the critique of judgement-第16章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


ne　qua　non）　of　grasping　the　object　as　a　single　representation　and　giving　to　the　manifold　its　determinate　form。　This　determination　is　an　end　in　respect　of　knowledge；　and　in　this　connection　it　is　invariably　coupled　with　delight　（such　as　attends　the　accomplishment　of　any；　even　problematical；　purpose）。　Here；　however；　we　have　merely　the　value　set　upon　the　solution　that　satisfies　the　problem；　and　not　a　free　and　indeterminately　final　entertainment　of　the　mental　powers　with　what　is　called　beautiful。　In　the　latter　case；　understanding　is　at　the　service　of　imagination；　in　the　former；　this　relation　is　reversed。　　　With　a　thing　that　owes　its　possibility　to　a　purpose；　a　building；　or　even　an　animal；　its　regularity；　which　consists　in　symmetry；　must　express　the　unity　of　the　intuition　accompanying　the　concept　of　its　end；　and　belongs　with　it　to　cognition。　But　where　all　that　is　intended　is　the　maintenance　of　a　free　play　of　the　powers　of　representation　（subject；　however；　to　the　condition　that　there　is　to　be　nothing　for　understanding　to　take　exception　to）；　in　ornamental　gardens；　in　the　decoration　of　rooms；　in　all　kinds　of　furniture　that　shows　good　taste；　etc。；　regularity　in　the　shape　of　constraint　is　to　be　avoided　as　far　as　possible。　Thus　English　taste　in　gardens；　and　fantastic　taste　in　furniture；　push　the　freedom　of　imagination　to　the　verge　of　what　is　grotesque　the　idea　being　that　in　this　divorce　from　all　constraint　of　rules　the　precise　instance　is　being　afforded　where　taste　can　exhibit　its　perfection　in　projects　of　the　imagination　to　the　fullest　extent。　　　All　stiff　regularity　（such　as　borders　on　mathematical　regularity）　is　inherently　repugnant　to　taste；　in　that　the　contemplation　of　it　affords　us　no　lasting　entertainment。　Indeed；　where　it　has　neither　cognition　nor　some　definite　practical　end　expressly　in　view；　we　get　heartily　tired　of　it。　On　the　other　hand；　anything　that　gives　the　imagination　scope　for　unstudied　and　final　play　is　always　fresh　to　us。　We　do　not　grow　to　hate　the　very　sight　of　it。　Marsden；　in　his　description　of　Sumatra；　observes　that　the　free　beauties　of　nature　so　surround　the　beholder　on　all　sides　that　they　cease　to　have　much　attraction　for　him。　On　the　other　band　he　found　a　pepper　garden　full　of　charm；　on　coming　across　it　in　mid…forest　with　its　rows　of　parallel　stakes　on　which　the　plant　twines　itself。　From　all　this　he　infers　that　wild；　and　in　its　appearance　quite　irregular　beauty；　is　only　pleasing　as　a　change　to　one　whose　eyes　have　become　surfeited　with　regular　beauty。　But　he　need　only　have　made　the　experiment　of　passing　one　day　in　his　pepper　garden　to　realize　that　once　the　regularity　has　enabled　the　understanding　to　put　itself　in　accord　with　the　order　that　is　the　constant　requirement；　instead　of　the　object　diverting　him　any　longer；　it　imposes　an　irksome　constraint　upon　the　imagination：　whereas　nature　subject　to　no　constraint　of　artificial　rules；　and　lavish；　as　it　there　is；　in　its　luxuriant　variety　can　supply　constant　food　for　his　taste。　Even　a　bird's　song；　which　we　can　reduce　to　no　musical　rule；　seems　to　have　more　freedom　in　it；　and　thus　to　be　richer　for　taste；　than　the　human　voice　singing　in　accordance　with　all　the　rules　that　the　art　of　music　prescribes；　for　we　grow　tired　much　sooner　of　frequent　and　lengthy　repetitions　of　the　latter。　Yet　here　most　likely　our　sympathy　with　the　mirth　of　a　dear　little　creature　is　confused　with　the　beauty　of　its　song；　for　if　exactly　imitated　by　man　（as　has　been　sometimes　done　with　the　notes　of　the　nightingale）　it　would　strike　our　ear　as　wholly　destitute　of　taste。　　　Further；　beautiful　objects　have　to　be　distinguished　from　beautiful　views　of　objects　（where　the　distance　often　prevents　a　clear　perception）。　In　the　latter　case；　taste　appears　to　fasten；　not　so　much　on　what　the　imagination　grasps　in　this　field；　as　on　the　incentive　it　receives　to　indulge　in　poetic　fiction；　i。　e。；　in　the　peculiar　fancies　with　which　the　mind　entertains　itself　as　it　is　being　continually　stirred　by　the　variety　that　strikes　the　eye。　It　is　just　as　when　we　watch　the　changing　shapes　of　the　fire　or　of　a　rippling　brook：　neither　of　which　are　things　of　beauty；　but　they　convey　a　charm　to　the　imagination；　because　they　sustain　its　free　play。

SEC1｜BK2　　　　　　　　　　　　FIRST　PART　CRITIQUE　OF　AESTHETIC　JUDGEMENT　　　　　　　　　　　　SECTION　I。　ANALYTIC　OF　AESTHETIC　JUDGEMENT。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　BOOK　II。　Analytic　of　the　Sublime。

　　　　　SS　23。　Transition　from　the　faculty　of　estimating　the　　　　　　　　　　beautiful　to　that　of　estimating　the　sublime。

　　The　beautiful　and　the　sublime　agree　on　the　point　of　pleasing　on　their　own　account。　Further　they　agree　in　not　presupposing　either　a　judgement　of　sense　or　one　logically　determinant；　but　one　of　reflection。　Hence　it　follows　that　the　delight　does　not　depend　upon　a　sensation；　as　with　the　agreeable；　nor　upon　a　definite　concept；　as　does　the　delight　in　the　good；　although　it　has；　for　all　that；　an　indeterminate　reference　to　concepts。　Consequently　the　delight　is　connected　with　the　mere　presentation　or　faculty　of　presentation；　and　is　thus　taken　to　express　the　accord；　in　a　given　intuition；　of　the　faculty　of　presentation；　or　the　imagination；　with　the　faculty　of　concepts　that　belongs　to　understanding　or　reason；　in　the　sense　of　the　former　assisting　the　latter。　Hence　both　kinds　of　judgements　are　singular；　and　yet　such　as　profess　to　be　universally　valid　in　respect　of　every　subject；　despite　the　fact　that　their　claims　are　directed　merely　to　the　feeling　of　pleasure　and　not　to　any　knowledge　of　the　object。　　　There　are；　however；　also　important　and　striking　differences　between　the　two。　The　beautiful　in　nature　is　a　question　of　the　form　of　object；　and　this　consists　in　limitation；　whereas　the　sublime　is　to　be　found　in　an　object　even　devoid　of　form；　so　far　as　it　immediately　involves；　or　else　by　its　presence　provokes　a　representation　of　limitlessness；　yet　with　a　superadded　thought　of　its　totality。　Accordingly；　the　beautiful　seems　to　be　regarded　as　a　presentation　of　an　indeterminate　concept　of　understanding；　the　sublime　as　a　presentation　of　an　indeterminate　concept　of　reason。　Hence　the　delight　is　in　the　former　case　coupled　with　the　representation　of　quality；　but　in　this　case　with　that　of　quantity。　Moreover；　the　former　delight　is　very　different　from　the　latter　in　kind。　For　the　beautiful　is　directly　attended　with　a　feeling　of　the　furtherance　of　life；　and　is　thus　compatible　with　charms　and　a　playful　imagination。　On　the　other　hand；　the　feeling　of　the　sublime　is　a　pleasure　that　only　arises　indirectly；　being　brought　about　by　the　feeling　of　a　momentary　check　to　the　vital　forces　followed　at　once　by　a　discharge　all　the　more　powerful；　and　so　it　is　an　emotion　that　seems　to　be　no　sport；　but　dead　earnest　in　the　affairs　of　the　imagination。　Hence　charms　are　repugnant　to　it；　and；　since　the　mind　is　not　simply　attracted　by　the　object；　but　is　also　alternately　repelled　thereby；　the　delight　in　the　sublime　does　not　so　much　involve　positive　pleasure　as　admiration　or　respect；　i。　e。；　merits　the　name　of　a　negative　pleasure。　　　But　the　most　important　and　vital　distinction　between　the　sublime　and　the　beautiful　is　certainly　this：　that　if；　as　is　allowable；　we　here　confine　our　attention　in　the　first　instance　to　the　sublime　in　objects　of　nature　（that　of　art　being　always　restricted　by　the　conditions　of　an　agreement　with　nature）；　we　observe　that　whereas　natural　beauty　（such　as　is　self…subsisting）　conveys　a　finality　in　its　form　making　the　object　appear；　as　it　were；　preadapted　to　our　power　of　judgement；　so　that　it　thus　forms　of　itself　an　object　of　our　delight；　that　which；　without　our　indulging　in　any　refinements　of　thought；　but；　simply　in　our　apprehension　of　it；　excites　the　feeling　of　the　sublime；　may　appear；　indeed；　in　point　of　form　to　contravene　the　ends　of　our　power　of　judgement；　to　be　ill…adapted　to　our　faculty　of　presentation；　and　to　be；　as　it　were；　an　outrage　on　the　imagination；　and　yet　it　is　judged　all　the　more　sublime　on　that　account。　　　From　this　it　may　be　seen　at　once　that　we　express　ourselves　on　the　whole　inaccurately　if　we　term　any　object　of　nature　sublime；　although　we　may　with　perfect　propriety　call　many　such　objects　beautiful。　For　how　can　that　which　is　apprehended　as　inherently　contra…final　be　noted　with　an　expression　of　approval？　All　that　we　can　say　is　that　the　object　lends　itself　to　the　presentation　of　a　sublimity　discoverable　in　the　mind。　　　For　the　sublime；　in　the　strict　sense　of　the　word；　cannot　be　contained　in　any　sensuous　form；　but　rather　concerns　ideas　of　reason；　which；　although　no　adequate　presentation　of　them　is　possible；　may　be　excited　and　called　into　the　mind　by　that　very　inadequacy　itself　which　does　admit　of　sensuous　presentation。　Thus　the　broad　ocean　agitated　by　storms　cannot　be　called　sublime。　Its　aspect　is　horrible；　and　one　must　have　stored　one's　mind　in　advance　with　a　rich　stock　of　ideas；　if　such　an　intuition　is　to　raise　it　to　the　pitch　of　a　feeling　which　is　itself　sublime…sublime　because　the　mind　has　been　incited　to　abandon　sensibility　and　employ　itself　upon　ideas　involving　higher　finality。　　　Self…subsisting　natural　beauty　reveals　to　us　a　technic　of　nature　which　shows　it　in　the　light　of　a　system　ordered　in　accordance　with　laws　the　principle　of　which　is　not　to　be　found　within　the　range　of　our　entire　faculty　of　understanding。　This　principle　is　that　of　a　finality　relative　to　the　employment　of　judgement　in　respect　of　phenomena　which　have　thus　to　be　assigned；　not　merely　to　nature　regarded　as　aimless　mechanism；　but　also　to　nature　regarded　after　the　analogy　of　art。　Hence　it　gives　a　veritable　extension；　not；　of　course；　to　our　knowledge　of　objects　of　nature；　but　to　our　conception　of　nature　itself…nature　as　mere　mechanism　being　enlarged　to　the　conception　of　nature　as　art…an　extension　inviting　profound　inquiries　as　to　the　possibility　of　such　a　form。　But　in　what　we　are　wont　to　call　sublime　in　nature　there　is　such　an　absence　of　anything　leading　to　particular　objective　principles　and　corresponding　forms　of　nature　that　it　is　rather　in　its　chaos；　or　in　its　wildest　and　most　irregular　disorder　and　desolation；　provided　it　gives　signs　of　magnitude　and　power；　that　nature　chiefly　excites　the　ideas　of　the　sublime。　Hence　we　see　that　the　concept　of　the　sublime　in　nature　is　far　less　important　and　rich　in　consequences　than　that　of　its　beauty。　It　gives　on　the　whole　no　indication　of　anything　final　in　nature　itself；　but　only　in　the　possible　employment　of　our　intuitions　of　it　in　inducing　a　feeling　in　our　own　selves　of　a　finality　quite　independent　of　nature。　For　the　beautiful　in　nature　we　must　seek　a　ground　external　to　ourselves；　but　for　the　sublime　one　merely　in　ourselves　and　the　attitude　of　mind　that　introduces　sublimity　into　the　representation　of　nature。　This　is　a　very　needful　preliminary　remark。　It　entirely　separates　the　ideas　of　the　sublime　from　that　of　a　finality　of　nature；　and　makes　the　theory　of　the　sublime　a　mere　appendage　to　the　aesthetic　estimate　of　the　finality　of　nature；　because　it　does　not　give　a　representation　of　any　particular　form　in　nature；　but　involves　no　more　than　the　development　of　a　final　employment　by　the　imagination　of　its　own　representation。

　　　　　　　SS　24。　Subdivision　of　an　investigation　of　the　feeling　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　of　the　sublime。

　　In　the　division　of　the　moments　of　an　aesthetic　estimate　of　objects　in　respect　of　the　feeling　of　the　sublime；　the　course　of　the　Analytic　will