the critique of judgement-第25章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


sponsible　for　it　and；　when　he　goes　wrong；　cannot　shift　the　blame　upon　others　as　teachers　or　leaders…general　precepts　learned　at　the　feet　either　of　priests　or　philosophers；　or　even　drawn　from　ones'　own　resources；　are　never　so　efficacious　as　an　example　of　virtue　or　holiness；　which；　historically　portrayed；　does　not　dispense　with　the　autonomy　of　virtue　drawn　from　the　spontaneous　and　original　idea　of　morality　（a　priori）；　or　convert　this　into　a　mechanical　process　of　imitation。　Following　which　has　reference　to　a　precedent；　and　not　imitation；　is　the　proper　expression　for　all　influence　which　the　products　of　an　exemplary　author　may　exert　upon　others　and　this　means　no　more　than　going　to　the　same　sources　for　a　creative　work　as　those　to　which　he　went　for　his　creations；　and　learning　from　one's　predecessor　no　more　than　the　mode　of　availing　oneself　of　such　sources。　Taste；　just　because　its　judgement　cannot　be　determined　by　concepts　or　precepts；　is　among　all　faculties　and　talents　the　very　one　that　stands　most　in　need　of　examples　of　what　has　in　the　course　of　culture　maintained　itself　longest　in　esteem。　Thus　it　avoids　an　early　lapse　into　crudity　and　a　return　to　the　rudeness　of　its　earliest　efforts。

　　　　　SS　33。　Second　peculiarity　of　the　judgement　of　taste。

　　Proofs　are　of　no　avail　whatever　for　determining　the　judgement　of　taste；　and　in　this　connection　matters　stand　just　as　they　would　were　that　judgement　simply　subjective。　　　If　any　one　does　not　think　a　building；　view；　or　poem　beautiful；　then；　in　the　first　place；　he　refuses；　so　far　as　his　inmost　conviction　goes；　to　allow　approval　to　be　wrung　from　him　by　a　hundred　voices　all　lauding　it　to　the　skies。　Of　course　he　may　affect　to　be　pleased　with　it；　so　as　not　to　be　considered　as　wanting　in　taste。　He　may　even　begin　to　harbour　doubts　as　to　whether　he　has　formed　his　taste　upon　an　acquaintance　with　a　sufficient　number　of　objects　of　a　particular　kind　（just　as　one　who　in　the　distance　recognizes；　as　he　believes；　something　as　a　wood　which　every　one　else　regards　as　a　town；　becomes　doubtful　of　the　judgement　of　his　own　eyesight）。　But；　for　all　that；　he　clearly　perceives　that　the　approval　of　others　affords　no　valid　proof；　available　for　the　estimate　of　beauty。　He　recognizes　that　others；　perchance；　may　see　and　observe　for　him；　and　that　what　many　have　seen　in　one　and　the　same　way　may；　for　the　purpose　of　a　theoretical；　and　therefore　logical；　judgement；　serve　as　an　adequate　ground　of　proof　for　or　albeit　he　believes　he　saw　otherwise；　but　that　what　has　pleased　others　can　never　serve　him　as　the　ground　of　an　aesthetic　judgement。　The　judgement　of　others；　where　unfavourable　to　ours；　may；　no　doubt；　rightly　make　us　suspicious　in　respect　of　our　own；　but　convince　us　that　it　is　wrong　it　never　can。　Hence　there　is　no　empirical　ground　of　proof　that　can　coerce　any　one's　judgement　of　taste。　　　In　the　second　place；　a　proof　a　priori　according　to　definite　rules　is　still　less　capable　of　determining　the　judgement　as　to　beauty。　If　any　one　reads　me　his　poem；　or　brings　me　to　a　play；　which；　all　said　and　done；　fails　to　commend　itself　to　my　taste；　then　let　him　adduce　Batteux　or　Lessing；　or　still　older　and　more　famous　critics　of　taste；　with　all　the　host　of　rules　laid　down　by　them；　as　a　proof　of　the　beauty　of　his　poem；　let　certain　passages　particularly　displeasing　to　me　accord　completely　with　the　rules　of　beauty　（as　set　out　by　these　critics　and　universally　recognized）：　I　stop　my　ears：　I　do　not　want　to　hear　any　reasons　or　any　arguing　about　the　matter。　I　would　prefer　to　suppose　that　those　rules　of　the　critics　were　at　fault；　or　at　least　have　no　application；　than　to　allow　my　judgement　to　be　determined　by　a　priori　proofs。　I　take　my　stand　on　the　ground　that　my　judgement　is　to　be　one　of　taste；　and　not　one　of　understanding　or　reason。　　　This　would　appear　to　be　one　of　the　chief　reasons　why　this　faculty　of　aesthetic　judgement　has　been　given　the　name　of　taste。　For　a　man　may　recount　to　me　all　the　ingredients　of　a　dish；　and　observe　of　each　and　every　one　of　them　that　it　is　just　what　I　like；　and；　in　addition；　rightly　commend　the　wholesomeness　of　the　food；　yet　I　am　deaf　to　all　these　arguments。　I　try　the　dish　with　my　own　tongue　and　palate；　and　I　pass　judgement　according　to　their　verdict　（not　according　to　universal　principles）。　　　As　a　matter　of　fact；　the　judgement　of　taste　is　invariably　laid　down　as　a　singular　judgement　upon　the　object。　The　understanding　can；　from　the　comparison　of　the　object；　in　point　of　delight；　with　the　judgements　of　others；　form　a　universal　judgement；　e。g。：　〃All　tulips　are　beautiful。〃　But　that　judgement　is　then　not　one　of　taste；　but　is　a　logical　judgement　which　converts　the　reference　of　an　object　to　our　taste　into　a　predicate　belonging　to　things　of　a　certain　kind。　But　it　is　only　the　judgement　whereby　I　regard　an　individual　given　tulip　as　beautiful；　i。e。；　regard　my　delight　in　it　as　of　universal　validity；　that　is　a　judgement　of　taste。　Its　peculiarity；　however；　consists　in　the　fact；　that；　although　it　has　merely　subjective　validity；　still　it　extends　its　claims　to　all　subjects；　as　unreservedly　as　it　would　if　it　were　an　objective　judgement；　resting　on　grounds　of　cognition　and　capable　of　being　proved　to　demonstration。

　　　　　SS　34。　An　objective　principle　of　taste　is　not　possible。

　　A　principle　of　taste　would　mean　a　fundamental　premiss　under　the　condition　of　which　one　might　subsume　the　concept　of　an　object；　and　then；　by　a　syllogism；　draw　the　inference　that　it　is　beautiful。　That；　however；　is　absolutely　impossible。　For　I　must　feel　the　pleasure　immediately　in　the　representation　of　the　object；　and　I　cannot　be　talked　into　it　by　any　grounds　of　proof。　Thus　although　critics；　as　Hume　says；　are　able　to　reason　more　plausibly　than　cooks；　they　must　still　share　the　same　fate。　For　the　determining　ground　of　their　judgement　they　are　not　able　to　look　to　the　force　of　demonstrations；　but　only　to　the　reflection　of　the　subject　upon　his　own　state　（of　pleasure　or　displeasure）；　to　the　exclusion　of　precepts　and　rules。　　　There　is；　however；　a　matter　upon　which　it　is　competent　for　critics　to　exercise　their　subtlety；　and　upon　which　they　ought　to　do　so；　so　long　as　it　tends　to　the　rectification　and　extension　of　our　judgements　of　taste。　But　that　matter　is　not　one　of　exhibiting　the　determining　ground　of　aesthetic　judgements　of　this　kind　in　a　universally　applicable　formula…which　is　impossible。　Rather　is　it　the　investigation　of　the　faculties　of　cognition　and　their　function　in　these　judgements；　and　the　illustration；　by　the　analysis　of　examples；　of　their　mutual　subjective　finality；　the　form　of　which　in　a　given　representation　has　been　shown　above　to　constitute　the　beauty　of　their　object。　Hence　with　regard　to　the　representation　whereby　an　object　is　given；　the　critique　of　taste　itself　is　only　subjective；　viz。；　it　is　the　art　or　science　of　reducing　the　mutual　relation　of　the　understanding　and　the　imagination　in　the　given　representation　（without　reference　to　antecedent　sensation　or　concept）；　consequently　their　accordance　or　discordance；　to　rules；　and　of　determining　them　with　regard　to　their　conditions。　It　is　art　if　it　only　illustrates　this　by　examples；　it　is　science　if　it　deduces　the　possibility　of　such　an　estimate　from　the　nature　of　these　faculties　as　faculties　of　knowledge…in　general。　It　is　only　with　the　latter；　as　transcendental　critique；　that　we　have　here　any　concern。　Its　proper　scope　is　the　development　and　justification　of　the　subjective　principle　of　taste；　as　an　a　priori　principle　of　judgement。　As　an　art；　critique　merely　looks　to　the　physiological　（here　psychological）　and；　consequently；　empirical　rules；　according　to　which　in　actual　fact　taste　proceeds　（passing　by　the　question　of　their　possibility）　and　seeks　to　apply　them　in　estimating　its　objects。　The　latter　critique　criticizes　the　products　of　fine　art；　just　as　the　former　does　the　faculty　of　estimating　them。

　　　　　　SS　35。　The　principle　of　taste　is　the　subjective　principle　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　of　the　general　power　of　judgement。

　　The　judgement　of　taste　is　differentiated　from　logical　judgement　by　the　fact　that；　whereas　the　latter　subsumes　a　representation　under　a　concept　of　the　object；　the　judgement　of　taste　does　not　subsume　under　a　concept　at　all…for；　if　it　did；　necessary　and　universal　approval　would　be　capable　of　being　enforced　by　proofs。　And　yet　it　does　bear　this　resemblance　to　the　logical　judgement；　that　it　asserts　a　universality　and　necessity；　not；　however；　according　to　concepts　of　the　object；　but　a　universality　and　necessity　that　are；　consequently；　merely　subjective。　Now　the　concepts　in　a　judgement　constitute　its　content　（what　belongs　to　the　cognition　of　the　object）。　But　the　judgement　of　taste　is　not　determinable　by　means　of　concepts。　Hence　it　can　only　have　its　ground　in　the　subjective　formal　condition　of　a　judgement　in　general。　The　subjective　condition　of　all　judgements　is　the　judging　faculty　itself；　or　judgement。　Employed　in　respect　of　a　representation　whereby　an　object　is　given；　this　requires　the　harmonious　accordance　of　two　powers　of　representation。　These　are：　the　imagination　（for　the　intuition　and　the　arrangement　of　the　manifold　of　intuition）；　and　the　understanding　（for　the　concept　as　a　representation　of　the　unity　of　this　arrangement）。　Now；　since　no　concept　of　the　object　underlies　the　judgement　here；　it　can　consist　only　in　the　subsumption　of　the　imagination　itself　（in　the　case　of　a　representation　whereby　an　object　is　given）　under　the　conditions　enabling　the　understanding　in　general　to　advance　from　the　intuition　to　concepts。　That　is　to　say；　since　the　freedom　of　the　imagination　consists　precisely　in　the　fact　that　it　schematizes　without　a　concept；　the　judgement　of　taste　must　found　upon　a　mere　sensation　of　the　mutually　quickening　activity　of　the　imagination　in　its　freedom；　and　of　the　understanding　with　its　conformity　to　law。　It　must　therefore　rest　upon　a　feeling　that　allows　the　object　to　be　estimated　by　the　finality　of　the　representation　（by　which　an　object　is　given）　for　the　furtherance　of　the　cognitive　faculties　in　their　free　play。　Taste；　then；　as　a　subjective　power　of　judgement；　contains　a　principle　of　subsumption；　not　of　intuitions　under　concepts；　but　of　the　faculty　of　intuitions　or　presentations；　i。e。；　of　the　imagination；　under　the　faculty　of　concepts；　i。e。；　the　understanding；　so　far　as　the　former　in　its　freedom　accords　with　the　latter　in　its　conformity　to　law。　　　For　the　discovery　of　this　title　by　means　of　a　deduction　of　judgements　of　taste；　we　can　only　avail　ourselves　of　the　guidance　of　the　formal　peculiarities　of　judgements　of　this　kind；　and　consequently　the　mere　consideration　of　their　logical　form。

　　　SS　36。　The　problem　of　a　deduction　of　judgements　of　taste。

　　To　form　a　cognitive　judgement　we　may　immediately　connect　with　the　perception　of　an　object　the　concept　of　an　object　in　general；　the　empirical　predicates　of　which　are　contained　in　that　perception。　In　this　way；　a　judgement　of　experience　is　produced。　Now　this　judgement　rests　on　the　foundation　of　a　priori　concepts　of　the　synthetical　unity　of　the　manifold　of　intuition；　enabling　it　to　be　thought　as　the　determination　of　an　object。　These　concepts　（the　categories）　call　for　a　deduction；　and　such　was　supplied　in　the　Critique　of　Pure　Reason。　That　deduction　enabled　us　to　solve　the　problem：　How　are　synthetical　a　priori　cognitive　judgements　possible？　This　problem　had；　accordingly；　to　do　with　the　a