the critique of judgement-第38章

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self　qualitatively　answers　in　experience　to　the　rational　concept　of　the　former；　while　in　the　case　of　virtue　no　empirical　product　of　the　above　causality　attains　the　degree　that　the　rational　idea　prescribes　as　the　rule。　　　Just　as　the　imagination；　in　the　case　of　a　rational　idea；　fails　with　its　intuitions　to　attain　to　the　given　concept；　so　understanding；　in　the　case　of　an　aesthetic　idea；　fails　with　its　concepts　ever　to　attain　to　the　completeness　of　the　internal　intuition　which　imagination　conjoins　with　a　given　representation。　Now　since　the　reduction　of　a　representation　of　the　imagination　to　concepts　is　equivalent　to　giving　its　exponents；　the　aesthetic　idea　may　be　called　on　inexponible　representation　of　the　imagination　（in　its　free　play）。　I　shall　have　an　opportunity　hereafter　of　dealing　more　fully　with　ideas　of　this　kind。　At　present　I　confine　myself　to　the　remark；　that　both　kinds　of　ideas；　aesthetic　ideas　as　well　as　rational；　are　bound　to　have　their　principles；　and　that　the　seat　of　these　principles　must　in　both　cases　be　reason…the　latter　depending　upon　the　objective；　the　former　upon　the　subjective；　principles　of　its　employment。　　　Consonantly　with　this；　GENIUS　may　also　be　defined　as　the　faculty　of　aesthetic　ideas。　This　serves　at　the　same　time　to　point　out　the　reason　why　it　is　nature　（the　nature　of　the　individual）　and　not　a　set　purpose；　that　in　products　of　genius　gives　the　rule　to　art　（as　the　production　of　the　beautiful）。　For　the　beautiful　must　not　be　estimated　according　to　concepts；　but　by　the　final　mode　in　which　the　imagination　is　attuned　so　as　to　accord　with　the　faculty　of　concepts　generally；　and　so　rule　and　precept　are　incapable　of　serving　as　the　requisite　subjective　standard　for　that　aesthetic　and　unconditioned　finality　in　fine　art　which　has　to　make　a　warranted　claim　to　being　bound　to　please　every　one。　Rather　must　such　a　standard　be　sought　in　the　element　of　mere　nature　in　the　subject；　which　cannot　be　comprehended　under　rules　or　concepts；　that　is　to　say；　the　supersensible　substrate　of　all　the　subject's　faculties　（unattainable　by　any　concept　of　understanding）；　and　consequently　in　that　which　forms　the　point　of　reference　for　the　harmonious　accord　of　all　our　faculties　of　cognition…the　production　of　which　accord　is　the　ultimate　end　set　by　the　intelligible　basis　of　our　nature。　Thus　alone　is　it　possible　for　a　subjective　and　yet　universally　valid　principle　a　priori　to　lie　at　the　basis　of　that　finality　for　which　no　objective　principle　can　be　prescribed。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　REMARK　2。

　　The　following　important　observation　here　naturally　presents　itself：　There　are　three　kinds　of　antinomies　of　pure　reason；　which；　however；　all　agree　in　forcing　reason　to　abandon　the　otherwise　very　natural　assumption　which　takes　the　objects　of　sense　for　things…in…themselves；　and　to　regard　them；　instead；　merely　as　phenomena；　and　to　lay　at　their　basis　an　intelligible　substrate　（something　supersensible；　the　concept　of　which　is　only　an　idea　and　affords　no　proper　knowledge）。　Apart　from　some　such　antinomy；　reason　could　never　bring　itself　to　take　such　a　step　as…to　adopt　a　principle　so　severely　restricting　the　field　of　its　speculation；　and　to　submit　to　sacrifices　involving　the　complete　dissipation　of　so　many　otherwise　brilliant　hopes。　For　even　now　that　it　is　recompensed　for　this　loss　by　the　prospect　of　a　proportionately　wider　scope　of　action　from　a　practical　point　of　view；　it　is　not　without　a　pang　of　regret　that　it　appears　to　part　company　with　those　hopes；　and　to　break　away　from　the　old　ties。　　　The　reason　for　there　being　three　kinds　of　antinomies　is　to　be　found　in　the　fact　that　there　are　three　faculties　of　cognition；　understanding；　judgement；　and　reason；　each　of　which；　being　a　higher　faculty　of　cognition；　must　have　its　a　priori　principles。　For；　so　far　as　reason　passes　judgement　upon　these　principles　themselves　and　their　employment；　it　inexorably　requires　the　unconditioned　for　the　given　conditioned　in　respect　of　them　all。　This　can　never　be　found　unless　the　sensible；　instead　of　being　regarded　as　inherently　appurtenant　to　things…in…themselves；　is　treated　as　a　mere　phenomenon；　and；　as　such；　being　made　to　rest　upon　something　supersensible　（the　intelligible　substrate　of　external　and　internal　nature）　as　the　thing…in…itself。　There　is　then　（1）　for　the　cognitive　faculty　an　antinomy　of　reason　in　respect　of　the　theoretical　employment　of　understanding　carried　to　the　point　of　the　unconditioned；　（2）　for　the　feeling　of　pleasure　and　displeasure　an　antinomy　of　reason　in　respect　of　the　aesthetic　employment　of　judgement；　（3）　for　the　faculty　Of　desire　an　antinomy　in　respect　of　the　practical　employment　of　self…legislative　reason。　For　all　these　faculties　have　their　fundamental　a　priori　principles；　and；　following　an　imperative　demand　of　reason；　must　be　able　to　judge　and　to　determine　their　object　unconditionally　in　accordance　with　these　principles。　　　As　to　two　of　the　antinomies　of　these　higher　cognitive　faculties；　those；　namely；　of　their　theoretical　and　of　their　practical　employment；　we　have　already　shown　elsewhere　both　that　they　are　inevitable；　if　no　cognisance　is　taken　in　such　judgements　of　a　supersensible　substrate　of　the　given　objects　as　phenomena；　and；　on　the　other　hand；　that　they　can　be　solved　the　moment　this　is　done。　Now；　as　to　the　antinomy　incident　to　the　employment　of　judgement　in　conformity　with　the　demand　of　reason；　and　the　solution　of　it　here　given；　we　may　say　that　to　avoid　facing　it　there　are　but　the　following　alternatives。　It　is　open　to　us　to　deny　that　any　a　priori　principle　lies　at　the　basis　of　the　aesthetic　judgement　of　taste；　with　the　result　that　all　claim　to　the　necessity　of　a　universal　consensus　of　opinion　is　an　idle　and　empty　delusion；　and　that　a　judgement　of　taste　only　deserves　to　be　considered　to　this　extent　correct；　that　it　so　happens　that　a　number　share　the　same　opinion；　and　even　this；　not；　in　truth；　because　an　a　priori　principle　is　presumed　to　lie　at　the　back　of　this　agreement；　but　rather　（as　with　the　taste　of　the　palate）　because　of　the　contingently　resembling　organization　of　the　individuals。　Or　else；　in　the　alternative；　we　should　have　to　suppose　that　the　judgement　of　taste　is　in　fact　a　disguised　judgement　of　reason　on　the　perfection　discovered　in　a　thing　and　the　reference　of　the　manifold　in　it　to　an　end；　and　that　it　is　consequently　only　called　aesthetic　on　account　of　the　confusion　that　here　besets　our　reflection；　although　fundamentally　it　is　teleological。　In　this　latter　case　the　solution　of　the　antinomy　with　the　assistance　of　transcendental　ideas　might　be　declared　otiose　and　nugatory；　and　the　above　laws　of　taste　thus　reconciled　with　the　objects　of　sense；　not　as　mere　phenomena；　but　even　as　things…in…themselves。　How　unsatisfactory　both　of　those　alternatives　alike　are　as　a　means　of　escape　has　been　shown　in　several　places　in　our　exposition　of　judgements　of　taste。　　　If；　however；　our　deduction　is　at　least　credited　with　having　been　worked　out　on　correct　lines；　even　though　it　may　not　have　been　sufficiently　clear　in　all　its　details；　three　ideas　then　stand　out　in　evidence。　Firstly；　there　is　the　supersensible　in　general；　without　further　determination；　as　substrate　of　nature；　secondly；　this　same　supersensible　as　principle　of　the　subjective　finality　of　nature　for　our　cognitive　faculties；　thirdly；　the　same　supersensible　again；　as　principle　of　the　ends　of　freedom；　and　principle　of　the　common　accord　of　these　ends　with　freedom　in　the　moral　sphere。

　　　　　　SS　58。　The　idealism　of　the　finality　alike　of　nature　　　　　　　　　　and　of　art；　as　the　unique　principle　of　the　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　aesthetic　judgement。

　　The　principle　of　taste　may；　to　begin　with；　be　placed　on　either　of　two　footings。　For　taste　may　be　said　invariably　to　judge　on　empirical　grounds　of　determination　and　such；　therefore；　as　are　only　given　a　posteriori　through　sense；　or　else　it　may　be　allowed　to　judge　on　an　a　priori　ground。　The　former　would　be　the　empiricism　of　the　critique　of　taste；　the　latter　its　rationalism。　The　first　would　obliterate　the　distinction　that　marks　off　the　object　of　our　delight　from　the　agreeable；　the　second；　supposing　the　judgement　rested　upon　determinate　concepts；　would　obliterate　its　distinction　from　the　good。　In　this　way　beauty　would　have　its　locus　standi　in　the　world　completely　denied；　and　nothing　but　the　dignity　of　a　separate　name；　betokening；　maybe；　a　certain　blend　of　both　the　above…named　kinds　of　delight；　would　be　left　in　its　stead。　But　we　have　shown　the　existence　of　grounds　of　delight　which　are　a　priori；　and　which　therefore；　can　consist　with　the　principle　of　rationalism；　and　which　are　yet　incapable　of　being　grasped　by　definite　concepts。　　　As　against　the　above；　we　may　say　that　the　rationalism　of　the　principle　of　taste　may　take　the　form　either　of　the　realism　of　finality　or　of　its　idealism。　Now；　as　a　judgement　of　taste　is　not　a　cognitive　judgement；　and　as　beauty　is　not　a　property　of　the　object　considered　in　its　own　account；　the　rationalism　of　the　principle　of　taste　can　never　be　placed　in　the　fact　that　the　finality　in　this　judgement　is　regarded　in　thought　as　objective。　In　other　words；　the　judgement　is　not　directed　theoretically；　nor；　therefore；　logically；　either　（no　matter　if　only　in　a　confused　estimate）；　to　the　perfection　of　the　object；　but　only　aesthetically　to　the　harmonizing　of　its　representation　in　the　imagination　with　the　essential　principles　of　judgement　generally　in　the　subject。　For　this　reason　the　judgement　of　taste；　and　the　distinction　between　its　realism　and　its　idealism；　can　only；　even　on　the　principle　of　rationalism；　depend　upon　its　subjective　finality　interpreted　in　one　or　other　of　two　ways。　Either　such　subjective　finality　is；　in　the　first　case；　a　harmony　with　our　judgement　pursued　as　an　actual　（intentional）　end　of　nature　（or　of　art）；　or　else；　in　the　second　case；　it　is　only　a　supervening　final　harmony　with　the　needs　of　our　faculty　of　judgement　in　its　relation　to　nature　and　the　forms　which　nature　produces　in　accordance　with　particular　laws；　and　one　that　is　independent　of　an　end；　spontaneous　and　contingent。　　　The　beautiful　forms　displayed　in　the　organic　world　all　plead　eloquently　on　the　side　of　the　realism　of　the　aesthetic　finality　of　nature　in　support　of　the　plausible　assumption　that　beneath　the　production　of　the　beautiful　there　must　lie　a　preconceived　idea　in　the　producing　cause…that　is　to　say　an　end　acting　in　the　interest　of　our　imagination。　Flowers；　blossoms；　even　the　shapes　of　plants　as　a　whole；　the　elegance　of　animal　formations　of　all　kinds；　unnecessary　for　the　discharge　of　any　function　on　their　part；　but　chosen　as　it　were　with　an　eye　to　our　taste；　and；　beyond　all　else；　the　variety　and　harmony　in　the　array　of　colours　（in　the　pheasant；　in　crustacea；　in　insects；　down　even　to　the　meanest　flowers）；　so　pleasing　and　charming　to　the　eyes；　but　which；　inasmuch　as　they　touch　the　bare　surf　ace；　and　do　not　even　here　in　any　way　all　act　the　structure；　of　these　creatures…a　matter　which　might　have　a　necessary　bearing　on　their　internal　ends…seem　to　be　planned　entirely　with　a　view　to　outward　appearance：　all　these　lend　great　weight　to　the　mode　of　explanation　which　assumes　actual　ends　of　nature　in　favour　of　our　aesthetic　judgement。　　　On　the　other　hand；　not　alone　does　reason；　with　its　maxims　enjoining　upon　us　in　all　cases　to　avoid；　as　far　as　possible；　any　unnecessary　multiplication　of　principles；　set　itself　against　this　a