philosophy of right-第9章

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I　itself。　It　thus　appears　first　of　all　as　placed　in　opposition；　because　it　exhibits；　as　it　were；　a
separation。　As　I　am　practical；　I　am　；active；　I　act　and　determine　myself；　and　to　determine　myself
means　to　set　up　a　distinction。　But　these　distinctions　are　again　mine；　my　own　determinations　come
to　me；　and　the　ends　are　mine；　to　which　I　am　impelled。　Even　when　I　let　these　distinctions　and
determinations　go；　setting　them　in　the　so…called　external　world；　they　remain　mine。　They　are　that
which　I　have　done　and　made；　and　bear　the　trace　of　my　spirit。　That　is　the　distinction　to　be　drawn
between　the　theoretical　and　the　practical　relations。　

And　now　the　connection　of　the　two　must　be　also　stated。　The　theoretical　is　essentially　contained　in
the　practical。　Against　the　idea　that　the　two　are　separate　runs　the　fact　that　man　has　no　will　without
intelligence。　The　will　holds　within　itself　the　theoretical；　the　will　determines　itself；　and　this
determination　is　in　the　first　instance　internal。　That　which　I　will　I　place　before　my　mind；　and　it　is　an
object　for　me。　The　animal　acts　according　to　instinct；　is　impelled　by　something　internal；　and　so　is
also　practical。　But　it　has　no　will；　because　it　cannot　place　before　its　mind　what　it　desires。　Similarly
man　cannot　use　his　theoretic　faculty　or　think　without　will；　for　in　thinking　we　are　active。　The　content
of　what　is　thought　receives；　indeed；　the　form　of　something　existing；　but　this　existence　is　occasioned
by　our　activity　and　by　it；　established。　These　distinctions　of　theoretical　and　practical　are　inseparable
；　they　are　one　and　the　same；　and　in　every　activity；　whether　of　thought　or　will；　both　these　elements
are　found。　

It　is　worth　while　to　recall　the　older　way　of　proceeding　with　regard　to　the　freedom　of　the　will。　First
of　all；　the　idea　of　the　will　was　assumed；　and　then　an　effort　was　made　to　deduce　from　it　and
establish　a　definition　of　the　will。　Next；　the　method　of　the　older　empirical　psychology　was　adopted；
and　different　perceptions　and　general　phenomena　of　the　ordinary　consciousness　were　collected；
such　as　remorse；　guilt；　and　the　like；　on　the　ground　that　these　could　be　explained　only　as
proceeding　out　of　a　will　that　is　free。　Then　from　these　phenomena　was　deduced　the　so…called　proof
that　the　will　is　free。　But　it　is　more　convenient　to　take　a　short　cut　and　hold　that　freedom　is　given　as　a
fact　of　consciousness；　and　must　be　believed　in。　

The　nature　of　the　will　and　of　freedom；　and　the　proof　that　the　will　is　free；　can　be　shown；　as　has
already　been　observed　（§　2）；　only　in　connection　with　the　whole。　The　ground　principles　of　the
premises　that　spirit　is　in　the　first　instance　intelligence；　and　that　the　phases；　through　which　it　passes
in　its　development；　namely　from　feeling；　through　imaginative　thinking　to　thought；　are　the　way　by
which　it　produces　itself　as　will；　which；　in　turn；　as　the　practical　spirit　in　general；　is　the　most　direct
truth　of　intelligence　…　I　have　presented　in　my　Encyclopaedia　of　the　Philosophical　Sciences
（1817）；　and　hope　some　day　to　be　able　to　give　of　them　a　more　complete　exposition。　There　is；　to
my　mind；　so　much　the　more　need　for　me　to　give　my　contribution　to；　as　I　hope；　the　more　thorough
knowledge　of　the　nature　of　spirit；　Since；　as　I　have　there　said；　it　would　be　difficult　to　find　a
philosophic　science　in　a　more　neglected　and　evil　plight　than　is　that　theory　of　spirit；　which　is
commonly　called　psychology。　Some　elements　of　the　conception　of　will；　resulting　from　the　premises
enumerated　above　are　mentioned　in　this　and　the　following　paragraphs。　As　to　these；　appeal　may
moreover　be　made　to　every　individual　to　see　them　in　his　own　self…consciousness。　Everyone　will；　in
the　first　place；　find　in　himself　the　ability　to　abstract　himself　from　all　that　he　is；　and　in　this　way　prove
himself　able　of　himself　to　set　every　content　within　himself；　and　thus　have　in　his　own　consciousness
an　illustration　of　all　the　subsequent　phases。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　5。

The　will　contains　＇a＇　the　element　of　pure　indeterminateness；　i。e。；　the　pure
doubling　of　the　I　back　in　thought　upon　itself。　In　this　process　every　limit　or
content；　present　though　it　be　directly　by　way　of　nature；　as　in　want；　appetite　or
impulse；　or　given　in　any　specific　way；　is　dissolved。　Thus　we　have　the　limitless
infinitude　of　absolute　abstraction；　or　universality；　the　pure　thought　of　itself。　

Remark：　Those　who　treat　thinking　and　willing　as　two　special　peculiar　and　separate　faculties；
and；　further；　look　upon　thought　is　detrimental　to　the　will；　especially　the　good　will；　show　from　the
very　start　that　they　know　nothing　of　the　nature　of　willing　a　remark　which　we　shall　be　called　upon　to
a　number　of　times　upon　the　same　attitude　of　mind。　The　will　on　one　side　is　the　possibility　of
abstraction　from　every　aspect　in　which　the　I　finds　itself　or　has　set　itself　up。　It　reckons　any　content
as　a　limit；　and　flees　from　it。　This　is　one　of　the　forms　of　the　self…direction　of　the　will；　and　is　by
imaginative　thinking　insisted　upon　as　of　itself　freedom。　It　is　the　negative　side　of　the　will；　or　freedom
as　apprehended　by　the　understanding。　This　freedom　is　that　of　the　void；　which　his　taken　actual
shape；　and　is　stirred　to　passion。　It；　while　remaining　purely　theoretical；　appears　in　Hindu　religion　as
the　fanaticism　of　pure　contemplation；　but　becoming　actual　it　assumes　both　in　politics　and　religion
the　form　of　a　fanaticism；　which　would　destroy　the　established　social　order；　remove　all　individuals
suspected　of　desiring　any　kind　of　order；　and　demolish　any　organisation　which　then　sought　to　rise
out　of　the　ruins　only　in　devastation　does　the　negative　will　feel　that　it　has　reality。　It　intends；　indeed；
to　bring　to　pass　some　positive　social　condition；　such　as　universal　equality　or　universal　religious　life。
But　in　fact　it　does　not　will　the　positive　reality　of　any　such　condition；　since　that　would　carry　in　its
train　a　system；　and　introduce　a　separation　by　way　of　institutions　and　between　individuals。　But
classification　and　objective　system　attain　self　consciousness　only　by　destroying　negative　freedom。
Negative　freedom　is　actuated　by　a　mere　solitary　idea；　whose　realisation　is　nothing　but　the　fury　of
desolation。　

Addition。　This　phase　of　will　implies　that　I　break　loose　from　everything；　give　up　all　ends；　and
bury　myself　in　abstraction。　It　is　man　alone　who　can　let　go　everything；　even　life。　He　can　commit
suicide；　an　act　impossible　for　the　animal；　which　always　remains　only　negative；　abiding　in　a　state
foreign　to　itself；　to　which　it　must　merely　get　accustomed　is　pure　thought　of　himself；　and　only　in
thinking　has　he　the　power　to　give　himself　universality　and　distinguish　in　himself　all　that　is　particular
and　definite。　

Negative　freedom；　or　freedom　of　the　understanding；　is　one…sided；　yet　as　this　one…sidedness
contains　an　essential　feature；　it　is　not　to　be　discarded。　But　the　defect　of　the　understanding　is　that　it
exalts　its　one…sidedness　to　the　sole　highest　place。　This　form　of　freedom　frequently　occurs　in
history。　By　the　Hindus；　e。g。；　the　highest　freedom　is　declared　to　be　persistence　in　the　consciousness
of　one's　simple　identity　with　himself；　to　abide　in　the　empty　space　of　one's　own　inner　being；　like　the
colourless　light　of　pure　intuition；　and　to　renounce　every；　activity　of　life；　every　purpose　and　every
idea。　In　this　way　man　becomes　Brahma；　there　is　no　longer　any　distinction　between　finite　man　and
Brahma；　every　difference　having　been　swallowed　up　in　this　universality。　A　more　concrete
manifestation　of　this　freedom　is　fanaticism　of　political　and　religious　life。　Of　this　nature　was　the
terrible　epoch　of　the　French　Revolution；　by　which　all　distinctions　in　talent　and　authority　were　to
have　been　superseded。　In　this　time　of　upheaval　and　commotion　any　specific　thing　was　intolerable。
Fanaticism　wills　an　abstraction　and　not　an　articulate　association。　It　finds　all　distinctions　antagonistic
to　its　indefiniteness；　and　supersedes　them。　Hence　in　the　French　Revolution　the　people　abolished
the　institutions　which　they　themselves　had　set　up；　since　every　institution　is　inimical　to　the　abstract
self…consciousness　of　equality。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　6。

＇b＇　The　I　is　also　the　transition　from　blank　indefiniteness　to　the　distinct　and
definite　establishment　of　a　definite　content　and　object；　whether　this　content　be
given　by　nature　or　produced　out　of　the　conception　of　spirit。　Through　this
establishment　of　itself　as　a　definite　thing　the　I　becomes　a　reality。　This　is　the
absolute　element　of　the　finitude　or　specialisation　of　the　I。　

Remark：　This　second　element　in　the　characterisation　of　the　I　is　just　as　negative　as　the　first；　since
it　annuls　and　replaces　the　first　abstract　negativity。　As　the　particular　is　contained　in　the　universal；　so
this　second　phase　is　contained　already　in　the　first；　and　is　only　an　establishing　of　what　the　first　is
implicitly。　The　first　phase；　if　taken　independents；　is　not　the　true　infinitude；　i。e。；　the　concrete
universal；　or　the　conception；　but　limited　and　one…sided。　In　that　it　is　the　abstraction　from　all　definite
character；　it　has　a　definite　character。　Its　abstract　and　one…sided　nature　constitutes　its　definite
character；　its　defect　and　finitude。　

The　distinct　characterisation　of　these　two　phases　of　the　I　is　found　in　the　philosophy　of　Fichte　as
also　in　that　of　Kant。　Only；　in　the　exposition　of　Fichte　the　I；　when　taken　as　unlimited；　as　it　is　in　the
first　proposition　of　his　Wissenschaftslehre；　is　merely　positive。　It　is　the　universality　and　identity
made　by　the　understanding。　Hence　this　abstract　I　is　in　its　independence　to　be　taken　as　the　truth；　to
which　by　way　of　mere　addition　comes　in　the　second　proposition；　the　limitation；　or　the　negative　in
general；　whether　it　be　in　the　form　of　a　given　external　limit　or　of　an　activity　of　the　I。　To　apprehend
the　negative　as　immanent　in　the　universal　or　self…identical；　and　also　as　in　the　I；　was　the　next　step；
which　speculative　philosophy　had　to　make。　Of　this　want　they　have　no　presentiment；　who　like
Fichte　never　apprehend　that　the　infinite　and　finite　are；　if　separated；　abstract；　and　must　be　seen　as
immanent　one　in　the　other。　

Addition。　This　second　element　makes　its　appearance　as　the　opposite　of　the　first　；　it　is　to　be
understood　in　its　general　form：　it　belongs　to　freedom　but　does　not　constitute　the　whole　of　it。　Here
the　I　passes　over　from　blank　indeterminateness　to　the　distinct　establishment　of　a　specific　character
as　a　content　or　object。　I　do　not　will　merely；　but　I　will　something。　Such　a　will；　as　is　analysed　in　the
preceding　paragraph；　wills　only　the　abstract　universal；　and　therefore　wills　nothing。　Hence　it　is　not　a
will。　The　particular　thing；　which　the　will　wills　is　a　limitation；　since　the　will；　in　order　to　be　a　will；　must
in　general　limit　itself。　Limit　or　negation　consists　in　the　will　willing　something　Particularising　is　thus　as
a　rule　named　finitude。　Ordinary　reflection　holds　the　first　element；　that　of　the　indefinite；　for　the
absolute　and　higher。　and　the　limited　for　a　mere　negation　of　this　indefiniteness。　But　this　indefiniteness
is　itself　only　a　negation；　in　contrast　with　the　definite　and　finite。　The　I　is　solitude　and　absolute
negation。　The　indefinite　will　is　thus　quite　as　much　one…sided　as　the　will；　which　continues　merely　in
the　definite。