the critique of judgement-第4章

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ly　according　to　the　universal　concept　of　it　as　nature）；　particular　empirical　laws　must　be　regarded；　in　respect　of　that　which　is　left　undetermined　in　them　by　these　universal　laws；　according　to　a　unity　such　as　they　would　have　if　an　understanding　（though　it　be　not　ours）　had　supplied　them　for　the　benefit　of　our　cognitive　faculties；　so　as　to　render　possible　a　system　of　experience　according　to　particular　natural　laws。　This　is　not　to　be　taken　as　implying　that　such　an　understanding　must　be　actually　assumed　（for　it　is　only　the　reflective　judgement　which　avails　itself　of　this　idea　as　a　principle　for　the　purpose　of　reflection　and　not　for　determining　anything）；　but　this　faculty　rather　gives　by　this　means　a　law　to　itself　alone　and　not　to　nature。　　　Now　the　concept　of　an　object；　so　far　as　it　contains　at　the　same　time　the　ground　of　the　actuality　of　this　object；　is　called　its　end；　and　the　agreement　of　a　thing　with　that　constitution　of　things　which　is　only　possible　according　to　ends；　is　called　the　finality　of　its　form。　Accordingly　the　principle　of　judgement；　in　respect　of　the　form　of　the　things　of　nature　under　empirical　laws　generally；　is　the　finality　of　nature　in　its　multiplicity。　In　other　words；　by　this　concept　nature　is　represented　as　if　an　understanding　contained　the　ground　of　the　unity　of　the　manifold　of　its　empirical　laws。　　　The　finality　of　nature　is；　therefore；　a　particular　a　priori　concept；　which　bas　its　origin　solely　in　the　reflective　judgement。　For　we　cannot　ascribe　to　the　products　of　nature　anything　like　a　reference　of　nature　in　them　to　ends；　but　we　can　only　make　use　of　this　concept　to　reflect　upon　them　in　respect　of　the　nexus　of　phenomena　in　nature…a　nexus　given　according　to　empirical　laws。　Furthermore；　this　concept　is　entirely　different　from　practical　finality　（in　human　art　or　even　morals）；　though　it　is　doubtless　thought　after　this　analogy。

　　　　　　　V。　The　Principle　of　the　formal　finality　of　Nature　is　a　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　transcendental　Principle　of　Judgement。

　　A　transcendental　principle　is　one　through　which　we　represent　a　priori　the　universal　condition　under　which　alone　things　can　become　objects　of　our　cognition　generally。　A　principle；　on　the　other　band；　is　called　metaphysical　where　it　represents　a　priori　the　condition　under　which　alone　objects　whose　concept　has　to　be　given　empirically　may　become　further　determined　a　priori。　Thus　the　principle　of　the　cognition　of　bodies　as　substances；　and　as　changeable　substances；　is　transcendental　where　the　statement　is　that　their　change　must　have　a　cause：　but　it　is　metaphysical　where　it　asserts　that　their　change　must　have　an　external　cause。　For；　in　the　first　case；　bodies　need　only　be　thought　through　ontological　predicates　（pure　concepts　of　understanding）　e。g。；　as　substance；　to　enable　the　proposition　to　be　cognized　a　priori；　whereas；　in　the　second　case；　the　empirical　concept　of　a　body　（as　a　movable　thing　in　space）　must　be　introduced　to　support　the　proposition；　although；　once　this　is　done；　it　may　be　seen　quite　a　priori　that　the　latter　predicate　（movement　only　by　means　of　an　external　cause）　applies　to　body。　In　this　way；　as　I　shall　show　presently；　the　principle　of　the　finality　of　nature　（in　the　multiplicity　of　its　empirical　laws）　is　a　transcendental　principle。　For　the　concept　of　objects；　regarded　as　standing　under　this　principle；　is　only　the　pure　concept　of　objects　of　possible　empirical　cognition　generally；　and　involves　nothing　empirical。　On　the　other　band；　the　principle　of　practical　finality；　implied　in　the　idea　of　the　determination　of　a　free　will；　would　be　a　metaphysical　principle；　because　the　concept　of　a　faculty　of　desire；　as　will；　has　to　be　given　empirically；　i。e。；　is　not　included　among　transcendental　predicates。　But　both　these　principles　are；　none　the　less；　not　empirical；　but　a　priori　principles；　because　no　further　experience　is　required　for　the　synthesis　of　the　predicate　with　the　empirical　concept　of　the　subject　of　their　judgements；　but　it　may　be　apprehended　quite　a　priori。　　　That　the　concept　of　a　finality　of　nature　belongs　to　transcendental　principles　is　abundantly　evident　from　the　maxims　of　judgement　upon　which　we　rely　a　priori　in　the　investigation　of　nature；　and　which　yet　have　to　do　with　no　more　than　the　possibility　of　experience；　and　consequently　of　the　knowledge　of　nature…but　of　nature　not　merely　in　a　general　way；　but　as　determined　by　a　manifold　of　particular　laws。　These　maxims　crop　up　frequently　enough　in　the　course　of　this　science；　though　only　in　a　scattered　way。　They　are　aphorisms　of　metaphysical　wisdom；　making　their　appearance　in　a　number　of　rules　the　necessity　of　which　cannot　be　demonstrated　from　concepts。　〃Nature　takes　the　shortest　way　（lex　parsimoniae）；　yet　it　makes　no　leap；　either　in　the　sequence　of　its　changes；　or　in　the　juxtaposition　of　specifically　different　forms　（lex　continui　in　natura）；　its　vast　variety　in　empirical　laws　is　for　all　that；　unity　under　a　few　principles　（principia　praeter　necessitatem　non　sunt　multiplicanda）〃；　and　so　forth。　　　If　we　propose　to　assign　the　origin　of　these　elementary　rules；　and　attempt　to　do　so　on　psychological　lines；　we　go　straight　in　the　teeth　of　their　sense。　For　they　tell　us；　not　what　happens；　i。e。；　according　to　what　rule　our　powers　of　judgement　actually　discharge　their　functions；　and　how　we　judge；　but　how　we　ought　to　judge；　and　we　cannot　get　this　logical　objective　necessity　where　the　principles　are　merely　empirical。　Hence　the　finality　of　nature　for　our　cognitive　faculties　and　their　employment；　which　manifestly　radiates　from　them；　is　a　transcendental　principle　of　judgements；　and　so　needs　also　a　transcendental　deduction；　by　means　of　which　the　ground　for　this　mode　of　judging　must　be　traced　to　the　a　priori　sources　of　knowledge。　　　Now；　looking　at　the　grounds　of　the　possibility　of　an　experience；　the　first　thing；　of　course；　that　meets　us　is　something　necessary…namely；　the　universal　laws　apart　from　which　nature　in　general　（as　an　object　of　sense）　cannot　be　thought。　These　rest　on　the　categories；　applied　to　the　formal　conditions　of　all　intuition　possible　for　us；　so　far　as　it　is　also　given　a　priori。　Under　these　laws；　judgement　is　determinant；　for　it　bas　nothing　else　to　do　than　to　subsume　under　given　laws。　For　instance；　understanding　says：　all　change　has　its　cause　（universal　law　of　nature）；　transcendental　judgement　has　nothing　further　to　do　than　to　furnish　a　priori　the　condition　of　subsumption　under　the　concept　of　understanding　placed　before　it：　this　we　get　in　the　succession　of　the　determinations　of　one　and　the　same　thing。　Now　for　nature　in　general；　as　an　object　of　possible　experience；　that　law　is　cognized　as　absolutely　necessary。　But　besides　this　formal　time…condition；　the　objects　of　empirical　cognition　are　determined；　or；　so　far　as　we　can　judge　a　priori；　are　determinable；　in　divers　ways；　so　that　specifically　differentiated　natures；　over　and　above　what　they　have　in　common　as　things　of　nature　in　general；　are　further　capable　of　being　causes　in　an　infinite　variety　of　ways；　and　each　of　these　modes　must；　on　the　concept　of　a　cause　in　general；　have　its　rule；　which　is　a　law；　and；　consequently；　imports　necessity：　although　owing　to　the　constitution　and　limitations　of　our　faculties　of　cognition　we　may　entirely　fail　to　see　this　necessity。　Accordingly；　in　respect　of　nature's　merely　empirical　laws；　we　must　think　in　nature　a　possibility　of　an　endless　multiplicity　of　empirical　laws；　which　yet　are　contingent　so　far　as　our　insight　goes；　i。e。；　cannot　be　cognized　a　priori。　In　respect　of　these　we　estimate　the　unity　of　nature　according　to　empirical　laws；　and　the　possibility　of　the　unity　of　experience；　as　a　system　according　to　empirical　laws；　to　be　contingent。　But；　now；　such　a　unity　is　one　which　must　be　necessarily　presupposed　and　assumed；　as　otherwise　we　should　not　have　a　thoroughgoing　connection　of　empirical　cognition　in　a　whole　of　experience。　For　the　universal　laws　of　nature；　while　providing；　certainly；　for　such　a　connection　among　things　generically；　as　things　of　nature　in　general；　do　not　do　so　for　them　specifically　as　such　particular　things　of　nature。　Hence　judgement　is　compelled；　for　its　own　guidance；　to　adopt　it　as　an　a　priori　principle；　that　what　is　for　human　insight　contingent　in　the　particular　（empirical）　laws　of　nature　contains　nevertheless　unity　of　law　in　the　synthesis　of　its　manifold　in　an　intrinsically　possible　experience…unfathomable；　though　still　thinkable；　as　such　unity　may；　no　doubt；　be　for　us。　Consequently；　as　the　unity　of　law　in　a　synthesis；　which　is　cognized　by　us　in　obedience　to　a　necessary　aim　（a　need　of　understanding）；　though　recognized　at　the　same　time　as　contingent；　is　represented　as　a　finality　of　objects　（here　of　nature）；　so　judgement；　which；　in　respect　of　things　under　possible　（yet　to　be　discovered）　empirical　laws；　is　merely　reflective；　must　regard　nature　in　respect　of　the　latter　according　to　a　principle　of　finality　for　our　cognitive　faculty；　which　then　finds　expression　in　the　above　maxims　of　judgement。　Now　this　transcendental　concept　of　a　finality　of　nature　is　neither　a　concept　of　nature　nor　of　freedom；　since　it　attributes　nothing　at　all　to　the　object；　i。e。；　to　nature；　but　only　represents　the　unique　mode　in　which　we　must　proceed　in　our　reflection　upon　the　objects　of　nature　with　a　view　to　getting　a　thoroughly　interconnected　whole　of　experience；　and　so　is　a　subjective　principle；　i。e。；　maxim；　of　judgement。　For　this　reason；　too；　just　as　if　it　were　a　lucky　chance　that　favoured　us；　we　are　rejoiced　（properly　speaking；　relieved　of　a　want）　where　we　meet　with　such　systematic　unity　under　merely　empirical　laws：　although　we　must　necessarily　assume　the　presence　of　such　a　unity；　apart　from　any　ability　on　our　part　to　apprehend　or　prove　its　existence。　　　In　order　to　convince　ourselves　of　the　correctness　of　this　deduction　of　the　concept　before　us；　and　the　necessity　of　assuming　it　as　a　transcendental　principle　of　cognition；　let　us　just　bethink　ourselves　of　the　magnitude　of　the　task。　We　have　to　form　a　connected　experience　from　given　perceptions　of　a　nature　containing　a　maybe　endless　multiplicity　of　empirical　laws；　and　this　problem　has　its　seat　a　priori　in　our　understanding。　This　understanding　is　no　doubt　a　priori　in　possession　of　universal　laws　of　nature；　apart　from　which　nature　would　be　incapable　of　being　an　object　of　experience　at　all。　But　over　and　above　this　it　needs　a　certain　order　of　nature　in　its　particular　rules　which　are　only　capable　of　being　brought　to　its　knowledge　empirically；　and　which；　so　far　as　it　is　concerned　are　contingent。　These　rules；　without　which　we　would　have　no　means　of　advance　from　the　universal　analogy　of　a　possible　experience　in　general　to　a　particular；　must　be　regarded　by　understanding　as　laws；　i。e。；　as　necessary…for　otherwise　they　would　not　form　an　order　of　nature…though　it　be　unable　to　cognize　or　ever　get　an　insight　into　their　necessity。　Albeit；　then；　it　can　determine　nothing　a　priori　in　respect　of　these　（objects）；　it　must；　in　pursuit　of　such　empirical　so…called　laws；　lay　at　the　basis　of　all　reflection　upon　them　an　a　priori　principle；　to　the　effect；　namely；　that　a　cognizable　order　of　nature　is　possible　according　to　them。　A　principle　of　this　kind　is　expressed　in　the　following　propositions。　There　is　in　nature　a　subordination　of　genera　and　species　comprehensible　by　us：　Each　of　these　genera　again　approximates　to　the　others　on　a　common　principle；　so　that　a　transition　m