the critique of judgement-第12章

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as　not　yet　emerged　from　barbarism。　　　And　yet　charms　are　frequently　not　alone　ranked　with　beauty　（which　ought　properly　to　be　a　question　merely　of　the　form）　as　supplementary　to　the　aesthetic　universal　delight；　but　they　have　been　accredited　as　intrinsic　beauties；　and　consequently　the　matter　of　delight　passed　off　for　the　form。　This　is　a　misconception　which；　like　many　others　that　have　still　an　underlying　element　of　truth；　may　be　removed　by　a　careful　definition　of　these　concepts。　　　A　judgement　of　taste　which　is　uninfluenced　by　charm　or　emotion　（though　these　may　be　associated　with　the　delight　in　the　beautiful）；　and　whose　determining　ground；　therefore；　is　simply　finality　of　form；　is　a　pure　judgement　of　taste。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SS　14　Exemplification。

　　Aesthetic；　just　like　theoretical　（logical）　judgements；　are　divisible　into　empirical　and　pure。　The　first　are　those　by　which　agreeableness　or　disagreeableness；　the　second　those　by　which　beauty　is　predicated　of　an　object　or　its　mode　of　representation。　The　former　are　judgements　of　sense　（material　aesthetic　judgements）；　the　latter　（as　formal）　alone　judgements　of　taste　proper。　　　A　judgement　of　taste；　therefore；　is　only　pure　so　far　as　its　determining　ground　is　tainted　with　no　merely　empirical　delight。　But　such　a　taint　is　always　present　where　charm　or　emotion　have　a　share　in　the　judgement　by　which　something　is　to　be　described　as　beautiful。　　　Here　now　there　is　a　recrudescence　of　a　number　of　specious　pleas　that　go　the　length　of　putting　forward　the　case　that　charm　is　not　merely　a　necessary　ingredient　of　beauty；　but　is　even　of　itself　sufficient　to　merit　the　name　of　beautiful。　A　mere　colour；　such　as　the　green　of　a　plot　of　grass；　or　a　mere　tone　（as　distinguished　from　sound　or　noise）；　like　that　of　a　violin；　is　described　by　most　people　as　in　itself　beautiful；　notwithstanding　the　fact　that　both　seem　to　depend　merely　on　the　matter　of　the　representations　in　other　words；　simply　on　sensation…which　only　entitles　them　to　be　called　agreeable。　But　it　will　at　the　same　time　be　observed　that　sensations　of　colour　as　well　as　of　tone　are　only　entitled　to　be　immediately　regarded　as　beautiful　where；　in　either　case；　they　are　pure。　This　is　a　determination　which　at　once　goes　to　their　form；　and　it　is　the　only　one　which　these　representations　possess　that　admits　with　certainty　of　being　universally　communicated。　For　it　is　not　to　be　assumed　that　even　the　quality　of　the　sensations　agrees　in　all　subjects；　and　we　can　hardly　take　it　for　granted　that　the　agreeableness　of　a　colour；　or　of　the　tone　of　a　musical　instrument；　which　we　judge　to　be　preferable　to　that　of　another；　is　given　a　like　preference　in　the　estimate　of　every　one。　　　Assuming　vibrations　vibration　sound；　and；　what　is　most　important；　that　the　mind　not　alone　perceives　by　sense　their　effect　in　stimulating　the　organs；　but　also；　by　reflection；　the　regular　play　of　the　impressions　（and　consequently　the　form　in　which　different　representations　are　united）…which　I；　still；　in　no　way　doubt…then　colour　and　tone　would　not　be　mere　sensations。　They　would　be　nothing　short　of　formal　determinations　of　the　unity　of　a　manifold　of　sensations；　and　in　that　case　could　even　be　ranked　as　intrinsic　beauties。　　　But　the　purity　of　a　simple　mode　of　sensation　means　that　its　uniformity　is　not　disturbed　or　broken　by　any　foreign　sensation。　It　belongs　merely　to　the　form；　for　abstraction　may　there　be　made　from　the　quality　of　the　mode　of　such　sensation　（what　colour　or　tone；　if　any；　it　represents）。　For　this　reason；　all　simple　colours　are　regarded　as　beautiful　so　far　as　pure。　Composite　colours　have　not　this　advantage；　because；　not　being　simple；　there　is　no　standard　for　estimating　whether　they　should　be　called　pure　or　impure。　　　But　as　for　the　beauty　ascribed　to　the　object　on　account　of　its　form；　and　the　supposition　that　it　is　capable　of　being　enhanced　by　charm；　this　is　a　common　error　and　one　very　prejudicial　to　genuine；　uncorrupted；　sincere　taste。　Nevertheless　charms　may　be　added　to　beauty　to　lend　to　the　mind；　beyond　a　bare　delight；　an　adventitious　interest　in　the　representation　of　the　object；　and　thus　to　advocate　taste　and　its　cultivation。　This　applies　especially　where　taste　is　as　yet　crude　and　untrained。　But　they　are　positively　subversive　of　the　judgement　of　taste；　if　allowed　to　obtrude　themselves　as　grounds　of　estimating　beauty。　For　so　far　are　they　from　contributing　to　beauty　that　it　is　only　where　taste　is　still　weak　and　untrained　that；　like　aliens；　they　are　admitted　as　a　favour；　and　only　on　terms　that　they　do　not　violate　that　beautiful　form。　　　In　painting；　sculpture；　and　in　fact　in　all　the　formative　arts；　in　architecture　and　horticulture；　so　far　as　fine　arts；　the　design　is　what　is　essential。　Here　it　is　not　what　gratifies　in　sensation　but　merely　what　pleases　by　its　form；　that　is　the　fundamental　prerequisite　for　taste。　The　colours　which　give　brilliancy　to　the　sketch　are　part　of　the　charm。　They　may　no　doubt；　in　their　own　way；　enliven　the　object　for　sensation；　but　make　it　really　worth　looking　at　and　beautiful　they　cannot。　Indeed；　more　often　than　not　the　requirements　of　the　beautiful　form　restrict　them　to　a　very　narrow　compass；　and；　even　where　charm　is　admitted；　it　is　only　this　form　that　gives　them　a　place　of　honour。　　　All　form　of　objects　of　sense　（both　of　external　and　also；　mediately；　of　internal　sense）　is　either　figure　or　play。　In　the　latter　case　it　is　either　play　of　figures　（in　space：　mimic　and　dance）；　or　mere　play　of　sensations　（in　time）。　The　charm　of　colours；　or　of　the　agreeable　tones　of　instruments；　may　be　added：　but　the　design　in　the　former　and　the　composition　in　the　latter　constitute　the　proper　object　of　the　pure　judgement　of　taste。　To　say　that　the　purity　alike　of　colours　and　of　tones；　or　their　variety　and　contrast；　seem　to　contribute　to　beauty；　is　by　no　means　to　imply　that；　because　in　themselves　agreeable；　they　therefore　yield　an　addition　to　the　delight　in　the　form　and　one　on　a　par　with　it。　The　real　meaning　rather　is　that　they　make　this　form　more　clearly；　definitely；　and　completely　intuitable；　and　besides　stimulate　the　representation　by　their　charm；　as　they　excite　and　sustain　the　attention　directed　to　the　object　itself。　　　Even　what　is　called　ornamentation　（parerga）；　i。e。；　what　is　only　an　adjunct　and　not　an　intrinsic　constituent　in　the　complete　representation　of　the　object；　in　augmenting　the　delight　of　taste　does　so　only　by　means　of　its　form。　Thus　it　is　with　the　frames　of　pictures　or　the　drapery　on　statues；　or　the　colonnades　of　palaces。　But　if　the　ornamentation　does　not　itself　enter　into　the　composition　of　the　beautiful　form…if　it　is　introduced　like　a　gold　frame　merely　to　win　approval　for　the　picture　by　means　of　its　charm…it　is　then　called　finery　and　takes　away　from　the　genuine　beauty。　　　Emotion…a　sensation　where　an　agreeable　feeling　is　produced　merely　by　means　of　a　momentary　check　followed　by　a　more　powerful　outpouring　of　the　vital　force…is　quite　foreign　to　beauty。　Sublimity　（with　which　the　feeling　of　emotion　is　connected）　requires；　however；　a　different　standard　of　estimation　from　that　relied　upon　by　taste。　A　pure　judgement　of　taste　has；　then；　for　its　determining　ground　neither　charm　nor　emotion；　in　a　word；　no　sensation　as　matter　of　the　aesthetic　judgement。

　　　　　　　SS　15。　The　judgement　of　taste　is　entirely　independent　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　of　the　concept　of　perfection。

　　Objective　finality　can　only　be　cognized　by　means　of　a　reference　of　the　manifold　to　a　definite　end；　and　hence　only　through　a　concept。　This　alone　makes　it　clear　that　the　beautiful；　which　is　estimated　on　the　ground　of　a　mere　formal　finality；　i。e。；　a　finality　apart　from　an　end；　is　wholly　independent　of　the　representation　of　the　good。　For　the　latter　presupposes　an　objective　finality；　i。e。；　the　reference　of　the　object　to　a　definite　end。　　　Objective　finality　is　either　external；　i。e。；　the　utility；　or　internal；　i。　e。；　the　perfection；　of　the　object。　That　the　delight　in　an　object　on　account　of　which　we　call　it　beautiful　is　incapable　of　resting　on　the　representation　of　its　utility；　is　abundantly　evident　from　the　two　preceding　articles；　for　in　that　case；　it　would　not　be　an　immediate　delight　in　the　object；　which　latter　is　the　essential　condition　of　the　judgement　upon　beauty。　But　in　an　objective；　internal　finality；　i。e。；　perfection；　we　have　what　is　more　akin　to　the　predicate　of　beauty；　and　so　this　has　been　held　even　by　philosophers　of　reputation　to　be　convertible　with　beauty；　though　subject　to　the　qualification：　where　it　is　thought　in　a　confused　way。　In　a　critique　of　taste　it　is　of　the　utmost　importance　to　decide　whether　beauty　is　really　reducible　to　the　concept　of　perfection。　　　For　estimating　objective　finality　we　always　require　the　concept　of　an　end；　and；　where　such　finality　has　to　be；　not　an　external　one　（utility）；　but　an　internal　one；　the　concept　of　an　internal　end　containing　the　ground　of　the　internal　possibility　of　the　object。　Now　an　end　is　in　general　that；　the　concept　of　which　may　be　regarded　as　the　ground　of　the　possibility　of　the　object　itself。　So　in　order　to　represent　an　objective　finality　in　a　thing　we　must　first　have　a　concept　of　what　sort　of　a　thing　it　is　to　be。　The　agreement　of　the　manifold　in　a　thing　with　this　concept　（which　supplies　the　rule　of　its　synthesis）　is　the　qualitative　perfection　of　the　thing。　Quantitative　perfection　is　entirely　distinct　from　this。　It　consists　in　the　completeness　of　anything　after　its　kind；　and　is　a　mere　concept　of　quantity　（of　totality）。　In　its　case　the　question　of　what　the　thing　is　to　be　is　regarded　as　definitely　disposed　of；　and　we　only　ask　whether　it　is　possessed　of　all　the　requisites　that　go　to　make　it　such。　What　is　formal　in　the　representation　of　a　thing；　i。e。；　the　agreement　of　its　manifold　with　a　unity　（i。e。；　irrespective　of　what　it　is　to　be）；　does　not；　of　itself；　afford　us　any　cognition　whatsoever　of　objective　finality。　For　since　abstraction　is　made　from　this　unity　as　end　（what　the　thing　is　to　be）；　nothing　is　left　but　the　subjective　finality　of　the　representations　in　the　mind　of　the　subject　intuiting。　This　gives　a　certain　finality　of　the　representative　state　of　the　subject；　in　which　the　subject　feels　itself　quite　at　home　in　its　effort　to　grasp　a　given　form　in　the　imagination；　but　no　perfection　of　any　object；　the　latter　not　being　here　thought　through　any　concept。　For　instance；　if　in　a　forest　I　light　upon　a　plot　of　grass；　round　which　trees　stand　in　a　circle；　and　if　I　do　not　then　form　any　representation　of　an　end；　as　that　it　is　meant　to　be　used；　say；　for　country　dances；　then　not　the　least　hint　of　a　concept　of　perfection　is　given　by　the　mere　form。　To　suppose　a　formal　objective　finality　that　is　yet　devoid　of　an　end；　i。e。；　the　mere　form　of　a　perfection　（apart　from　any　matter　or　concept　of　that　to　which　the　agreement　relates；　even　though　there　was　the　mere　general　idea　of　a　conformity　to　law）　is　a　veritable　contradiction。　　　Now　the　judgement　of　taste　is　an　aesthetic　judgement；　one　resting　on　subjective　grounds。　No　concept　can　be　its　determining　ground；　and　hence　not　one　of　a　definite　end。　Beauty；　therefore；　as　a　formal　subjective　finality；　involves　no　thought　whatsoever　of　a　perfection　of　the　object；　as　a　would…be　formal　finality　which　yet；　for　all　that；　is　objective：　and　the　distinction　between　the　concepts　of　the　beautiful　and　the　good；　which　represents　both　as　differing　only　in　their　logical　form；　the　first　being　merely