philosophy of right-第39章

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　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（c）　The　Court　of　Justice
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　219。

By　taking　the　form　of　law；　right　steps　into　a　determinate　mode　of　being。　It　is　then
something　on　its　own　account；　and　in　contrast　with　particular　willing　and　opining
of　the　right；　it　is　self…subsistent　and　has　to　vindicate　itself　as　something　universal。；
This　is　achieved　by　recognising　it　and　making　it　actual　in　a　particular　case　without
the　subjective　feeling　of　private　interest；　and　this　is　the　business　of　a　public
authority　—　the　court　of　justice。　

Remark：　The　historical　origin　of　the　judge　and　his　court　may　have　had　the　form　of　a　patriarch’s
gift　to　his　people　or　of　force　or　free　choice；　but　this　makes　no　difference　to　the　concept　of　the
thing。　To　regard　the　introduction　of　a　legal　system　as　no　more　than　an　optional　act　of　grace　or
favour　on　the　part　of　monarchs　and　governments　（as　Herr　von　Haller　does　in　his　Restauration　der
Staatswissenschaft）　is　a　piece　of　the　mere　thoughtlessness　which　has　no　inkling　of　the　point　at
issue　in　a　discussion　of　law　and　the　state。　The　point　is　that　legal　and　political　institutions　are　rational
in　principle　and　therefore　absolutely　necessary；　and　the　question　of　the　form　in　which　they　arose　or
were　introduced　is　entirely　irrelevant　to　a　consideration　of　their　rational　basis。　

At　the　other　extreme　from　Herr　von　Haller’s　point　of　view　is　the　barbarous　nation　that　the
administration　of　justice　is　now；　as　it　was　in　the　days　when　might　was　right；　an　improper　exercise
of　force；　a　suppression　of　freedom；　and　a　despotism。　The　administration　of　justice　must　be
regarded　as　the　fulfilment　of　a　duty　by　the　public　authority；　no　less　than　as　the　exercise　of　a　right；
and　so　far　as　it　is　a　right；　it　does　not　depend　upon　an　optional　delegation　to　one　authority　by　the
individual　members　of　society。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　220。

When　the　right　against　crime　has　the　form　of　revenge　（see　§　102）；　it　is　only　right
implicit；　not　right　in　the　form　of　right；　i。e。　no　act　of　revenge　is　justified。　Instead　of
the　injured　party；　the　injured　universal　now　comes　on　the　scene；　and　this　has　its
proper　actuality　in　the　court　of　law。　It　takes　over　the　pursuit　and　the　avenging　of
crime；　and　this　pursuit　consequently　ceases　to　be　the　subjective　and　contingent
retribution　of　revenge　and　is　transformed　into　the　genuine　reconciliation　of　right
with　itself；　i。e。　into　punishment。　Objectively；　this　is　the　reconciliation　of　the　law
with　itself；　by　the　annulment　of　the　crime；　the　law　is　restored　and　its　authority　is
thereby　actualised。　Subjectively；　it　is　the　reconciliation　of　the　criminal　with
himself；　i。e。　with　the　law　known　by　him　as　his　own　and　as　valid　for　him　and　his
protection；　when　this　law　is　executed　upon　him；　he　himself　finds　in　this　process
the　satisfaction　of　justice　and　nothing　save　his　own　act。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　221。

A　member　of　civil　society　has　the　right　in　judicio　stare　and；　correspondingly；　the
duty　of　acknowledging　the　jurisdiction　of　the　court　and　accepting　its　decision　as
final　when　his　own　rights　are　in　dispute。　

Addition：　Since　any　individual　has　the　right　in　judicio　stare；　he　must　also　know　what　the　law　is
or　otherwise　this　privilege　would　be　useless　to　him。　But　it　is　also　his　duty　to　stand　his　trial。　Under
the　feudal　system；　the　nobles　often　refused　to　stand　their　trial。　They　defied　the　court　and　alleged
that　the　court　was　wrong　to　demand　their　appearance。　Feudal　conditions；　however；　contravened
the　very　idea　of　a　court。　Nowadays　monarchs　have　to　recognise　the　jurisdiction　of　the　court　in
their　private　affairs；　and　in　free　states　they　commonly　lose　their　case。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　222。

In　court　the　specific　character　which　rightness　acquires　is　that　it　must　be
demonstrable。　When　parties　go　to　law；　they　are　put　in　the　position　of　having　to
make　good　their　evidence　and　their　claims　and　to　make　the　judge　acquainted　with
the　facts。　These　steps　in　a　legal　process　are　themselves　rights；　and　their　course
must　therefore　be　fixed　by　law。　They　also　constitute　an　essential　part　of
jurisprudence。　

Addition：　A　man　may　be　indignant　if　a　right　which　he　knows　he　has　is　refused　him　because　he
cannot　prove　it。　But　if　I　have　a　right；　it　must　at　the　same　time　be　a　right　posited　in　law。　I　must　be
able　to　explain　and　prove　it；　and　its　validity　can　only　be　recognised　in　society　if　its　rightness　in
principle　is　also　made　a　posited　rightness　in　law。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　223。

These　steps　in　a　legal　process　are　subdivided　continually　within　no　fixed　limits
into　more　and　more　actions；　each　being　distinct　in　itself　and　a　right。　Hence　a　legal
process；　in；　itself　in　any　case　a　means；　now　begins　to　be　something　external　to　its
end　and　contrasted　with　it。　This　long　course　of　formalities　is　a　right　of　the　parties
at　law　and　they　have　the　right　to　traverse　it　from　beginning　to　end。　Still；　it　may　be
turned　into　an　evil；　and　even　an　instrument　of　wrong；　and　for　this　reason　it　is　by
law　made　the　duty　of　the　parties　to　submit　themselves　to　the　simple　process　of
arbitration　（before　a　tribunal　of　arbitrators）　and　to　the　attempt　to　reconcile　their
differences　out　of　court；　in　order　that　they　—　and　right　itself；　as　the　substance　of
the　thing　and　so　the　thing　really　at　issue　may　be　protected　against　legal　processes
and　their　misuse。　

Remark：　Equity　involves　a　departure　from　formal　rights　owing　to　moral　or　other　considerations
and　is　concerned　primarily　with　the　content　of　the　lawsuit。　A　court　of　equity；　however；　comes　to
mean　a　court　which　decides　in　a　single　case　without　insisting　on　the　formalities　of　a　legal　process
or；　in　particular；　on　the　objective　evidence　which　the　letter　of　the　law　may　require。　Further；　it
decides　on　the　merits　of　the　single　case　as　a　unique　one；　not　with　a　view　to　disposing　of　it　in　such　a
way　as　to　create　a　binding　legal　precedent　for　the　future。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　224。

Amongst　the　rights　of　the　subjective　consciousness　are　not　only　the　publication　of
the　laws　（see　§　215）　but　also　the　possibility　of　ascertaining　the　actualisation　of　the
law　in　a　particular　case　（the　course　of　the　proceedings；　the　legal　argument；　&c。）
—　i。e。　the　publicity　of　judicial　proceedings。　The　reason　for　this　is　that　a　trial　is
implicitly　an　event　of　universal　validity；　and　although　the　particular　content　of　the
action　affects　the　interests　of　the　parties　alone；　its　universal　content；　i。e。　the　right
at　issue　and　the　judgment　thereon；　affects　the　interests　of　everybody。　

Remark：　If　the　members　of　the　bench　deliberate　amongst　themselves　about　the　judgment　which
they　are　to　deliver；　such　deliberations　express　opinions　and　views　still　personal　and　so　naturally　are
not　public。　

Addition：　It　is　straightforward　common　sense　to　hold　that　the　publicity　of　legal　proceedings　is
right　and　just。　A　strong　reason　against　such　publicity　has　always　been　the　rank　of　justices；　they　are
unwilling　to　sit　in　public　and　they　regard　themselves　as　a　sanctuary　of　law　which　laymen　are　not　to
enter。　But　an　integral　part　of　justice　is　the　confidence　which　citizens　have　in　it；　and　it　is　this　which
requires　that　proceedings　shall　be　public。　The　right　of　publicity　depends　on　the　fact　that　（i）　the　aim
of　the　court　is　justice；　which　as　universal　falls　under　the　cognisance　of　everyone；　and　（ii）　it　is
through　publicity　that　the　citizens　become　convinced　that　the　judgment　was　actually　just。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　225。

By　the　judgment　of　the　court；　the　law　is　applied　to　a　single　case；　and　the　work　of
judgment　has　two　distinct　aspects：　first；　ascertainment　of　the　nature　of　the　case　as
a　unique；　single；　occurrence　（e。g。　whether　a　contract；　&c。；　&c。；　has　been　made；
whether　a　trespass　has　been　committed；　and　if　so　by　whom）　and；　in　criminal
cases；　reflection　to　determine　the　essential；　criminal；　—　character　of　the　deed　（see
Remark　to　§　119）；　secondly；　the　subsumption　of　the　case　under　the　law　that　right
must　be　restored。　Punishment　in　criminal　cases　is　a　conception　falling　under　this
law。　Decisions　on　these　two　different　aspects　are　given　by　different　functionaries。　

Remark：　In　the　Roman　judicial　system；　this　distinction　of　functions　appeared　in　that　the　Praetor
pronounced　judgment　on　the　assumption　that　the　facts　were　so　and　so；　and　then　appointed　a
special　judex　to　inquire　into　the　facts。　

In　English　law；　it　is　left　to　the　insight　or　option　of　the　prosecutor　to　determine　the　precise　character
of　a　criminal　act　（e。g。　whether　it　is　murder　or　manslaughter）　and　the　court　is　powerless　to　alter　the
indictment　if　it　finds　the　prosecutor’s　choice　wrong。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　226。

First；　the　conduct　of　the　entire　process　of　inquiry；　secondly；　the　detailed　stages　of
the　action　between　the　parties　（these　stages　themselves　being　rights　—　see　§　222）；
and　then　also　the　second　of　the　aspects　of　the　work　of　judgment　mentioned　in　the
previous　Paragraph；　are　all　a　task　which　properly　belongs　to　the　judge　at　law。　He
is　the　organ　of　the　law；　and　the　case　must　be　‘prepared　for　him　in　such　a　way　as
to　make　possible　its　subsumption　founder　some　principle；　that　is　to　say；　it　must　be
stripped　of　its　。apparent；　empirical；　character　and　exalted　into　a　recognised　fact　of
a　general　type。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　227。

The　first　aspect　of　the　work　of　judgment；　i。e。　the　knowledge　of　the　facts　of　the
case　as　a　unique；　single；　occurrence；　and　the　description　of　its　general　character；
involves　in　itself　no　pronouncement　on　points　of　law。　This　is　knowledge　attainable
by　any　educated　man。　In　settling　the　character　of　an　action；　the　subjective
moment；　i。e。　the　agent’s　insight　and　intention　（see　the　Second　Part）；　is　the
essential　thing；　and　apart　from　this；　the　proof　depends　not　on　objects　of　reason　or
abstractions　of　the　Understanding；　but　only　on　single　details　and　circumstances；
objects　of　sensuous　intuition　and　subjective　certainty；　and　therefore　does　not
contain　in　itself　any　absolute；　objective；　probative　factor。　It　follows　that　judgment
on　the　facts　lies　in　the　last　resort　with　subjective　conviction　and　conscience
（animi　sententia）；　while　the　proof；　resting　as　it　does　on　the　statements　and
affidavits　of　others；　receives　its　final　though　purely　subjective　verification　from
the　oath。　

Remark：　In　this　matter　it　is　of　the　first　importance　to　fix　our　eyes　on　the　type　of　proof　here　in
question　and　to　distinguish　it　from　knowledge　and　proof　of　another　sort。　To　establish　by　proof　a
rational　category；　like　the　concept　of　right　itself；　means　to　apprehend　its　necessity；　and　so
demands　a　method　other　than　that　requisite　for　the　proof　of　a　geometrical　theorem。　Further；　in　this
latter　case；　the　figure　is　determined　by　the　Understanding　and　made　abstract　in　advance　according
to　a　rule。　But　in　the　case　of　something　empirical　in　content；　like　a　fact；　the　material　of　knowledge　is
a　given　sensuous　intuition　and　subjective　sense…certainty；　and　statements　and　affidavits　about　such
material。　It　is　then　a　question　of　drawing　conclusions　and　putting　two　and　two　together　out　of
depositions　of　that　kind；　attestations　and　other　details；　&c。　The　objective　truth