the critique of judgement-第40章

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al　laws；　but　as　a　mere　machine　（like　a　handmill）　when　it　is　governed　by　an　individual　absolute　will；　but　in　both　cases　the　representation　is　merely　symbolic。　For　there　is　certainly　no　likeness　between　a　despotic　state　and　a　handmill；　whereas　there　surely　is　between　the　rules　of　reflection　upon　both　and　their　causality。　Hitherto　this　function　has　been　but　little　analysed；　worthy　as　it　is　of　a　deeper　study。　Still　this　is　not　the　place　to　dwell　upon　it。　In　language　we　have　many　such　indirect　presentations　modelled　upon　an　analogy　enabling　the　expression　in　question　to　contain；　not　the　proper　schema　for　the　concept；　but　merely　a　symbol　for　reflection。　Thus　the　words　ground　（support；　basis）；　to　depend　（to　be　held　up　from　above）；　to　flow　from　（instead　of　to　follow）；　substance　（as　Locke　puts　it：　the　support　of　accidents）；　and　numberless　others；　are　not　schematic；　but　rather　symbolic　hypotyposes；　and　express　concepts　without　employing　a　direct　intuition　for　the　purpose；　but　only　drawing　upon　an　analogy　with　one；　i。e。；　transferring　the　reflection　upon　an　object　of　intuition　to　quite　a　new　concept；　and　one　with　which　perhaps　no　intuition　could　ever　directly　correspond。　Supposing　the　name　of　knowledge　may　be　given　to　what　only　amounts　to　a　mere　mode　of　representation　（which　is　quite　permissible　where　this　is　not　a　principle　of　the　theoretical　determination　of　the　object　in　respect　of　what　it　is　in　itself；　but　of　the　practical　determination　of　what　the　idea　of　it　ought　to　be　for　us　and　for　its　final　employment）；　then　all　our　knowledge　of　God　is　merely　symbolic；　and　one　who　takes　it；　with　the　properties　of　understanding；　will；　and　so　forth；　which　only　evidence　their　objective　reality　in　beings　of　this　world；　to　be　schematic；　falls　into　anthropomorphism；　just　as；　if　he　abandons　every　intuitive　element；　he　falls　into　Deism　which　furnishes　no　knowledge　whatsoever…not　even　from　a　practical　point　of　view。　　　Now；　I　say；　the　beautiful　is　the　symbol　of　the　morally　good；　and　only　in　this　light　（a　point　of　view　natural　to　every　one；　and　one　which　every　one　exacts　from　others　as　a　duty）　does　it　give　us　pleasure　with　an　attendant　claim　to　the　agreement　of　every　one　else；　whereupon　the　mind　becomes　conscious　of　a　certain　ennoblement　and　elevation　above　mere　sensibility　to　pleasure　from　impressions　of　sense；　and　also　appraises　the　worth　of　others　on　the　score　of　a　like　maxim　of　their　judgement。　This　is　that　intelligible　to　which　taste；　as　noticed　in　the　preceding　paragraph；　extends　its　view。　It　is；　that　is　to　say；　what　brings　even　our　higher　cognitive　faculties　into　common　accord；　and　is　that　apart　from　which　sheer　contradiction　would　arise　between　their　nature　and　the　claims　put　forward　by　taste。　In　this　faculty；　judgement　does　not　find　itself　subjected　to　a　heteronomy　of　laws　of　experience　as　it　does　in　the　empirical　estimate　of　things…in　respect　of　the　objects　of　such　a　pure　delight　it　gives　the　law　to　itself；　just　as　reason　does　in　respect　of　the　faculty　of　desire。　Here；　too；　both　on　account　of　this　inner　possibility　in　the　subject；　and　on　account　of　the　external　possibility　of　a　nature　harmonizing　therewith；　it　finds　a　reference　in　itself　to　something　in　the　subject　itself　and　outside　it；　and　which　is　not　nature；　nor　yet　freedom；　but　still　is　connected　with　the　ground　of　the　latter；　i。e。；　the　supersensible…a　something　in　which　the　theoretical　faculty　gets　bound　up　into　unity　with　the　practical　in　an　intimate　and　obscure　manner。　We　shall　bring　out　a　few　points　of　this　analogy；　while　taking　care；　at　the　same　time；　not　to　let　the　points　of　difference　escape　us。　　　（1）　The　beautiful　pleases　immediately　（but　only　in　reflective　intuition；　not；　like　morality；　in　its　concept）。　（2）　It　pleases　apart　from　all　interest　（pleasure　in　the　morally　good　is　no　doubt　necessarily　bound　up　with　an　interest；　but　not　with　one　of　the　kind　that　are　antecedent　to　the　judgement　upon　the　delight；　but　with　one　that　judgement　itself　for　the　first　time　calls　into　existence）。　（3）　The　freedom　of　the　imagination　（consequently　of　our　faculty　in　respect　of　its　sensibility）　is；　in　estimating　the　beautiful；　represented　as　in　accord　with　the　understanding's　conformity　to　law　（in　moral　judgements　the　freedom　of　the　will　is　thought　as　the　harmony　of　the　latter　with　itself　according　to　universal　laws　of　Reason）。　（4）　The　subjective　principles　of　the　estimate　of　the　beautiful　is　represented　as　universal；　i。e。；　valid　for　every　man；　but　as　incognizable　by　means　of　any　universal　concept　（the　objective　principle　of　morality　is　set　forth　as　also　universal；　i。e。；　for　all　individuals；　and；　at　the　same　time；　for　all　actions　of　the　same　individual；　and；　besides；　as　cognizable　by　means　of　a　universal　concept）。　For　this　reason　the　moral　judgement　not　alone　admits　of　definite　constitutive　principles；　but　is　only　possible　by　adopting　these　principles　and　their　universality　as　the　ground　of　its　maxims。　　　Even　common　understanding　is　wont　to　pay　regard　to　this　analogy；　and　we　frequently　apply　to　beautiful　objects　of　nature　or　of　art　names　that　seem　to　rely　upon　the　basis　of　a　moral　estimate。　We　call　buildings　or　trees　majestic　and　stately；　or　plains　laughing　and　gay；　even　colours　are　called　innocent；　modest；　soft；　because　they　excite　sensations　containing　something　analogous　to　the　consciousness　of　the　state　of　mind　produced　by　moral　judgements。　Taste　makes；　as　it　were；　the　transition　from　the　charm　of　sense　to　habitual　moral　interest　possible　without　too　violent　a　leap；　for　it　represents　the　imagination；　even　in　its　freedom；　as　amenable　to　a　final　determination　for　understanding；　and　teaches　us　to　find；　even　in　sensuous　objects；　a　free　delight　apart　from　any　charm　of　sense。

　　　　　　　　　　SS　60。　APPENDIX。　The　methodology　of　taste。

　　The　division　of　a　critique　into　elementology　and　methodology…a　division　which　is　introductory　to　science…is　one　inapplicable　to　the　critique　of　taste。　For　there　neither　is；　nor　can　be；　a　science　of　the　beautiful；　and　the　judgement　of　taste　is　not　determinable　by　principles。　For；　as　to　the　element　of　science　in　every　art　…a　matter　which　turns　upon　truth　in　the　presentation　of　the　object　of　the　art…while　this　is；　no　doubt；　the　indispensable　condition　（conditio　sine　qua　non）　of　fine　art；　it　is　not　itself　fine　art。　Fine　art；　therefore；　has　only　got　a　manner　（modus）；　and　not　a　method　of　teaching　（methodus）。　The　master　must　illustrate　what　the　pupil　is　to　achieve　and　how　achievement　is　to　be　attained；　and　the　proper　function　of　the　universal　rules　to　which　he　ultimately　reduces　his　treatment　is　rather　that　of　supplying　a　convenient　text　for　recalling　its　chief　moments　to　the　pupil's　mind；　than　of　prescribing　them　to　him。　Yet；　in　all　this；　due　regard　must　be　paid　to　a　certain　ideal　which　art　must　keep　in　view；　even　though　complete　success　ever　eludes　its　happiest　efforts。　Only　by　exciting　the　pupil's　imagination　to　conformity　with　a　given　concept；　by　pointing　out　how　the　expression　falls　short　of　the　idea　to　which；　as　aesthetic；　the　concept　itself　fails　to　attain；　and　by　means　of　severe　criticism；　is　it　possible　to　prevent　his　promptly　looking　upon　the　examples　set　before　him　as　the　prototypes　of　excellence；　and　as　models　for　him　to　imitate；　without　submission　to　any　higher　standard　or　to　his　own　critical　judgement。　This　would　result　in　genius　being　stifled；　and；　with　it；　also　the　freedom　of　the　imagination　in　its　very　conformity　to　law…a　freedom　without　which　a　fine　art　is　not　possible；　nor　even　as　much　as　a　correct　taste　of　one's　own　for　estimating　it。　　　The　propaedeutic　to　all　fine　art；　so　far　as　the　highest　degree　of　its　perfection　is　what　is　in　view；　appears　to　lie；　not　in　precepts；　but　in　the　culture　of　the　mental　powers　produced　by　a　sound　preparatory　education　in　what　are　called　the　humaniora…so　called；　presumably；　because　humanity　signifies；　on　the　one　hand；　the　universal　feeling　of　sympathy；　and；　on　the　other；　the　faculty　of　being　able　to　communicate　universally　one's　inmost　self…properties　constituting　in　conjunction　the　befitting　social　spirit　of　mankind；　in　contradistinction　to　the　narrow　life　of　the　lower　animals。　There　was　an　age　and　there　were　nations　in　which　the　active　impulse　towards　a　social　life　regulated　by　laws…what　converts　a　people　into　a　permanent　community…grappled　with　the　huge　difficulties　presented　by　the　trying　problem　of　bringing　freedom　（and　therefore　equality　also）　into　union　with　constraining　force　（more　that　of　respect　and　dutiful　submission　than　of　fear）。　And　such　must　have　been　the　age；　and　such　the　nation；　that　first　discovered　the　art　of　reciprocal　communication　of　ideas　between　the　more　cultured　and　ruder　sections　of　the　community；　and　how　to　bridge　the　difference　between　the　amplitude　and　refinement　of　the　former　and　the　natural　simplicity　and　originality　of　the　latter…in　this　way　hitting　upon　that　mean　between　higher　culture　and　the　modest　worth　of　nature；　that　forms　for　taste　also；　as　a　sense　common　to　all　mankind；　that　true　standard　which　no　universal　rules　can　supply。　　　Hardly　will　a　later　age　dispense　with　those　models。　For　nature　will　ever　recede　farther　into　the　background；　so　that　eventually；　with　no　permanent　example　retained　from　the　past；　a　future　age　would　scarce　be　in　a　position　to　form　a　concept　of　the　happy　union；　in　one　and　the　same　people；　of　the　law…directed　constraint　belonging　to　the　highest　culture；　with　the　force　and　truth　of　a　free　nature　sensible　of　its　proper　worth。　　　However；　taste　is；　in　the　ultimate　analysis；　a　critical　faculty　that　judges　of　the　rendering　of　moral　ideas　in　terms　of　sense　（through　the　intervention　of　a　certain　analogy　in　our　reflection　on　both）；　and　it　is　this　rendering　also；　and　the　increased　sensibility；　founded　upon　it；　for　the　feeling　which　these　ideas　evoke　（termed　moral　sense）；　that　are　the　origin　of　that　pleasure　which　taste　declares　valid　for　mankind　in　general　and　not　merely　for　the　private　feeling　of　each　individual。　This　makes　it　clear　that　the　true　propaedeutic　for　laying　the　foundations　of　taste　is　the　development　of　moral　ideas　and　the　culture　of　the　moral　feeling。　For　only　when　sensibility　is　brought　into　harmony　with　moral　feeling　can　genuine　taste　assume　a　definite　unchangeable　form。


　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　The　End