the critique of judgement-第18章

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gnitude　due　to　comparison　with　others　of　a　like　kind；　whereas　the　former　presents　magnitude　absolutely；　so　far　as　the　mind　can　grasp　it　in　an　intuition。　　　To　take　in　a　quantum　intuitively　in　the　imagination　so　as　to　be　able　to　use　it　as　a　measure；　or　unit　for　estimating　magnitude　by　numbers；　involves　two　operations　of　this　faculty：　apprehension　（apprehensio）　and　comprehension　（comprehension　aesthetica）。　Apprehension　presents　no　difficulty：　for　this　process　can　be　carried　on　ad　infinitum；　but　with　the　advance　of　apprehension　comprehension　becomes　more　difficult　at　every　step　and　soon　attains　its　maximum；　and　this　is　the　aesthetically　greatest　fundamental　measure　for　the　estimation　of　magnitude。　For　if　the　apprehension　has　reached　a　point　beyond　which　the　representations　of　sensuous　intuition　in　the　case　of　the　parts　first　apprehended　begin　to　disappear　from　the　imagination　as　this　advances　to　the　apprehension　of　yet　others；　as　much；　then；　is　lost　at　one　end　as　is　gained　at　the　other；　and　for　comprehension　we　get　a　maximum　which　the　imagination　cannot　exceed。　　　This　explains　Savary's　observations　in　his　account　of　Egypt；　that　in　order　to　get　the　full　emotional　effect　of　the　size　of　the　Pyramids　we　must　avoid　coming　too　near　just　as　much　as　remaining　too　far　away。　For　in　the　latter　case　the　representation　of　the　apprehended　parts　（the　tiers　of　stones）　is　but　obscure；　and　produces　no　effect　upon　the　aesthetic　judgement　of　the　Subject。　In　the　former；　however；　it　takes　the　eye　some　time　to　complete　the　apprehension　from　the　base　to　the　summit；　but　in　this　interval　the　first　tiers　always　in　part　disappear　before　the　imagination　has　taken　in　the　last；　and　so　the　comprehension　is　never　complete。　The　same　explanation　may　also　sufficiently　account　for　the　bewilderment；　or　sort　of　perplexity；　which；　as　is　said；　seizes　the　visitor　on　first　entering　St。　Peter's　in　Rome。　For　here　a　feeling　comes　home　to　him　of　the　inadequacy　of　his　imagination　for　presenting　the　idea　of　a　whole　within　which　that　imagination　attains　its　maximum；　and；　in　its　fruitless　efforts　to　extend　this　limit；　recoils　upon　itself；　but　in　so　doing　succumbs　to　an　emotional　delight。　　　At　present　I　am　not　disposed　to　deal　with　the　ground　of　this　delight；　connected；　as　it　is；　with　a　representation　in　which　we　would　least　of　all　look　for　it…a　representation；　namely；　that　lets　us　see　its　own　inadequacy；　and　consequently　its　subjective　want　of　finality　for　our　judgement　in　the　estimation　of　magnitude…but　confine　myself　to　the　remark　that　if　the　aesthetic　judgement　is　to　be　pure　（unmixed　with　any　teleological　judgement　which；　as　such；　belongs　to　reason）；　and　if　we　are　to　give　a　suitable　example　of　it　for　the　Critique　of　aesthetic　judgement；　we　must　not　point　to　the　sublime　in　works　of　art；　e。g。；　buildings；　statues　and　the　like；　where　a　human　end　determines　the　form　as　well　as　the　magnitude；　nor　yet　in　things　of　nature；　that　in　their　very　concept　import　a　definite　end；　e。g。；　animals　of　a　recognized　natural　order；　but　in　rude　nature　merely　as　involving　magnitude　（and　only　in　this　so　far　as　it　does　not　convey　any　charm　or　any　emotion　arising　from　actual　danger）。　For；　in　a　representation　of　this　kind；　nature　contains　nothing　monstrous　（nor　what　is　either　magnificent　or　horrible）…the　magnitude　apprehended　may　be　increased　to　any　extent　provided　imagination　is　able　to　grasp　it　all　in　one　whole。　An　object　is　monstrous　where　by　its　size　it　defeats　the　end　that　forms　its　concept。　The　colossal　is　the　mere　presentation　of　a　concept　which　is　almost　too　great　for　presentation；　i。e。；　borders　on　the　relatively　monstrous；　for　the　end　to　be　attained　by　the　presentation　of　a　concept　is　made　harder　to　realize　by　the　intuition　of　the　object　being　almost　too　great　for　our　faculty　of　apprehension。　A　pure　judgement　upon　the　sublime　must；　however；　have　no　end　belonging　to　the　object　as　its　determining　ground；　if　it　is　to　be　aesthetic　and　not　to　be　tainted　with　any　judgement　of　understanding　or　reason。

　　Since　whatever　is　to　be　a　source　of　pleasure；　apart　from　interest；　to　the　merely　reflective　judgement　must　involve　in　its　representation　subjective；　and；　as　such；　universally　valid　finality…though　here；　however；　no　finality　of　the　form　of　the　object　underlies　our　estimate　of　it　（as　it　does　in　the　case　of　the　beautiful）…the　question　arises：　What　is　the　subjective　finality；　and　what　enables　it　to　be　prescribed　as　a　norm　so　as　to　yield　a　ground　for　universally　valid　delight　in　the　mere　estimation　of　magnitude；　and　that；　too；　in　a　case　where　it　is　pushed　to　the　point　at　which　faculty　of　imagination　breaks　down　in　presenting　the　concept　of　a　magnitude；　and　proves　unequal　to　its　task？　　　In　the　successive　aggregation　of　units　requisite　for　the　representation　of　magnitudes；　the　imagination　of　itself　advances　ad　infinitum　without　let　or　hindrance…understanding；　however；　conducting　it　by　means　of　concepts　of　number　for　which　the　former　must　supply　the　schema。　This　procedure　belongs　to　the　logical　estimation　of　magnitude；　and；　as　such；　is　doubtless　something　objectively　final　according　to　the　concept　of　an　end　（as　all　measurement　is）；　but　it　is　hot　anything　which　for　the　aesthetic　judgement　is　final　or　pleasing。　Further；　in　this　intentional　finality　there　is　nothing　compelling　us　to　tax　the　utmost　powers　of　the　imagination；　and　drive　it　as　far　as　ever　it　can　reach　in　its　presentations；　so　as　to　enlarge　the　size　of　the　measure；　and　thus　make　the　single　intuition　holding　the　many　in　one　（the　comprehension）　as　great　as　possible。　For；　in　the　estimation　of　magnitude　by　the　understanding　（arithmetic）；　we　get　just　as　far；　whether　the　comprehension　of　the　units　is　pushed　to　the　number　10　（as　in　the　decimal　scale）　or　only　to　4　（as　in　the　quaternary）；　the　further　production　of　magnitude　being　carried　out　by　the　successive　aggregation　of　units；　or；　if　the　quantum　is　given　in　intuition；　by　apprehension；　merely　progressively　（not　comprehensively）；　according　to　an　adopted　principle　of　progression。　In　this　mathematical　estimation　of　magnitude；　understanding　is　as　well　served　and　as　satisfied　whether　imagination　selects　for　the　unit　a　magnitude　which　one　can　take　in　at　a　glance；　e。g。；　a　foot；　or　a　perch；　or　else　a　German　mile；　or　even　the　earth's　diameter；　the　apprehension　of　which　is　indeed　possible；　but　not　its　comprehension　in；　sit　intuition　of　the　imagination　（i。e。；　it　is　not　possible　by　means　of　a　comprehension　aesthetica；　thought　quite　so　by　means　of　a　comprehension　logica　in　a　numerical　concept）。　In　each　case　the　logical　estimation　of　magnitude　advances　ad　infinitum　with　nothing　to　stop　it。　　　The　mind；　however；　hearkens　now　to　the　voice　of　reason；　which　for　all　given　magnitudes…even　for　those　which　can　never　be　completely　apprehended；　though　（in　sensuous　representation）　estimated　as　completely　given…requires　totality；　and　consequently　comprehension　in　one　intuition；　and　which　calls　for　a　presentation　answering　to　all　the　above　members　of　a　progressively　increasing　numerical　series；　and　does　not　exempt　even　the　infinite　（space　and　time　past）　from　this　requirement；　but　rather　renders　it　inevitable　for　us　to　regard　this　infinite　（in　the　judgement　of　common　reason）　as　completely　given　（i。e。；　given　in　its　totality）。　　　But　the　infinite　is　absolutely　（not　merely　comparatively）　great。　In　comparison　with　this　all　else　（in　the　way　of　magnitudes　of　the　same　order）　is　small。　But　the　point　of　capital　importance　is　that　the　mere　ability　even　to　think　it　as　a　whole　indicates　a　faculty　of　mind　transcending　every　standard　of　sense。　For　the　latter　would　entail　a　comprehension　yielding　as　unit　a　standard　bearing　to　the　infinite　ratio　expressible　in　numbers；　which　is　impossible。　Still　the　mere　ability　even　to　think　the　given　infinite　without　contradiction；　is　something　that　requires　the　presence　in　the　human　mind　of　a　faculty　that　is　itself　supersensible。　For　it　is　only　through　this　faculty　and　its　idea　of　a　noumenon；　which　latter；　while　not　itself　admitting　of　any　intuition；　is　yet　introduced　as　substrate　underlying　the　intuition　of　the　world　as　mere　phenomenon；　that　the　infinite　of　the　world　of　sense；　in　the　pure　intellectual　estimation　of　magnitude；　is　completely　comprehended　under　a　concept；　although　in　the　mathematical　estimation　by　means　of　numerical　concepts　it　can　never　be　completely　thought。　Even　a　faculty　enabling　the　infinite　of　supersensible　intuition　to　be　regarded　as　given　（in　its　intelligible　substrate）；　transcends　every　standard　of　sensibility　and　is　great　beyond　all　comparison　even　with　the　faculty　of　mathematical　estimation：　not；　of　course；　from　a　theoretical　point　of　view　that　looks　to　the　interests　of　our　faculty　of　knowledge；　but　as　a　broadening　of　the　mind　that　from　another　（the　practical）　point　of　view　feels　itself　empowered　to　pass　beyond　the　narrow　confines　of　sensibility。　　　Nature；　therefore；　is　sublime　in　such　of　its　phenomena　as　in　their　intuition　convey　the　idea　of　their　infinity。　But　this　can　only　occur　through　the　inadequacy　of　even　the　greatest　effort　of　our　imagination　in　the　estimation　of　the　magnitude　of　an　object。　But；　now；　in　the　case　of　the　mathematical　estimation　of　magnitude；　imagination　is　quite　competent　to　supply　a　measure　equal　to　the　requirements　of　any　object。　For　the　numerical　concepts　of　the　understanding　can　by　progressive　synthesis　make　any　measure　adequate　to　any　given　magnitude。　Hence　it　must　be　the　aesthetic　estimation　of　magnitude　in　which　we　get　at　once　a　feeling　of　the　effort　towards　a　comprehension　that　exceeds　the　faculty　of　imagination　for　mentally　grasping　the　progressive　apprehension　in　a　whole　of　intuition；　and；　with　it；　a　perception　of　the　inadequacy　of　this　faculty；　which　has　no　bounds　to　its　progress；　for　taking　in　and　using　for　the　estimation　of　magnitude　a　fundamental　measure　that　understanding　could　turn　to　account　without　the　least　trouble。　Now　the　proper　unchangeable　fundamental　measure　of　nature　is　its　absolute　whole；　which；　with　it；　regarded　as　a　phenomenon；　means　infinity　comprehended。　But；　since　this　fundamental　measure　is　a　self…contradictory　concept　（owing　to　the　impossibility　of　the　absolute　totality　of　an　endless　progression）；　it　follows　that　where　the　size　of　a　natural　object　is　such　that　the　imagination　spends　its　whole　faculty　of　comprehension　upon　it　in　vain；　it　must　carry　our　concept　of　nature；　to　a　supersensible　substrate　（underlying　both　nature　and　our　faculty　of　thought）。　which　is；　great　beyond　every　standard　of　sense。　Thus；　instead　of　the　object；　it　is　rather　the　cast　of　the　mind　in　appreciating　it　that　we　have　to　estimate　as　sublime。　　　Therefore；　just　as　the　aesthetic　judgement　in　its　estimate　of　the　beautiful　refers　the　imagination　in　its　free　play　to　the　understanding；　to　bring　out　its　agreement　with　the　concepts　of　the　latter　in　general　（apart　from　their　determination）：　so　in　its　estimate　of　a　thing　as　sublime　it　refers　that　faculty　to　reason　to　bring　out　its　subjective　accord　with　ideas　of　reason　（indeterminately　indicated）；　i。e。；　to　induce　a　temper　of　mind　conformable…to　that　which　the　influence　of　definite　（practical）　ideas　would　produce　upon　feeling；　and　in　common　accord　with　it。　　　This　makes　it　evident　that　true　sublimity　must　be　sought　only　in　the　mind　of　the　judging　subject；　and　not　in　the　object　of　nature　that　occasions　this　attitude　by　the　estimate　formed　of　it。　W