philosophy of right-第50章

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Further；　if　the　state　is　to　come　into　existence　as　the　self…knowing　ethical　actuality　of　mind；　it　is
essential　that　its　form　should　be　distinct　from　that　of　authority　and　faith。　But　this　distinction　emerges
only　in　so　far　as　the　church　is　subjected　to　inward　divisions。　It　is　only　thereafter　that　the　state；　in
contrast　with　the　particular　sects；　has　attained　to　universality　of　thought　…　its　formal　principle　…　and
is　bringing　this　universality　into　existence。　（In　order　to　understand　this；　it　is　necessary　to　know　not
only　what　universality　is　in　itself；　but　also　what　its　existence　is。　Hence　so　far　from　its　being　or　its
having　been　a　misfortune　for　the　state　that　the　church　is　disunited；　it　is　only　as　a　result　of　that
disunion　that　the　state　has　been　able　to　reach　its　appointed　end　as　a　self…consciously　rational　and
ethical　organisation。　Moreover；　this　disunion　is　the　best　piece　of　good　fortune　which　could　have
befallen　either　the　church　or　thought　so　far　as　the　freedom　and　rationality　of　either　is　concerned）。　

Addition：　The　state　is　actual；　and　its　actuality　consists　in　this；　that　the　interest　of　the　whole　is
realised　in　and　through　particular　ends。　Actuality　is　always　the　unity　of　universal　and　particular；　the
universal　dismembered　in　the　particulars　which　seem　to　be　self…subsistent；　although　they　really　are
upheld　and　contained　only　in　the　whole。　Where　this　unity　is　not　present；　a　thing　is　not　actual　even
though　it　may　have　acquired　existence。　A　bad　state　is　one　which　merely　exists；　a　sick　body　exists
too；　but　it　has　no　genuine　reality。　A　hand　which　is　cut　off　still　looks　like　a　hand；　and　it　exists；　but
without　being　actual。　Genuine　actuality　is　necessity；　what　is　actual　is　inherently　necessary。
Necessity　consists　in　this；　that　the　whole　is　sundered　into　the　differences　of　the　concept　and　that
this　divided　whole　yields　a　fixed　and　permanent　determinacy；　though　one　which　is　not　fossilised　but
perpetually　recreates　itself　in　its　dissolution。　

To　a　mature　state　thought　and　consciousness　essentially　belong。　Therefore　the　state　knows　what　it
wills　and　knows　it　as　something　thought。　Now　since　knowing　has　its　seat　in　the　state；　the　seat　of
science　must　be　there　too　and　not　in　the　church。　Despite　this；　it　is　often　said　nowadays　that　the
state　must　grow　out　of　religion。　The　state　is　mind　fully　mature　and　it　exhibits　its　moments　in　the
daylight　of　consciousness。　Now　the　fact　that　what　is　hidden　in　the　Idea　steps　forth　into　objective
existence　gives　the　state　the　appearance　of　something　finite；　and　so　the　state　reveals　itself　as　a
domain　of　worldliness；　while　religion　displays　itself　as　a　domain　of　the　infinite。　If　this　be　so；　the
state　seems　to　be　the　subordinate；　and　since　what　is　finite　cannot　stand　on　its　own　feet；　the　state　is
therefore　said　to　need　the　church　as　its　basis。　As　finite；　it　lacks　justification；　and　it　is　only　through
religion　that　it　can　become　sacrosanct　and　pertain　to　the　infinite。　This　handling　of　the　matter；
however；　is　supremely　one…sided。　Of　course　the　state　is　essentially　worldly　and　finite；　it　has
particular　ends　and　particular　powers；　but　its　worldly　character　is　only　one　of　its　aspects；　and　it　is
only　to　an　unintelligent　superficial　glance　that　it　is　finite　and　nothing　more。　For　the　state　has　a
life…giving　soul；　and　the　soul　which　animates　it　is　subjectivity；　which　creates　differences　and　yet　at
the　same　time　holds　them　together　in　unity。　In　the　realm　of　religion　too　there　are　distinctions　and
limitations。　God；　it　is　said；　is　triune；　thus　there　are　three　persons　whose　unity　alone　is　Spirit　（Geist）。
Therefore　to　apprehend　the　nature　of　God　concretely　is　to　apprehend　it　through　distinctions　alone。
Hence　in　the　kingdom　of　God　there　are　limitations；　just　as　there　are　in　the　world；　and　to　hold　that
mind　（Geist）　on　earth；　i。e。　the　state；　is　only　a　finite　mind；　is　a　one…sided　view；　since　there　is　nothing
irrational　about　actuality。　Of　course　a　bad　state　is　worldly　and　finite　and　nothing　else；　but　the
rational　state　is　inherently　infinite。　

Secondly；　it　is　averred　that　the　state　must　deny　e　its　justification　from　religion。　In　religion；　the　Idea
is　mind　in　the　inwardness　of　the　heart；　but　it　is　this　same　Idea　which　gives　itself　a　worldly　form　as
the　state　and　fashions　for　itself　an　embodiment　and　an　actuality　in　knowing　and　willing。　Now　if　you
say　that　the　state　must　be　grounded　on　religion；　you　may　mean　that　it　should　rest　on　rationality　and
arise　out　of　it；　but　your　statement　may　also　be　misunderstood　to　mean　that　men　are　most　adroitly
schooled　to　obedience　if　their　minds　are　shackled　by　a　slavish　religion。　（The　Christian　religion；
however；　is　the　religion　of　freedom；　though　it　must　be　admitted　that　this　religion　may　become
changed　in　character　and　perverted　from　freedom　to　bondage　when　it　is　infected　with
superstition。）　Now　if　you　mean　that　men　must　have　religion　so　that　their　minds；　already　shackled；
may　the　more　easily　be　oppressed　by　the　state；　then　the　purport　of　your　statement　is　bad。　But　if
you　mean　that　men　ought　to　respect　the　state；　this　whole　whose　limbs　they　are；　then　of　course　the
best　means　of　effecting　this　is　to　give　them　philosophical　insight　into　the　essence　of　the　state；
though；　in　default　of　that；　a　religious　frame　of　mind　may　lead　to　the　same　result。　For　this　reason；　the
state　may　have　need　of　religion　and　faith。　But　the　state　remains　essentially　distinct　from　religion；
since　whatever　it　claims；　it　claims　in　the　form　of　a　legal　duty；　and　it　is　a　matter　of　indifference　to　it　in
what　spirit　that　duty　is　performed。　The　field　of　religion；　on　the　other　hand；　is　the　inner　life；　and　just
as　the　state　would　jeopardise　the　right　of　that　life　if；　like　religion；　it　made　claims　on　it；　so　also　when
the　church　acts　like　a　state　and　imposes　penalties；　it　degenerates　into　a　religion　of　tyranny。　

A　third　difference　which　is　connected　with　the　foregoing　is　that　the　content　of　religion　is　and
remains　veiled；　and　consequently　religion's　place　is　in　the　field　of　the　heart；　feeling；　and
representative　thinking。　In　this　field　everything　has　the　form　of　subjectivity。　The　state；　on　the　other
hand；　actualises　itself　and　gives　its　specific　institutions　a　stable；　objective；　existence。　Now　if
religious　feeling　wished　to　assert　itself　in　the　state　in　the　same　way　as　it　is　wont　to　do　in　its　own
field；　it　would　overturn　the　organisation　of　the　state；　because　the　different　organs　of　the　state　have
latitude　to　pursue　their　several　distinct　paths；　while　in　religion　everything　is　always　referred　back　to
the　whole。　If　this　whole；　then；　wished　to　engulf　all　the　concerns　of　the　state；　this　would　be
tantamount　to　fanaticism；　the　wish　to　have　the　whole　in　every　particular　could　be　fulfilled　only　by
the　destruction　of　the　particular；　and　fanaticism　is　just　the　refusal　to　give　scope　to　particular
differences。　Hence　to　say：　'To　the　pious　man　no　law　is　given'　is　nothing　but　an　expression　of　this
same　fanaticism。　Once　piety　usurps　the　place　of　the　state；　it　cannot　tolerate　the　determinate　but
simply　shatters　it。　It　is　quite　consistent　with　this　if　piety　leaves　decisions　to　conscience；　to　the　inner
life；　and　is　not　governed　by　reasons。　This　inner　life　does　not　develop　into　reasoned　argument　or
give　an　account　of　itself。　Hence　if　piety　is　to　pass　for　the　actuality　of　the　state；　all　laws　are　cast　to
the　winds　and　subjective　feeling　is　the　legislator。　This　feeling　may　be　pure　caprice；　and　whether　it　is
or　not　can　only　be　learnt　from　its　actions。　But　by　becoming　actions　and　precepts；　its　actions
assume　the　guise　of　laws；　and　this　is　just　the　very　opposite　of　the　subjective　feeling　with　which　we
started。　This　feeling　has　God　for　its　object；　and　we　might　make　him　the　determinant　of　everything。
But　God　is　the　universal　Idea　and　this　feeling　can　regard　him　only　as　the　indeterminate；　which　is
too　immature　to　determine　what　is　existent　in　the　state　in　a　developed　form。　It　is　precisely　the　fact
that　everything　in　the　state　is　fixed　and　secure　which　is　the　bulwark　against　caprice　and　dogmatic
opinion。　Religion　as　such；　then；　ought　not　to　be　the　governor。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　271。　

The　constitution　of　the　state　is；　in　the　first　place；　the　organisation　of　the　state　and
the　self…related　process　of　its　organic　life；　a　process　whereby　it　differentiates　its
moments　within　itself　and　develops　them　to　self…subsistence。　Secondly；　the　state
is　an　individual；　unique　and　exclusive；　and　therefore　related　to　others。　Thus　it
turns　its　differentiating　activity　outward　and　accordingly　establishes　within　itself
the　ideality　of　its　subsisting　inward　differentiations。　

Addition：　Just　as　irritability　in　the　living　organism　is　itself　from　one　point　of　view　something
inward；　something　pertaining　to　the　organism　as　such；　so　here　again　the　outward　reference　is　an
inward　tendency。　The　inner　side　of　the　state　as　such　is　the　civil　power；　while　its　outward　tendency
is　the　military　power；　although　this　has　a　fixed　place　inside　the　state　itself。　Now　to　have　both　these
powers　in　equilibrium　constitutes　an　important　factor　in　the　spirit　of　the　state。　Sometimes　the　civil
power　is　wholly　effaced　and　rests　entirely　on　the　military　power；　as　was　the　case；　for　instance；　in
the　time　of　the　Roman　Emperors　and　the　Praetorians。　At　other　times；　nowadays　for　example；　the
military　power　is　a　mere　by…product　of　the　civil　power　once　all　the　citizens　are　conscriptable。　

　　　　　1。　The　Constitution　（on　its　internal　side　only）
　　　　　　　　　　2。　Sovereignty　vis…à…vis　foreign　States

　　　B。　International　Law

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　330。

International　law　springs　from　the　relations　between　autonomous　states。　It　is　for
this　reason　that　what　is　absolute　in　it　retains　the　form　of　an　ought…to…be；　since　its
actuality　depends　on　different　wills　each　of　which　is　sovereign。　

Addition：　States　are　not　private　persons　but　completely　autonomous　totalities　in　themselves；
and　so　the　relation　between　them　differs　from　a　moral　relation　and　a　relation　involving　private
rights。　Attempts　have　often　been　made　to　regard　the　state　as　a　person　with　the　rights　of　persons
and　as　a　moral　entity。　But　the　position　with　private　persons　is　that　they　are　under　the　jurisdiction　of
a　court　which　gives　effect　to　what　is　right　in　principle。　Now　a　relation　between　states　ought　also　to
be　right　in　principle；　but　in　mundane　affairs　a　principle　ought　also　to　have　power。　Now　since　there
is　no　power　in　existence　which　decides　in　face　of　the　state　what　is　right　in　principle　and　actualises
this　decision；　it　follows　that　so　far　as　international　relations　are　concerned　we　can　never　get
beyond　an　'ought'。　The　relation　between　states　is　a　relation　between　autonomous　entities　which
make　mutual　stipulations　but　which　at　the　same　time　are　superior　to　these　stipulations。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　331。

The　nation　state　is　mind　in　its　substantive　rationality　and　immediate　actuality　and
is　therefore　the　absolute　power　on　earth。　It　follows　that　every　state　is　sovereign
and　autonomous　against　its　neighbours。　It　is　entitled　in　the　first　place　and　without
qualification　to　be　sovereign　from　their　point　of　view；　i。e。　to　be　recognised　by
them　as　sovereign。　At　the　same　time；　however；　this　title　is　purely　formal；　an