
solely　as　the　individual's　simple　conformity　with　the　duties　of　the　station　to　which
he　belongs；　it　is　rectitude。　

Remark：　In　an　ethical　community；　it　is　easy　to　say　what　man　must　do；　what　are　the　duties　he
has　to　fulfil　in　order　to　be　virtuous：　he　has　simply　to　follow　the　well…known　and　explicit　rules　of　his
own　situation。　Rectitude　is　the　general　character　which　may　be　demanded　of　him　by　law　or
custom。　But　from　the　standpoint　of　morality；　rectitude　often　seems　to　be　something　comparatively
inferior；　something　beyond　which　still　higher　demands　must　be　made　on　oneself　and　others；
because　the　craving　to　be　something　special　is　not　satisfied　with　what　is　absolute　and　universal；　it
finds　consciousness　of　peculiarity　only　in　what　is　exceptional。　

The　various　facets　of　rectitude　may　equally　well　be　called　virtues；　since　they　are　also　properties　of
the　individual；　although　not　specially　of　him　in　contrast　with　others。　Talk　about　virtue；　however；
readily　borders　on　empty　rhetoric；　because　it　is　only　about　something　abstract　and　indeterminate；
and　furthermore；　argumentative　and　expository　talk　of　the　sort　is　addressed　to　the　individual　as　to
a　being　of　caprice　and　subjective　inclination。　In　an　existing　ethical　order　in　which　a　complete
system　of　ethical　relations　has　been　developed　and　actualised；　virtue　in　the　strict　sense　of　the　word
is　in　place　and　actually　appears　only　in　exceptional　circumstances　or　when　one　obligation　clashes
with　another。　The　clash；　however；　must　be　a　genuine　one；　because　moral　reflection　can
manufacture　clashes　of　all　sorts　to　suit　its　purpose　and　give　itself　a　consciousness　of　being
something　special　and　having。　made　sacrifices。　It　is　for　this　reason　that　the　phenomenon　of　virtue
proper　is　commoner　when　societies　and　communities　are　uncivilised；　since　in　those　circumstances
ethical　conditions　and　their　actualisation　are　more　a　matter　of　private　choice　or　the　natural　genius
of　an　exceptional　individual。　For　instance；　it　was　especially　to　Hercules　that　the　ancients　ascribed
virtue。　In　the　states　of　antiquity；　ethical　life　had　not　grown　into　this　free　system　of　an　objective
order　self…subsistently　developed；　and　consequently　it　was　by　the　personal　genius　of　individuals
that　this　defect　had　to　be　made　good。　It　follows　that　if　a　'doctrine　of　virtues'　is　not　a　mere　'doctrine
of　duties'；　and　if　therefore　it　embraces　the　particular　facet　of　character；　the　facet　grounded　in
natural　endowment；　it　will　be　a　natural　history　of　mind。　

Since　virtues　are　ethical　principles　applied　to　the　particular；　and　since　in　this　their　subjective　aspect
they　are　something　indeterminate；　there　turns　up　here　for　determining　them　the　quantitative
principle　of　more　or　less。　The　result　is　that　consideration　of　them　introduces　their　corresponding
defects　or　vices；　as　in　Aristotle；　who　defined　each　particular　virtue　as　strictly　a　mean　between　an
excess　and　a　deficiency。　

The　content　which　assumes　the　form　of　duties　and　then　virtues　is　the　same　as　that　which　also　has
the　form　of　impulses　（see　Remark　to　§　19）。　Impulses　have　the　same　basic　content　as　duties　and
virtues；　but　in　impulses　this　content　still　belongs　to　the　immediate　will　and　to　instinctive　feeling；　it
has　not　been　developed　to　the　point　of；　becoming　ethical。　Consequently；　impulses　have　in　common
with　the　content　of　duties　and　virtues　only　the　abstract　object　on　which　they　are　directed；　an
object　indeterminate　in　itself；　and　so　devoid　of　anything　to　discriminate　them　as　good　or　evil。　Or　in
other　words；　impulses；　considered　abstractly　in　their　positive　aspect　alone；　are　good；　while；
considered　abstractly　in　their　negative　aspect　alone；　they　are　evil　（see　§　18）。　

Addition：　To　conform　to　the　ethical　order　on　this　or　that　particular　occasion　is　hardly　enough　to
make　a　man　virtuous；　he　is　virtuous　only　when　this　mode　of　behaviour　is　a　fixed　element　in　his
character。　Virtue　is　rather　like　ethical　virtuosity；　＇Heroes　（'ethical　virtuosi'）　lived　in　uncivilised
conditions　（see　Addition　to　§　93）　and　there　was　no　ethical　life　in　society　as　they　found　it；　but　since
they　introduced　ethical　institutions　for　the　first　time　（see　Remarks　to　§§　167　and　203）；　they
displayed　virtue　as　a　kind　of　virtuosity。　Nowadays；　ethical　life　is　common　to　everyone　and　consists
in　conformity　to　the　existing　order；　not　in　divergence　from　it。＇　and　the　reason　why　we　speak　of
virtue　less　nowadays　than　formerly　is　that　ethical　living　is　less　like　the　form　of　a　particular
individuals　character。　The　French　are　par　excellence　the　people　who　speak　most　of　virtue；　and
the　reason　is　that　amongst　them　ethical　life　in　the　individuals　is　more　a　matter　of　his　own
idiosyncrasies　or　a　natural　mode　of　conduct。　The　Germans；　on　the　other　hand；　are　more
thoughtful；　and　amongst　them　the　same　content　acquires　the　form　of　universality。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　151。

But　when　individuals　are　simply　identified　with　the　actual　order；　ethical　life　（das
Sittliche）　appears　as　their　general　mode　of　conduct；　i。e。　as　custom　（Sitte）；　while
the　habitual　practice　of　ethical　living　appears　as　a　second　nature　which；　put　in　the
place　of　the　initial；　purely　natural　will；　is　the　soul　of　custom　permeating　it　through
and　through；　the　significance　and　the　actuality　of　its　existence。　It　is　mind　living
and　present　as　a　world；　and　the　substance　of　mind　thus　exists　now　for　the　first
time　as　mind。　

Addition：　Just　as　nature　has　its　laws；　and　as　animals；　trees；　and　the　sun　fulfil　their　law；　so
custom　（Sitte）　is　the　law　appropriate　to　free　mind。　Right　and　morality　are　not　yet　what　ethics
（Sitte）　is；　namely　mind。　In　right；　particularity　is　still　not　the　particularity　of　the　concept；　but　only　that
of　the　natural　will。　So；　too；　at　the　standpoint　of　morality；　self…consciousness　is　not　yet　mind's
consciousness　of　itself。　At　that　level　it　is　only　the　worth　of　the　subject　in　himself　that　is　in　question；
i。e。　the　subject　who　determines　himself　by　reference　to　good　in　contrast　with　evil；　who　still　has
self…will　as　the　form　of　his　willing。　Here；　however；　at　the　standpoint　of　ethics；　the　will　is　mind's　will
and　it　has　a　content　which　is　substantive　and　in　conformity　with　itself。　

Education　is　the　art　of　making　men　ethical。　It　begins　with　pupils　whose　life　is　at　the　instinctive　level
and　shows　them　the　way　to　a　second　birth；　the　way　to　change　their　instinctive　nature　into　a
second；　intellectual；　nature；　and　makes　this　intellectual　level　habitual　to　them。　At　this　point　the　clash
between　the　natural　and　the　subjective　will　disappears；　the　subject's　internal　struggle　dies　away。　To
this　extent；　habit　is　part　of　ethical　life　as　it　is　of　philosophic　thought　also；　since　such　thought
demands　that　mind　be　trained　against　capricious　fancies；　and　that　these　be　destroyed　and
overcome　to　leave　the　way　clear　for　rational　thinking。　It　is　true　that　a　man　is　killed　by　habit；　i。e。　if
he　has　once　come　to　feel　completely　at　home　in　life；　if　he　has　become　mentally　and　physically　dull；
and　if　the　clash　between　subjective　consciousness　and　mental　activity　has　disappeared；　for　man　is
active　only　in　so　far　as　he　has　not　attained　his　end　and　wills　to　develop　his　potentialities　and
vindicate　himself　in　struggling　to　attain　it。　When　this　has　been　fully　achieved；　activity　and　vitality　are
at　an　end；　and　the　result　…　loss　of　interest　in　life　…　is　mental　or　physical　death。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　152。

In　this　way　the　ethical　substantial　order　has　attained　its　right；　and　its　right　its
validity。　That　is　to　say；　the　self…will　of　the　individual　has　vanished　together　with
his　private　conscience　which　had　claimed　independence　and　opposed　itself　to　the
ethical　substance。　For；　when　his　character　is　ethical；　he　recognises　as　the　end
which　moves　him　to　act　the　universal　which　is　itself　unmoved　but　is　disclosed　in
its　specific　determinations　as　rationality　actualised。　He　knows　that　his　own　dignity
and　the　whole　stability　of　his　particular　ends　are　grounded　in　this　same　universal；
and　it　is　therein　that　he　actually　attains　these。　Subjectivity　is　itself　the　absolute
form　and　existent　actuality　of　the　substantial　order；　and　the　distinction　between
subject　on　the　one　hand　and　substance　on　the　other；　as　the　object；　end；　and
controlling　power　of　the　subject；　is　the　same　as；　and　has　vanished　directly　along
with；　the　distinction　between　them　in　form。　

Remark：　Subjectivity。　is　the　ground　wherein　the　concept　of　freedom　is　realised　（see　§　106）。　At
the　level　of　morality；　subjectivity　is　still　distinct　from　freedom；　the　concept　of　subje