protagoras-第6章
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to be a difference between them。 But what matter？ if you please I
please； and let us assume； if you will I； that justice is holy； and
that holiness is just。
Pardon me； I replied； I do not want this 〃if you wish〃 or 〃if you
will〃 sort of conclusion to be proven； but I want you and me to be
proven： I mean to say that the conclusion will be best proven if there
be no 〃if。〃
Well； he said； I admit that justice bears a resemblance to holiness；
for there is always some point of view in which everything is like
every other thing； white is in a certain way like black； and hard is
like soft； and the most extreme opposites have some qualities in
common； even the parts of the face which； as we were saying before；
are distinct and have different functions； are still in a certain
point of view similar； and one of them is like another of them。 And
you may prove that they are like one another on the same principle
that all things are like one another； and yet things which are like in
some particular ought not to be called alike； nor things which are
unlike in some particular； however slight； unlike。
And do you think； I said in a tone of surprise； that justice and
holiness have but a small degree of likeness？
Certainly not； any more than I agree with what I understand to be
your view。
Well； I said； as you appear to have a difficulty about this； let
us take another of the examples which you mentioned instead。 Do you
admit the existence of folly？
I do。
And is not wisdom the。 very opposite of folly？
That is true； he said。
And when men act rightly and advantageously they seem to you to be
temperate？
Yes； he said。
And temperance makes them temperate？
Certainly。
And they who do not act rightly act foolishly； and in acting thus
are not temperate？
I agree； he said。
Then to act foolishly is the opposite of acting temperately？
He assented。
And foolish actions are done by folly； and temperate actions by
temperance？
He agreed。
And that is done strongly which is done by strength； and that
which is weakly done； by weakness？
He assented。
And that which is done with swiftness is done swiftly； and that
which is done with slowness； slowly？
He assented again。
And that which is done in the same manner； is done by the same；
and that which is done in an opposite manner by the opposite？
He agreed。
Once more； I said； is there anything beautiful？
Yes。
To which the only opposite is the ugly？
There is no other。
And is there anything good？
There is。
To which the only opposite is the evil？
There is no other。
And there is the acute in sound？
True。
To which the only opposite is the grave？
There is no other； he said； but that。
Then every opposite has one opposite only and no more？
He assented。
Then now； I said； let us recapitulate our admissions。 First of all
we admitted that everything has one opposite and not more than one？
We did so。
And we admitted also that what was done in opposite ways was done by
opposites？
Yes。
And that which was done foolishly； as we further admitted； was
done in the opposite way to that which was done temperately？
Yes。
And that which was done temperately was done by temperance； and that
which was done foolishly by folly？
He agreed。
And that which is done in opposite ways is done by opposites？
Yes。
And one thing is done by temperance； and quite another thing by
folly？
Yes。
And in opposite ways？
Certainly。
And therefore by opposites：…then folly is the opposite of
temperance？
Clearly。
And do you remember that folly has already been acknowledged by us
to be the opposite of wisdom？
He assented。
And we said that everything has only one opposite？
Yes。
Then； Protagoras； which of the two assertions shall we renounce？ One
says that everything has but one opposite； the other that wisdom is
distinct from temperance； and that both of them are parts of virtue；
and that they are not only distinct； but dissimilar； both in
themselves and in their functions； like the parts of a face。 Which
of these two assertions shall we renounce？ For both of them together
are certainly not in harmony； they do not accord or agree： for how can
they be said to agree if everything is assumed to have only one
opposite and not more than one； and yet folly； which is one； has
clearly the two opposites wisdom and temperance？ Is not that true；
Protagoras？ What else would you say？
He assented； but with great reluctance。
Then temperance and wisdom are the same； as before justice and
holiness appeared to us to be nearly the same。 And now； Protagoras；
I said； we must finish the enquiry； and not faint。 Do you think that
an unjust man can be temperate in his injustice？
I should be ashamed； Socrates； he said； to acknowledge this which
nevertheless many may be found to assert。
And shall I argue with them or with you？ I replied。
I would rather； he said； that you should argue with the many
first； if you will。
Whichever you please； if you will only answer me and say whether you
are of their opinion or not。 My object is to test the validity of
the argument； and yet the result may be that I who ask and you who
answer may both be put on our trial。
Protagoras at first made a show of refusing； as he said that the
argument was not encouraging； at length； he consented to answer。
Now then； I said； begin at the beginning and answer me。 You think
that some men are temperate； and yet unjust？
Yes； he said； let that be admitted。
And temperance is good sense？
Yes。
And good sense is good counsel in doing injustice？
Granted。
If they succeed； I said； or if they do not succeed？
If they succeed。
And you would admit the existence of goods？
Yes。
And is the good that which is expedient for man？
Yes； indeed； he said： and there are some things which may be
inexpedient； and yet I call them good。
I thought that Protagoras was getting ruffled and excited； he seemed
to be setting himself in an attitude of war。 Seeing this； I minded
my business； and gently said：…
When you say； Protagoras； that things inexpedient are good； do you
mean inexpedient for man only； or inexpedient altogether？ and do you
call the latter good？
Certainly not the last； he replied； for I know of many things…meats；
drinks； medicines； and ten thousand other things； which are
inexpedient for man； and some which are expedient； and some which
are neither expedient nor inexpedient for man； but only for horses；
and some for oxen only； and some for dogs； and some for no animals；
but only for trees； and some for the roots of trees and not for
their branches； as for example； manure； which is a good thing when
laid about the roots of a tree； but utterly destructive if thrown upon
the shoots and young branches； or I may instance olive oil； which is
mischievous to all plants； and generally most injurious to the hair of
every animal with the exception of man； but beneficial to human hair
and to the human body generally； and even in this application （so
various and changeable is the nature of the benefit）； that which is
the greatest good to the outward parts of a man； is a very great
evil to his inward parts： and for this reason physicians always forbid
their patients the use of oil in their food； except in very small
quantities； just enough to extinguish the disagreeable sensation of
smell in meats and sauces。
When he had given this answer； the company cheered him。 And I
said： Protagoras； I have a wretched memory； and when any one makes a
long speech to me I never remember what he is talking about。 As
then； if I had been deaf； and you were going to converse with me；
you would have had to raise your voice； so now； having such a bad
memory； I will ask you to cut your answers shorter； if you would
take me with you。
What do you mean？ he said： how am I to shorten my answers？ shall I
make them too short？
Certainly not； I said。
But short enough？
Yes； I said。
Shall I answer what appears to me to be short enough； or what
appears to you to be short enough？
I have heard； I said； that you can speak and teach others to speak
about the same things at such length that words never seemed to
fail； or with such brevity that no one could use fewer of them。 Please
therefore； if you talk with me； to adopt the latter or more
compendious method。
Socrates； he replied； many a battle of words have I fought； and if I
had followed the method of disputation which my adversaries desired；
as you want me to do； I should have been no better than another； and
the name of Protagoras would have been nowhere。
I saw that he was not satisfied with his previous answers； and
that he would not play the part of answerer any more if he could help；
and I considered that there was no call upon me to continue the
conversation； so I said： Protagoras； I do not wish to force the
conversation upon you if you had rather not； but when you are
willing to argue with me in such a way that I can follow you； then I
will argue with you。 Now you； as is said of you by others and as you
say of yourself； are able to have discussions in shorter forms of
speech as well as in longer； for you are a master of wisdom； but I
cannot manage these long speeches： I only wish that I could。 You； on
the other hand； who are capable of either； ought to speak shorter as I
beg you； and then we might converse。 But I see that you are
disinclined； and as I have an engagement which will prevent my staying
to hear you at greater length （for I have to be in another place）； I
will depart； although I should have liked to have heard you。
Thus I spoke； and was rising from my seat； when Callias seized me by
the right hand； and in his left hand caught hold of this old cloak
of mine。 He said： We cannot let you go； Socrates； for if you leave
us there will be an end of our discussions： I must therefore beg you
to remain； as there is nothing in the world that I should like
better than to hear you and Protagoras discourse。 Do not deny the
company this pleasure。
Now I had got up； and was in the act of departure。 Son of
Hipponicus； I replied； I have always admired； and do now heartily
applaud and love your philosophical spirit； and I would gladly
comply with your request； if I could。 But the truth is that I
cannot。 And what you ask is as great an impossibility to me； as if you
bade me run a race
