philosophy of right-第32章

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unethical　consequences　of　giving　the　head　of　a　Roman　family　the　right　to　name　whom　he　pleased
as　his　heir。　

Marriage　is　ethical　life　at　the　level　of　immediacy；　in　the　very　nature　of　the　case；　therefore；　it　must
be　a　mixture　of　a　substantial　tie　with　natural　contingency　and　inner　arbitrariness。　Now　when　by　the
slave…status　of　children；　by　legal　provisions　such　as　those　mentioned　above　as　well　as　others
consequential　upon　them；　and　in　addition　by　the　ease　of　Roman　divorce；　pride　of　place　is　given　to
arbitrariness　instead　of　to　the　right　of　the　substantial　（so　that　even　Cicero　…　and　what　fine　writing
about　the　Honestum　and　Decorum　there　is　in　his　De　Officiis　and　in　all　sorts　of　other　places！　…
even　Cicero　divorced　his　wife　as　a　business　speculation　in　order　to　pay　his　debts　with　his　new
wife's　dowry）；　then　a　legal　road　is　paved　to　the　corruption　of　manners；　or　rather　the　laws
themselves　necessitate　such　corruption。　

The　institution　of　heirs…at…law　with　a　view　to　preserving　the　family　and　its　splendour　by　means　of
fideicommissa　and　substitutiones　（in　order　to　favour　sons　by　excluding　daughters　from　inheriting；
or　to　favour　the　eldest　son　by　excluding　the　other　children）　is　an　infringement　of　the　principle　of　the
freedom　of　property　（see　§　62）；　like　the　admission　of　any　other　inequality　in　the　treatment　of　heirs。
And　besides；　such　an　institution　depends　on　an　arbitrariness　which　in　and　by　itself　has　no　right　to
recognition；　or　more　precisely　on　the　thought　of　wishing　to　preserve　intact　not　so　much　this　family
but　rather　this　clan　or　'house'。　Yet　it　is　not　this　clan　or　'house'；　but　the　family　proper　which　is　the
Idea　and　which　therefore　possesses　the　right　to　recognition；　and　both　the　ethical　disposition　and
family　trees　are　much　more　likely　to　be　preserved　by　freedom　of　property　and　equality　of
inheritance　than　by　the　reverse　of　these。　

Institutions　of　this　kind；　like　the　Roman；　wholly　ignore　the　right　due　to　marriage；　because　by　a
marriage　the　foundation　of　a　unique　actual　family　is　eo　ipso　completed　（see　§　172）；　and　because
what　is　called；　in　contrast　with　the　new　family；　the　family　in　the　wide　sense；　i。e。　the　stirps　or　gens；
becomes　only　an　abstraction　（see　§　177）　growing　less　and　less　actual　the　further　it　recedes　into
the　background　as　one　generation　succeeds　another。　Love；　the　ethical　moment　in　marriage；　is　by
its　very　nature　a　feeling　for　actual　living　individuals；　not　for　an　abstraction。　This　abstraction　of　the
Understanding　＇the　gens＇　appears　in　history　as　the　principle　underlying　the　contribution　of　the
Roman　Empire　to　world　history　（see　§　357）。　In　the　higher　sphere　of　the　state；　a　right　of
primogeniture　arises　together　with　estates　rigidly　entailed；　it　arises；　however；　not　arbitrarily　but　as
the　inevitable　outcome　of　the　Idea　of　the　state。　On　this　point　see　below；　§　306。　

Addition：　In　earlier　times；　a　Roman　father　had　the　right　to　disinherit　his　children　and　even　kill
them。　Later　he　lost　both　these　rights。　Attempts　were　made　to　forge　into　a　legal　system　this
incoherence　between　unethical　institutions　and　devices　to　rob　them　of　that　character；　and　it　is　the
retention　of　this　incoherence　which　constitutes　the　deficiency　and　difficulty　of　the　German　law　of
inheritance。　To　be　sure；　the　right　to　make　a　will　must　be　conceded；　but　in　conceding　it　our　point　of
view　must　be　that　this　right　of　free　choice　arises　or　is　magnified　with　the　dispersion　and
estrangement　of　the　members　of　the　family。　Further；　the　so…called　'family　of　friends'　which
testamentary　disposition　brings　with　it　may　be　admitted　only　in　defect　of　members　of　the　family
proper；　i。e。　of　spouse　and　children。　To　make　a　will　at　all　entails　something　obnoxious　and
disagreeable；　because　in　making　it　I　reveal　the　names　of　my　favourites。　Favour；　however；　is
arbitrary；　it　may　be　gained　surreptitiously　by　a　variety　of　expedients；　it　may　depend　on　all　sorts　of
foolish　reasons；　and　as　a　condition　of　having　his　name　included　in　a　will；　a　beneficiary　may　be
required　to　subject　himself　to　the　most　abject　servilities。　In　England；　the　home　of　all　sorts　of
eccentricity；　there　is　no　end　to　the　folly　and　whimsicality　of　bequests。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Transition　of　the　Family　into　Civil　Society

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　181。　

The　family　disintegrates　（both　essentially；　through　the　working　of　the　principle　of
personality；　and　also　in　the　course　of　nature）　into　a　plurality　of　families；　each　of
which　conducts　itself　as　in　principle　a　self…subsistent　concrete　person　and
therefore　as　externally　related　to　its　neighbours。　In　other　words；　the　moments
bound　together　in　the　unity　of　the　family；　since　the　family　is　the　ethical　Idea　still
in　its　concept；　must　be　released　from　the　concept　to　self…subsistent　objective
reality。　This　is　the　stage　of　difference。　This　gives　us；　to　use　abstract　language　in
the　first　place；　the　determination　of　particularity　which　is　related　to　universality
but　in　such　a　way　that　universality　is　its　basic　principle；　though　still　only　an　inward
principle；　for　that　reason；　the　universal　merely　shows　in　the　particular　as　its　form。
Hence　this　relation　of　reflection　prima　facie　portrays　the　disappearance　of　ethical
life　or；　since　this　life　as　the　essence　necessarily　shows　itself；　this　relation
constitutes　the　world　of　ethical　appearance　…　civil　society。　

Remark：　The　expansion　of　the　family；　as　its　transition　into　a　new　principle；　is　in　the　external
world　sometimes　its　peaceful　expansion　until　it　becomes　a　people；　i。e。　a　nation；　which　thus　has　a
common　natural　origin；　or　sometimes　the　federation　of　scattered　groups　of　families　under　the
influence　of　an　overlord's　power　or　as　a　result　of　a　voluntary　association　produced　by　the　tie　of
needs　and　the　reciprocity　of　their　satisfaction。　

Addition：　The；　starting…point　for　the　universal　here　is　the　self…subsistence　of　the　particular；　and
the　ethical　order　seems　therefore　to　be　lost　at　this　point；　since　it　is　precisely　the　identity　of　the
family　which　consciousness　takes　to　be　the　primary　thing；　the　divine；　and　the　source　of　obligation。
Now；　however；　a　situation　arises　in　which　the　particular　is　to　be　my　primary　determining　principle；
and　thus　my　determinacy　by　ethical　factors　has　been　annulled。　But　this　is　nothing　but　a　pure
mistake；　since；　while　I　suppose　that　I　am　adhering　to　the　particular；　the　universal　and　the　necessity
of　the　link　between　particulars　remains　the　primary　and　essential　thing。　I　am　thus　altogether　on　the
level　of　show；　and　while　my　particularity　remains　my　determining　principle；　i。e。　my　end；　I　am　for
that　very　reason　the　servant　of　the　universal　which　properly　retains　power　over　me　in　the　last
resort。　




Third　Part：　Ethical　Life
　　　　　　　　　　　　　ii　Civil　Society

　　　　　　　　　A：　System　of　needs　B：　Justice　C：　Corporations


　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　182。

The　concrete　person；　who　is　himself　the　object　of　his　particular　aims；　is；　as　a
totality　and　a　mixture　of　caprice　and　physical　necessity；　one　principle　of　civil
society。　But　the　particular　person　is　essentially　so　related　to　other　particular
persons　that　each　establishes　himself　and　finds　satisfaction　by　means　of　the
others；　and　at　the　same　time　purely　and　simply　by　means　of　the　form　of
universality；　the　second　principle　here。　

　　　　　Addition：　Civil　society　is　the　＇stage　of＇　difference　which　intervenes　between　the　family　and
the　state；　even　if　its　formation　follows　later　in　time　than　that　of　the　state；　because；　as　＇the　stage　of＇
difference；　it　presupposes　the　state；　to　subsist　itself；　it　must　have　the　state　before　its　eyes　as
something　self…subsistent。　Moreover；　the　creation　of　civil　society　is　the　achievement　of　the　modern
world　which　has　for　the　first　time　given　all　determinations　of　the　Idea　their　due。　If　the　state　is
represented　as　a　unity　of　different　persons；　as　a　unity　which　is　only　a　partnership；　then　what　is
really　meant　is　only　civil　society。　Many　modem　constitutional　lawyers　have　been　able　to　bring
within　their　purview　no　theory　of　the　state　but　this。　In　civil　society　each　member　is　his　own　end；
everything　else　is　nothing　to　him。　But　except　in　contact　with　others　he　cannot　attain　the　whole
compass　of　his　ends；　and　therefore　these　others　are　means　to　the　end　of　the　particular　member。　A
particular　end；　however；　assumes　the　form　of　universality　through　this　relation　to　other　people；　and
it　is　attained　in　the　simultaneous　attainment　of　the　welfare　of　others。　Since　particularity　is　inevitably
conditioned　by　universality；　the　whole　sphere　of　civil　Society　is　the　territory　of　mediation　where
there　is　free　play　for　every　idiosyncrasy；　every　talent；　every　accident　of　birth　and　fortune；　and
where　waves　of　every　passion　gush　forth；　regulated　only　by　reason　glinting　through　them。
Particularity；　restricted　by　universality；　is　the　only　standard　whereby　each　particular　member
promotes　his　welfare。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　183。

In　the　course　of　the　actual　attainment　of　selfish　ends　—　an　attainment　conditioned
in　this　way　by　universality　—　there　is　formed　a　system　of　complete
interdependence；　wherein　the　livelihood；　happiness；　and　legal　status　of　one　man　is
interwoven　with　the　livelihood；　happiness；　and　rights　of　all。　On　this　system；
individual　Happiness；　&c。；　depend；　and　only　in　this　connected　system　are　they
actualised　and　secured。　This　system　may　be　prima　facie　regarded　as　the　external
state；　the　state　based　on　need；　the　state　as　the　Understanding　envisages　it。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　184。

The　Idea　in　this　its　stage　of　division　imparts　to　each　of　its　moments　a
characteristic　embodiment；　to　particularity　it　gives　the　right　to　develop　and　launch
forth　in　all　directions；　and　to　universality　the　right　to　prove　itself　not　only　the
ground　and　necessary　form　of　particularity；　but　also　the　authority　standing　over　it
and　its　final　end。　It　is　the　system　of　the　ethical　order；　split　into　its　extremes　and
lost；　which　constitutes　the　Idea’s　abstract　moment；　its　moment　of　reality。　Here
the　Idea　is　present　only　as　a　relative　totality　and　as　the　inner　necessity　behind　this
outward　appearance。　

Addition：　Here　ethical　life　is　split　into　its　extremes　and　lost；　the　immediate　unity　of　the　family　has
fallen　apart　into　a　plurality。　Reality　here　is　externality；　the　decomposing　of　the　concept；　the
self…subsistence　of　its　moments　which　have　now　won　their　freedom　and　their　determinate
existence。　Though　in　civil　society　universal　and　particular　have　fallen　apart；　yet　both　are　still
reciprocally　bound　together　and　conditioned。　While　each　of　them　seems　to　do　just　the　opposite　to
the　other　and　supposes　that　it　can　exist　only　by　keeping　the　other　at　arm’s　length；　none　the　less
each　still　conditions　the　other。　Thus；　for　example；　most　people　regard　the　paying　of　taxes　as
injurious　to　their　particular　interest；　as　something　inimical　and　obstructive　of　their　own　ends。　Yet；
however　true　this　seems；　particular　ends　cannot　be　attained　without　the　help　of　the　universal；　and　a
country　where　no　taxes　were　paid　could　not　be　singled　out　as　invigorating　its　citizens。　Similarly；　it
might　seem　that　universal　ends　would　be　more　readily　attainable　if　the　universal　absorbed　the
strength　of　the　particulars　in　the　way　described；　fo