laches-第6章
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tell us what you think about courage。
NICIAS： I have been thinking； Socrates； that you and Laches are not
defining courage in the right way； for you have forgotten an excellent
saying which I have heard from your own lips。
SOCRATES： What is it； Nicias？
NICIAS： I have often heard you say that 'Every man is good in that in
which he is wise； and bad in that in which he is unwise。'
SOCRATES： That is certainly true； Nicias。
NICIAS： And therefore if the brave man is good； he is also wise。
SOCRATES： Do you hear him； Laches？
LACHES： Yes； I hear him； but I do not very well understand him。
SOCRATES： I think that I understand him； and he appears to me to mean that
courage is a sort of wisdom。
LACHES： What can he possibly mean； Socrates？
SOCRATES： That is a question which you must ask of himself。
LACHES： Yes。
SOCRATES： Tell him then； Nicias； what you mean by this wisdom； for you
surely do not mean the wisdom which plays the flute？
NICIAS： Certainly not。
SOCRATES： Nor the wisdom which plays the lyre？
NICIAS： No。
SOCRATES： But what is this knowledge then； and of what？
LACHES： I think that you put the question to him very well； Socrates； and
I would like him to say what is the nature of this knowledge or wisdom。
NICIAS： I mean to say； Laches； that courage is the knowledge of that which
inspires fear or confidence in war； or in anything。
LACHES： How strangely he is talking； Socrates。
SOCRATES： Why do you say so； Laches？
LACHES： Why； surely courage is one thing； and wisdom another。
SOCRATES： That is just what Nicias denies。
LACHES： Yes； that is what he denies； but he is so silly。
SOCRATES： Suppose that we instruct instead of abusing him？
NICIAS： Laches does not want to instruct me； Socrates； but having been
proved to be talking nonsense himself； he wants to prove that I have been
doing the same。
LACHES： Very true； Nicias； and you are talking nonsense； as I shall
endeavour to show。 Let me ask you a question： Do not physicians know the
dangers of disease？ or do the courageous know them？ or are the physicians
the same as the courageous？
NICIAS： Not at all。
LACHES： No more than the husbandmen who know the dangers of husbandry； or
than other craftsmen； who have a knowledge of that which inspires them with
fear or confidence in their own arts； and yet they are not courageous a
whit the more for that。
SOCRATES： What is Laches saying； Nicias？ He appears to be saying
something of importance。
NICIAS： Yes； he is saying something； but it is not true。
SOCRATES： How so？
NICIAS： Why； because he does not see that the physician's knowledge only
extends to the nature of health and disease： he can tell the sick man no
more than this。 Do you imagine； Laches； that the physician knows whether
health or disease is the more terrible to a man？ Had not many a man better
never get up from a sick bed？ I should like to know whether you think that
life is always better than death。 May not death often be the better of the
two？
LACHES： Yes certainly so in my opinion。
NICIAS： And do you think that the same things are terrible to those who
had better die； and to those who had better live？
LACHES： Certainly not。
NICIAS： And do you suppose that the physician or any other artist knows
this； or any one indeed； except he who is skilled in the grounds of fear
and hope？ And him I call the courageous。
SOCRATES： Do you understand his meaning； Laches？
LACHES： Yes； I suppose that； in his way of speaking； the soothsayers are
courageous。 For who but one of them can know to whom to die or to live is
better？ And yet Nicias； would you allow that you are yourself a
soothsayer； or are you neither a soothsayer nor courageous？
NICIAS： What！ do you mean to say that the soothsayer ought to know the
grounds of hope or fear？
LACHES： Indeed I do： who but he？
NICIAS： Much rather I should say he of whom I speak； for the soothsayer
ought to know only the signs of things that are about to come to pass；
whether death or disease； or loss of property； or victory； or defeat in
war； or in any sort of contest； but to whom the suffering or not suffering
of these things will be for the best； can no more be decided by the
soothsayer than by one who is no soothsayer。
LACHES： I cannot understand what Nicias would be at； Socrates； for he
represents the courageous man as neither a soothsayer； nor a physician； nor
in any other character； unless he means to say that he is a god。 My
opinion is that he does not like honestly to confess that he is talking
nonsense； but that he shuffles up and down in order to conceal the
difficulty into which he has got himself。 You and I； Socrates； might have
practised a similar shuffle just now； if we had only wanted to avoid the
appearance of inconsistency。 And if we had been arguing in a court of law
there might have been reason in so doing； but why should a man deck himself
out with vain words at a meeting of friends such as this？
SOCRATES： I quite agree with you； Laches； that he should not。 But perhaps
Nicias is serious； and not merely talking for the sake of talking。 Let us
ask him just to explain what he means； and if he has reason on his side we
will agree with him； if not； we will instruct him。
LACHES： Do you； Socrates； if you like； ask him： I think that I have asked
enough。
SOCRATES： I do not see why I should not； and my question will do for both
of us。
LACHES： Very good。
SOCRATES： Then tell me； Nicias； or rather tell us； for Laches and I are
partners in the argument： Do you mean to affirm that courage is the
knowledge of the grounds of hope and fear？
NICIAS： I do。
SOCRATES： And not every man has this knowledge； the physician and the
soothsayer have it not； and they will not be courageous unless they acquire
itthat is what you were saying？
NICIAS： I was。
SOCRATES： Then this is certainly not a thing which every pig would know；
as the proverb says； and therefore he could not be courageous。
NICIAS： I think not。
SOCRATES： Clearly not； Nicias； not even such a big pig as the Crommyonian
sow would be called by you courageous。 And this I say not as a joke； but
because I think that he who assents to your doctrine； that courage is the
knowledge of the grounds of fear and hope； cannot allow that any wild beast
is courageous； unless he admits that a lion； or a leopard； or perhaps a
boar； or any other animal； has such a degree of wisdom that he knows things
which but a few human beings ever know by reason of their difficulty。 He
who takes your view of courage must affirm that a lion； and a stag； and a
bull； and a monkey； have equally little pretensions to courage。
LACHES： Capital； Socrates； by the gods； that is truly good。 And I hope；
Nicias； that you will tell us whether these animals； which we all admit to
be courageous； are really wiser than mankind； or whether you will have the
boldness； in the face of universal opinion； to deny their courage。
NICIAS： Why； Laches； I do not call animals or any other things which have
no fear of dangers； because they are ignorant of them； courageous； but only
fearless and senseless。 Do you imagine that I should call little children
courageous； which fear no dangers because they know none？ There is a
difference； to my way of thinking； between fearlessness and courage。 I am
of opinion that thoughtful courage is a quality possessed by very few； but
that rashness and boldness； and fearlessness； which has no forethought； are
very common qualities possessed by many men； many women； many children；
many animals。 And you； and men in general； call by the term 'courageous'
actions which I call rash；my courageous actions are wise actions。
LACHES： Behold； Socrates； how admirably； as he thinks； he dresses himself
out in words； while seeking to deprive of the honour of courage those whom
all the world acknowledges to be courageous。
NICIAS： Not so； Laches； but do not be alarmed； for I am quite willing to
say of you and also of Lamachus； and of many other Athenians； that you are
courageous and therefore wise。
LACHES： I could answer that； but I would not have you cast in my teeth
that I am a haughty Aexonian。
SOCRATES： Do not answer him； Laches； I rather fancy that you are not aware
of the source from which his wisdom is derived。 He has got all this from
my friend Damon； and Damon is always with Prodicus； who； of all the
Sophists； is considered to be the best puller to pieces of words of this
sort。
LACHES： Yes； Socrates； and the examination of such niceties is a much more
suitable employment for a Sophist than for a great statesman whom the city
chooses to preside over her。
SOCRATES： Yes； my sweet friend； but a great statesman is likely to have a
great intelligence。 And I think that the view which is implied in Nicias'
definition of courage is worthy of examination。
LACHES： Then examine for yourself； Socrates。
SOCRATES： That is what I am going to do； my dear friend。 Do not； however；
suppose I shall let you out of the partnership； for I shall expect you to
apply your mind； and join with me in the consideration of the question。
LACHES： I will if you think that I ought。
SOCRATES： Yes； I do； but I must beg of you； Nicias； to begin again。 You
remember that we originally considered courage to be a part of virtue。
NICIAS： Very true。
SOCRATES： And you yourself said that it was a part； and there were many
other parts； all of which taken together are called virtue。
NICIAS： Certainly。
SOCRATES： Do you agree with me about the parts？ For I say that justice；
temperance； and the like； are all of them parts of virtue as well as
courage。 Would you not say the same？
NICIAS： Certainly。
SOCRATES： Well then； so far we are agreed。
