the critique of judgement-第39章

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o　avoid；　as　far　as　possible；　any　unnecessary　multiplication　of　principles；　set　itself　against　this　assumption；　but　we　have　nature　in　its　free　formations　displaying　on　all　sides　extensive　mechanical　proclivity　to　producing　forms　seemingly　made；　as　it　were；　for　the　aesthetic　employment　of　our　judgement；　without　affording　the　least　support　to　the　supposition　of　a　need　for　anything　over　and　above　its　mechanism；　as　mere　nature；　to　enable　them　to　be　final　for　our　judgement　apart　from　their　being　grounded　upon　any　idea。　The　above　expression；　〃free　formations〃　of　nature；　is；　however；　here　used　to　denote　such　as　are　originally　set　up　in　a　fluid　at　rest　where　the　volatilization　or　separation　of　some　constituent　（sometimes　merely　of　caloric）　leaves　the　residue　on　solidification　to　assume　a　definite　shape　or　structure　（figure　or　texture）　which　differs　with　specific　differences　of　the　matter；　but　for　the　same　matter　is　invariable。　Here；　however；　it　is　taken　for　granted　that；　as　the　true　meaning　of　a　fluid　requires；　the　matter　in　the　fluid　is　completely　dissolved　and　not　a　mere　admixture　of　solid　particles　simply　held　there　in　suspension。　　　The　formation；　then；　takes　place　by　a　concursion；　i。e。；　by　a　sudden　solidification…　not　by　a　gradual　transition　from　the　fluid　to　the　solid　state；　but；　as　it　were；　by　a　leap。　This　transition　is　termed　crystallization。　Freezing　water　offers　the　most　familiar　instance　of　a　formation　of　this　kind。　There　the　process　begins　by　straight　threads　of　ice　forming。　These　unite　at　angles　of　60〃；　whilst　others　similarly　attach　themselves　to　them　at　every　point　until　the　whole　has　turned　into　ice。　But　while　this　is　going　on；　the　water　between　the　threads　of　ice　does　not　keep　getting　gradually　more　viscous；　but　remains　as　thoroughly　fluid　as　it　would　be　at　a　much　higher　temperature；　although　it　is　perfectly　ice…cold。　The　matter　that　frees　itself　that　makes　its　sudden　escape　at　the　moment　of　solidification…is　a　considerable　quantum　of　caloric。　As　this　was　merely　required　to　preserve　fluidity；　its　disappearance　leaves　the　existing　ice　not　a　whit　colder　than　the　water　which　but　a　moment　before　was　there　as　fluid。　　　There　are　many　salts　and　also　stones　of　a　crystalline　figure　which　owe　their　origin　in　like　manner　to　some　earthly　substance　being　dissolved　in　water　under　the　influence　of　agencies　little　understood。　The　drusy　configurations　of　many　minerals；　of　the　cubical　sulphide　of　lead；　of　the　red　silver　ore；　etc。；　are　presumably　also　similarly　formed　in　water；　and　by　the　concursion　of　their　particles；　on　their　being　forced　by　some　cause　or　other　to　relinquish　this　vehicle　and　to　unite　among　themselves　in　definite　external　shapes。　　　But；　further；　all　substances　rendered　fluid　by　heat；　which　have　become　solid　as　the　result　of　cooling；　give；　when　broken；　internal　evidences　of　a　definite　texture；　thus　suggesting　the　inference　that　only　for　the　interference　of　their　own　weight　or　the　disturbance　of　the　air；　the　exterior　would　also　have　exhibited　their　proper　specific　shape。　This　has　been　observed　in　the　case　of　some　metals　where　the　exterior　of　a　molten　mass　has　hardened；　but　the　interior　remained　fluid；　and　then。　owing　to　the　withdrawal　of　the　still　fluid　portion　in　the　interior；　there　has　been　an　undisturbed　concursion　of　the　remaining　parts　on　the　inside。　A　number　of　such　mineral　crystallizations；　such　as　spars；　hematite；　aragonite；　frequently　present　extremely　beautiful　shapes　such　as　it　might　take　art　all　its　time　to　devise；　and　the　halo　in　the　grotto　of　Antiparos　is　merely　the　work　of　water　percolating　through　strata　of　gypsum。　　　The　fluid　state　is；　to　all　appearance；　on　the　whole　older　than　the　solid；　and　plants　as　well　as　animal　bodies　are　built　up　out　of　fluid　nutritive　substance；　so　far　as　this　takes　form　undisturbed…in　the　case　of　the　latter；　admittedly；　in　obedience；　primarily；　to　a　certain　original　bent　of　nature　directed　to　ends　（which；　as　will　be　shown　in　Part　II；　must　not　be　judged　aesthetically；　but　teleologically　by　the　principle　of　realism）；　but　still　all　the　while；　perhaps；　also　following　the　universal　law　of　the　affinity　of　substances　in　the　way　they　shoot　together　and　form　in　freedom。　In　the　same　way；　again；　where　an　atmosphere；　which　is　a　composite　of　different　kinds　of　gas；　is　charged　with　watery　fluids；　and　these　separate　from　it　owing　to　a　reduction　of　the　temperature；　they　produce　snow…figures　of　shapes　differing　with　the　actual　composition　of　the　atmosphere。　These　are　frequently　of　very　artistic　appearance　and　of　extreme　beauty。　So　without　at　all　derogating　from　the　teleological　principle　by　which　an　organization　is　judged；　it　is　readily　conceivable　how　with　beauty　of　flowers；　of　the　plumage　of　birds；　of　crustacea；　both　as　to　their　shape　and　their　colour；　we　have　only　what　may　be　ascribed　to　nature　and　its　capacity　for　originating　in　free　activity　aesthetically　final　forms；　independently　of　any　particular　guiding　ends；　according　to　chemical　laws；　by　means　of　the　chemical　integration　of　the　substance　requisite　for　the　organization。　　　But　what　shows　plainly　that　the　principle　of　the　ideality　of　the　finality　in　the　beauty　of　nature　is　the　one　upon　which　we　ourselves　invariably　take　our　stand　in　our　aesthetic　judgements；　forbidding　us　to　have　recourse　to　any　realism　of　a　natural　end　in　favour　of　our　faculty　of　representation　as　a　principle　of　explanation；　is　that　in　our　general　estimate　of　beauty　we　seek　its　standard　a　priori　in　ourselves；　and；　that　the　aesthetic　faculty　is　itself　legislative　in　respect　of　the　judgement　whether　anything　is　beautiful　or　not。　This　could　not　be　so　on　the　assumption　of　a　realism　of　the　finality　of　nature；　because　in　that　case　we　should　have　to　go　to　nature　for　instruction　as　to　what　we　should　deem　beautiful；　and　the　judgement　of　taste　would　be　subject　to　empirical　principles。　For　in　such　an　estimate　the　question　does　not　turn　on　what　nature　is；　or　even　on　what　it　is　for　us　in　the　way　of　an　end；　but　on　how　we　receive　it。　For　nature　to　have　fashioned　its　forms　for　our　delight　would　inevitably　imply　an　objective　finality　on　the　part　of　nature；　instead　of　a　subjective　finality　resting　on　the　play　of　imagination　in　its　freedom；　where　it　is　we　who　receive　nature　with　favour；　and　not　nature　that　does　us　a　favour。　That　nature　affords　us　an　opportunity　for　perceiving　the　inner　finality　in　the　relation　of　our　mental　powers　engaged　in　the　estimate　of　certain　of　its　products；　and；　indeed；　such　a　finality　as　arising　from　a　supersensible　basis　is　to　be　pronounced　necessary　and　of　universal　validity；　is　a　property　of　nature　which　cannot　belong　to　it　as　its　end；　or　rather；　cannot　be　estimated　by　us　to　be　such　an　end。　For　otherwise　the　judgement　that　would　be　determined　by　reference　to　such　an　end　would　found　upon　heteronomy；　instead　of　founding　upon　autonomy　and　being　free；　as　befits　a　judgement　of　taste。　　　The　principle　of　the　idealism　of　finality　is　still　more　clearly　apparent　in　fine　art。　For　the　point　that　sensations　do　not　enable　us　to　adopt　an　aesthetic　realism　of　finality　（which　would　make　art　merely　agreeable　instead　of　beautiful）　is　one　which　it　enjoys　in　common　with　beautiful　nature。　But　the　further　point　that　the　delight　arising　from　aesthetic　ideas　must　not　be　made　dependent　upon　the　successful　attainment　of　determinate　ends　（as　an　art　mechanically　directed　to　results）；　and　that；　consequently；　even　in　the　case　of　the　rationalism　of　the　principle；　an　ideality　of　the　ends　and　not　their　reality　is　fundamental；　is　brought　home　to　us　by　the　fact　that　fine　art；　as　such；　must　not　be　regarded　as　a　product　of　understanding　and　science；　but　of　genius；　and　must；　therefore；　derive　its　rule　from　aesthetic　ideas；　which　are　essentially　different　from　rational　ideas　of　determinate　ends。　　　Just　as　the　ideality　of　objects　of　sense　as　phenomena　is　the　only　way　of　explaining　the　possibility　of　their　forms　admitting　of　a　priori　determination；　so；　also；　the　idealism　of　the　finality　in　estimating　the　beautiful　in　nature　and　in　art　is　the　only　hypothesis　upon　which　a　critique　can　explain　the　possibility　of　a　judgement　of　taste　that　demands　a　priori　validity　for　every　one　（yet　without　basing　the　finality　represented　in　the　object　upon　concepts）。

　　　　　　　　　　　SS　59。　Beauty　as　the　symbol　of　morality。

　Intuitions　are　always　required　to　verify　the　reality　of　our　concepts。　If　the　concepts　are　empirical；　the　intuitions　are　called　examples：　if　they　are　pure　concepts　of　the　understanding；　the　intuitions　go　by　the　name　of　schemata。　But　to　call　for　a　verification　of　the　objective　reality　of　rational　concepts；　i。e。；　of　ideas；　and；　what　is　more；　on　behalf　of　the　theoretical　cognition　of　such　a　reality；　is　to　demand　an　impossibility；　because　absolutely　no　intuition　adequate　to　them　can　be　given。　　　All　hypotyposis　（presentation；　subjectio　sub　adspectum）　as　a　rendering　in　terms　of　sense；　is　twofold。　Either　it　is　schematic；　as　where　the　intuition　corresponding　to　a　concept　comprehended　by　the　understanding　is　given　a　priori；　or　else　it　is　symbolic；　as　where　the　concept　is　one　which　only　reason　can　think；　and　to　which　no　sensible　intuition　can　be　adequate。　In　the　latter　case　the　concept　is　supplied　with　an　intuition　such　that　the　procedure　of　judgement　in　dealing　with　it　is　merely　analogous　to　that　which　it　observes　in　schematism。　In　other　words；　what　agrees　with　the　concept　is　merely　the　rule　of　this　procedure；　and　not　the　intuition　itself。　Hence　the　agreement　is　merely　in　the　form　of　reflection；　and　not　in　the　content。　　　Notwithstanding　the　adoption　of　the　word　symbolic　by　modern　logicians　in　a　sense　opposed　to　an　intuitive　mode　of　representation；　it　is　a　wrong　use　of　the　word　and　subversive　of　its　true　meaning；　for　the　symbolic　is　only　a　mode　of　any　intrinsic　connection　with　the　intuition　of　sentation　is；　in　fact；　divisible　into　the　schematic　and　the　symbolic。　Both　are　hypotyposes；　i。e。；　presentations　（exhibitiones）；　not　mere　marks。　Marks　are　merely　designations　of　concepts　by　the　aid　of　accompanying　sensible　signs　devoid　of　any　intrinsic　connection　with　the　intuition　of　the　object。　Their　sole　function　is　to　afford　a　means　of　reinvoking　the　concepts　according　to　the　imagination's　law　of　association…a　purely　subjective　role。　Such　marks　are　either　words　or　visible　（algebraic　or　even　mimetic）　signs；　simply　as　expressions　for　concepts。*

　　*The　intuitive　mode　of　knowledge　must　be　contrasted　with　the　discursive　mode　（not　with　the　symbolic）。　The　former　is　either　schematic；　by　mean　demonstration；　symbolic；　as　a　representation　following　a　mere　analogy。

　　All　intuitions　by　which　a　priori　concepts　are　given　a　foothold　are；　therefore；　either　schemata　or　symbols。　Schemata　contain　direct；　symbols　indirect；　presentations　of　the　concept。　Schemata　effect　this　presentation　demonstratively；　symbols　by　the　aid　of　an　analogy　（for　which　recourse　is　had　even　to　empirical　intuitions）；　in　which　analogy　judgement　performs　a　double　function：　first　in　applying　the　concept　to　the　object　of　a　sensible　intuition；　and　then；　secondly；　in　applying　the　mere　rule　of　its　reflection　upon　that　intuition　to　quite　another　object；　of　which　the　former　is　but　the　symbol。　In　this　way；　a　monarchical　state　is　represented　as　a　living　body　when　it　is　governed　by　constitutional　laws；　but　as　a　mere　machine　（like　a　handmill）　when　it　is　governed　by　an　individual　absolute　will；