history of the impeachment of andrew johnson-第15章
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al advisers if it should appear to him to be fit； subject to that general responsibility which every officer must be held to the public and to the Senate when they meet again。
Mr。 Williams said：
I prepared the original bill in this case； which contains in different words the exception contained in the amendment reported by the Committee。 I do not regard the exception as of any real practical consequence； because I suppose if the President and any head of a Department should disagree so as to make their relations unpleasant； and the President should signify a desire that the head of a Department retire from the Cabinet； THAT WOULD FOLLOW WITHOUT ANY POSITIVE ACT OF REMOVAL ON THE PART OF THE PRESIDENT。
Mr。 Fessenden said：
The Constitution imposes upon the President of the United States the duty of executing the laws； it does not impose that duty upon the Secretaries。 They are creatures of the law and not of the Constitution directly。 Some； and perhaps the greater part； of their functions are as advisers of the President and to aid him in executing the laws in their several Departments。 There are some duties that are specifically conferred upon them by Congress。 Their relation to the President； as has been well said by gentlemen； is that mostly of confidential advisers。 With the exception of the particular duties imposed upon them by law； and on the Secretary of the Treasury more than on the others； they do nothing of their own motion； but act by order of the President in discharging the particular duties of their office。 * * * That being the peculiar condition of affairs it has always been considered since the foundation of the Government； as a matter of course； as a general rulethere may have been one or two exceptions； and I think there have been； but I am not very positive on that pointthat the President might select such persons as he pleased to be members of his Cabinet。 Of course the confirmation of the Senate is necessary； but the general idea of the Senate has been； whether they liked the men or not； to confirm them without any difficulty； because in executing the great and varied interests of this great country it is exceedingly important that there should be the utmost harmony between those who are charged with that execution。
The bill passed as reported and went to the House。 That body amended it by making Cabinet officers non…removable by the President without the consent of the Senate； and sent the bill back to the Senate； when Mr。 Sherman said：
It （the Tenure…of…Office bill） ought to have been passed； and probably would have been passed； long ago； if a different condition of affairs had existed before。 But when you propose to extend that principle to Cabinet officers； a very different state of affairs arises； and different circumstances apply to this subject。 Now I say； that if a Cabinet officer should attempt to hold his office for a moment beyond the time when he retained the entire confidence of the President； I would not vote to retain him； NOR WOULD I COMPEL THE PRESIDENT TO LEAVE ABOUT HIM IN THESE HIGH POSITIONS A MAN IN WHOM HE DID NOT ENTIRELY TRUST； both personally and politically。 It would be unwise to require him to administer the Government without agents of his own choosing。 It seems to me； therefore； that it would be unwise for the Senate to engraft in this bill a provision that would enable a Cabinet officer to hold on to his office in violation of the will of his Chief。 * * * Suppose the personal relations between a Cabinet officer and the President became so unpleasant that they could have no personal intercourse。 The Senator from Wisconsin （Mr。 Howe）； says in such a case the Cabinet officer would resign。 Suppose he should hold on to his power and positionwhat then？ There is no power to remove him； and the President can have no intercourse with him。 Would you compel such a state of affairs？ It seems to me that it would be unwise to do so。 That the Senate had no such purpose is shown by its vote twice to make this exception。 That this provision does not apply to the present case； is shown by the fact that its language is so framed as NOT TO APPLY TO THE PRESENT PRESIDENT。 * * * It would not prevent the present President from removing the present Secretary of War； the Secretary of the Navy； or the Secretary of State。
A considerable number of Senators participated in the debate； which was able and exhaustive to an exceptional degree； on both sides； and occupied several days in the various stages of the proceeding。
Mr。 Edmunds closed the debate in the Senate with the following remarks：
I do not rise to prolong the debate； but only to express the hope that the debate on this question may terminatethat we may come to a vote。 * * * While I should be glad to occupy some time in reply to some things that have fallen in the course of this debate； I feel it to be due to the business of the Senate to abstain。 I hope the Senate will disagree to this amendment； （made by the House） and adhere to the bill as it stands。
The vote was then taken； and resulted in 17 for agreeing to the House amendment； and 28 against it。
The action of the Senate was reported to the House and Conference Committees were appointed by the two houses。
On the 18th of February； the following substitute for the first section of the bill was reported by the Committee of Conference and adopted by both Houses； and the bill went to the President：
Provided； That the Secretaries of State； of the Treasury； of War； of the Navy； and of the Interior； the Postmaster General and the Attorney General； shall hold their offices respectively FOR AND DURING THE TERMS OF THE PRESIDENT BY WHOM THEY MAY HAVE BEEN APPOINTED； and for one month thereafter； subject to removal by and with the advice and consent of the Senate。
On Monday； March 2nd； 1867； the President returned the bill to the Senate； in which house it had originated； with his objections thereto； as follows：
To the Senate of the United States：
I have carefully examined the bill to regulate the tenure of certain civil offices。 The material portion of the bill is contained in the first section； and is of the effect following； namely：
〃That every person holding any civil office to which he has been appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate； and every person who shall hereafter be appointed to any such office； and shall become duly qualified to act therein； is and shall be entitled to hold such office until a successor shall have been appointed by the President； with the advice and consent of the Senate； and duly qualified； and that the Secretaries of State； of the Treasury； of War； of the Navy； and of the Interior； the Postmaster General； and the Attorney General； shall hold their offices respectively for and during the term of the President by whom they may have been appointed； and for one month thereafter； subject to removal by and with the advice and consent of the Senate。〃
These revisions are qualified by a reservation in the fourth section； 〃that nothing contained in the bill shall be construed to extend the term of any office the duration of which is limited by law。〃 In effect the bill provides that the President shall not remove from their places any of the civil officers whose terms of service are not limited by law without the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States。 The bill； in this respect； conflicts； in my judgment； with the Constitution of the United States。 The question； as Congress is well aware； is by no means a new one。 That the power of removal is constitutionally vested in the President of the United States is a principle which has been not more distinctly declared by judicial authority and judicial commentators than it has been uniformly practiced upon by the legislative and executive departments of the Government。 The question arose in the House of Representatives so early as the 16th day of June； 1789； on the bill for establishing an executive department； denominated 〃The Department of Foreign Affairs。〃 The first clause of the bill； after recapitulating the functions of that officer and defining his duties； had these words： 〃To be removable from office by the President of the United States。〃 It was moved to strike out these words； and the motion was sustained with great ability and vigor。 It was insisted that the President could not constitutionally exercise the power of removal exclusive of the Senate； that the Federalist so interpreted the Constitution when arguing for its adoption by the several States； that the Constitution had nowhere given the President power of removal； either expressly or by strong implication； but on the contrary； had distinctly provided for removals from office by impeachment only。 A construction which denied the power of removal by the President was further maintained by arguments drawn from the danger of the abuse of the power； from the supposed tendency of an exposure of public officers to capricious removal； to impair the efficiency of the civil service； from the alleged injustice and hardship of displacing incumbents； dependent upon their official stations； without sufficient consideration； from a supposed want of responsibility on the part the President； and from an imagined defect of guarantees against a vicious President； who might incline to abuse the power。
On the other hand； an exclusive power of removal by the President was defended as a true exposition of the text of the Constitution。 It was maintained that there are certain causes for which persons ought to be removed from office without being guilty of treason； bribery； or malfeasance； and that the nature of things demands that it should be so。 〃Suppose；〃 it was said； 〃a man becomes insane by the visitation of God； and is likely to ruin our affairs； are the hands of Government to be confined front warding off the evil？ Suppose a person in office not possessing the talents he was judged to have at the time of the appointment； is the error not to be corrected； suppose he acquire vicious habits and incurable indolence； or totally neglect the duties of his office； which shall work mischief to the public welfare； is there no way to arrest the threatened danger？ Suppose he become odious and unpopular by reason of the measures he pursues； and this he may do without committing any positive offense against the law； must he preserve his office in despite of the popular will？ Suppose him grasping for his own aggrandizement and the elevation of his connections by every means short of the treason defined by the Constitution； hurrying your affairs to the precipice of destruction； endangering your domestic tranquility； plundering you of the means of defense； alienating the affections of your allies； and promoting the spirit of discord； must the tardy； tedious； desultory road； by way of impeachment； be traveled to overtake the man who； barely confining himself within the letter of the law； is employed in drawing off the vital principle of the Government？〃 The nature of things； the great objects of society； the express objects of the Constitution itself require that this thing should be otherwise。 To unite the Senate with the President 〃in the exercise of the power〃 it was said； would involve us in the most serious difficulty。 〃Suppose a d
