the critique of judgement-第31章

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ent；　it　is　imperative　at　the　outset　accurately　to　determine　the　difference　between　beauty　of　nature；　which　it　only　requires　taste　to　estimate；　and　beauty　of　art；　which　requires　genius　for　its　possibility　（a　possibility　to　which　regard　must　also　be　paid　in　estimating　such　an　object）。　　　A　beauty　of　nature　is　a　beautiful　thing；　beauty　of　art　is　a　beautiful　representation　of　a　thing。　　　To　enable　me　to　estimate　a　beauty　of　nature；　as　such；　I　do　not　need　to　be　previously　possessed　of　a　concept　of　what　sort　of　a　thing　the　object　is　intended　to　be；　i。e。；　I　am　not　obliged　to　know　its　material　finality　（the　end）；　but；　rather；　in　forming　an　estimate　of　it　apart　from　any　knowledge　of　the　end；　the　mere　form　pleases　on　its　own　account。　If；　however；　the　object　is　presented　as　a　product　of　art；　and　is　as　such　to　be　declared　beautiful；　then；　seeing　that　art　always　presupposes　an　end　in　the　cause　（and　its　causality）；　a　concept　of　what　the　thing　is　intended　to　be　must　first　of　all　be　laid　at　its　basis。　And；　since　the　agreement　of　the　manifold　in　a　thing　with　an　inner　character　belonging　to　it　as　its　end　constitutes　the　perfection　of　the　thing；　it　follows　that　in　estimating　beauty　of　art　the　perfection　of　the　thing　must　be　also　taken　into　account…a　matter　which　in　estimating　a　beauty　of　nature；　as　beautiful；　is　quite　irrevelant。　It　is　true　that　in　forming　an　estimate；　especially　of　animate　objects　of　nature；　e。g。；　of　a　man　or　a　horse；　objective　finality　is　also　commonly　taken　into　account　with　a　view　to　judgement　upon　their　beauty；　but　then　the　judgement　also　ceases　to　be　purely　aesthetic；　i。e。；　a　mere　judgement　of　taste。　Nature　is　no　longer　estimated　as　it　appears　like　art；　but　rather　in　so　far　as　it　actually　is　art；　though　superhuman　art；　and　the　teleological　judgement　serves　as　a　basis　and　condition　of　the　aesthetic；　and　one　which　the　latter　must　regard。　In　such　a　case；　where　one　says；　for　example；　〃That　is　a　beautiful　woman；〃　what　one　in　fact　thinks　is　only　this；　that　in　her　form　nature　excellently　portrays　the　ends　present　in　the　female　figure。　For　one　has　to　extend　one's　view　beyond　the　mere　form　to　a　concept；　to　enable　the　object　to　be　thought　in　such　manner　by　means　of　an　aesthetic　judgement　logically　conditioned。　　　Where　fine　art　evidences　its　superiority　is　in　the　beautiful　descriptions　it　gives　of　things　that　in　nature　would　be　ugly　or　displeasing。　The　Furies；　diseases；　devastations　of　war；　and　the　like；　can　（as　evils）　be　very　beautifully　described；　nay　even　represented　in　pictures。　One　kind　of　ugliness　alone　is　incapable　of　being　represented　conformably　to　nature　without　destroying　all　aesthetic　delight；　and　consequently　artistic　beauty；　namely；　that　which　excites　disgust。　For；　as　in　this　strange　sensation；　which　depends　purely　on　the　imagination；　the　object　is　represented　as　insisting；　as　it　were；　upon　our　enjoying　it；　while　we　still　set　our　face　against　it；　the　artificial　representation　of　the　object　is　no　longer　distinguishable　from　the　nature　of　the　object　itself　in　our　sensation；　and　so　it　cannot　possibly　be　regarded　as　beautiful。　The　art　of　sculpture；　again；　since　in　its　products　art　is　almost　confused　with　nature；　has　excluded　from　its　creations　the　direct　representation　of　ugly　objects；　and；　instead；　only　sanctions；　for　example；　the　representation　of　death　（in　a　beautiful　genius）；　or　of　the　warlike　spirit　（in　Mars）；　by　means　of　an　allegory；　or　attributes　which　wear　a　pleasant　guise；　and　so　only　indirectly；　through　an　interpretation　on　the　part　of　reason；　and　not　for　the　pure　aesthetic　judgement。　　　So　much　for　the　beautiful　representation　of　an　object；　which　is　properly　only　the　form　of　the　presentation　of　a　concept　and　the　means　by　which　the　latter　is　universally　communicated。　To　give　this　form；　however；　to　the　product　of　fine　art；　taste　merely　is　required。　By　this　the　artist；　having　practised　and　corrected　his　taste　by　a　variety　of　examples　from　nature　or　art；　controls　his　work　and；　after　many；　and　often　laborious；　attempts　to　satisfy　taste；　finds　the　form　which　commends　itself　to　him。　Hence　this　form　is　not；　as　it　were；　a　matter　of　inspiration；　or　of　a　free　swing　of　the　mental　powers；　but　rather　of　a　slow　and　even　painful　process　of　improvement；　directed　to　making　the　form　adequate　to　his　thought　without　prejudice　to　the　freedom　in　the　play　of　those　powers。　　　Taste　is；　however；　merely　a　critical；　not　a　productive　faculty；　and　what　conforms　to　it　is　not；　merely　on　that　account；　a　work　of　fine　art。　It　may　belong　to　useful　and　mechanical　art；　or　even　to　science；　as　a　product　following　definite　rules　which　are　capable　of　being　learned　and　which　must　be　closely　followed。　But　the　pleasing　form　imparted　to　the　work　is　only　the　vehicle　of　communication　and　a　mode；　as　it　were；　of　execution；　in　respect　of　which　one　remains　to　a　certain　extent　free；　notwithstanding　being　otherwise　tied　down　to　a　definite　end。　So　we　demand　that　table　appointments；　or　even　a　moral　dissertation；　and；　indeed；　a　sermon；　must　bear　this　form　of　fine　art；　yet　without　its　appearing　studied。　But　one　would　not　call　them　on　this　account　works　of　fine　art。　A　poem；　a　musical　composition；　a　picture…gallery；　and　so　forth；　would；　however；　be　placed　under　this　head；　and　so　in　a　would…be　work　of　fine　art　we　may　frequently　recognize　genius　without　taste；　and　in　another　taste　without　genius。

　　　　SS　49。　The　faculties　of　the　mind　which　constitute　genius。

　　Of　certain　products　which　are　expected；　partly　at　least；　to　stand　on　the　footing　of　fine　art；　we　say　they　are　soulless；　and　this；　although　we　find　nothing　to　censure　in　them　as　far　as　taste　goes。　A　poem　may　be　very　pretty　and　elegant；　but　is　soulless。　A　narrative　has　precision　and　method；　but　is　soulless。　A　speech　on　some　festive　occasion　may　be　good　in　substance　and　ornate　withal；　but　may　be　soulless。　Conversation　frequently　is　not　devoid　of　entertainment；　but　yet　soulless。　Even　of　a　woman　we　may　well　say；　she　is　pretty；　affable；　and　refined；　but　soulless。　Now　what　do　we　here　mean　by　〃soul〃？　　　Soul　（Geist）　in　an　aesthetical　sense；　signifies　the　animating　principle　in　the　mind。　But　that　whereby　this　principle　animates　the　psychic　substance　（Seele）…the　material　which　it　employs　for　that　purpose…is　that　which　sets　the　mental　powers　into　a　swing　that　is　final；　i。e。；　into　a　play　which　is　self…maintaining　and　which　strengthens　those　powers　for　such　activity。　　　Now　my　proposition　is　that　this　principle　is　nothing　else　than　the　faculty　of　presenting　aesthetic　ideas。　But；　by　an　aesthetic　idea　I　mean　that　representation　of　the　imagination　which　induces　much　thought；　yet　without　the　possibility　of　any　definite　thought　whatever；　i。e。；　concept；　being　adequate　to　it；　and　which　language；　consequently；　can　never　get　quite　on　level　terms　with　or　render　completely　intelligible。　It　is　easily　seen；　that　an　aesthetic　idea　is　the　counterpart　（pendant）　of　a　rational　idea；　which；　conversely；　is　a　concept；　to　which　no　intuition　（representation　of　the　imagination）　can　be　adequate。　　　The　imagination　（as　a　productive　faculty　of　cognition）　is　a　powerful　agent　for　creating；　as　it　were；　a　second　nature　out　of　the　material　supplied　to　it　by　actual　nature。　It　affords　us　entertainment　where　experience　proves　too　commonplace；　and　we　even　use　it　to　remodel　experience；　always　following；　no　doubt；　laws　that　are　based　on　analogy；　but　still　also　following　principles　which　have　a　higher　seat　in　reason　（and　which　are　every　whit　as　natural　to　us　as　those　followed　by　the　understanding　in　laying　hold　of　empirical　nature）。　By　this　means　we　get　a　sense　of　our　freedom　from　the　law　of　association'　（which　attaches　to　the　empirical　employment　of　the　imagination）；　with　the　result　that　the　material　can　be　borrowed　by　us　from　nature　in　accordance　with　that　law；　but　be　worked　up　by　us　into　something　else…namely；　what　surpasses　nature。　　　Such　representations　of　the　imagination　may　be　termed　ideas。　This　is　partly　because　they　at　least　strain　after　something　lying　out　beyond　the　confines　of　experience；　and　so　seek　to　approximate　to　a　presentation　of　rational　concepts　（i。e。；　intellectual　ideas）；　thus　giving　to　these　concepts　the　semblance　of　an　objective　reality。　But；　on　the　other　hand；　there　is　this　most　important　reason；　that　no　concept　can　be　wholly　adequate　to　them　as　internal　intuitions。　The　poet　essays　the　task　of　interpreting　to　sense　the　rational　ideas　of　invisible　beings；　the　kingdom　of　the　blessed；　hell；　eternity；　creation；　etc。　Or；　again；　as　to　things　of　which　examples　occur　in　experience；　e。g。；　death；　envy；　and　all　vices；　as　also　love；　fame；　and　the　like；　transgressing　the　limits　of　experience　he　attempts　with　the　aid　of　an　imagination　which　emulates　the　display　of　reason　in　its　attainment　of　a　maximum；　to　body　them　forth　to　sense　with　a　completeness。　of　which：　nature　affords　no　parallel；　and　it　is　in'　fact　precisely　in　the　poetic　art　that　the　faculty　of　aesthetic　ideas　can　show　itself　to　full　advantage。　This　faculty；　however；　regarded　solely　on　its　own　account；　is　properly　no　more　than　a　talent'　（of　the　imagination）。　　　If；　now；　we　attach　to　a　concept　a　representation　of　the　imagination　belonging　to　its　presentation；　but　inducing　solely　on　its　own　account　such　a　wealth　of　thought　as　would　never　admit　of　comprehension　in　a　definite　concept；　and；　as　a　consequence；　giving　aesthetically　an　unbounded　expansion　to　the　concept　itself；　then　the　imagination　here　displays　a　creative　activity；　and　it　puts　the　faculty　of　intellectual　ideas　（reason）　into　motion…a　motion；　at　the　instance　of　a　representation；　towards　an　extension　of　thought；　that；　while　germane；　no　doubt；　to　the　concept　of　the　object；　exceeds　what　can　be　laid　hold　of　in　that　representation　or　clearly　expressed。　　　Those　forms　which　do　not　constitute　the　presentation　of　a　given　concept　itself；　but　which；。　as　secondary　representations　of　the　imagination；　express　the　derivatives　connected　with　it；　and　its　kinship　with　other　concepts；　are　called　（aesthetic）　attributes　of　an　object；　the　concept　of　Which；　as　an　idea　of　reason；　cannot　be　adequately　presented。　In　this　way　Jupiter's　eagle；　with　the　lightning　in　its　claws；　is　an　attribute　of　the　mighty　king　of　heaven；　and　the　peacock　of　its　stately　queen。　They　do　not；　like　logical　（aesthetic）　attributes　of　an　object；　the　concept　of　the　sublimity　and　majesty　of　creation；　but　rather　something　else…something　that　gives　the　imagination　an　incentive　to　spread　its　flight　over　a　whole　host　of　kindred　representations　that　provoke　more　thought　than　admits　of　expression　in　a　concept　determined　by　words。　They　furnish　an　aesthetic　idea；　which　serves　the　above　rational　idea　as　a　substitute　for　logical　presentation；　but　with　the　proper　function；　however；　of　animating　the　mind　by　opening　out　for　it　a　prospect　into　a　field　of　kindred　representations　stretching　beyond　its　ken。　But　it　is　not　alone　in　the　arts　of　painting　or　sculpture；　where　the　name　of　attribute　is　customarily　employed；　that　fine　art　acts　in　this　way；　poetry　and　rhetoric　also　drive　the　soul　that　animates　their　work　wholly　from　the　aesthetic　attributes　of　the　objects…attributes　which　go　hand　in　hand　with　the　logical；　and　give　the　imagination　an　impetus　to　bring　more　thought　into：　play　in　the　matter；　though　in　an　undeveloped　manner；　than　allows　of　being　brought　within　the　embrace　of　a　concept；　or；　therefore；　of　being　definitely　formulated　in　l