protagoras-第7章

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cannot。　And　what　you　ask　is　as　great　an　impossibility　to　me；　as　if　you



bade　me　run　a　race　with　Crison　of　Himera；　when　in　his　prime；　or　with



some　one　of　the　long　or　day　course　runners。　To　such　a　request　I　should



reply　that　I　would　fain　ask　the　same　of　my　own　legs；　but　they　refuse



to　comply。　And　therefore　if　you　want　to　see　Crison　and　me　in　the



same　stadium；　you　must　bid　him　slacken　his　speed　to　mine；　for　I　cannot



run　quickly；　and　he　can　run　slowly。　And　in　like　manner　if　you　want



to　hear　me　and　Protagoras　discoursing；　you　must　ask　him　to　shorten　his



answers；　and　keep　to　the　point；　as　he　did　at　first；　if　not；　how　can



there　be　any　discussion？　For　discussion　is　one　thing；　and　making　an



oration　is　quite　another；　in　my　humble　opinion。



　　But　you　see；　Socrates；　said　Callias；　that　Protagoras　may　fairly



claim　to　speak　in　his　own　way；　just　as　you　claim　to　speak　in　yours。



　　Here　Alcibiades　interposed；　and　said：　That；　Callias；　is　not　a　true



statement　of　the　case。　For　our　friend　Socrates　admits　that　he　cannot



make　a　speech…in　this　he　yields　the　palm　to　Protagoras：　but　I　should



be　greatly　surprised　if　he　yielded　to　any　living　man　in　the　power　of



holding　and　apprehending　an　argument。　Now　if　Protagoras　will　make　a



similar　admission；　and　confess　that　he　is　inferior　to　Socrates　in



argumentative　skill；　that　is　enough　for　Socrates；　but　if　he　claims　a



superiority　in　argument　as　well；　let　him　ask　and　answer…not；　when　a



question　is　asked；　slipping　away　from　the　point；　and　instead　of



answering；　making　a　speech　at　such　length　that　most　of　his　hearers



forget　the　question　at　issue　（not　that　Socrates　is　likely　to



forget…I　will　be　bound　for　that；　although　he　may　pretend　in　fun　that



he　has　a　bad　memory）。　And　Socrates　appears　to　me　to　be　more　in　the



right　than　Protagoras；　that　is　my　view；　and　every　man　ought　to　say



what　he　thinks。



　　When　Alcibiades　had　done　speaking；　some　one…Critias；　I



believe…went　on　to　say：　O　Prodicus　and　Hippias；　Callias　appears　to



me　to　be　a　partisan　of　Protagoras：　and　this　led　Alcibiades；　who



loves　opposition；　to　take　the　other　side。　But　we　should　not　be



partisans　either　of　Socrates　or　of　Protagoras；　let　us　rather　unite



in　entreating　both　of　them　not　to　break　up　the　discussion。



　　Prodicus　added：　That；　Critias；　seems　to　me　to　be　well　said；　for



those　who　are　present　at　such　discussions　ought　to　be　impartial



hearers　of　both　the　speakers；　remembering；　however；　that



impartiality　is　not　the　same　as　equality；　for　both　sides　should　be



impartially　heard；　and　yet　an　equal　meed　should　not　be　assigned　to



both　of　them；　but　to　the　wiser　a　higher　meed　should　be　given；　and　a



lower　to　the　less　wise。　And　I　as　well　as　Critias　would　beg　you；



Protagoras　and　Socrates；　to　grant　our　request；　which　is；　that　you　will



argue　with　one　another　and　not　wrangle；　for　friends　argue　with　friends



out　of　goodwill；　but　only　adversaries　and　enemies　wrangle。　And　then



our　meeting　will　be　delightful；　for　in　this　way　you；　who　are　the



speakers；　will　be　most　likely　to　win　esteem；　and　not　praise　only；



among　us　who　are　your　audience；　for　esteem　is　a　sincere　conviction



of　the　hearers'　souls；　but　praise　is　often　an　insincere　expression



of　men　uttering　falsehoods　contrary　to　their　conviction。　And　thus　we



who　are　the　hearers　will　be　gratified　and　not　pleased；　for



gratification　is　of　the　mind　when　receiving　wisdom　and　knowledge；



but　pleasure　is　of　the　body　when　eating　or　experiencing　some　other



bodily　delight。　Thus　spoke　Prodicus；　and　many　of　the　company　applauded



his　words。



　　Hippias　the　sage　spoke　next。　He　said：　All　of　you　who　are　here



present　I　reckon　to　be　kinsmen　and　friends　and　fellow…citizens；　by



nature　and　not　by　law；　for　by　nature　like　is　akin　to　like；　whereas　law



is　the　tyrant　of　mankind；　and　often　compels　us　to　do　many　things　which



are　against　nature。　How　great　would　be　the　disgrace　then；　if　we；　who



know　the　nature　of　things；　and　are　the　wisest　of　the　Hellenes；　and



as　such　are　met　together　in　this　city；　which　is　the　metropolis　of



wisdom；　and　in　the　greatest　and　most　glorious　house　of　this　city；



should　have　nothing　to　show　worthy　of　this　height　of　dignity；　but



should　only　quarrel　with　one　another　like　the　meanest　of　mankind　I



pray　and　advise　you；　Protagoras；　and　you；　Socrates；　to　agree　upon　a



compromise。　Let　us　be　your　peacemakers。　And　do　not　you；　Socrates；



aim　at　this　precise　and　extreme　brevity　in　discourse；　if　Protagoras



objects；　but　loosen　and　let　go　the　reins　of　speech；　that　your　words



may　be　grander　and　more　becoming　to　you。　Neither　do　you；　Protagoras；



go　forth　on　the　gale　with　every　sail　set　out　of　sight　of　land　into



an　ocean　of　words；　but　let　there　be　a　mean　observed　by　both　of　you。　Do



as　I　say。　And　let　me　also　persuade　you　to　choose　an　arbiter　or



overseer　or　president；　he　will　keep　watch　over　your　words　and　will



prescribe　their　proper　length。



　　This　proposal　was　received　by　the　company　with　universal　approval；



Callias　said　that　he　would　not　let　me　off；　and　they　begged　me　to



choose　an　arbiter。　But　I　said　that　to　choose　an　umpire　of　discourse



would　be　unseemly；　for　if　the　person　chosen　was　inferior；　then　the



inferior　or　worse　ought　not　to　preside　over　the　better；　or　if　he　was



equal；　neither　would　that　be　well；　for　he　who　is　our　equal　will　do



as　we　do；　and　what　will　be　the　use　of　choosing　him？　And　if　you　say；



〃Let　us　have　a　better　then；〃…to　that　I　answer　that　you　cannot　have　any



one　who　is　wiser　than　Protagoras。　And　if　you　choose　another　who　is　not



really　better；　and　whom　you　only　say　is　better；　to　put　another　over



him　as　though　he　were　an　inferior　person　would　be　an　unworthy



reflection　on　him；　not　that；　as　far　as　I　am　concerned；　any



reflection　is　of　much　consequence　to　me。　Let　me　tell　you　then　what　I



will　do　in　order　that　the　conversation　and　discussion　may　go　on　as　you



desire。　If　Protagoras　is　not　disposed　to　answer；　let　him　ask　and　I



will　answer；　and　I　will　endeavour　to　show　at　the　same　time　how；　as　I



maintain；　he　ought　to　answer：　and　when　I　have　answered　as　many



questions　as　he　likes　to　ask；　let　him　in　like　manner　answer　me；　and　if



he　seems　to　be　not　very　ready　at　answering　the　precise　question



asked　of　him；　you　and　I　will　unite　in　entreating　him；　as　you　entreated



me；　not　to　spoil　the　discussion。　And　this　will　require　no　special



arbiter…all　of　you　shall　be　arbiters。



　　This　was　generally　approved；　and　Protagoras；　though　very　much



against　his　will；　was　obliged　to　agree　that　he　would　ask　questions；



and　when　he　had　put　a　sufficient　number　of　them；　that　he　would



answer　in　his　turn　those　which　he　was　asked　in　short　replies。　He　began



to　put　his　questions　as　follows：…



　　I　am　of　opinion；　Socrates；　he　said；　that　skill　in　poetry　is　the



principal　part　of　education；　and　this　I　conceive　to　be　the　power　of



knowing　what　compositions　of　the　poets　are　correct；　and　what　are



not；　and　how　they　are　to　be　distinguished；　and　of　explaining　when



asked　the　reason　of　the　difference。　And　I　propose　to　transfer　the



question　which　you　and　I　have　been　discussing　to　the　domain　of　poetry；



we　will　speak　as　before　of　virtue；　but　in　reference　to　a　passage　of



a　poet。　Now　Simonides　says　to　Scopas　the　son　of　Creon　the　Thessalian：







　　Hardly　on　the　one　hand　can　a　man　become　truly　good；　built



four…square　in　hands　and　feet　and　mind；　a　work　without　a　flaw。







Do　you　know　the　poem？　or　shall　I　repeat　the　whole？



　　There　is　no　need；　I　said；　for　I　am　perfectly　well　acquainted　with



the　ode…I　have　made　a　careful　study　of　it。



　　Very　well；　he　said。　And　do　you　think　that　the　ode　is　a　good



composition；　and　true？



　　Yes；　I　said；　both　good　and　true。



　　But　if　there　is　a　contradiction；　can　the　composition　be　good　or



true？



　　No；　not　in　that　case；　I　replied。



　　And　is　there　not　a　contradiction？　he　asked。　Reflect。



　　Well；　my　friend；　I　have　reflected。



　　And　does　not　the　poet　proceed　to　say；　〃I　do　not　agree　with　the



word　of　Pittacus；　albeit　the　utterance　of　a　wise　man：　Hardly　can　a　man



be　good〃？　Now　you　will　observe　that　this　is　said　by　the　same　poet。



　　I　know　it。



　　And　do　you　think；　he　said；　that　the　two　sayings　are　consistent？



　　Yes；　I　said；　I　think　so　（at　the　same　time　I　could　not　help　fearing



that　there　might　be　something　in　what　he　said）。　And　you　think



otherwise？



　　Why；　he　said；　how　can　he　be　consistent　in　both？　First　of　all；



premising　as　his　own　thought；　〃Hardly　can　a　man　become　truly　good〃；



and　then　a　little　further　on　in　the　poem；　forgetting；　and　blaming



Pittacus　and　refusing　to　agree　with　him；　when　he　says；　〃Hardly　can　a



man　be　good；〃　which　is　the　very　same　thing。　And　yet　when　he　blames　him



who　says　the　same　with　himself；　he　blames　himself；　so　that　he　must



be　wrong　either　in　his　first　or　his　second　assertion。



　　Many　of　the　audience　cheered　and　applauded　this。　And　I　felt　at　first



giddy　and　faint；　as　if　I　had　received　a　blow　from　the　hand　of　an



expert　boxer；　when　I　heard　his　words　and　the　sound　of　the　cheering；



and　to　confess　the　truth；　I　wanted　to　get　time　to　think　what　the



meaning　of　the　poet　really　was。　So　I　turned　to　Prodicus　and　called



him。　Prodicus；　I　said；　Simonides　is　a　countryman　of　yours；　and　you



ought　to　come　to　his　aid。　I　must　appeal　to　you；　like　the　river



Scamander　in　Homer；　who；　when　beleaguered　by　Achilles；　summons　the



Simois　to　aid　him；　saying：







　　Brother　dear；　let　us　both　together　stay　the　force　of　the　hero。







And　I　summon　you；　for　I　am　afraid　that　Protagoras　will　make　an　end



of　Simonides。　Now　is　the　time　to　rehabilitate　Simonides；　by　the



application　of　your　philosophy　of　synonyms；　which　enables　you　to



distinguish　〃will〃　and　〃wish；〃　and　make　other　charming　distinctions



like　those　which　you　drew　just　now。　And　I　should　like　to　know



whether　you　would　agree　with　me；　for　I　am　of　opinion　that　there　is



no　contradiction　in　the　words　of　Simonides。　And　first　of　all　I　wish



that　you　would　say　whether；　in　your　opinion；　Prodicus；　〃being〃　is



the　same　as　〃becoming。〃



　　Not　the　same；　certainly；　replied　Prodicus。



　　Did　not　Simonides　first　set　forth；　as　his　own　view；　that　〃Hardly　can



a　man　become　truly　good〃？



　　Quite　right；　said　Prodicus。



　　And　then　he　blames　Pittacus；　not；　as　Protagoras　imagines；　for



repeating　that　which　he　says　himself；　but　for　saying　something



different　from　himself。　Pittacus　does　not　say　as　Simonides　says；



that　hardly　can　a　man　become　good；　but　hardly　can　a　man　be　good：　and



our　friend　Prodicus　would　maintain　that　being；　Protagoras；　is　not



the　same　as　becoming；　and　if　they　are　not　the　same；　then　Simonides



is　not　inconsistent　with　himself。　I　dare　say　that　Prodicus　and　many



others　would　say；　as　Hesiod　says；







　　　On　the　one　hand；　hardly　can　a　man　become　good；



　　　For　the　gods　have　m