the critique of judgement-第7章

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n　of　taste　（a　matter　which　the　aesthetic　judgement　decides；　not　by　any　harmony　with　concepts；　but　by　feeling）。　On　the　other　hand；　judgement　as　teleologically　employed　assigns　the　determinate　conditions　under　which　something　（e。　g。；　an　organized　body）　is　to　be　estimated　after　the　idea　of　an　end　of　nature。　But　it　can　adduce　no　principle　from　the　concept　of　nature；　as　an　object　of　experience；　to　give　it　its　authority　to　ascribe　a　priori　to　nature　a　reference　to　ends；　or　even　only　indeterminately　to　assume　them　from　actual　experience　in　the　case　of　such　products。　The　reason　of　this　is　that；　in　order　to　be　able　merely　empirically　to　cognize　objective　finality　in　a　certain　object；　many　particular　experiences　must　be　collected　and　reviewed　under　the　unity　of　their　principle。　Aesthetic　judgement　is；　therefore；　a　special　faculty　of　estimating　according　to　a　rule；　but　not　according　to　concepts。　The　teleological　is　not　a　special　faculty；　but　only　general　reflective　judgement　proceeding；　as　it　always　does　in　theoretical　cognition；　according　to　concepts；　but　in　respect　of　certain　objects　of　nature；　following　special　principles…those；　namely；　of　a　judgement　that　is　merely　reflective　and　does　not　determine　objects。　Hence；　as　regards　its　application；　it　belongs　to　the　theoretical　part　of　philosophy；　and　on　account　of　its　special　principles；　which　are　not　determinant；　as　principles　belonging　to　doctrine　have　to　be；　it　must　also　form　a　special　part　of　the　Critique。　On　the　other　hand；　the　aesthetic　judgement　contributes　nothing　to　the　cognition　of　its　objects。　Hence　it　must　only　be　allocated　to　the　Critique　of　the　judging　subject　and　of　its　faculties　of　knowledge　so　far　as　these　are　capable　of　possessing　a　priori　principles；　be　their　use　（theoretical　or　practical）　otherwise　what　it　may…a　Critique　which　is　the　propaedeutic　of　all　philosophy。

　　　　　　　IX。　Joinder　of　the　Legislations　of　Understanding　and　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Reason　by　means　of　Judgement。

　　Understanding　prescribes　laws　a　priori　for　nature　as　an　object　of　sense；　so　that　we　may　have　a　theoretical　knowledge　of　it　in　a　possible　experience。　Reason　prescribes　laws　a　priori　for　freedom　and　its　peculiar　causality　as　the　supersensible　in　the　subject；　so　that　we　may　have　a　purely　practical　knowledge。　The　realm　of　the　concept　of　nature　under　the　one　legislation；　and　that　of　the　concept　of　freedom　under　the　other；　are　completely　cut　off　from　all　reciprocal　influence；　that　they　might　severally　（each　according　to　its　own　principles）　exert　upon　the　other；　by　the　broad　gulf　that　divides　the　supersensible　from　phenomena。　The　concept　of　freedom　determines　nothing　in　respect　of　the　theoretical　cognition　of　nature；　and　the　concept　of　nature　likewise　nothing　in　respect　of　the　practical　laws　of　freedom。　To　that　extent；　then；　it　is　not　possible　to　throw　a　bridge　from　the　one　realm　to　the　other。　Yet　although　the　determining　grounds　of　causality　according　to　the　concept　of　freedom　（and　the　practical　rule　that　this　contains）　have　no　place　in　nature；　and　the　sensible　cannot　determine　the　supersensible　in　the　subject；　still　the　converse　is　possible　（not；　it　is　true；　in　respect　of　the　knowledge　of　nature；　but　of　the　consequences　arising　from　the　supersensible　and　bearing　on　the　sensible）。　So　much　indeed　is　implied　in　the　concept　of　a　causality　by　freedom；　the　operation　of　which；　in　conformity　with　the　formal　laws　of　freedom；　is　to　take　effect　in　the　word。　The　word　cause；　however；　in　its　application　to　the　supersensible　only　signifies　the　ground　that　determines　the　causality　of　things　of　nature　to　an　effect　in　conformity　with　their　appropriate　natural　laws；　but　at　the　same　time　also　in　unison　with　the　formal　principle　of　the　laws　of　reason…a　ground　which；　while　its　possibility　is　impenetrable；　may　still　be　completely　cleared　of　the　charge　of　contradiction　that　it　is　alleged　to　involve。*　The　effect　in　accordance　with　the　concept　of　freedom　is　the　final　end　which　（or　the　manifestation　of　which　in　the　sensible　world）　is　to　exist；　and　this　presupposes　the　condition　of　the　possibility　of　that　end　in　nature　（i。　e。；　in　the　nature　of　the　subject　as　a　being　of　the　sensible　world；　namely；　as　man）。　It　is　so　presupposed　a　priori；　and　without　regard　to　the　practical；　by　judgement。　This　faculty；　with　its　concept　of　a　finality　of　nature；　provides　us　with　the　mediating　concept　between　concepts　of　nature　and　the　concept　of　freedom…a　concept　that　makes　possible　the　transition　from　the　pure　theoretical　＇legislation　of　understanding＇　to　the　pure　practical　＇legislation　of　reason＇　and　from　conformity　to　law　in　accordance　with　the　former　to　final　ends　according　to　the　latter。　For　through　that　concept　we　cognize　the　possibility　of　the　final　end　that　can　only　be　actualized　in　nature　and　in　harmony　with　its　laws。

　　*One　of　the　various　supposed　contradictions　in　this　complete　distinction　of　the　causality　of　nature　from　that　through　freedom　is　expressed　in　the　objection　that　when　I　speak　of　hindrances　opposed　by　nature　to　causality　according　to　laws　of　freedom　（moral　laws）　or　of　assistance　lent　to　it　by　nature；　I　am　all　the　time　admitting　an　influence　of　the　former　upon　the　latter。　But　the　misinterpretation　is　easily　avoided；　if　attention　is　only　paid　to　the　meaning　of　the　statement。　The　resistance　or　furtherance　is　not　between　nature　and　freedom；　but　between　the　former　as　phenomenon　and　the　effects　of　the　latter　as　phenomena　in　the　world　of　sense。　Even　the　causality　of　freedom　（of　pure　and　practical　reason）　is　the　causality　of　a　natural　cause　subordinated　to　freedom　（a　causality　of　the　subject　regarded　as　man；　and　consequently　as　a　phenomenon）；　and　one；　the　ground　of　whose　determination　is　contained　in　the　intelligible；　that　is　thought　under　freedom；　in　a　manner　that　is　not　further　or　otherwise　explicable　（just　as　in　the　case　of　that　intelligible　that　forms　the　supersensible　substrate　of　nature。）

　　Understanding；　by　the　possibility　of　its　supplying　a　priori　laws　for　nature；　furnishes　a　proof　of　the　fact　that　nature　is　cognized　by　us　only　as　phenomenon；　and　in　so　doing　points　to　its　having　a　supersensible　substrate；　but　this　substrate　it　leaves　quite　undetermined。　judgement　by　the　a　priori　principle　of　its　estimation　of　nature　according　to　its　possible　particular　laws　provides　this　supersensible　substrate　（within　as　well　as　without　us）　with　determinability　through　the　intellectual　faculty。　But　reason　gives　determination　to　the　same　a　priori　by　its　practical　law。　Thus　judgement　makes　possible　the　transition　from　the　realm　of　the　concept　of　nature　to　that　of　the　concept　of　freedom。　　　In　respect　of　the　faculties　of　the　soul　generally；　regarded　as　higher　faculties；　i。e。；　as　faculties　containing　an　autonomy；　understanding　is　the　one　that　contains　the　constitutive　a　priori　principles　for　the　faculty　of　cognition　（the　theoretical　knowledge　of　nature）。　The　feeling　pleasure　and　displeasure　is　provided　for　by　the　judgement　in　its　independence　from　concepts　and　from　sensations　that　refer　to　the　determination　of　the　faculty　of　desire　and　would　thus　be　capable　of　being　immediately　practical。　For　the　faculty　of　desire　there　is　reason；　which　is　practical　without　mediation　of　any　pleasure　of　whatsoever　origin；　and　which　determines　for　it；　as　a　higher　faculty；　the　final　end　that　is　attended　at　the　same　time　with　pure　intellectual　delight　in　the　object。　judgement's　concept　of　a　finality　of　nature　falls；　besides；　under　the　head　of　natural　concepts；　but　only　as　a　regulative　principle　of　the　cognitive　faculties…although　the　aesthetic　judgement　on　certain　objects　（of　nature　or　of　art）　which　occasions　that　concept；　is　a　constitutive　principle　in　respect　of　the　feeling　of　pleasure　or　displeasure。　The　spontaneity　in　the　play　of　the　cognitive　faculties　whose　harmonious　accord　contains　the　ground　of　this　pleasure；　makes　the　concept　in　question；　in　its　consequences；　a　suitable　mediating　link　connecting　the　realm　of　the　concept　of　nature　with　that　of　the　concept　of　freedom；　as　this　accord　at　the　same　time　promotes　the　sensibility　of　the　mind　for　or　moral　feeling。　The　following　table　may　facilitate　the　review　of　all　the　above　faculties　in　their　systematic　unity。*

　　*It　has　been　thought　somewhat　suspicious　that　my　divisions　in　pure　philosophy　should　almost　always　come　out　threefold。　But　it　is　due　to　the　nature　of　the　case。　If　a　division　is　to　be　a　priori　it　must　be　either　analytic；　according　to　the　law　of　contradiction…and　then　it　is　always　twofold　（quodlibet　ens　est　aut　A　aut　non　A）…Or　else　it　is　synthetic。　If　it　is　to　be　derived　in　the　latter　case　from　a　priori　concepts　（not；　as　in　mathematics；　from　the　a　priori　intuition　corresponding　to　the　concept）；　then；　to　meet　the　requirements　of　synthetic　unity　in　general；　namely　（1）　a　condition；　（2）　a　conditioned；　（3）　the　concept　arising　from　the　union　of　the　conditioned　with　its　condition；　the　division　must　of　necessity　be　trichotomous。

　　　　　List　of　Mental　Faculties　　　　　　Cognitive　Faculties　　　　　　　　Cognitive　faculties　　　　　　　　　　　　　Understanding　　　　　　　　Feeling　of　pleasure　　　　　　　　　　　　　Judgement　　　　　　　　　　and　displeasure　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Reason　　　　　　　　Faculty　of　desire

　　　　　　A　priori　Principles　　　　　　　　　　　　　Application　　　　　　　　Conformity　to　law　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Nature　　　　　　　　Finality　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Art　　　　　　　　Final　End　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Freedom

SEC1｜BK1　　　　　　　　　　　　FIRST　PART　CRITIQUE　OF　AESTHETIC　JUDGEMENT　　　　　　　　　　　　SECTION　I。　ANALYTIC　OF　AESTHETIC　JUDGEMENT。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　BOOK　I。　Analytic　of　the　Beautiful。

　　　　　　　　　　FIRST　MOMENT。　Of　the　Judgement　of　Taste*：　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Moment　of　Quality。

　　*The　definition　of　taste　here　relied　upon　is　that　it　is　the　faculty　of　estimating　the　beautiful。　But　the　discovery　of　what　is　required　for　calling　an　object　beautiful　must　be　reserved　for　the　analysis　of　judgements　of　taste。　In　my　search　for　the　moments　to　which　attention　is　paid　by　this　judgement　in　its　reflection；　I　have　followed　the　guidance　of　the　logical　functions　of　judging　（for　a　judgement　of　taste　always　involves　a　reference　to　understanding）。　I　have　brought　the　moment　of　quality　first　under　review；　because　this　is　what　the　aesthetic　judgement　on　the　beautiful　looks　to　in　the　first　instance。

　　　　　　　　　　　SS　1。　The　judgement　of　taste　is　aesthetic。

　　If　we　wish　to　discern　whether　anything　is　beautiful　or　not；　we　do　not　refer　the　representation　of　it　to　the　object　by　means　of　understanding　with　a　view　to　cognition；　but　by　means　of　the　imagination　（acting　perhaps　in　conjunction　with　understanding）　we　refer　the　representation　to　the　subject　and　its　feeling　of　pleasure　or　displeasure。　The　judgement　of　taste；　therefore；　is　not　a　cognitive　judgement；　and　so　not　logical；　but　is　aesthetic…which　means　that　it　is　one　whose　determining　ground　cannot　be　other　than　subjective。　Every　reference　of　representations　is　capable　of　being　objective；　even　that　of　sensations　（in　which　case　it　signifies　the　real　in　an　empirical　representation）。　The　one　exception　to　this　is　the　feeling　of　pleasure　or　displeasure。　This　denotes　nothing　in　the　object；　but　is　a　feeling　which　the　subject　has　of　itself　and　of　the　manner　in　which　it　is　affected　by　the　representation。　　　To　apprehend　a　regular　and　appropriate　building　with　one's　cognitive　faculties；　be　the　mode　of　representation　clear　or　confused；　is　quite　a　different　thing　from　being　conscio