protagoras-第12章
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painful evil。 And here I would beg my friend Prodicus not to introduce
his distinction of names； whether he is disposed to say pleasurable；
delightful； joyful。 However； by whatever name he prefers to call them；
I will ask you； most excellent Prodicus； to answer in my sense of
the words。
Prodicus laughed and assented； as did the others。
Then； my friends； what do you say to this？ Are not all actions
honourable and useful； of which the tendency is to make life
painless and pleasant？ The honourable work is also useful and good？
This was admitted。
Then； I said； if the pleasant is the good； nobody does anything
under the idea or conviction that some other thing would be better and
is also attainable； when he might do the better。 And this
inferiority of a man to himself is merely ignorance； as the
superiority of a man to himself is wisdom。
They all assented。
And is not ignorance the having a false opinion and being deceived
about important matters？
To this also they unanimously assented。
Then； I said； no man voluntarily pursues evil； or that which he
thinks to be evil。 To prefer evil to good is not in human nature；
and when a man is compelled to choose one of two evils； no one will
choose the greater when he may have the less。
All of us agreed to every word of this。
Well； I said； there is a certain thing called fear or terror； and
here； Prodicus； I should particularly like to know whether you would
agree with me in defining this fear or terror as expectation of evil。
Protagoras and Hippias agreed； but Prodicus said that this was
fear and not terror。
Never mind； Prodicus； I said； but let me ask whether； if our
former assertions are true； a man will pursue that which he fears when
he is not compelled？ Would not this be in flat contradiction to the
admission which has been already made； that he thinks the things which
he fears to be evil； and no one will pursue or voluntarily accept that
which he thinks to be evil？
That also was universally admitted。
Then； I said； these； Hippias and Prodicus； are our premisses； and
I would beg Protagoras to explain to us how he can be right in what he
said at first。 I do not mean in what he said quite at first； for his
first statement； as you may remember； was that whereas there were five
parts of virtue none of them was like any other of them； each of
them had a separate function。 To this； however； I am not referring；
but to the assertion which he afterwards made that of the five virtues
four were nearly akin to each other； but that the fifth； which was
courage； differed greatly from the others。 And of this he gave me
the following proof。 He said： You will find； Socrates； that some of
the most impious； and unrighteous； and intemperate； and ignorant of
men are among the most courageous； which proves that courage is very
different from the other parts of virtue。 I was surprised at his
saying this at the time； and I am still more surprised now that I have
discussed the matter with you。 So I asked him whether by the brave
he meant the confident。 Yes； he replied； and the impetuous or goers。
（You may remember； Protagoras； that this was your answer。）
He assented。
Well then； I said； tell us against what are the courageous ready
to go…against the same dangers as the cowards？
No； he answered。
Then against something different？
Yes； he said。
Then do cowards go where there is safety； and the courageous where
there is danger？
Yes； Socrates； so men say。
Very true； I said。 But I want to know against what do you say that
the courageous are ready to go…against dangers； believing them to be
dangers； or not against dangers？
No； said he； the former case has been proved by you in the
previous argument to be impossible。
That； again； I replied； is quite true。 And if this has been
rightly proven； then no one goes to meet what he thinks to be dangers；
since the want of self…control； which makes men rush into dangers； has
been shown to be ignorance。
He assented。
And yet the courageous man and the coward alike go to meet that
about which they are confident； so that； in this point of view； the
cowardly and the courageous go to meet the same things。
And yet； Socrates； said Protagoras； that to which the coward goes is
the opposite of that to which the courageous goes； the one； for
example； is ready to go to battle； and the other is not ready。
And is going to battle honourable or disgraceful？ I said。
Honourable； he replied。
And if honourable； then already admitted by us to be good； for all
honourable actions we have admitted to be good。
That is true； and to that opinion I shall always adhere。
True； I said。 But which of the two are they who； as you say； are
unwilling to go to war； which is a good and honourable thing？
The cowards； he replied。
And what is good and honourable； I said； is also pleasant？
It has certainly been acknowledged to be so； he replied。
And do the cowards knowingly refuse to go to the nobler； and
pleasanter； and better？
The admission of that； he replied； would belie our former
admissions。
But does not the courageous man also go to meet the better； and
pleasanter； and nobler？
That must be admitted。
And the courageous man has no base fear or base confidence？
True； he replied。
And if not base； then honourable？
He admitted this。
And if honourable； then good？
Yes。
But the fear and confidence of the coward or foolhardy or madman； on
the contrary； are base？
He assented。
And these base fears and confidences originate in ignorance and
uninstructedness？
True； he said。
Then as to the motive from which the cowards act； do you call it
cowardice or courage？
I should say cowardice； he replied。
And have they not been shown to be cowards through their ignorance
of dangers？
Assuredly； he said。
And because of that ignorance they are cowards？
He assented。
And the reason why they are cowards is admitted by you to be
cowardice？
He again assented。
Then the ignorance of what is and is not dangerous is cowardice？
He nodded assent。
But surely courage； I said； is opposed to cowardice？
Yes。
Then the wisdom which knows what are and are not dangers is
opposed to the ignorance of them？
To that again he nodded assent。
And the ignorance of them is cowardice？
To that he very reluctantly nodded assent。
And the knowledge of that which is and is not dangerous is
courage； and is opposed to the ignorance of these things？
At this point he would no longer nod assent； but was silent。
And why； I said； do you neither assent nor dissent； Protagoras？
Finish the argument by yourself； he said。
I only want to ask one more question； I said。 I want to know whether
you still think that there are men who are most ignorant and yet
most courageous？
You seem to have a great ambition to make me answer； Socrates； and
therefore I will gratify you； and say； that this appears to me to be
impossible consistently with the argument。
My only object； I said； in continuing the discussion； has been the
desire to ascertain the nature and relations of virtue； for if this
were clear； I am very sure that the other controversy which has been
carried on at great length by both of us…you affirming and I denying
that virtue can be taught…would also become clear。 The result of our
discussion appears to me to be singular。 For if the argument had a
human voice； that voice would be heard laughing at us and saying：
〃Protagoras and Socrates； you are strange beings； there are you；
Socrates； who were saying that virtue cannot be taught；
contradicting yourself now by your attempt to prove that all things
are knowledge； including justice； and temperance； and courage；…which
tends to show that virtue can certainly be taught； for if virtue
were other than knowledge； as Protagoras attempted to prove； then
clearly virtue cannot be taught； but if virtue is entirely
knowledge； as you are seeking to show； then I cannot but suppose
that virtue is capable of being taught。 Protagoras； on the other hand；
who started by saying that it might be taught； is now eager to prove
it to be anything rather than knowledge； and if this is true； it
must be quite incapable of being taught。〃 Now I； Protagoras；
perceiving this terrible confusion of our ideas； have a great desire
that they should be cleared up。 And I should like to carry on the
discussion until we ascertain what virtue is； whether capable of being
taught or not； lest haply Epimetheus should trip us up and deceive
us in the argument； as he forgot us in the story； I prefer your
Prometheus to your Epimetheus； for of him I make use； whenever I am
busy about these questions； in Promethean care of my own life。 And
if you have no objection； as I said at first； I should like to have
your help in the enquiry。
Protagoras replied： Socrates； I am not of a base nature； and I am
the last man in the world to be envious。 I cannot but applaud your
energy and your conduct of an argument。 As I have often said； I admire
you above all men whom I know； and far above all men of your age；
and I believe that you will become very eminent in philosophy。 Let
us come back to the subject at some future time； at present we had
better turn to something else。
By all means； I said； if that is your wish； for I too ought long
since to have kept the engagement of which I spoke before； and only
tarried because I could not refuse the request of the noble Callias。
So the conversation ended； and we went our way。
…THE END…
。
