the critique of judgement-第30章

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s　form　must　appear　just　as　free　from　the　constraint　of　arbitrary　rules　as　if　it　were　a　product　of　mere　nature。　Upon　this　feeling　of　freedom　in　the　play　of　our　cognitive　faculties…which　play　has　at　the　same　time　to　be　final　rests　that　pleasure　which　alone　is　universally　communicable　without　being　based　on　concepts。　Nature　proved　beautiful　when　it　wore　the　appearance　of　art；　and　art　can　only　be　termed　beautiful；　where　we　are　conscious　of　its　being　art；　while　yet　it　has　the　appearance　of　nature。　　　For；　whether　we　are　dealing　with　beauty　of　nature　or　beauty　of　art；　we　may　make　the　universal　statement：　That　is　beautiful　which　pleases　in　the　mere　estimate　of　it　（not　in　sensation　or　by　means　of　a　concept）。　Now　art　has　always　got　a　definite　intention　of　producing　something。　Were　this　〃something；〃　however；　to　be　mere　sensation　（something　merely　subjective）；　intended　to　be　accompanied　with　pleasure；　then　such　product　would；　in　our　estimation　of　it；　only　please　through　the　agency　of　the　feeling　of　the　senses。　On　the　other　hand；　were　the　intention　one　directed　to　the　production　of　a　definite　object；　then；　supposing　this　were　attained　by　art；　the　object　would　only　please　by　means　of　a　concept。　But　in　both　cases　the　art　would　please；　not　in　the　mere　estimate　of　it；　i。e。；　not　as　fine　art；　but　rather　as　mechanical　art。　　　Hence　the　finality　in　the　product　of　fine　art；　intentional　though　it　be；　must　not　have　the　appearance　of　being　intentional；　i。e。；　fine　art　must　be　clothed　with　the　aspect　of　nature；　although　we　recognize　it　to　be　art。　But　the　way　in　which　a　product　of　art　seems　like　nature　is　by　the　presence　of　perfect　exactness　in　the　agreement　with　rules　prescribing　how　alone　the　product　can　be　what　it　is　intended　to　be；　but　with　an　absence　of　laboured　effect　（without　academic　form　betraying　itself）；　i。e。；　without　a　trace　appearing　of　the　artist　having　always　had　the　rule　present　to　him　and　of　its　having　fettered　his　mental　powers。

　　　　　　　　　　　　SS　46。　Fine　art　is　the　art　of　genius。

　　Genius　is　the　talent　（natural　endowment）　which　gives　the　rule　to　art。　Since　talent；　as　an　innate　productive　faculty　of　the　artist；　belongs　itself　to　nature；　we　may　put　it　this　way：　Genius　is　the　innate　mental　aptitude　（ingenium）　through　which　nature　gives　the　rule　to　art。　　　Whatever　may　be　the　merits　of　this　definition；　and　whether　it　is　merely　arbitrary；　or　whether　it　is　adequate　or　not　to　the　concept　usually　associated　with　the　word　genius　（a　point　which　the　following　sections　have　to　clear　up）；　it　may　still　be　shown　at　the　outset　that；　according　to　this　acceptation　of　the　word；　fine　arts　must　necessarily　be　regarded　as　arts　of　genius。　　　For　every　art　presupposes　rules　which　are　laid　down　as　the　foundation　which　first　enables　a　product；　if　it　is　to　be　called　one　of　art；　to　be　represented　as　possible。　The　concept　of　fine　art；　however；　does　not　permit　of　the　judgement　upon　the　beauty　of　its　product　being　derived　from　any　rule　that　has　a　concept　for　its　determining　ground；　and　that　depends；　consequently；　on　a　concept　of　the　way　in　which　the　product　is　possible。　Consequently　fine　art　cannot　of　its　own　self　excogitate　the　rule　according　to　which　it　is　to　effectuate　its　product。　But　since；　for　all　that；　a　product　can　never　be　called　art　unless　there　is　a　preceding　rule；　it　follows　that　nature　in　the　individual　（and　by　virtue　of　the　harmony　of　his　faculties）　must　give　the　rule　to　art；　i。e。；　fine　art　is　only　possible　as　a　product　of　genius。　　　From　this　it　may　be　seen　that　genius　（1）　is　a　talent　for　producing　that　for　which　no　definite　rule　can　be　given；　and　not　an　aptitude　in　the　way　of　cleverness　for　what　can　be　learned　according　to　some　rule；　and　that　consequently　originality　must　be　its　primary　property。　（2）　Since　there　may　also　be　original　nonsense；　its　products　must　at　the　same　time　be　models；　i。e。；　be　exemplary；　and；　consequently；　though　not　themselves　derived　from　imitation；　they　must　serve　that　purpose　for　others；　i。e。；　as　a　standard　or　rule　of　estimating。　（3）　It　cannot　indicate　scientifically　how　it　brings　about　its　product；　but　rather　gives　the　rule　as　nature。　Hence；　where　an　author　owes　a　product　to　his　genius；　he　does　not　himself　know　how　the　ideas　for　it　have　entered　into　his　head；　nor　has　he　it　in　his　power　to　invent　the　like　at　pleasure；　or　methodically；　and　communicate　the　same　to　others　in　such　precepts　as　would　put　them　in　a　position　to　produce　similar　products。　（Hence；　presumably；　our　word　Genie　is　derived　from　genius；　as　the　peculiar　guardian　and　guiding　spirit　given　to　a　man　at　his　birth；　by　the　inspiration　of　which　those　original　ideas　were　obtained。）　（4）　Nature　prescribes　the　rule　through　genius　not　to　science　but　to　art；　and　this　also　only　in　so　far　as　it　is　to　be　fine　art。

　　　　　　　　　SS　47。　Elucidation　and　confirmation　of　the　above　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　explanation　of　genius。

　　Every　one　is　agreed　on　the　point　of　the　complete　opposition　between　genius　and　the　spirit　of　imitation。　Now　since　learning　is　nothing　but　imitation；　the　greatest　ability；　or　aptness　as　a　pupil　（capacity）；　is　still；　as　such；　not　equivalent　to　genius。　Even　though　a　man　weaves　his　own　thoughts　or　fancies；　instead　of　merely　taking　in　what　others　have　thought；　and　even　though　he　go　so　far　as　to　bring　fresh　gains　to　art　and　science；　this　does　not　afford　a　valid　reason　for　calling　such　a　man　of　brains；　and　often　great　brains；　a　genius；　in　contradistinction　to　one　who　goes　by　the　name　of　shallow…pate；　because　he　can　never　do　more　than　merely　learn　and　follow　a　lead。　For　what　is　accomplished　in　this　way　is　something　that　could　have　been　learned。　Hence　it　all　lies　in　the　natural　path　of　investigation　and　reflection　according　to　rules；　and　so　is　not　specifically　distinguishable　from　what　may　be　acquired　as　the　result　of　industry　backed　up　by　imitation。　So　all　that　Newton　bas　set　forth　in　his　immortal　work　on　the　Principles　of　Natural　Philosophy　may　well　be　learned；　however　great　a　mind　it　took　to　find　it　all　out；　but　we　cannot　learn　to　write　in　a　true　poetic　vein；　no　matter　how　complete　all　the　precepts　of　the　poetic　art　may　be；　or　however　excellent　its　models。　The　reason　is　that　all　the　steps　that　Newton　had　to　take　from　the　first　elements　of　geometry　to　his　greatest　and　most　profound　discoveries　were　such　as　he　could　make　intuitively　evident　and　plain　to　follow；　not　only　for　himself　but　for　every　one　else。　On　the　other　hand；　no　Homer　or　Wieland　can　show　how　his　ideas；　so　rich　at　once　in　fancy　and　in　thought；　enter　and　assemble　themselves　in　his　brain；　for　the　good　reason　that　he　does　not　himself　know；　and　so　cannot　teach　others。　In　matters　of　science；　therefore；　the　greatest　inventor　differs　only　in　degree　from　the　most　laborious　imitator　and　apprentice；　whereas　he　differs　specifically　from　one　endowed　by　nature　for　fine　art。　No　disparagement；　however；　of　those　great　men；　to　whom　the　human　race　is　so　deeply　indebted；　is　involved　in　this　comparison　of　them　with　those　who　on　the　score　of　their　talent　for　fine　art　are　the　elect　of　nature。　The　talent　for　science　is　formed　for　the　continued　advances　of　greater　perfection　in　knowledge；　with　all　its　dependent　practical　advantages；　as　also　for　imparting　the　same　to　others。　Hence　scientists　can　boast　a　ground　of　considerable　superiority　over　those　who　merit　the　honour　of　being　called　geniuses；　since　genius　reaches　a　point　at　which　art　must　make　a　halt；　as　there　is　a　limit　imposed　upon　it　which　it　cannot　transcend。　This　limit　has　in　all　probability　been　long　since　attained。　In　addition；　such　skill　cannot　be　communicated；　but　requires　to　be　bestowed　directly　from　the　hand　of　nature　upon　each　individual；　and　so　with　him　it　dies；　awaiting　the　day　when　nature　once　again　endows　another　in　the　same　way…one　who　needs　no　more　than　an　example　to　set　the　talent　of　which　he　is　conscious　at　work　on　similar　lines。　　　Seeing；　then；　that　the　natural　endowment　of　art　（as　fine　art）　must　furnish　the　rule；　what　kind　of　rule　must　this　be？　It　cannot　be　one　set　down　in　a　formula　and　serving　as　a　precept…for　then　the　judgement　upon　the　beautiful　would　be　determinable　according　to　concepts。　Rather　must　the　rule　be　gathered　from　the　performance；　i。e。；　from　the　product；　which　others　may　use　to　put　their　own　talent　to　the　test；　so　as　to　let　it　serve　as　a　model；　not　for　imitation；　but　for　following。　The　possibility　of　this　is　difficult　to　explain。　The　artist's　ideas　arouse　like　ideas　on　the　part　of　his　pupil；　presuming　nature　to　have　visited　him　with　a　like　proportion　of　the　mental　Powers。　For　this　reason；　the　models　of　fine　art　are　the　only　means　of　handing　down　this　art　to　posterity。　This　is　something　which　cannot　be　done　by　mere　descriptions　（especially　not　in　the　line　of　the　arts　of　speech）；　and　in　these　arts；　furthermore；　only　those　models　can　become　classical　of　which　the　ancient；　dead　languages；　preserved　as　learned；　are　the　medium。　　　Despite　the　marked　difference　that　distinguishes　mechanical　art；　as　an　art　merely　depending　upon　industry　and　learning；　from　fine　art；　as　that　of　genius；　there　is　still　no　fine　art　in　which　something　mechanical；　capable　of　being　at　once　comprehended　and　followed　in　obedience　to　rules；　and　consequently　something　academic；　does　not　constitute　the　essential　condition　of　the　art。　For　the　thought　of　something　as　end　must　be　present；　or　else　its　product　would　not　be　ascribed　to　an　art　at　all；　but　would　be　a　mere　product　of　chance。　But　the　effectuation　of　an　end　necessitates　determinate　rules　which　we　cannot　venture　to　dispense　with。　Now；　seeing　that　originality　of　talent　is　one　（though　not　the　sole）　essential　factor　that　goes　to　make　up　the　character　of　genius；　shallow　minds　fancy　that　the　best　evidence　they　can　give　of　their　being　full…blown　geniuses　is　by　emancipating　themselves　from　all　academic　constraint　of　rules；　in　the　belief　that　one　cuts　a　finer　figure　on　the　back　of　an　ill…tempered　than　of　a　trained　horse。　Genius　can　do　no　more　than　furnish　rich　material　for　products　of　fine　art；　its　elaboration　and　its　form　require　a　talent　academically　trained；　so　that　it　may　be　employed　in　such　a　way　as　to　stand　the　test　of　judgement。　But；　for　a　person　to　hold　forth　and　pass　sentence　like　a　genius　in　matters　that　fall　to　the　province　of　the　most　patient　rational　investigation；　is　ridiculous　in　the　extreme。1　One　is　at　a　loss　to　know　whether　to　laugh　more　at　the　impostor　who　envelops　himself　in　such　a　cloud…in　which　we　are　given　fuller　scope　to　our　imagination　at　the　expense　of　all　use　of　our　critical　faculty…or　at　the　simple…minded　public　which　imagines　that　its　inability　clearly　to　cognize　and　comprehend　this　masterpiece　of　penetration　is　due　to　its　being　invaded　by　new　truths　en　masse；　in　comparison　with　which；　detail；　due　to　carefully　weighed　exposition　and　an　academic　examination　of　root　principles；　seems　to　it　only　the　work　of　a　tyro。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　SS　48。　The　relation　of　genius　to　taste。

　　For　estimating　beautiful　objects；　as　such；　what　is　required　is　taste；　but　for　fine　art；　i。e。；　the　production　of　such　objects；　one　needs　genius。　　　If　we　consider　genius　as　the　talent　for　fine　art　（which　the　proper　signification　of　the　word　imports）；　and　if　we　would　analyse　it　from　this　point　of　view　into　the　faculties　which　must　concur　to　constitute　such　a　talent；　it　is　imperative　at　the　outset　accurately　to　determine　the　difference　between　beauty　of　nature；