the critique of judgement-第3章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


　also　be　capable　of　being　regarded　in　such　a　way　that　in　the　conformity　to　law　of　its　form　it　at　least　harmonizes　with　the　possibility　of　the　ends　to　be　effectuated　in　it　according　to　the　laws　of　freedom。　There　must；　therefore；　be　a　ground　of　the　unity　of　the　supersensible　that　lies　at　the　basis　of　nature；　with　what　the　concept　of　freedom　contains　in　a　practical　way；　and　although　the　concept　of　this　ground　neither　theoretically　nor　practically　attains　to　a　knowledge　of　it；　and　so　has　no　peculiar　realm　of　its　own；　still　it　renders　possible　the　transition　from　the　mode　of　thought　according　to　the　principles　of　the　one　to　that　according　to　the　principles　of　the　other。

　　　　　　　III。　The　Critique　of　Judgement　as　a　means　of　　　　　　　　　　　　connecting　the　two　Parts　of　Philosophy　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　in　a　whole。

　　The　critique　which　deals　with　what　our　cognitive　faculties　are　capable　of　yielding　a　priori　has　properly　speaking　no　realm　in　respect　of　objects；　for　it　is　not　a　doctrine；　its　sole　business　being　to　investigate　whether；　having　regard　to　the　general　bearings　of　our　faculties；　a　doctrine　is　possible　by　their　means；　and　if　so；　how。　Its　field　extends　to　all　their　pretentions；　with　a　view　to　confining　them　within　their　legitimate　bounds。　But　what　is　shut　out　of　the　division　of　philosophy　may　still　be　admitted　as　a　principal　part　into　the　general　critique　of　our　faculty　of　pure　cognition；　in　the　event；　namely；　of　its　containing　principles　which　are　not　in　themselves　available　either　for　theoretical　or　practical　employment。　　　Concepts　of　nature　contain　the　ground　of　all　theoretical　cognition　a　priori　and　rest；　as　we　saw；　upon　the　legislative　authority　of　understanding。　The　concept　of　freedom　contains　the　ground　of　all　sensuously　unconditioned　practical　precepts　a　priori；　and　rests　upon　that　of　reason。　Both　faculties；　therefore；　besides　their　application　in　point　of　logical　form　to　principles　of　whatever　origin；　have；　in　addition；　their　own　peculiar　jurisdiction　in　the　matter　of　their　content；　and　so；　there　being　no　further　（a　priori）　jurisdiction　above　them；　the　division　of　philosophy　into　theoretical　and　practical　is　justified。　　　But　there　is　still　further　in　the　family　of　our　higher　cognitive　faculties　a　middle　term　between　understanding　and　reason。　This　is　judgement；　of　which　we　may　reasonably　presume　by　analogy　that　it　may　likewise　contain；　if　not　a　special　authority　to　prescribe　laws；　still　a　principle　peculiar　to　itself　upon　which　laws　are　sought；　although　one　merely　subjective　a　priori。　This　principle；　even　if　it　has　no　field　of　objects　appropriate　to　it　as　its　realm；　may　still　have　some　territory　or　other　with　a　certain　character；　for　which　just　this　very　principle　alone　may　be　valid。　　　But　in　addition　to　the　above　considerations　there　is　yet　（to　judge　by　analogy）　a　further　ground；　upon　which　judgement　may　be　brought　into　line　with　another　arrangement　of　our　powers　of　representation；　and　one　that　appears　to　be　of　even　greater　importance　than　that　of　its　kinship　with　the　family　of　cognitive　faculties。　For　all　faculties　of　the　soul；　or　capacities；　are　reducible　to　three；　which　do　not　admit　of　any　further　derivation　from　a　common　ground：　the　faculty　of　knowledge；　the　feeling　of　pleasure　or　displeasure；　and　the　faculty　of　desire。*　For　the　faculty　of　cognition　understanding　alone　is　legislative；　if　（as　must　be　the　case　where　it　is　considered　on　its　own　account　free　of　confusion　with　the　faculty　of　desire）　this　faculty；　as　that　of　theoretical　cognition；　is　referred　to　nature；　in　respect　of　which　alone　（as　phenomenon）　it　is　possible　for　us　to　prescribe　laws　by　means　of　a　priori　concepts　of　nature；　which　are　properly　pure　concepts　of　understanding。　For　the　faculty　of　desire；　as　a　higher　faculty　operating　under　the　concept　of　freedom；　only　reason　（in　which　alone　this　concept　has　a　place）　prescribes　laws　a　priori。　Now　between　the　faculties　of　knowledge　and　desire　stands　the　feeling　of　pleasure；　just　as　judgement　is　intermediate　between　understanding　and　reason。　Hence　we　may；　provisionally　at　least；　assume　that　judgement　likewise　contains　an　a　priori　principle　of　its　own；　and　that；　since　pleasure　or　displeasure　is　necessarily　combined　with　the　faculty　of　desire　（be　it　antecedent　to　its　principle；　as　with　the　lower　desires；　or；　as　with　the　higher；　only　supervening　upon　its　determination　by　the　moral　law）；　it　will　effect　a　transition　from　the　faculty　of　pure　knowledge；　i。e。；　from　the　realm　of　concepts　of　nature；　to　that　of　the　concept　of　freedom；　just　as　i　its　logical　employment　it　makes　possible　the　transition　from　understanding　to　reason。

　　*Where　one　has　reason　to　suppose　that　a　relation　subsists　between　concepts　that　are　used　as　empirical　principles　and　the　faculty　of　pure　cognition　a　priori；　it　is　worth　while　attempting；　in　consideration　of　this　connection；　to　give　them　a　transcendental　definition…a　definition；　that　is；　by　pure　categories；　so　far　as　these　by　themselves　adequately　indicate　the　distinction　of　the　concept　in　question　from　others。　This　course　follows　that　of　the　mathematician；　who　leaves　the　empirical　data　of　his　problem　indeterminate；　and　only　brings　their　relation　in　pure　synthesis　under　the　concepts　of　pure　arithmetic；　and　thus　generalizes　his　solution。…I　have　been　taken　to　task　for　adopting　a　similar　procedure　and　fault　had　been　found　with　my　definition　of　the　faculty　of　desire　as　a　faculty　which　by　means　of　its　representations　is　the　cause　of　the　cause　of　the　actuality　of　the　objects　of　those　representations：　for　mere　wishes　would　still　be　desires；　and　yet　in　their　case　every　one　is　ready　to　abandon　all　claim　to　being　able　by　means　of　them　alone　to　call　their　object　into　existence。　…But　this　proves　no　more　than　the　presence　of　desires　in　man　by　which　he　is　in　contradiction　with　himself。　For　in　such　a　case　he　seeks　the　production　of　the　object　by　means　of　his　representation　alone；　without　any　hope　of　its　being　effectual；　since　he　is　conscious　that　his　mechanical　powers　（if　I　may　so　call　those　which　are　not　psychological）；　which　would　have　to　be　determined　by　that　representation；　are　either　unequal　to　the　task　of　realizing　the　object　（by　the　intervention　of　means；　therefore）　or　else　are　addressed　to　what　is　quite　impossible；　as；　for　example；　to　undo　the　past　（O　mihi　praeteritos；　etc。）　or；　to　be　able　to　annihilate　the　interval　that；　with　intolerable　delay；　divides　us　from　the　wished　for　moment。　…Now；　conscious　as　we　are　in　such　fantastic　desires　of　the　inefficiency　of　our　representations　（or　even　of　their　futility）；　as　causes　of　their　objects；　there　is　still　involved　in　every　wish　a　reference　of　the　same　as　cause；　and　therefore　the　representation　of　its　causality；　and　this　is　especially　discernible　where　the　wish；　as　longing；　is　an　affection。　For　such　affections；　since　they　dilate　the　heart　and　render　it　inert　and　thus　exhaust　its　powers；　show　that　a　strain　is　kept　on　being　exerted　and　re…exerted　on　these　powers　by　the　representations；　but　that　the　mind　is　allowed　continually　to　relapse　and　get　languid　upon　recognition　of　the　impossibility　before　it。　Even　prayers　for　the　aversion　of　great；　and；　so　far　as　we　can　see；　inevitable　evils；　and　many　superstitious　means　for　attaining　ends　impossible　of　attainment　by　natural　means；　prove　the　causal　reference　of　representations　to　their　objects…a　causality　which　not　even　the　consciousness　of　inefficiency　for　producing　the　effect　can　deter　from　straining　towards　it。　But　why　our　nature　should　be　furnished　with　a　propensity　to　consciously　vain　desires　is　a　teleological　problem　of　anthropology。　It　would　seem　that　were　we　not　to　be　determined　to　the　exertion　of　our　power　before　we　had　assured　ourselves　of　the　efficiency　of　our　faculty　for　producing　an　object；　our　power　would　remain　to　a　large　extent　unused。　For　as　a　rule　we　only　first　learn　to　know　our　powers　by　making　trial　of　them。　This　deceit　of　vain　desires　is　therefore　only　the　result　of　a　beneficent　disposition　in　our　nature。

　　Hence；　despite　the　fact　of　philosophy　being　only　divisible　into　two　principal　parts；　the　theoretical　and　the　practical；　and　despite　the　fact　of　all　that　we　may　have　to　say　of　the　special　principles　of　judgement　having　to　be　assigned　to　its　theoretical　part；　i。e。；　to　rational　cognition　according　to　concepts　of　nature：　still　the　Critique　of　Pure　Reason；　which　must　settle　this　whole　question　before　the　above　system　is　taken　in　hand；　so　as　to　substantiate　its　possibility；　consists　of　three　parts：　the　Critique　of　pure　understanding；　of　pure　judgement；　and　of　pure　reason；　which　faculties　are　called　pure　on　the　ground　of　their　being　legislative　a　priori。

　　　　　　　　　IV。　Judgement　as　a　Faculty　by　which　Laws　are　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　prescribed　a　priori。

　　Judgement　in　general　is　the　faculty　of　thinking　the　particular　as　contained　under　the　universal。　If　the　universal　（the　rule；　principle；　or　law）　is　given；　then　the　judgement　which　subsumes　the　particular　under　it　is　determinant。　This　is　so　even　where　such　a　judgement　is　transcendental　and；　as　such；　provides　the　conditions　a　priori　in　conformity　with　which　alone　subsumption　under　that　universal　can　be　effected。　If；　however；　only　the　particular　is　given　and　the　universal　has　to　be　found　for　it；　then　the　judgement　is　simply　reflective。　　　The　determinant　judgement　determines　under　universal　transcendental　laws　furnished　by　understanding　and　is　subsumptive　only；　the　law　is　marked　out　for　it　a　priori；　and　it　has　no　need　to　devise　a　law　for　its　own　guidance　to　enable　it　to　subordinate　the　particular　in　nature　to　the　universal。　But　there　are　such　manifold　forms　of　nature；　so　many　modifications；　as　it　were；　of　the　universal　transcendental　concepts　of　nature；　left　undetermined　by　the　laws　furnished　by　pure　understanding　a　priori　as　above　mentioned；　and　for　the　reason　that　these　laws　only　touch　the　general　possibility　of　a　nature　（as　an　object　of　sense）；　that　there　must　needs　also　be　laws　in　this　behalf。　These　laws；　being　empirical；　may　be　contingent　as　far　as　the　light　of　our　understanding　goes；　but　still；　if　they　are　to　be　called　laws　（as　the　concept　of　a　nature　requires）；　they　must　be　regarded　as　necessary　on　a　principle；　unknown　though　it　be　to　us；　of　the　unity　of　the　manifold。　The　reflective　judgement　which　is　compelled　to　ascend　from　the　particular　in　nature　to　the　universal　stands；　therefore；　in　need　of　a　principle。　This　principle　it　cannot　borrow　from　experience；　because　what　it　has　to　do　is　to　establish　just　the　unity　of　all　empirical　principles　under　higher；　though　likewise　empirical；　principles；　and　thence　the　possibility　of　the　systematic　subordination　of　higher　and　lower。　Such　a　transcendental　principle；　therefore；　the　reflective　judgement　can　only　give　as　a　law　from　and　to　itself。　It　cannot　derive　it　from　any　other　quarter　（as　it　would　then　be　a　determinant　judgement）。　Nor　can　it　prescribe　it　to　nature；　for　reflection　on　the　laws　of　nature　adjusts　itself　to　nature；　and　not　nature　to　the　conditions　according　to　which　we　strive　to　obtain　a　concept　of　it…a　concept　that　is　quite　contingent　in　respect　of　these　conditions。　　　Now　the　principle　sought　can　only　be　this：　as　universal　laws　of　nature　have　their　ground　in　our　understanding；　which　prescribes　them　to　nature　（though　only　according　to　the　universal　concept　of　it　as　nature）；　particular　empirical　laws　must　be　regarded；