protagoras-第9章

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good；　and　yet　this　is　possible：　but　to　be　good　is　an　impossibility…







　　For　he　who　does　well　is　the　good　man；　and　he　who　does　ill　is　the



bad。







But　what　sort　of　doing　is　good　in　letters？　and　what　sort　of　doing



makes　a　man　good　in　letters？　Clearly　the　knowing　of　them。　And　what



sort　of　well…doing　makes　a　man　a　good　physician？　Clearly　the　knowledge



of　the　art　of　healing　the　sick。　〃But　he　who　does　ill　is　the　bad。〃



Now　who　becomes　a　bad　physician？　Clearly　he　who　is　in　the　first



place　a　physician；　and　in　the　second　place　a　good　physician；　for　he



may　become　a　bad　one　also：　but　none　of　us　unskilled　individuals　can　by



any　amount　of　doing　ill　become　physicians；　any　more　than　we　can　become



carpenters　or　anything　of　that　sort；　and　he　who　by　doing　ill　cannot



become　a　physician　at　all；　clearly　cannot　become　a　bad　physician。　In



like　manner　the　good　may　become　deteriorated　by　time；　or　toil；　or



disease；　or　other　accident　（the　only　real　doing　ill　is　to　be



deprived　of　knowledge）；　but　the　bad　man　will　never　become　bad；　for



he　is　always　bad；　and　if　he　were　to　become　bad；　he　must　previously



have　been　good。　Thus　the　words　of　the　poem　tend　to　show　that　on　the



one　hand　a　man　cannot　be　continuously　good；　but　that　he　may　become



good　and　may　also　become　bad；　and　again　that







　　They　are　the　best　for　the　longest　time　whom　the　gods　love。







　　All　this　relates　to　Pittacus；　as　is　further　proved　by　the　sequel。



For　he　adds：







　　Therefore　I　will　not　throw　away　my　span　of　life　to　no　purpose　in



searching　after　the　impossible；　hoping　in　vain　to　find　a　perfectly



faultless　man　among　those　who　partake　of　the　fruit　of　the



broad…bosomed　earth：　if　I　find　him；　I　will　send　you　word。







（this　is　the　vehement　way　in　which　he　pursues　his　attack　upon　Pittacus



throughout　the　whole　poem）：







　　But　him　who　does　no　evil；　voluntarily　I　praise　and　love；…not　even



the　gods　war　against　necessity。







All　this　has　a　similar　drift；　for　Simonides　was　not　so　ignorant　as



to　say　that　he　praised　those　who　did　no　evil　voluntarily；　as　though



there　were　some　who　did　evil　voluntarily。　For　no　wise　man；　as　I



believe；　will　allow　that　any　human　being　errs　voluntarily；　or



voluntarily　does　evil　and　dishonourable　actions；　but　they　are　very



well　aware　that　all　who　do　evil　and　dishonourable　things　do　them



against　their　will。　And　Simonides　never　says　that　he　praises　him　who



does　no　evil　voluntarily；　the　word　〃voluntarily〃　applies　to　himself。



For　he　was　under　the　impression　that　a　good　man　might　often　compel



himself　to　love　and　praise　another；　and　to　be　the　friend　and



approver　of　another；　and　that　there　might　be　an　involuntary　love；　such



as　a　man　might　feel　to　an　unnatural　father　or　mother；　or　country；　or



the　like。　Now　bad　men；　when　their　parents　or　country　have　any　defects；



look　on　them　with　malignant　joy；　and　find　fault　with　them　and　expose



and　denounce　them　to　others；　under　the　idea　that　the　rest　of　mankind



will　be　less　likely　to　take　themselves　to　task　and　accuse　them　of



neglect；　and　they　blame　their　defects　far　more　than　they　deserve；　in



order　that　the　odium　which　is　necessarily　incurred　by　them　may　be



increased：　but　the　good　man　dissembles　his　feelings；　and　constrains



himself　to　praise　them；　and　if　they　have　wronged　him　and　he　is



angry；　he　pacifies　his　anger　and　is　reconciled；　and　compels　himself　to



love　and　praise　his　own　flesh　and　blood。　And　Simonides；　as　is



probable；　considered　that　he　himself　had　often　had　to　praise　and



magnify　a　tyrant　or　the　like；　much　against　his　will；　and　he　also



wishes　to　imply　to　Pittacus　that　he　does　not　censure　him　because　he　is



censorious。







　　For　I　am　satisfied　＇he　says＇　when　a　man　is　neither　bad　nor　very



stupid；　and　when　he　knows　justice　（which　is　the　health　of　states）；　and



is　of　sound　mind；　I　will　find　no　fault　with　him；　for　I　am　not　given　to



finding　fault；　and　there　are　innumerable　fools







（implying　that　if　he　delighted　in　censure　he　might　have　abundant



opportunity　of　finding　fault）。







　　All　things　are　good　with　which　evil　is　unmingled。







In　these　latter　words　he　does　not　mean　to　say　that　all　things　are　good



which　have　no　evil　in　them；　as　you　might　say　〃All　things　are　white



which　have　no　black　in　them；〃　for　that　would　be　ridiculous；　but　he



means　to　say　that　he　accepts　and　finds　no　fault　with　the　moderate　or



intermediate　state。　He　says：







　　I　do　not　hope　to　find　a　perfectly　blameless　man　among　those　who



partake　of　the　fruits　of　the　broad…bosomed　earth　（if　I　find　him；　I



will　send　you　word）；　in　this　sense　I　praise　no　man。　But　he　who　is



moderately　good；　and　does　no　evil；　is　good　enough　for　me；　who　love　and



approve　every　one。







（and　here　observe　that　he　uses　a　Lesbian　word；　epainemi　＇approve＇；



because　he　is　addressing　Pittacus；







　　Who　love　and　approve　every　one　voluntarily；　who　does　no　evil：







and　that　the　stop　should　be　put　after　〃voluntarily〃）；　〃but　there　are



some　whom　I　involuntarily　praise　and　love。　And　you；　Pittacus；　I



would　never　have　blamed；　if　you　had　spoken　what　was　moderately　good



and　true；　but　I　do　blame　you　because；　putting　on　the　appearance　of



truth；　you　are　speaking　falsely　about　the　highest　matters。　And　this；　I



said；　Prodicus　and　Protagoras；　I　take　to　be　the　meaning　of　Simonides



in　this　poem。



　　Hippias　said：　I　think；　Socrates；　that　you　have　given　a　very　good



explanation　of　the　poem；　but　I　have　also　an　excellent　interpretation



of　my　own　which　I　will　propound　to　you；　if　you　will　allow　me。



　　Nay；　Hippias；　said　Alcibiades；　not　now；　but　at　some　other　time。　At



present　we　must　abide　by　the　compact　which　was　made　between　Socrates



and　Protagoras；　to　the　effect　that　as　long　as　Protagoras　is　willing　to



ask；　Socrates　should　answer；　or　that　if　he　would　rather　answer；　then



that　Socrates　should　ask。



　　I　said：　I　wish　Protagoras　either　to　ask　or　answer　as　he　is　inclined；



but　I　would　rather　have　done　with　poems　and　odes；　if　he　does　not



object；　and　come　back　to　the　question　about　which　I　was　asking　you



at　first；　Protagoras；　and　by　your　help　make　an　end　of　that。　The　talk



about　the　poets　seems　to　me　like　a　commonplace　entertainment　to



which　a　vulgar　company　have　recourse；　who；　because　they　are　not　able



to　converse　or　amuse　one　another；　while　they　are　drinking；　with　the



sound　of　their　own　voices　and　conversation；　by　reason　of　their



stupidity；　raise　the　price　of　flute…girls　in　the　market；　hiring　for



a　great　sum　the　voice　of　a　flute　instead　of　their　own　breath；　to　be



the　medium　of　intercourse　among　them：　but　where　the　company　are　real



gentlemen　and　men　of　education；　you　will　see　no　flute…girls；　nor



dancing…girls；　nor　harp…girls；　and　they　have　no　nonsense　or　games；　but



are　contented　with　one　another's　conversation；　of　which　their　own



voices　are　the　medium；　and　which　they　carry　on　by　turns　and　in　an



orderly　manner；　even　though　they　are　very　liberal　in　their



potations。　And　a　company　like　this　of　ours；　and　men　such　as　we　profess



to　be；　do　not　require　the　help　of　another's　voice；　or　of　the　poets



whom　you　cannot　interrogate　about　meaning　of　what　they　are　saying；



people　who　cite　them　declaring；　some　that　the　poet　has　meaning；　and



others　that　he　has　another；　and　the　point　which　is　in　dispute　can



never　be　decided。　This　sort　of　entertainment　they　decline；　and



prefer　to　talk　with　one　another；　and　put　one　another　to　the　proof　in



conversation。　And　these　are　the　models　which　I　desire　that　you　and　I



should　imitate。　Leaving　the　poets；　and　keeping　to　ourselves；　let　us



try　the　mettle　of　one　another　and　make　proof　of　the　truth　in



conversation。　If　you　have　a　mind　to　ask；　I　am　ready　to　answer；　or　if



you　would　rather；　do　you　answer；　and　give　me　the　opportunity　of



resuming　and　completing　our　unfinished　argument。



　　I　made　these　and　some　similar　observations；　but　Protagoras　would　not



distinctly　say　which　he　would　do。　Thereupon　Alcibiades　turned　to



Callias；　and　said：…Do　you　think；　Callias；　that　Protagoras　is　fair　in



refusing　to　say　whether　he　will　or　will　not　answer？　for　I　certainly



think　that　he　is　unfair；　he　ought　either　to　proceed　with　the　argument；



or　distinctly　refuse　to　proceed；　that　we　may　know　his　intention；　and



then　Socrates　will　be　able　to　discourse　with　some　one　else；　and　the



rest　of　the　company　will　be　free　to　talk　with　one　another。



　　I　think　that　Protagoras　was　really　made　ashamed　by　these　words　of



Alcibiades　and　when　the　prayers　of　Callias　and　the　company　were



superadded；　he　was　at　last　induced　to　argue；　and　said　that　I　might　ask



and　he　would　answer。



　　So　I　said：　Do　not　imagine；　Protagoras；　that　I　have　any　other



interest　in　asking　questions　of　you　but　that　of　clearing　up　my　own



difficulties。　For　I　think　that　Homer　was　very　right　in　saying　that







　　　　　　When　two　go　together；　one　sees　before　the　other；







for　all　men　who　have　a　companion　are　readier　in　deed；　word；　or



thought；　but　if　a　man







　　　　　　　　　　Sees　a　thing　when　he　is　alone；







he　goes　about　straightway　seeking　until　he　finds　some　one　to　whom　he



may　show　his　discoveries；　and　who　may　confirm　him　in　them。　And　I　would



rather　hold　discourse　with　you　than　with　any　one；　because　I　think　that



no　man　has　a　better　understanding　of　most　things　which　a　good　man



may　be　expected　to　understand；　and　in　particular　of　virtue。　For　who　is



there；　but　you？…who　not　only　claim　to　be　a　good　man　and　a　gentleman；



for　many　are　this；　and　yet　have　not　the　power　of　making　others　good



whereas　you　are　not　only　good　yourself；　but　also　the　cause　of　goodness



in　others。　Moreover　such　confidence　have　you　in　yourself；　that



although　other　Sophists　conceal　their　profession；　you　proclaim　in



the　face　of　Hellas　that　you　are　a　Sophist　or　teacher　of　virtue　and



education；　and　are　the　first　who　demanded　pay　in　return。　How　then



can　I　do　otherwise　than　invite　you　to　the　examination　of　these



subjects；　and　ask　questions　and　consult　with　you？　I　must；　indeed。



And　I　should　like　once　more　to　have　my　memory　refreshed　by　you　about



the　questions　which　I　was　asking　you　at　first；　and　also　to　have　your



help　in　considering　them。　If　I　am　not　mistaken　the　question　was



this：　Are　wisdom　and　temperance　and　courage　and　justice　and　holiness



five　names　of　the　same　thing？　or　has　each　of　the　names　a　separate



underlying　essence　and　corresponding　thing　having　a　peculiar　function；



no　one　of　them　being　like　any　other　of　them？　And　you　replied　that



the　five　names　were　not　the　names　of　the　same　thing；　but　that　each



of　them　had　a　separate　object；　and　that　all　these　objects　were　parts



of　virtue；　not　in　the　same　way　that　the　parts　of　gold　are　like　each



other　and　the　whole　of　which　they　are　parts；　but　as　the　parts　of　the



face　are　unlike　the　whole　of　which　th