the critique of judgement-第21章

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d　himself　merely；　as　most　travellers　do；　for　a　fad；　or　so　as　some　day　to　be　able　to　give　a　thrilling　account　of　his　adventures？　But　the　mind　of　Sassure　was　bent　on　the　instruction　of　mankind；　and　soul…stirring　sensations　that　excellent　man　indeed　had；　and　the　reader　of　his　travels　got　them　thrown　into　the　bargain。　　　But　the　fact　that　culture　is　requisite　for　the　judgement　upon　the　sublime　in　nature　（more　than　for　that　upon　the　beautiful）　does　not　involve　its　being　an　original　product　of　culture　and　something　introduced　in　a　more　or　less　conventional　way　into　society。　Rather　is　it　in　human　nature　that　its　foundations　are　laid；　and；　in　fact；　in　that　which；　at　once　with　common　understanding；　we　may　expect　every　one　to　possess　and　may　require　of　him；　namely；　a　native　capacity　for　the　feeling　for　（practical）　ideas；　i。e。；　for　moral　feeling。　　　This；　now；　is　the　foundation　of　the　necessity　of　that　agreement　between　other　men's　judgements　upon　the　sublime　and　our　own；　which　we　make　our　own　imply。　For　just　as　we　taunt　a　man　who　is　quite　inappreciative　when　forming　an　estimate　of　an　object　of　nature　in　which　we　see　beauty；　with　want　of　taste；　so　we　say　of　a　man　who　remains　unaffected　in　the　presence　of　what　we　consider　sublime；　that　he　has　no　feeling。　But　we　demand　both　taste　and　feeling　of　every　man；　and；　granted　some　degree　of　culture；　we　give　him　credit　for　both。　Still；　we　do　so　with　this　difference：　that；　in　the；　case　of　the　former；　since　judgement　there　refers　the　imagination　merely　to　the　understanding；　as　a　the　faculty　of　concepts；　we　make　the　requirement　as　a　matter　of　course；　whereas　in　the　case　of　the　latter；　since　here　the　judgement　refers　the　imagination　to　reason；　as　a　faculty　of　ideas；　we　do　so　only　under　a　subjective　presupposition　（which；　however；　we　believe　we　are　warranted　in　making）；　namely；　that　of　the　moral　feeling　in　man。　And；　on　this　assumption；　we　attribute　necessity　to　the　latter　aesthetic　judgement　also。　　　In　this　modality　of　aesthetic　judgements；　namely；　their　assumed　necessity；　lies　what　is　for　the　Critique　of　judgement　a　moment　of　capital　importance。　For　this　is　exactly　what　makes　an　a　priori　principle　apparent　in　their　case；　and　lifts　them　out　of　the　sphere　of　empirical　psychology；　in　which　otherwise　they　would　remain　buried　amid　the　feelings　of　gratification　and　pain　（only　with　the　senseless　epithet　of　finer　feeling）；　so　as　to　place　them；　and；　thanks　to　them；　to　place　the　faculty　of　judgement　itself；　in　the　class　of　judgements　of　which　the　basis　of　an　a　priori　principle　is　the　distinguishing　feature；　and；　thus　distinguished；　to　introduce　them　into　transcendental　philosophy。

　　　　　　　　　　　General　Remark　upon　the　Exposition　of　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Aesthetic　Reflective　Judgements。

　　In　relation　to　the　feeling　of　pleasure　an　object　is　to　be　counted　either　as　agreeable；　or　beautiful；　or　sublime；　or　good　（absolutely）；　（incundum；　pulchrum；　sublime；　honestum）。　　　As　the　motive　of　desires　the　agreeable　is　invariably　of　one　and　the　same　kind；　no　matter　what　its　source　or　how　specifically　different　the　representation　（of　sense　and　sensation　objectively　considered）。　Hence　in　estimating　its　influence　upon　the　mind；　the　multitude　of　its　charms　（simultaneous　or　successive）　is　alone　revelant；　and　so　only；　as　it　were；　the　mass　of　the　agreeable　sensation；　and　it　is　only　by　the　quantity；　therefore；　that　this　can　be　made　intelligible。　Further　it　in　no　way　conduces　to　our　culture；　but　belongs　only　to　mere　enjoyment。　The　beautiful；　on　the　other　hand；　requires　the　representation　of　a　certain　quality　of　the　object；　that　pern…fits　also　of　being　understood　and　reduced　to　concepts　（although　in　the　aesthetic　judgement　it　is　not　reduced）；　and　it　cultivates；　as　it　instructs　us　to　attend　to；　finality　in　the　feeling　of　pleasure。　The　sublime　consists　merely　in　the　relation　exhibited　by　the　estimate　of　the　serviceability　of　the　sensible　in　the　representation　of　nature　for　a　possible　supersensible　employment。　The　absolutely　good；　estimated　subjectively　according　to　the　feeling　it　inspires　（the　object　of　the　moral　feeling）；　as　the　determinability　of　the　powers　of　the　subject　by　means　of　the　representation　of　an　absolutely　necessitating　law；　is　principally　distinguished；　by　the　modality　of　a　necessity　resting　upon　concepts　a　priori；　and　involving　not　a　mere　claim；　but　a　command　upon　every　one　to　assent；　and　belongs　intrinsically　not　to　the　aesthetic；　but　to　the　pure　intellectual　judgement。　Further；　it　is　not　ascribed　to　nature　but　to　freedom；　and　that　in　a　determinant　and　not　a　merely　reflective　judgement。　But　the　determinability　of　the　subject　by　means　of　this　idea；　and；　what　is　more；　that　of　a　subject　which　can　be　sensible；　in　the　way　of　a　modification　of　its　state；　to　hindrances　on　the　part　of　sensibility；　while；　at　the　same　time；　it　can　by　surmounting　them　feel　superiority　over　them…a　determinability；　in　other　words；　as　moral　feeling…is　still　so　allied　to　aesthetic　judgement　and　its　formal　conditions　as　to　be　capable　of　being　pressed　into　the　service　of　the　aesthetic　representation　of　the　conformity　to　law　of　action　from　duty；　i。e。；　of　the　representation　of　this　as　sublime；　or　even　as　beautiful；　without　forfeiting　its　purity…an　impossible　result　were　one　to　make　it　naturally　bound　up　with　the　feeling　of　the　agreeable。　　　The　net　result　to　be　extracted　from　the　exposition　so　far　given　of　both　kinds　of　aesthetic　judgements　may　be　summed　up　in　the　following　brief　definitions：　　　The　beautiful　is　what　pleases　in　the　mere　estimate　formed　of　it　（consequently　not　by　intervention　of　any　feeling　of　sense　in　accordance　with　a　concept　of　the　understanding）。　From　this　it　follows　at　once　that　it　must　please　apart　from　all　interest。　　　The　sublime　is　what　pleases　immediately　by　reason　of　its　opposition　to　the　interest　of　sense。　　　Both；　as　definitions　of　aesthetic　universally　valid　estimates；　have　reference　to　subjective　grounds。　In　the　one　case　the　reference　is　to　grounds　of　sensibility；　in　so　far　as　these　are　final　on　behalf　of　the　contemplative　understanding；　in　the　other　case　in　so　far　as；　in　their　opposition　to　sensibility；　they　are；　on　the　contrary；　final　in　reference　to　the　ends　of　practical　reason。　Both；　however；　as　united　in　the　same　subject；　are　final　in　reference　to　the　moral　feeling。　The　beautiful　prepares　us　to　love　something；　even　nature；　apart　from　any　interest：　the　sublime　to　esteem　something　highly　even　in　opposition　to　our　（sensible）　interest　object；　　　The　sublime　may　be　described　in　this　way：　It　is　an　object　（of　nature）　the　representation　of　which　determines　the　mind　to　regard　the　elevation　of　nature　beyond　our　reach　as　equivalent　to　a　presentation　of　ideas。　　　In　a　literal　sense　and　according　to　their　logical　import；　ideas　cannot　be　presented。　But　if　we　enlarge　our　empirical　faculty　of　representation　（mathematical　or　dynamical）　with　a　view　to　the　intuition　of　nature；　reason　inevitably　steps　forward；　as　the　faculty　concerned　with　the　independence　of　the　absolute　totality；　and　calls　forth　the　effort　of　the　mind；　unavailing　though　it　be；　to　make　representation　of　sense　adequate　to　this　totality。　This　effort；　and　the　feeling　of　the　unattainability　of　the　idea　by　means　of　imagination；　is　itself　a　presentation　of　the　subjective　finality　of　our　mind　in　the　employment　of　the　imagination　in　the　interests　of　the　mind's　supersensible　province；　and　compels　us　subjectively　to　think　nature　itself　in　its　totality　as　a　presentation　of　something　supersensible；　without　our　being　able　to　effectuate　this　presentation　objectively。　　　For　we　readily　see　that　nature　in　space　and　time　falls　entirely　short　of　the　unconditioned；　consequently　also　of　the　absolutely　great；　which　still　the　commonest　reason　demands。　And　by　this　we　are　also　reminded　that　we　have　only　to　do　with　nature　as　phenomenon；　and　that　this　itself　must　be　regarded　as　the　mere　presentation　of　a　nature…in…itself　（which　exists　in　the　idea　of　reason）。　But　this　idea　of　the　supersensible；　which　no　doubt　we　cannot　further　determine　so　that　we　cannot　cognize　nature　as　its　presentation；　but　only　think　it　as　such…is　awakened　in　us　by　an　object　the　aesthetic　estimating　of　which　strains　the　imagination　to　its　utmost；　whether　in　respect　of　its　extension　（mathematical）；　or　of　its　might　over　the　mind　（dynamical）。　For　it　is　founded　upon　the　feeling　of　a　sphere　of　the　mind　which　altogether　exceeds　the　realm　of　nature　（i。e。；　upon　the　moral　feeling）；　with　regard　to　which　the　representation　of　the　object　is　estimated　as　subjectively　final。　　　As　a　matter　of　fact；　a　feeling　for　the　sublime　in　nature　is　hardly　thinkable　unless　in　association　with　an　attitude　of　mind　resembling　the　moral。　And　though；　like　that　feeling；　the　immediate　pleasure　in　the　beautiful　in　nature　presupposes　and　cultivates　a　certain　liberality　of　thought；　i。e。；　makes　our　delight　independent　of　any　mere　enjoyment　of　sense；　still　it　represents　freedom　rather　as　in　play　than　as　exercising　a　law…ordained　function；　which　is　the　genuine　characteristic　of　human　morality；　where　reason　has　to　impose　its　dominion　upon　sensibility。　There　is；　however；　this　qualification；　that　in　the　aesthetic　judgement　upon　the　sublime　this　dominion　is　represented　as　exercised　through　the　imagination　itself　as　an　instrument　of　reason。　　　Thus；　too；　delight　in　the　sublime　in　nature　is　only　negative　（whereas　that　in　the　beautiful　is　positive）：　that　is　to　say；　it　is　a　feeling　of　imagination　by　its　own　act　depriving　itself　of　its　freedom　by　receiving　a　final　determination　in　accordance　with　a　law　other　than　that　of　its　empirical　employment。　In　this　way　it　gains　an　extension　and　a　might　greater　than　that　which　it　sacrifices。　But　the　ground　of　this　is　concealed　from　it；　and　in　its　place　it　feels　the　sacrifice　or　deprivation；　as　well　as　its　cause；　to　which　it　is　subjected。　The　astonishment　amounting　almost　to　terror；　the　awe　and　thrill　of　devout　feeling；　that　takes　hold　of　one　when　gazing　upon　the　prospect　of　mountains　ascending　to　heaven；　deep　ravines　and　torrents　raging　there；　deep　shadowed　solitudes　that　invite　to　brooding　melancholy；　and　the　like…all　this；　when　we　are　assured　of　our　own　safety；　is　not　actual　fear。　Rather　is　it　an　attempt　to　gain　access　to　it　through　imagination；　for　the　purpose　of　feeling　the　might　of　this　faculty　in　combining　the　movement　of　the　mind　thereby　aroused　with　its　serenity；　and　of　thus　being　superior　to　internal　and；　therefore；　to　external；　nature；　so　far　as　the　latter　can　have　any　bearing　upon　our　feeling　of　well…being。　For　the　imagination；　in　accordance　with　laws　of　association；　makes　our　state　of　contentment　dependent　upon　physical　conditions。　But　acting　in　accordance　with　principles　of　the　schematism　of　judgement　（consequently　so　far　as　it　is　subordinated　to　freedom）；　it　is　at　the　same　time　an　instrument　of　reason　and　its　ideas。　But　in　this　capacity　it　is　a　might　enabling　us　to　assert　our　independence　as　against　the　influences　of　nature；　to　degrade　what　is　great　in　respect　of　the　latter　to　the　level　of　what　is　little；　and　thus　to　locate　the　absolutely　great　only　in　the　proper　estate　of　the　subject。　This　reflection　of　aesthetic　judgement　by　which　it　raises　itself　to　the　point　of　adequacy　with　reason；　though　without　any　determinate　concept　of　reason；　is　still　a　representation　of　the　object　as　subjectively　final；　by　virtue　even　of　the　objective　inadequacy　of　the　imagination　in