the critique of judgement-第17章

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　　In　the　division　of　the　moments　of　an　aesthetic　estimate　of　objects　in　respect　of　the　feeling　of　the　sublime；　the　course　of　the　Analytic　will　be　able　to　follow　the　same　principle　as　in　the　analysis　of　judgements　of　taste。　For；　the　judgement　being　one　of　the　aesthetic　reflective　judgement；　the　delight　in　the　sublime；　just　like　that　in　the　beautiful；　must　in　its　quantity　be　shown　to　be　universally　valid；　in　its　quality　independent　of　interest；　in　its　relation　subjective　finality；　and　the　latter；　in　its　modality；　necessary。　Hence　the　method　here　will　not　depart　from　the　lines　followed　in　the　preceding　section：　unless　something　is　made　of　the　point　that　there；　where　the　aesthetic　judgement　bore　on　the　form　of　the　object；　we　began　with　the　investigation　of　its　quality；　whereas　here；　considering　the　formlessness　that　may　belong　to　what　we　call　sublime；　we　begin　with　that　of　its　quantity；　as　first　moment　of　the　aesthetic　judgement　on　the　sublime…a　divergence　of　method　the　reason　for　which　is　evident　from　SS　23。　　　But　the　analysis　of　the　sublime　obliges　a　division　not　required　by　that　of　the　beautiful；　namely　one　into　the　mathematically　and　the　dynamically　sublime。　　　For　the　feeling　of　sublime　involves　as　its　characteristic　feature　a　mental　movement　combined　with　the　estimate　of　the　object；　whereas　taste　in　respect　of　the　beautiful　presupposes　that　the　mind　is　in　restful　contemplation；　and　preserves　it　in　this　state。　But　this　movement　has　to　be　estimated　as　subjectively　final　（since　the　sublime　pleases）。　Hence　it　is　referred　through　the　imagination　either　to　the　faculty　of　cognition　or　to　that　of　desire；　but　to　whichever　faculty　the　reference　is　made；　the　finality　of　the　given　representation　is　estimated　only　in　respect　of　these　faculties　（apart　from　end　or　interest）。　Accordingly　the　first　is　attributed　to　the　object　as　a　mathematical；　the　second　as　a　dynamical；　affection　of　the　imagination。　Hence　we　get　the　above　double　mode　of　representing　an　object　as　sublime。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　A。　THE　MATHEMATICALLY　SUBLIME。　　　　　　　　　　　　SS　25。　Definition　of　the　term　〃sublime〃。

　　Sublime　is　the　name　given　to　what　is　absolutely　great。　But　to　be　great　and　to　be　a　magnitude　are　entirely　different　concepts　（magnitudo　and　quantitas）。　In　the　same　way；　to　assert　without　qualification　（simpliciter）　that　something　is　great　is　quite　a　different　thing　from　saying　that　it　is　absolutely　great　（absolute；　non　comparative　magnum）。　The　latter　is　what　is　beyond　all　comparison　great。　What；　then；　is　the　meaning　of　the　assertion　that　anything　is　great；　or　small；　or　of　medium　size？　What　is　indicated　is　not　a　pure　concept　of　understanding；　still　less　an　intuition　of　sense；　and　just　as　little　is　it　a　concept　of　reason；　for　it　does　not　import　any　principle　of　cognition。　It　must；　therefore；　be　a　concept　of　judgement；　or　have　its　source　in　one；　and　must　introduce　as　basis　of　the　judgement　a　subjective　finality　of　the　representation　with　reference　to　the　power　of　judgement。　Given　a　multiplicity　of　the　homogeneous　together　constituting　one　thing；　and　we　may　at　once　cognize　from　the　thing　itself　that　it　is　a　magnitude　（quantum）。　No　comparison　with　other　things　is　required。　But　to　determine　how　great　it　is　always　requires　something　else；　which　itself　has　magnitude；　for　its　measure。　Now；　since　in　the　estimate　of　magnitude　we　have　to　take　into　account　not　merely　the　multiplicity　（number　of　units）　but　also　the　magnitude　of　the　unit　（the　measure）；　and　since　the　magnitude　of　this　unit　in　turn　always　requires　something　else　as　its　measure　and　as　the　standard　of　its　comparison；　and　so　on；　we　see　that　the　computation　of　the　magnitude　of　phenomena　is；　in　all　cases；　utterly　incapable　of　affording　us　any　absolute　concept　of　a　magnitude；　and　can；　instead；　only　afford　one　that　is　always　based　on　comparison。　　　If；　now；　I　assert　without　qualification　that　anything　is　great；　it　would　seem　that　I　have　nothing　in　the　way　of　a　comparison　present　to　my　mind；　or　at　least　nothing　involving　an　objective　measure；　for　no　attempt　is　thus　made　to　determine　how　great　the　object　is。　But；　despite　the　standard　of　comparison　being　merely　subjective；　the　claim　of　the　judgement　is　none　the　less　one　to　universal　agreement；　the　judgements：　〃that　man　is　beautiful〃　and　〃He　is　tall〃；　do　not　purport　to　speak　only　for　the　judging　subject；　but；　like　theoretical　judgements；　they　demand　the　assent　of　everyone。　　　Now　in　a　judgement　that　without　qualification　describes　anything　as　great；　it　is　not　merely　meant　that　the　object　has　a　magnitude；　but　greatness　is　ascribed　to　it　pre…eminently　among　many　other　objects　of　a　like　kind；　yet　without　the　extent　of　this　pre…eminence　being　determined。　Hence　a　standard　is　certainly　laid　at　the　basis　of　the　judgement；　which　standard　is　presupposed　to　be　one　that　can　be　taken　as　the　same　for　every　one；　but　which　is　available　only　for　an　aesthetic　estimate　of　the　greatness；　and　not　for　one　that　is　logical　（mathematically　determined）；　for　the　standard　is　a　merely　subjective　one　underlying　the　reflective　judgement　upon　the　greatness。　Furthermore；　this　standard　may　be　empirical；　as；　let　us　say；　the　average　size　of　the　men　known　to　us；　of　animals　of　a　certain　kind；　of　trees；　of　houses；　of　mountains；　and　so　forth。　Or　it　may　be　a　standard　given　a　priori；　which　by　reason　of　the　imperfections　of　the　judging　subject　is　restricted　to　subjective　conditions　of　presentation　in　concreto；　as；　in　the　practical　sphere；　the　greatness　of　a　particular　virtue；　or　of　public　liberty　and　justice　in　a　country；　or；　in　the　theoretical　sphere；　the　greatness　of　the　accuracy　or　inaccuracy　of　an　experiment　or　measurement；　etc。　　　Here；　now；　it　is　of　note　that；　although　we　have　no　interest　whatever　in　the　object；　i。e。；　its　real　existence　may　be　a　matter　of　no　concern　to　us；　still　its　mere　greatness；　regarded　even　as　devoid　of　form；　is　able　to　convey　a　universally　communicable　delight　and　so　involve　the　consciousness　of　a　subjective　finality　in　the　employment　of　our　cognitive　faculties；　but　not；　be　it　remembered；　a　delight　in　the　object；　for　the　latter　may　be　formless；　but；　in　contradistinction　to　what　is　the　case　with　the　beautiful；　where　the　reflective　judgement　finds　itself　set　to　a　key　that　is　final　in　respect　of　cognition　generally；　a　delight　in　an　extension　affecting　the　imagination　itself。　　　If　（subject　as　above）　we　say　of　an　object；　without　qualification；　that　it　is　great；　this　is　not　a　mathematically　determinant；　but　a　mere　reflective　judgement　upon　its　representation；　which　is　subjectively　final　for　a　particular　employment　of　our　cognitive　faculties　in　the　estimation　of　magnitude；　and　we　then　always　couple　with　the　representation　a　kind　of　respect；　just　as　we　do　a　kind　of　contempt　with　what　we　call　absolutely　small。　Moreover；　the　estimate　of　things　as　great　or　small　extends　to　everything；　even　to　all　their　qualities。　Thus　we　call　even　their　beauty　great　or　small。　The　reason　of　this　is　to　be　found　in　the　fact　that　we　have　only　got　to　present　a　thing　in　intuition；　as　the　precept　of　judgement　directs　（consequently　to　represent　it　aesthetically）；　for　it　to　be　in　its　entirety　a　phenomenon；　and　hence　a　quantum。　　　If；　however；　we　call　anything　not　alone　great；　but；　without　qualification；　absolutely；　and　in　every　respect　（beyond　all　comparison）　great；　that　is　to　say；　sublime；　we　soon　perceive　that　for　this　it　is　not　permissible　to　seek　an　appropriate　standard　outside　itself；　but　merely　in　itself。　It　is　a　greatness　comparable　to　itself　alone。　Hence　it　comes　that　the　sublime　is　not　to　be　looked　for　in　the　things　of　nature；　but　only　in　our　own　ideas。　But　it　must　be　left　to　the　deduction　to　show　in　which　of　them　it　resides。　　　The　above　definition　may　also　be　expressed　in　this　way：　that　is　sublime　in　comparison　with　which　all　else　is　small。　Here　we　readily　see　that　nothing　can　be　given　in　nature；　no　matter　how　great　we　may　judge　it　to　be；　which；　regarded　in　some　other　relation；　may　not　be　degraded　to　the　level　of　the　infinitely　little；　and　nothing　so　small　which　in　comparison　with　some　still　smaller　standard　may　not　for　our　imagination　be　enlarged　to　the　greatness　of　a　world。　Telescopes　have　put　within　our　reach　an　abundance　of　material　to　go　upon　in　making　the　first　observation；　and　microscopes　the　same　in　making　the　second。　Nothing；　therefore；　which　can　be　an　object　of　the　senses　is　to　be　termed　sublime　when　treated　on　this　footing。　But　precisely　because　there　is　a　striving　in　our　imagination　towards　progress　ad　infinitum；　while　reason　demands　absolute　totality；　as　a　real　idea；　that　same　inability　on　the　part　of　our　faculty　for　the　estimation　of　the　magnitude　of　things　of　the　world　of　sense　to　attain　to　this　idea；　is　the　awakening　of　a　feeling　of　a　supersensible　faculty　within　us；　and　it　is　the　use　to　which　judgement　naturally　puts　particular　objects　on　behalf　of　this　latter　feeling；　and　not　the　object　of　sense；　that　is　absolutely　great；　and　every　other　contrasted　employment　small。　Consequently　it　is　the　disposition　of　soul　evoked　by　a　particular　representation　engaging　the　attention　of　the　reflective　judgement；　and　not　the　object；　that　is　to　be　called　sublime。　　　The　foregoing　formulae　defining　the　sublime　may；　therefore；　be　supplemented　by　yet　another：　The　sublime　is　that；　the　mere　capacity　of　thinking　which　evidences　a　faculty　of　mind　transcending　every　standard　of　sense。

　　　　　　　SS　26。　The　estimation　of　the　magnitude　of　natural　　　　　　　　　　　things　requisite　for　the　idea　of　the　sublime。

　　The　estimation　of　magnitude　by　means　of　concepts　of　number　（or　their　signs　in　algebra）　is　mathematical；　but　that　in　mere　intuition　（by　the　eye）　is　aesthetic。　Now　we　can　only　get　definite　concepts　of　how　great　anything　is　by　having　recourse　to　numbers　（or；　at　any　rate；　by　getting　approximate　measurements　by　means　of　numerical　series　progressing　ad　infinitum）；　the　unit　being　the　measure；　and　to　this　extent　all　logical　estimation　of　magnitude　is　mathematical。　But；　as　the　magnitude　of　the　measure　has　to　be　assumed　as　a　known　quantity；　if；　to　form　an　estimate　of　this；　we　must　again　have　recourse　to　numbers　involving　another　standard　for　their　unit；　and　consequently　must　again　proceed　mathematically；　we　can　never　arrive　at　a　first　or　fundamental　measure；　and　so　cannot　get　any　definite　concept　of　a　given　magnitude。　The　estimation　of　the　magnitude　of　the　fundamental　measure　must；　therefore；　consist　merely　in　the　immediate　grasp　which　we　can　get　of　it　in　intuition；　and　the　use　to　which　our　imagination　can　put　this　in　presenting　the　numerical　concepts：　i。e。；　all　estimation　of　the　magnitude　of　objects　of　nature　is　in　the　last　resort　aesthetic　（i。e。；　subjectively　and　not　objectively　determined）。　　　Now　for　the　mathematical　estimation　of　magnitude　there　is；　of　course；　no　greatest　possible　（for　the　power　of　numbers　extends　to　infinity）；　but　for　the　aesthetic　estimation　there　certainly　is　and　of　it　I　say　that　where　it　is　considered　an　absolute　measure　beyond　which　no　greater　is　possible　subjectively　（i。e。；　for　the　judging　subject）；　it　then　conveys　the　idea　of　the　sublime　and　calls　forth　that　emotion　which　no　mathematical　estimation　of　magnitudes　by　numbers　can　evoke　（unless　in　so　far　as　the　fundamental　aesthetic　measure　is　kept　vividly　present　to　the　imagination）：　because　the　latter　presents　only　the　relative　magnitude　due　to　comparison　with　others　of　a　like　kind；　wh