the critique of judgement-第13章

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　and　the　good；　which　represents　both　as　differing　only　in　their　logical　form；　the　first　being　merely　a　confused；　the　second　a　clearly　defined；　concept　of　perfection；　while　otherwise　alike　in　content　and　origin；　all　goes　for　nothing：　for　then　there　would　be　no　specific　difference　between　them；　but　the　judgement　of　taste　would　be　just　as　much　a　cognitive　judgement　as　one　by　which　something　is　described　as　good…just　as　the　man　in　the　street；　when　be　says　that　deceit　is　wrong；　bases　his　judgement　on　confused；　but　the　philosopher　on　clear　grounds；　while　both　appeal　in　reality　to　identical　principles　of　reason。　But　I　have　already　stated　that　an　aesthetic　judgement　is　quite　unique；　and　affords　absolutely　no　（not　even　a　confused）　knowledge　of　the　object。　It　is　only　through　a　logical　judgement　that　we　get　knowledge。　The　aesthetic　judgement；　on　the　other　hand；　refers　the　representation；　by　which　an　object　is　given；　solely　to　the　subject；　and　brings　to　our　notice　no　quality　of　the　object；　but　only　the　final　form　in　the　determination　of　the　powers　of　representation　engaged　upon　it。　The　judgement　is　called　aesthetic　for　the　very　reason　that　its　determining　ground　cannot　be　a　concept；　but　is　rather　the　feeling　（of　the　internal　sense）　of　the　concert　in　the　play　of　the　mental　powers　as　a　thing　only　capable　of　being　felt。　If；　on　the　other　band；　confused　concepts；　and　the　objective　judgement　based　on　them；　are　going　to　be　called　aesthetic；　we　shall　find　ourselves　with　an　understanding　judging　by　sense；　or　a　sense　representing　its　objects　by　concepts…a　mere　choice　of　contradictions。　The　faculty　of　concepts；　be　they　confused　or　be　they　clear；　is　understanding；　and　although　understanding　has　（as　in　all　judgements）　its　role　in　the　judgement　of　taste；　as　an　aesthetic　judgement；　its　role　there　is　not　that　of　a　faculty　for　cognizing　an　object；　but　of　a　faculty　for　determining　that　judgement　and　its　representation　（without　a　concept）　according　to　its　relation　to　the　subject　and　its　internal　feeling；　and　for　doing　so　in　so　far　as　that　judgement　is　possible　according　to　a　universal　rule。

　　　　　　SS　16。　A　judgement　of　taste　by　which　an　object　is　　　　　　　　described　as　beautiful；　under　the　condition　of　　　　　　　　　　　　　　a　definite　concept；　is　not　pure。

　　There　are　two　kinds　of　beauty：　free　beauty　（pulchritudo　vaga）；　or　beauty　which　is　merely　dependent　（pulchritudo　adhaerens）。　The　first　presupposes　no　concept　of　what　the　object　should　be；　the　second　does　presuppose　such　a　concept　and；　with　it；　an　answering　perfection　of　the　object。　Those　of　the　first　kind　are　said　to　be　（self…subsisting）　beauties　of　this　thing　or　that　thing；　the　other　kind　of　beauty；　being　attached　to　a　concept　（conditioned　beauty）；　is　ascribed　to　objects　which　come　under　the　concept　of　a　particular　end。　　　Flowers　are　free　beauties　of　nature。　Hardly　anyone　but　a　botanist　knows　the　true　nature　of　a　flower；　and　even　he；　while　recognizing　in　the　flower　the　reproductive　organ　of　the　plant；　pays　no　attention　to　this　natural　end　when　using　his　taste　to　judge　of　its　beauty。　Hence　no　perfection　of　any　kind…no　internal　finality；　as　something　to　which　the　arrangement　of　the　manifold　is　related…underlies　this　judgement。　Many　birds　（the　parrot；　the　humming…bird；　the　bird　of　paradise）；　and　a　number　of　crustacea；　are　self…subsisting　beauties　which　are　not　appurtenant　to　any　object　defined　with　respect　to　its　end；　but　please　freely　and　on　their　own　account。　So　designs　a　la　grecque；　foliage　for　framework　or　on　wall…papers；　etc。；　have　no　intrinsic　meaning；　they　represent　nothing…no　object　under　a　definite　concept…and　are　free　beauties。　We　may　also　rank　in　the　same　class　what　in　music　are　called　fantasias　（without　a　theme）；　and；　indeed；　all　music　that　is　not　set　to　words。　　　In　the　estimate　of　a　free　beauty　（according　to　mere　form）　we　have　the　pure　judgement　of　taste。　No　concept　is　here　presupposed　of　any　end　for　which　the　manifold　should　serve　the　given　object；　and　which　the　latter；　therefore；　should　represent…an　incumbrance　which　would　only　restrict　the　freedom　of　the　imagination　that；　as　it　were；　is　at　play　in　the　contemplation　of　the　outward　form。　　　But　the　beauty　of　man　（including　under　this　head　that　of　a　man；　woman；　or　child）；　the　beauty　of　a　horse；　or　of　a　building　（such　as　a　church；　palace；　arsenal；　or　summer…house）；　presupposes　a　concept　of　the　end　that　defines　what　the　thing　has　to　be；　and　consequently　a　concept　of　its　perfection；　and　is　therefore　merely　appendant　beauty。　Now；　just　as　it　is　a　clog　on　the　purity　of　the　purity　of　the　judgement　of　taste　to　have　the　agreeable　（of　sensation）　joined　with　beauty　to　which　properly　only　the　form　is　relevant；　so　to　combine　the　good　with　beauty　（the　good；　namely；　of　the　manifold　to　the　thing　itself　according　to　its　end）　mars　its　purity。　　　Much　might　be　added　to　a　building　that　would　immediately　please　the　eye；　were　it　not　intended　for　a　church。　A　figure　might　be　beautified　with　all　manner　of　flourishes　and　light　but　regular　lines；　as　is　done　by　the　New　Zealanders　with　their　tattooing；　were　we　dealing　with　anything　but　the　figure　of　a　human　being。　And　here　is　one　whose　rugged　features　might　be　softened　and　given　a　more　pleasing　aspect；　only　he　has　got　to　be　a　man；　or　is；　perhaps；　a　warrior　that　has　to　have　a　warlike　appearance。　　　Now　the　delight　in　the　manifold　of　a　thing；　in　reference　to　the　internal　end　that　determines　its　possibility；　is　a　delight　based　on　a　concept；　whereas　delight　in　the　beautiful　is　such　as　does　not　presuppose　any　concept；　but　is　immediately　coupled　with　the　representation　through　which　the　object　is　given　（not　through　which　it　is　thought）。　If；　now；　the　judgement　of　taste　in　respect　of　the　latter　delight　is　made　dependent　upon　the　end　involved　in　the　former　delight　as　a　judgement　of　reason；　and　is　thus　placed　under　a　restriction；　then　it　is　no　longer　a　free　and　pure　judgement　of　taste。　　　Taste；　it　is　true；　stands　to　gain　by　this　combination　of　intellectual　delight　with　the　aesthetic。　For　it　becomes　fixed；　and；　while　not　universal；　it　enables　rules　to　be　prescribed　for　it　in　respect　of　certain　definite　final　objects。　But　these　rules　are　then　not　rules　of　taste；　but　merely　rules　for　establishing　a　union　of　taste　with　reason；　i。e。；　of　the　beautiful　with　the　good…rules　by　which　the　former　becomes　available　as　an　intentional　instrument　in　respect　of　the　latter；　for　the　purpose　of　bringing　that　temper　of　the　mind　which　is　self…sustaining　and　of　subjective　universal　validity　to　the　support　and　maintenance　of　that　mode　of　thought　which；　while　possessing　objective　universal　validity；　can　only　be　preserved　by　a　resolute　effort。　But；　strictly　speaking；　perfection　neither　gains　by　beauty；　nor　beauty　by　perfection。　The　truth　is　rather　this；　when　we　compare　the　representation　through　which　an　object　is　given　to　us　with　the　object　（in　respect　of　what　it　is　meant　to　be）　by　means　of　a　concept；　we　cannot　help　reviewing　it　also　in　respect　of　the　sensation　in　the　subject。　Hence　there　results　a　gain　to　the　entire　faculty　of　our　representative　power　when　harmony　prevails　between　both　states　of　mind。　　　In　respect　of　an　object　with　a　definite　internal　end；　a　judgement　of　taste　would　only　be　pure　where　the　person　judging　either　has　no　concept　of　this　end；　or　else　makes　abstraction　from　it　in　his　judgement。　But　in　cases　like　this；　although　such　a　person　should　lay　down　a　correct　judgement　of　taste；　since　he　would　be　estimating　the　object　as　a　free　beauty；　he　would　still　be　found　fault　with　by　another　who　saw　nothing　in　its　beauty　but　a　dependent　quality　（i。e。；　who　looked　to　the　end　of　the　object）　and　would　be　accused　by　him　of　false　taste；　though　both　would；　in　their　own　way；　be　judging　correctly：　the　one　according　to　what　he　had　present　to　his　senses；　the　other　according　to　what　was　present　in　his　thoughts。　This　distinction　enables　us　to　settle　many　disputes　about　beauty　on　the　part　of　critics；　for　we　may　show　them　how　one　side　is　dealing　with　free　beauty；　and　the　other　with　that　which　is　dependent：　the　former　passing　a　pure　judgement　of　taste；　the　latter　one　that　is　applied　intentionally。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SS　17。　Ideal　of　beauty。

　　There　can　be　no　objective　rule　of　taste　by　which　what　is　beautiful　may　be　defined　by　means　of　concepts。　For　every　judgement　from　that　source　is　aesthetic；　i。e。；　its　determining　ground　is　the　feeling　of　the　subject；　and　not　any　concept　of　an　object。　It　is　only　throwing　away　labour　to　look　for　a　principle　of　taste　that　affords　a　universal　criterion　of　the　beautiful　by　definite　concepts；　because　what　is　sought　is　a　thing　impossible　and　inherently　contradictory。　But　in　the　universal　communicability　of　the　sensation　（of　delight　or　aversion）…a　communicability；　too；　that　exists　apart　from　any　concept…in　the　accord；　so　far　as　possible；　of　all　ages　and　nations　as　to　this　feeling　in　the　representation　of　certain　objects；　we　have　the　empirical　criterion；　weak　indeed　and　scarce　sufficient　to　raise　a　presumption；　of　the　derivation　of　a　taste；　thus　confirmed　by　examples；　from　grounds　deep　seated　and　shared　alike　by　all　men；　underlying　their　agreement　in　estimating　the　forms　under　which　objects　are　given　to　them。　　　For　this　reason　some　products　of　taste　are　looked　on　as　exemplary…not　meaning　thereby　that　by　imitating　others　taste　may　be　acquired。　For　taste　must　be　an　original　faculty；　whereas　one　who　imitates　a　model；　while　showing　skill　commensurate　with　his　success；　only　displays　taste　as　himself　a　critic　of　this　model。*　Hence　it　follows　that　the　highest　model；　the　archetype　of　taste；　is　a　mere　idea；　which　each　person　must　beget　in　his　own　consciousness；　and　according　to　which　he　must　form　his　estimate　of　everything　that　is　an　object　of　taste；　or　that　is　an　example　of　critical　taste；　and　even　of　universal　taste　itself。　Properly　speaking；　an　idea　signifies　a　concept　of　reason；　and　an　ideal　the　representation　of　an　individual　existence　as　adequate　to　an　idea。　Hence　this　archetype　of　taste…which　rests；　indeed；　upon　reason's　indeterminate　idea　of　a　maximum；　but　is　not；　however；　capable　of　being　represented　by　means　of　concepts；　but　only　in　an　individual　presentation…may　more　appropriately　be　called　the　ideal　of　the　beautiful。　While　not　having　this　ideal　in　our　possession；　we　still　strive　to　beget　it　within　us。　But　it　is　bound　to　be　merely　an　ideal　of　the　imagination；　seeing　that　it　rests；　not　upon　concepts；　but　upon　the　presentation…the　faculty　of　presentation　being　the　imagination。　Now；　how　do　we　arrive　at　such　an　ideal　of　beauty？　Is　it　a　priori　or　empirically？　Further；　what　species　of　the　beautiful　admits　of　an　ideal？

　　*Models　of　taste　with　respect　to　the　arts　of　speech　must　be　composed　in　a　dead　and　learned　language；　the　first；　to　prevent　their　having　to　suffer　the　changes　that　inevitably　overtake　living　ones；　making　dignified　expressions　become　degraded；　common　ones　antiquated；　and　ones　newly　coined　after　a　short　currency　obsolete：　the　second　to　ensure　its　having　a　grammar　that　is　not　subject　to　the　caprices　of　fashion；　but　has　fixed　rules　of　its　own。

　　First　of　all；　we　do　well　to　observe　that　the　beauty　for　which　an　ideal　has　to　be　sought　cannot　be　a　beauty　that　is　free　and　at　large；　but　must　be　one　fixed　by　a　concept　of　objective　finality。　Hence　it　cannot　belong　to　the　object　of　an　altogether　pure　judgement　of　taste；　but　must　attach　to　one　that　is　partly