the critique of judgement-第22章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


f　the　object　as　subjectively　final；　by　virtue　even　of　the　objective　inadequacy　of　the　imagination　in　its　greatest　extension　for　meeting　the　demands　of　reason　（as　the　faculty　of　ideas）。　　　Here　we　have　to　attend　generally　to　what　has　been　already　adverted　to；　that　in　the　transcendental　aesthetic　of　judgement　there　must　be　no　question　of　anything　but　pure　aesthetic　judgements。　Consequently　examples　are　not　to　be　selected　from　such　beautiful；　or　sublime　objects　as　presuppose　the　concept　of　an　end。　For　then　the　finality　would　be　either　teleological；　or　based　upon　mere　sensations　of　an　object：　（gratification　or　pain）　and　so；　in　the　first　case；　not　aesthetic；　and；　in　the　second；　not　merely　formal。　So；　if　we　call　the　sight　of　the　starry　heaven　sublime；　we　must　not　found　our　estimate　of　it　upon　any　concepts　of　worlds　inhabited　by　rational　beings；　with　the　bright　spots；　which　we　see　filling　the　space　above　us；　as　their　suns　moving　in　orbits　prescribed　for　them　with　the　wisest　regard　to　ends。　But　we　must　take　it；　just　as　it　strikes　the　eye；　as　a　broad　and　all…embracing　canopy：　and　it　is　merely　under　such　a　representation　that　we　may　posit　the　sublimity　which　the　pure　aesthetic　judgement　attributes　to　this　object。　Similarly；　as　to　the　prospect　of　the　ocean；　we　are　not　to　regard　it　as　we；　with　our　minds　stored　with　knowledge　on　a　variety　of　matters　（which；　however；　is　not　contained　in　the　immediate　intuition）；　are　wont　to　represent　it　in　thought；　as；　let　us　say；　a　spacious　realm　of　aquatic　creatures；　or　as　the　mighty　reservoirs　from　which　are　drawn　the　vapours　that　fill　the　air　with　clouds　of　moisture　for　the　good　of　the　land；　or　yet　as　an　element　which　no　doubt　divides　continent　from　continent；　but　at　the　same　time　affords　the　means　of　the　greatest　commercial　intercourse　between　them…for　in　this　way　we　get　nothing　beyond　teleological　judgements。　Instead　of　this　we　must　be　able　to　see　sublimity　in　the　ocean；　regarding　it；　as　the　poets　do；　according　to　what　the　impression　upon　the　eye　reveals；　as；　let　us　say；　in　its　calm　a　clear　mirror　of　water　bounded　only　by　the　heavens；　or；　be　it　disturbed；　as　threatening　to　overwhelm　and　engulf　everything。　The　same　is　to　be　said　of　the　sublime　and　beautiful　in　the　human　form。　Here；　for　determining　grounds　of　the　judgement；　we　must　not　have　recourse　to　concepts　of　ends　subserved　by　all：　all　its　and　members；　or　allow　their　accordance　with　these　ends　to　influence　our　aesthetic　judgement　（in　such　case　no　longer　pure）；　although　it　is　certainly　also　a　also　a　necessary　condition　of　aesthetic　delight　that　they　should　not　conflict。　With　these　ends。　Aesthetic　finality　is　the　conformity　to　law　of　judgement　in　its　freedom。　The　delight　in　the　object　depends　on　the　reference　which　we　seek　to　give　to　the　imagination；　subject　to　the　proviso　that　it　is　to　entertain　the　mind　in　a　free　activity。　If；　on　the　other　hand；　something　else…be　it　sensation　or　concept　of　the　understanding…determines　the　judgement；　it　is　then　conformable　to　law；　no　doubt；　but　not　an　act　of　free　judgement。　　　Hence　to　speak　of　intellectual　beauty　or　sublimity　is　to　use　expressions　which；　in　the　first　place；　are　not　quite　correct。　For　these　are　aesthetic　modes　of　representation　which　would　be　entirely　foreign　to　us　were　we　merely　pure　intelligences　（or　if　we　even　put　ourselves　in　thought　in　the　position　of　such）。　Secondly；　although　both；　as　objects　of　an　intellectual　（moral）　delight；　are　compatible　with　aesthetic　delight　to　the　extent　of　not　resting　upon　any　interest；　still；　on　the：　Other　hand；　there　is　a　difficulty　in　the　way　of　their　alliance　with　such　delight；　since　their　function　is　to　produce　an　interest；　and；　on　the　assumption　that　the　presentation　has　to　accord　with　delight　in　the　aesthetic　estimate；　this　interest　could　only　be　effected　by　means　of　an　interest　of　sense　combined　with　it　in　the　presentation。　But　in　this　way　the　intellectual　finality　would　be　violated　and　rendered　impure。　　　The　object　of　a　pure　and　unconditioned　intellectual　delight　is　the　moral　law　in　the　might　which　it　exerts　in　us　over　all　antecedent　motives　of　the　mind。　Now；　since　it　is　only　through　sacrifices　that　this　might　makes　itself　known　to　us　aesthetically　（and　this　involves　a　deprivation　of　something　…though　in　the　interest　of　inner　freedom…whilst　in　turn　it　reveals　in　us　an　unfathomable　depth　of　this　supersensible　faculty；　the　consequences　of　which　extend　beyond　reach　of　the　eye　of　sense）；　it　follows　that　the　delight；　looked　at　from　the　aesthetic　side　（in　reference　to　sensibility）　is　negative；　i。e。；　opposed　to　this　interest；　but　from　the　intellectual　side；　positive　and　bound　up　with　an　interest。　Hence　it　follows　that　the　intellectual　and　intrinsically　final　（moral）　good；　estimated　aesthetically；　instead　of　being　represented　as　beautiful；　must　rather　be　represented　as　sublime；　with　the　result　that　it　arouses　more　a　feeling　of　respect　（which　disdains　charm）　than　of　love　or　of　the　heart　being　drawn　towards　it…for　human　nature　does　not　of　its　own　proper　motion　accord　with　the　good；　but　only　by　virtue　of　the　dominion　which　reason　exercises　over　sensibility。　Conversely；　that；　too；　which　we　call　sublime　in　external　nature；　or　even　internal　nature　（e。g。；　certain　affections）　is　only　represented　as　a　might　of　the　mind　enabling　it　to　overcome　this　or　that　hindrance　of　sensibility　by　means　of　moral　principles；　and　it　is　from　this　that　it　derives　its　interest。　　　I　must　dwell　while　on　the　latter　point。　The　idea　of　the　good　to　which　affection　is　superadded　is　enthusiasm。　This　state　of　mind　appears　to　be　sublime：　so　much　so　that　there　is　a　common　saying　that　nothing　great　can　be　achieved　without　it。　But　now　every　affection*　is　blind　either　as　to　the　choice　of　its　end；　or；　supposing　this　has　been　furnished　by　reason；　in　the　way　it　is　effected　for　it　is　that　mental　movement　whereby　the　exercise　of　free　deliberation　upon　fundamental　principles；　with　a　view　to　determining　oneself　accordingly；　is　rendered　impossible。　On　this　account　it　cannot　merit　any　delight　on　the　part　of　reason。　Yet；　from　an　aesthetic　point　of　view；　enthusiasm　is　sublime；　because　it　is　an　effort　of　one's　powers　called　forth　by　ideas　which　give　to　the　mind　an　impetus　of　far　stronger　and　more　enduring　efficacy　than　the　stimulus　afforded　by　sensible　representations。　But　（as　seems　strange）　even　freedom　from　affection　（apatheia；　phlegma　in　significatu　bono）　in　a　mind　that　strenuously　follows　its　unswerving　principles　is　sublime；　and　that；　too；　in　a　manner　vastly　superior；　because　it　has　at　the　same　time　the　delight　of　pure　reason　on　its　side。　Such　a　stamp　of　mind　is　alone　called　noble。　This　expression；　however；　comes　in　time　to　be　applied　to　things…such　as　buildings；　a　garment；　literary　style；　the　carriage　of　one's　person；　and　the　like…provided　they　do　not　so　much　excite　astonishment　（the　affection　attending　the　representation　of　novelty　exceeding　expectation）　as　admiration　（an　astonishment　which　does　not　cease　when　the　novelty　wears　off）…and　this　obtains　where　ideas　undesignedly　and　artlessly　accord　in　their　presentation　with　aesthetic　delight。

　　*There　is　a　specific　distinction　between　affections　and　Passions。　Affections　are　related　merely　to　feeling；　passions　belong　to　the　faculty　of　desire；　and　are　inclinations　that　hinder　or　render　impossible　all　determinability　of　the　elective　will　by　principles。　Affections　are　impetuous　and　irresponsible；　passions　are　abiding　and　deliberate。　Thus　resentment；　in　the　form　of　anger；　is　an　affection：　but　in　the　form　of　hatred　（vindictiveness）　it　is　a　passion。　Under　no　circumstances　can　the　latter　be　called　sublime；　for；　while　the　freedom　of　the　mind　is；　no　doubt；　impeded　in　the　case　of　affection；　in　passion　it　is　abrogated。

　　Every　affection　of　the　STRENUOUS　TYPE　（such；　that　is；　as　excites　the　consciousness　of　our　power　of　overcoming　every　resistance　＇animus　strenuus＇）　is　aesthetically　sublime；　e。g。；　anger；　even　desperation　（the　rage　of　forlorn　hope　but　not　faint…hearted　despair）。　On　the　other　hand；　affection　of　the　LANGUID　TYPE　（which　converts　the　very　effort　of　resistance　into　an　object　of　displeasure　＇animus　languidus＇　has　nothing　noble　about　it；　though　it　may　take　its　rank　as　possessing　beauty　of　the　sensuous　order。　Hence　the　emotions　capable　of　attaining　the　strength　of　an　affection　are　very　diverse。　We　have　spirited；　and　we　have　tender　emotions。　When　the　strength　of　the　latter　reaches　that　of　an　affection　they　can　be　turned　to　no　account。　The　propensity　to　indulge　in　them　is　sentimentality。　A　sympathetic　grief　that　refuses　to　be　consoled；　or　one　that　has　to　do　with　imaginary　misfortune　to　which　we　deliberately　give　way　so　far　as　to　allow　our　fancy　to　delude　us　into　thinking　it　actual　fact；　indicates　and　goes　to　make　a　tender；　but　at　the　same　time　weak；　soul；　which　shows　a　beautiful　side；　and　may　no　doubt　be　called　fanciful；　but　never　enthusiastic。　Romances；　maudlin　dramas；　shallow　homilies；　which　trifle　with　so…called　（though　falsely　so）　noble　sentiments；　but　in　fact　make　the　heart　enervated；　insensitive　to　the　stem　precepts　of　duty；　and　incapable　of　respect　for　the　worth　of　humanity　in　our　own　person　and　the　rights　of　men　（which　is　something　quite　other　than　their　happiness）；　and　in　general　incapable　of　all　firm　principles；　even　a　religious　discourse　which　recommends　a　cringing　and　abject　grace…begging　and　favour…seeking；　abandoning　all　reliance　on　our　own　ability　to　resist　the　evil　within　us；　in　place　of　the　vigorous　resolution　to　try　to　get　the　better　of　our　inclinations　by　means　of　those　powers　which；　miserable　sinners　though　we　be；　are　still　left　to　us；　that　false　humility　by　which　self…abasement；　whining　hypocritical　repentance　and　a　merely　passive　frame　of　mind　are　set　down　as　the　method　by　which　alone　we　can　become　acceptable　to　the　Supreme　Being…these　have　neither　lot　nor　fellowship　with　what　may　be　reckoned　to　belong　to　beauty；　not　to　speak　of　sublimity；　of　mental　temperament。　　　But　even　impetuous　movements　of　the　mind　be　they　allied　under　the　name　of　edification　with　ideas　of　religion；　or；　as　pertaining　merely　to　culture；　with　ideas　involving　a　social　interest　no　matter　what　tension　of　the　imagination　they　may　produce；　can　in　no　way　lay　claim　to　the　honour　of　a　sublime　presentation；　if　they　do　not　leave　behind　them　a　temper　of　mind　which；　though　it　be　only　indirectly；　has　an　influence　upon　the　consciousness　of　the　mind's　strength　and　resoluteness　in　respect　of　that　which　carries　with　it　pure　intellectual　finality　（the　supersensible）。　For；　in　the　absence　of　this；　all　these　emotions　belong　only　to　motion；　which　we　welcome　in　the　interests　of　good　health。　The　agreeable　lassitude　that　follows　upon　being　stirred　up　in　that　way　by　the　play　of　the　affections；　is　a　fruition　of　the　state　of　well…being　arising　from　the　restoration　of　the　equilibrium　of　the　various　vital　forces　within　us。　This；　in　the　last　resort；　comes　to　no　more　than　what　the　Eastern　voluptuaries　find　so　soothing　when　they　get　their　bodies　massaged；　and　all　their　muscles　and　joints　softly　pressed　and　bent；　only　that　in　the　first　case　the　principle　that　occasions　the　movement　is　chiefly　internal；　whereas　here　it　is　entirely　external。　Thus；　many　a　man　believes　himself　edified　by　a　sermon　in　which　there　is　no　establishment　of　anything　（no　system　of　good　maxims）；　or　thinks　himself　improved　by　a　tragedy；　when　he　is　merely　glad　at