the critique of judgement-第23章

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thing　（no　system　of　good　maxims）；　or　thinks　himself　improved　by　a　tragedy；　when　he　is　merely　glad　at　having　got　well　rid　of　the　feeling　of　being　bored。　Thus　the　sublime　must　in　every　case　have　reference　to　our　way　of　thinking；　i。e。；　to　maxims　directed　to　giving　the　intellectual　side　of　our　nature　and　the　ideas　of　reason　supremacy　over　sensibility。　　　We　have　no　reason　to　fear　that　the　feeling　of　the　sublime　will　suffer　from　an　abstract　mode　of　presentation　like　this；　which　is　altogether　negative　as　to　what　is　sensuous。　For　though　the　imagination；　no　doubt；　finds　nothing　beyond　the　sensible　world　to　which　it　can　lay　hold；　still　this　thrusting　aside　of　the　sensible　barriers　gives　it　a　feeling　of　being　unbounded；　and　that　removal　is　thus　a　presentation　of　the　infinite。　As　such　it　can　never　be　anything　more　than　a　negative　presentation…but　still　it　expands　the　soul。　Perhaps　there　is　no　more　sublime　passage　in　the　Jewish　Law　than　the　commandment：　〃Thou　shalt　not　make　unto　thee　any　graven　image；　or　any　likeness　of　any　thing　that　is　in　heaven　or　on　earth；　or　under　the　earth；　etc。〃　This　commandment　can　alone　explain　the　enthusiasm　which　the　Jewish　people；　in　their　moral　period；　felt　for　their　religion　when　comparing　themselves　with　others；　or　the　pride　inspired　by　Mohammedanism。　The　very　same　holds　good　of　our　representation　of　the　moral　law　and　of　our　native　capacity　for　morality。　The　fear　that；　if　we　divest　this　representation　of　everything　that　can　commend　it　to　the　senses；　it　will　thereupon　be　attended　only　with　a　cold　and　lifeless　approbation　and　not　with　any　moving　force　or　emotion；　is　wholly　unwarranted。　The　very　reverse　is　the　truth。　For　when　nothing　any　longer　meets　the　eye　of　sense；　and　the　unmistakable　and　ineffaceable　idea　of　morality　is　left　in　possession　of　the　field；　there　would　be　need　rather　of　tempering　the　ardour　of　an　unbounded　imagination　to　prevent　it　rising　to　enthusiasm；　than　of　seeking　to　lend　these　ideas　the　aid　of　images　and　childish　devices　for　fear　of　their　being　wanting　in　potency。　For　this　reason；　governments　have　gladly　let　religion　be　fully　equipped　with　these　accessories；　seeking　in　this　way　to　relieve　their　subjects　of　the　exertion；　but　to　deprive　them；　at　the　same　time；　of　the　ability；　required　for　expanding　their　spiritual　powers　beyond　the　limits　arbitrarily　laid　down　for　them；　and　which　facilitate　their　being　treated　as　though　they　were　merely　passive。　　　This　pure；　elevating；　merely　negative　presentation　of　morality　involves；　on　the　other　hand；　no　fear　of　fanaticism；　which　is　a　delusion　that　would　will　some　VISION　beyond　all　the　bounds　of　sensibility；　i。e。；　would　dream　according　to　principles　（rational　raving）。　The　safeguard　is　the　purely　negative　character　of　the　presentation。　For　the　inscrutability　of　the　idea　of　freedom　precludes　all　positive　presentation。　The　moral　law；　however；　is　a　sufficient　and　original　source　of　determination　within　us：　so　it　does　not　for　a　moment　permit　us　to　cast　about　for　a　ground　of　determination　external　to　itself。　If　enthusiasm　is　comparable　to　delirium；　fanaticism　may　be　compared　to　mania。　Of　these；　the　latter　is　least　of　all　compatible　with　the　sublime；　for　it　is　profoundly　ridiculous。　In　enthusiasm；　as　an　affection；　the　imagination　is　unbridled；　in　fanaticism；　as　a　deep…seated；　brooding　passion；　it　is　anomalous。　The　first　is　a　transitory　accident　to　which　the　healthiest　understanding　is　liable　to　become　at　times　the　victim；　the　second　is　an　undermining　disease。　　　Simplicity　（artless　finality）　is；　as　it　were；　the　style　adopted　by　nature　in　the　sublime。　It　is　also　that　of　morality。　The　latter　is　a　second　（supersensible）　nature；　whose　laws　alone　we　know；　without　being　able　to　attain　to　an　intuition　of　the　supersensible　faculty　within　us…that　which　contains　the　ground　of　this　legislation。　　　One　further　remark。　The　delight　in　the　sublime；　no　less　than　in　the　beautiful；　by　reason　of　its　universal　communicability　not　alone　is　plainly　distinguished　from　other　aesthetic　judgements；　but　also　from　this　same　property　acquires　an　interest　in　society　（in　which　it　admits　of　such　communication）。　Yet；　despite　this；　we　have　to　note　the　fact　that　isolation　from　all　society　is　looked　upon　as　something　sublime；　provided　it　rests　upon　ideas　which　disregard　all　sensible　interest。　To　be　self…sufficing；　and　so　not　to　stand　in　need　of　society；　yet　without　being　unsociable；　i。e。；　without　shunning　it；　is　something　approaching　the　sublime…a　remark　applicable　to　all　superiority　to　wants。　On　the　other　hand；　to　shun　our　fellow　men　from　misanthropy；　because　of　enmity　towards　them；　or　from　anthropophobia；　because　we　imagine　the　hand　of　every　man　is　against　us；　is　partly　odious；　partly　contemptible。　There　is；　however；　a　misanthropy　（most　improperly　so　called）；　the　tendency　towards　which　is　to　be　found　with　advancing　years　in　many　right　minded　men；　that；　as　far　as　good　will　goes；　is　no　doubt；　philanthropic　enough；　but　as　the　result　of　long　and　sad　experience；　is　widely　removed　from　delight　in　mankind。　We　see　evidences　of　this　in　the　propensity　to　recluseness；　in　the　fanciful　desire　for　a　retired　country　seat；　or　else　（with　the　young）　in　the　dream　of　the　happiness　of　being　able　to　spend　one's　life　with　a　little　family　on　an　island　unknown　to　the　rest　of　the　world…material　of　which　novelists　or　writers　of　Robinsonades　know　how　to　make　such　good　use。　Falsehood；　ingratitude；　injustice；　the　puerility　of　the　ends　which　we　ourselves　look　upon　as　great　and　momentous；　and　to　compass　which　man　inflicts　upon　his　brother　man　all　imaginable　evils…these　all　so　contradict　the　idea　of　what　men　might　be　if　they　only　would；　and　are　so　at　variance　with　our　active　wish　to　see　them　better；　that；　to　avoid　hating　where　we　cannot　love；　it　seems　but　a　slight　sacrifice　to　forego　all　the　joys　of　fellowship　with　our　kind。　This　sadness；　which　is　not　directed　to　the　evils　which　fate　brings　down　upon　others　（a　sadness　which　springs　from　sympathy）；　but　to　those　which　they　inflict　upon　themselves　（one　which　is　based　on　antipathy　in　questions　of　principle）；　is　sublime　because　it　is　founded　on　ideas；　whereas　that　springing　from　sympathy　can　only　be　accounted　beautiful。　Sassure；　who　was　no　less　ingenious　than　profound；　in　the　description　of　his　Alpine　travels　remarks　of　Bonhomme；　one　of　the　Savoy　mountains：　〃There　reigns　there　a　certain　insipid　sadness。〃　He　recognized；　therefore；　that；　besides　this；　there　is　an　interesting　sadness；　such　as　is　inspired　by　the　sight　of　some　desolate　place　into　which　men　might　fain　withdraw　themselves　so　as　to　hear　no　more　of　the　world　without；　and　be　no　longer　versed　in　its　affairs；　a　place；　however；　which　must　yet　not　be　so　altogether　inhospitable　as　only　to　afford　a　most　miserable　retreat　for　a　human　being。　I　only　make　this　observation　as　a　reminder　that　even　melancholy；　（but　not　dispirited　sadness）；　may　take　its　place　among　the　vigorous　affections；　provided　it　has　its　root　in　moral　ideas。　If；　however；　it　is　grounded　upon　sympathy；　and；　as　such；　is　lovable；　it　belongs　only　to　the　languid　affections。　And　this　serves　to　call　attention　to　the　mental　temperament　which　in　the　first　case　alone　is　sublime　are

　　The　transcendental　exposition　of　aesthetic　judgements　now　brought　to　a　close　may　be　compared　with　the　physiological；　as　worked　out　by　Burke　and　many　acute　men　among　us；　so　that　we　may　see　where　a　merely　empirical　exposition　of　the　sublime　and　beautiful　would　bring　us。　Burke；　who　deserves　to　be　called　the　foremost　author　in　this　method　of　treatment；　deduces；　on　these　lines；　〃that　the　feeling　of　the　sublime　is　grounded　on　the　impulse　towards　self…preservation　and　on　fear；　i。e。；　on　a　pain；　which；　since　it　does　not　go　the　length　of　disordering　the　bodily　parts；　calls　forth　movements　which；　as　they　clear　the　vessels；　whether　fine　or　gross；　of　a　dangerous　and　troublesome　encumbrance；　are　capable　of　producing　delight；　not　pleasure　but　a　sort　of　delightful　horror；　a　sort　of　tranquility　tinged　With　terror。〃　The　beautiful；　which　he　grounds　on　love　（from　which；　still；　he　would　have　desire　kept　separate）；　he　reduces　to　〃the　relaxing；　slackening；　and　enervating　of　the　fibres　of　the　body；　and　consequently　a　softening；　a　dissolving；　a　languor；　and　a　fainting；　dying；　and　melting　away　for　pleasure。〃　And　this　explanation　he　supports；　not　alone　by　instances　in　which　the　feeling　of　the　beautiful　as　well　as　of　the　sublime　is　capable　of　being　excited　in　us　by　the　imagination　in　conjunction　with　the　understanding；　but　even　by　instances　when　it　is　in　conjunction　with　sensations。　As　psychological　observations；　these　analyses　of　our　mental　phenomena　are　extremely　fine；　and　supply　a　wealth　of　material　for　the　favourite　investigations　of　empirical　anthropology。　But；　besides　that；　there　is　no　denying　the　fact　that　all　representations　within　us；　no　matter　whether　they　are　objectively　merely　sensible　or　wholly　intellectual；　are　still　subjectively　associable　with　gratification　or　pain；　however　imperceptible　either　of　these　may　be。　（For　these　representations　one　and　all　have　an　influence　on　the　feeling　of　life；　and　none　of　them；　so　far　as　it　is　a　modification　of　the　subject；　can　be　indifferent。）　We　must　even　admit　that；　as　Epicurus　maintained；　gratification　and　pain　though　proceeding　from　the　imagination　or　even　from　representations　of　the　understanding；　are　always　in　the　last　resort　corporeal；　since　apart　from　any　feeling　of　the　bodily　organ　life　would　be　merely　a　consciousness　of　one's　existence；　and　could　not　include　any　feeling　of　well…being　or　the　reverse；　i。e。；　of　the　furtherance　or　hindrance　of　the　vital　forces。　For；　of　itself　alone；　the　mind　is　all　life　（the　life…principle　itself）；　and　hindrance　or　furtherance　has　to　be　sought　outside　it；　and　yet　in　the　man　himself　consequently　in　the　connection　with　his　body　and　melting　　　But　if　we　attribute　the　delight　in　the　object　wholly　and　entirely　to　the　gratification　which　it　affords　through　charm　or　emotion；　then　we　must　not　exact　from　any　one　else　agreement　with　the　aesthetic　judgement　passed　by　us。　For；　in　such　matters　each　person　rightly　consults　his　own　personal　feeling　alone。　But　in　that　case　there　is　an　end　of　all　censorship　of　taste…unless　the　afforded　by　others　as　the　result　of　a　contingent　coincidence　of　their　judgements　is　to　be　held　over　us　as　commanding　our　assent。　But　this　principle　we　would　presumably　resent；　and　appeal　to　our　natural　right　of　submitting　a　judgement　to　our　own　sense；　where　it　rests　upon　the　immediate　feeling　of　personal　well…being；　instead　of　submitting　it　to　that　of　others。　　　Hence　if　the　import　of　the　judgement　of　taste；　where　we　appraise　it　as　a　judgement　entitled　to　require　the　concurrence　of　every　one；　cannot　be　egoistic；　but　must　necessarily；　from　its　inner　nature；　be　allowed　a　pluralistic　validity；　i。e。；　on　account　of　what　taste　itself　is；　and　not　on　account　of　the　examples　which　others　give　of　their　taste；　then　it　must　found　upon　some　a　priori　principle　（be　it　subjective　or　objective）；　and　no　amount　of　prying　into　the　empirical　laws　of　the　changes　that　go　on　within　the　mind　can　succeed　in　establishing　such　a　principle。　For　these　laws　only　yield　a　knowledge　of　how　we　do　judge；　but　they　do　not　give　us　a　command　as　to　how　we　ought　to　judge；　and；　what　is　more；　such　a　command　as　is　unconditioned…and　commands　of　this　kind　are　presupposed　by　judgements　of　taste；　inasm