the critique of judgement-第2章

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account　are　called　practical。　Hence　the　division　of　philosophy　falls　properly　into　two　parts；　quite　distinct　in　their　principles…a　theoretical；　as　philosophy　of　nature；　and　a　practical；　as　philosophy　of　morals　（for　this　is　what　the　practical　legislation　of　reason　by　the　concept　of　freedom　is　called）。　Hitherto；　however；　in　the　application　of　these　expressions　to　the　division　of　the　different　principles；　and　with　them　to　the　division　of　philosophy；　a　gross　misuse　of　the　terms　has　prevailed；　for　what　is　practical　according　to　concepts　of　nature　bas　been　taken　as　identical　with　what　is　practical　according　to　the　concept　of　freedom；　with　the　result　that　a　division　has　been　made　under　these　heads　of　theoretical　and　practical；　by　which；　in　effect；　there　has　been　no　division　at　all　（seeing　that　both　parts　might　have　similar　principles）。　　　The　will…for　this　is　what　is　said…is　the　faculty　of　desire　and；　as　such；　is　just　one　of　the　many　natural　causes　in　the　world；　the　one；　namely；　which　acts　by　concepts；　and　whatever　is　represented　as　possible　（or　necessary）　through　the　efficacy　of　will　is　called　practically　possible　（or　necessary）：　the　intention　being　to　distinguish　its　possibility　（or　necessity）　from　the　physical　possibility　or　necessity　of　an　effect　the　causality　of　whose　cause　is　not　determined　to　its　production　by　concepts　（but　rather；　as　with　lifeless　matter；　by　mechanism；　and；　as　with　the　lower　animals；　by　instinct）。　Now；　the　question　in　respect　of　the　practical　faculty：　whether；　that　is　to　say；　the　concept；　by　which　the　causality　of　the　will　gets　its　rule；　is　a　concept　of　nature　or　of　freedom；　is　here　left　quite　open。　　　The　latter　distinction；　however；　is　essential。　For；　let　the　concept　determining　the　causality　be　a　concept　of　nature；　and　then　the　principles　are　technically…practical；　but；　let　it　be　a　concept　of　freedom；　and　they　are　morally…practical。　Now；　in　the　division　of　a　rational　science　the　difference　between　objects　that　require　different　principles　for　their　cognition　is　the　difference　on　which　everything　turns。　Hence　technically…practical　principles　belong　to　theoretical　philosophy　（natural　science）；　whereas　those　morally…practical　alone　form　the　second　part；　that　is；　practical　philosophy　（ethical　science）。　　　All　technically…practical　rules　（i。e。；　those　of　art　and　skill　generally；　or　even　of　prudence；　as　a　skill　in　exercising　an　influence　over　men　and　their　wills）　must；　so　far　as　their　principles　rest　upon　concepts；　be　reckoned　only　as　corollaries　to　theoretical　philosophy。　For　they　only　touch　the　possibility　of　things　according　to　concepts　of　nature；　and　this　embraces；　not　alone　the　means　discoverable　in　nature　for　the　purpose；　but　even　the　will　itself　（as　a　faculty　of　desire；　and　consequently　a　natural　faculty）；　so　far　as　it　is　determinable　on　these　rules　by　natural　motives。　Still　these　practical　rules　are　not　called　laws　（like　physical　laws）；　but　only　precepts。　This　is　due　to　the　fact　that　the　will　does　not　stand　simply　under　the　natural　concept；　but　also　under　the　concept　of　freedom。　In　the　latter　connection　its　principles　are　called　laws；　and　these　principles；　with　the　addition　of　what　follows　them；　alone　constitute　the　second　at　practical　part　of　philosophy。　　　The　solution　of　the　problems　of　pure　geometry　is　not　allocated　to　a　special　part　of　that　science；　nor　does　the　art　of　land…surveying　merit　the　name　of　practical；　in　contradistinction　to　pure；　as　a　second　part　of　the　general　science　of　geometry；　and　with　equally　little；　or　perhaps　less；　right　can　the　mechanical　or　chemical　art　of　experiment　or　of　observation　be　ranked　as　a　practical　part　of　the　science　of　nature；　or；　in　fine；　domestic；　agricultural；　or　political　economy；　the　art　of　social　intercourse；　the　principles　of　dietetics；　or　even　general　instruction　as　to　the　attainment　of　happiness；　or　as　much　as　the　control　of　the　inclinations　or　the　restraining　of　the　affections　with　a　view　thereto；　be　denominated　practical　philosophy…not　to　mention　forming　these　latter　in　a　second　part　of　philosophy　in　general。　For；　between　them　all；　the　above　contain　nothing　more　than　rules　of　skill；　which　are　thus　only　technically　practical…the　skill　being　directed　to　producing　an　effect　which　is　possible　according　to　natural　concepts　of　causes　and　effects。　As　these　concepts　belong　to　theoretical　philosophy；　they　are　subject　to　those　precepts　as　mere　corollaries　of　theoretical　philosophy　（i。e。；　as　corollaries　of　natural　science）；　and　so　cannot　claim　any　place　in　any　special　philosophy　called　practical。　On　the　other　hand；　the　morally　practical　precepts；　which　are　founded　entirely　on　the　concept　of　freedom；　to　the　complete　exclusion　of　grounds　taken　from　nature　for　the　determination　of　the　will；　form　quite　a　special　kind　of　precepts。　These；　too；　like　the　rules　obeyed　by　nature；　are；　without　qualification；　called　laws…though　they　do　not；　like　the　latter；　rest　on　sensible　conditions；　but　upon　a　supersensible　principle…and　they　must　needs　have　a　separate　part　of　philosophy　allotted　to　them　as　their　own；　corresponding　to　the　theoretical　part；　and　termed　practical　philosophy　capable　　　Hence　it　is　evident　that　a　complex　of　practical　precepts　furnished　by　philosophy　does　not　form　a　special　part　of　philosophy；　co…ordinate　with　the　theoretical；　by　reason　of　its　precepts　being　practical…for　that　they　might　be；　notwithstanding　that　their　principles　were　derived　wholly　from　the　theoretical　knowledge　of　nature　（as　technically…practical　rules）。　But　an　adequate　reason　only　exists　where　their　principle；　being　in　no　way　borrowed　from　the　concept　of　nature；　which　is　always　sensibly　conditioned；　rests　consequently　on　the　supersensible；　which　the　concept　of　freedom　alone　makes　cognizable　by　means　of　its　formal　laws；　and　where；　therefore；　they　are　morally…practical；　i。　e。；　not　merely　precepts　and　its　and　rules　in　this　or　that　interest；　but　laws　independent　of　all　antecedent　reference　to　ends　or　aims。

　　　　　　　　　　　　II。　The　Realm　of　Philosophy　in　General。

　　The　employment　of　our　faculty　of　cognition　from　principles；　and　with　it　philosophy；　is　coextensive　with　the　applicability　of　a　priori　concepts。　　　Now　a　division　of　the　complex　of　all　the　objects　to　which　those　concepts　are　referred　for　the　purpose；　where　possible；　of　compassing　their　knowledge；　may　be　made　according　to　the　varied　competence　or　incompetence　of　our　faculty　in　that　connection。　　　Concepts；　so　far　as　they　are　referred　to　objects　apart　from　the　question　of　whether　knowledge　of　them　is　possible　or　not；　have　their　field；　which　is　determined　simply　by　the　relation　in　which　their　object　stands　to　our　faculty　of　cognition　in　general。　The　part　of　this　field　in　which　knowledge　is　possible　for　us　is　a　territory　（territorium）　for　these　concepts　and　the　requisite　cognitive　faculty。　The　part　of　the　territory　over　which　they　exercise　legislative　authority　is　the　realm　（ditio）　of　these　concepts；　and　their　appropriate　cognitive　faculty。　Empirical　concepts　have；　therefore；　their　territory；　doubtless；　in　nature　as　the　complex　of　all　sensible　objects；　but　they　have　no　realm　（only　a　dwelling…place；　domicilium）；　for；　although　they　are　formed　according　to　law；　they　are　not　themselves　legislative；　but　the　rules　founded　on　them　are　empirical　and；　consequently；　contingent。　　　Our　entire　faculty　of　cognition　has　two　realms；　that　of　natural　concepts　and　that　of　the　concept　of　freedom；　for　through　both　it　prescribes　laws　a　priori。　In　accordance　with　this　distinction；　then；　philosophy　is　divisible　into　theoretical　and　practical。　But　the　territory　upon　which　its　realm　is　established；　and　over　which　it　exercises　its　legislative　authority；　is　still　always　confined　to　the　complex　of　the　objects　of　all　possible　experience；　taken　as　no　more　than　mere　phenomena；　for　otherwise　legislation　by　the　understanding　in　respect　of　them　is　unthinkable。　　　The　function　of　prescribing　laws　by　means　of　concepts　of　nature　is　discharged　by　understanding　and　is　theoretical。　That　of　prescribing　laws　by　means　of　the　concept　of　freedom　is　discharged　by　reason　and　is　merely　practical。　It　is　only　in　the　practical　sphere　that　reason　can　prescribe　laws；　in　respect　of　theoretical　knowledge　（of　nature）　it　can　only　（as　by　the　understanding　advised　in　the　law）　deduce　from　given　logical　consequences；　which　still　always　remain　restricted　to　nature。　But　we　cannot　reverse　this　and　say　that　where　rules　are　practical　reason　is　then　and　there　legislative；　since　the　rules　might　be　technically　practical。　　　Understanding　and　reason；　therefore；　have　two　distinct　jurisdictions　over　one　and　the　same　territory　of　experience。　But　neither　can　interfere　with　the　other。　For　the　concept　of　freedom　just　as　little　disturbs　the　legislation　of　nature；　as　the　concept　of　nature　influences　legislation　through　the　concept　of　freedom。　That　it　is　possible　for　us　at　least　to　think　without　contradiction　of　both　these　jurisdictions；　and　their　appropriate　faculties；　as　co…existing　in　the　same　subject；　was　shown　by　the　Critique　of　Pure　Reason；　since　it　disposed　of　the　objections　on　the　other　side　by　detecting　their　dialectical　illusion。　　　Still；　how　does　it　happen　that　these　two　different　realms　do　not　form　one　realm；　seeing　that；　while　they　do　not　limit　each　other　in　their　legislation；　they　continually　do　so　in　their　effects　in　the　sensible　world？　The　explanation　lies　in　the　fact　that　the　concept　of　nature　represents　its　objects　in　intuition　doubtless；　yet　not　as　things　in…themselves；　but　as　mere　phenomena；　whereas　the　concept　of　freedom　represents　in　its　object　what　is　no　doubt　a　thing…in…itself；　but　it　does　not　make　it　intuitable；　and　further　that　neither　the　one　nor　the　other　is　capable；　therefore；　of　furnishing　a　theoretical　cognition　of　its　object　（or　even　of　the　thinking　subject）　as　a　thing…in…itself；　or；　as　this　would　be；　of　the　supersensible　idea　of　which　has　certainly　to　be　introduced　as　the　basis　of　the　possibility　of　all　those　objects　of　experience；　although　it　cannot　itself　ever　be　elevated　or　extended　into　a　cognition。　　　Our　entire　cognitive　faculty　is；　therefore；　presented　with　an　unbounded；　but；　also；　inaccessible　field…the　field　of　the　supersensible…in　which　we　seek　in　vain　for　a　territory；　and　on　which；　therefore；　we　can　have　no　realm　for　theoretical　cognition；　be　it　for　concepts　of　understanding　or　of　reason。　This　field　we　must　indeed　occupy　with　ideas　in　the　interest　as　well　of　the　theoretical　as　the　practical　employment　of　reason；　but；　in　connection　with　the　laws　arising　from　the　concept　of　freedom；　we　cannot　procure　for　these　ideas　any　but　practical　reality；　which；　accordingly；　fails　to　advance　our　theoretical　cognition　one　step　towards　the　supersensible。　　　Albeit；　then；　between　the　realm　of　the　natural　concept；　as　the　sensible；　and　the　realm　of　the　concept　of　freedom；　as　the　supersensible；　there　is　a　great　gulf　fixed；　so　that　it　is　not　possible　to　pass　from　the　to　the　latter　（by　means　of　the　theoretical　employment　of　reason）；　just　as　if　they　were　so　many　separate　worlds；　the　first　of　which　is　powerless　to　exercise　influence　on　the　second：　still　the　latter　is　meant　to　influence　the　former…that　is　to　say；　the　concept　of　freedom　is　meant　to　actualize　in　the　sensible　world　the　end　proposed　by　its　laws；　and　nature　must　consequently　also　be　capable　of　being　regarded　in　such　a　way　that　in　the　conformity　to　law　of　its　form　it　at　lea