the critique of judgement-第8章

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ties；　be　the　mode　of　representation　clear　or　confused；　is　quite　a　different　thing　from　being　conscious　of　this　representation　with　an　accompanying　sensation　of　delight。　Here　the　representation　is　referred　wholly　to　the　subject；　and　what　is　more　to　its　feeling　of　life…under　the　name　of　the　feeling　of　pleasure　or　displeasure…and　this　forms　the　basis　of　a　quite　separate　faculty　of　discriminating　and　estimating；　that　contributes　nothing　to　knowledge。　All　it　does　is　to　compare　the　given　representation　in　the　subject　with　the　entire　faculty　of　representations　of　which　the　mind　is　conscious　in　the　feeling　of　its　state。　Given　representations　in　a　judgement　may　be　empirical；　and　so　aesthetic；　but　the　judgement　which　is　pronounced　by　their　means　is　logical；　provided　it　refers　them　to　the　object。　Conversely；　be　the　given　representations　even　rational；　but　referred　in　a　judgement　solely　to　the　subject　（to　its　feeling）；　they　are　always　to　that　extent　aesthetic。

　　　　　SS　2。　The　delight　which　determines　the　judgement　of　　　　　　　　　　　　taste　is　independent　of　all　interest。

　　The　delight　which　we　connect　with　the　representation　of　the　real　existence　of　an　object　is　called　interest。　Such　a　delight；　therefore；　always　involves　a　reference　to　the　faculty　of　desire；　either　as　its　determining　ground；　or　else　as　necessarily　implicated　with　its　determining　ground。　Now；　where　the　question　is　whether　something　is　beautiful；　we　do　not　want　to　know；　whether　we；　or　any　one　else；　are；　or　even　could　be；　concerned　in　the　real　existence　of　the　thing；　but　rather　what　estimate　we　form　of　it　on　mere　contemplation　（intuition　or　reflection）。　If　any　one　asks　me　whether　I　consider　that　the　palace　I　see　before　me　is　beautiful；　I　may；　perhaps；　reply　that　I　do　not　care　for　things　of　that　sort　that　are　merely　made　to　be　gaped　at。　Or　I　may　reply　in　the　same　strain　as　that　Iroquois　sachem　who　said　that　nothing　in　Paris　pleased　him　better　than　the　eating…houses。　I　may　even　go　a　step　further　and　inveigh　with　the　vigour　of　a　Rousseau　against　the　vigour　of　a　great　against　the　vanity　of　the　of　the　people　on　such　superfluous　things。　Or；　in　fine；　I　may　quite　easily　persuade　myself　that　if　I　found　myself　on　an　uninhabited　island；　without　hope　of　ever　again　coming　among　men；　and　could　conjure　such　a　palace　into　existence　by　a　mere　wish；　I　should　still　not　trouble　to　do　so；　so　long　as　I　had　a　hut　there　that　was　comfortable　enough　for　me。　All　this　may　be　admitted　and　approved；　only　it　is　not　the　point　now　at　issue。　All　one　wants　to　know　is　whether　the　mere　representation　of　the　object　is　to　my　liking；　no　matter　how　indifferent　I　may　be　to　the　real　existence　of　the　object　of　this　representation。　It　is　quite　plain　that　in　order　to　say　that　the　object　is　beautiful；　and　to　show　that　I　have　taste；　everything　turns　on　the　meaning　which　I　can　give　to　this　representation；　and　not　on　any　factor　which　makes　me　dependent　on　the　real　existence　of　the　object。　Every　one　must　allow　that　a　judgement　on　the　beautiful　which　is　tinged　with　the　slightest　interest；　is　very　partial　and　not　a　pure　judgement　of　taste。　One　must　not　be　in　the　least　prepossessed　in　favour　of　the　real　existence　of　the　thing；　but　must　preserve　complete　indifference　in　this　respect；　in　order　to　play　the　part　of　judge　in　matters　of　taste。　　　This　proposition；　which　is　of　the　utmost　importance；　cannot　be　better　explained　than　by　contrasting　the　pure　disinterested*　delight　which　appears　in　the　judgement　of　taste　with　that　allied　to　an　interest…especially　if　we　can　also　assure　ourselves　that　there　are　no　other　kinds　of　interest　beyond　those　presently　to　be　mentioned。

　　*A　judgement　upon　an　object　of　our　delight　may　be　wholly　disinterested　but　withal　very　interesting；　i。e。；　it　relies　on　no　interest；　but　it　produces　one。　Of　this　kind　are　all　pure　moral　judgements。　But；　of　themselves　judgements　of　taste　do　not　even　set　up　any　interest　whatsoever。　Only　in　society　is　it　interesting　to　have　taste…a　point　which　will　be　explained　in　the　sequel。

　　　　SS　3。　Delight　in　the　agreeable　is　coupled　with　interest。

　　That　is　agreeable　which　the　senses　find　pleasing　in　sensation。　This　at　once　affords　a　convenient　opportunity　for　condemning　and　directing　particular　attention　to　a　prevalent　confusion　of　the　double　meaning　of　which　the　word　sensation　is　capable。　All　delight　（as　is　said　or　thought）　is　itself　sensation　（of　a　pleasure）。　Consequently　everything　that　pleases；　and　for　the　very　reason　that　it　pleases；　is　agreeable…and　according　to　its　different　degrees；　or　its　relations　to　other　agreeable　sensations；　is　attractive；　charming；　delicious；　enjoyable；　etc。　But　if　this　is　conceded；　then　impressions　of　sense；　which　determine　inclination；　or　principles　of　reason；　which　determine　the　will；　or　mere　contemplated　forms　of　intuition；　which　determine　judgement；　are　all　on　a　par　in　everything　relevant　to　their　effect　upon　the　feeling　of　pleasure；　for　this　would　be　agreeableness　in　the　sensation　of　one's　state；　and　since；　in　the　last　resort；　all　the　elaborate　work　of　our　faculties　must　issue　in　and　unite　in　the　practical　as　its　goal；　we　could　credit　our　faculties　with　no　other　appreciation　of　things　and　the　worth　of　things；　than　that　consisting　in　the　gratification　which　they　promise。　How　this　is　attained　is　in　the　end　immaterial；　and；　as　the　choice　of　the　means　is　here　the　only　thing　that　can　make　a　difference；　men　might　indeed　blame　one　another　for　folly　or　imprudence；　but　never　for　baseness　or　wickedness；　for　they　are　all；　each　according　to　his　own　way　of　looking　at　things；　pursuing　one　goal；　which　for　each　is　the　gratification　in　question。　　　When　a　modification　of　the　feeling　of　pleasure　or　displeasure　is　termed　sensation；　this　expression　is　given　quite　a　different　meaning　to　that　which　it　bears　when　I　call　the　representation　of　a　thing　（through　sense　as　a　receptivity　pertaining　to　the　faculty　of　knowledge）　sensation。　For　in　the　latter　case　the　representation　is　referred　to　the　object；　but　in　the　former　it　is　referred　solely　to　the　subject　and　is　not　available　for　any　cognition；　not　even　for　that　by　which　the　subject　cognizes　itself。　　　Now　in　the　above　definition　the　word　sensation　is　used　to　denote　an　objective　representation　of　sense；　and；　to　avoid　continually　running　the　risk　of　misinterpretation；　we　shall　call　that　which　must　always　remain　purely　subjective；　and　is　absolutely　incapable　of　forming　a　representation　of　an　object；　by　the　familiar　name　of　feeling。　The　green　colour　of　the　meadows　belongs　to　objective　sensation；　as　the　perception　of　an　object　of　sense；　but　its　agreeableness　to　subjective　sensation；　by　which　no　object　is　represented；　i。e。；　to　feeling；　through　which　the　object　is　regarded　as　an　object　of　delight　（which　involves　no　cognition　of　the　object）。　　　Now；　that　a　judgement　on　an　object　by　which　its　agreeableness　is　affirmed；　expresses　an　interest　in　it；　is　evident　from　the　fact　that　through　sensation　it　provokes　a　desire　for　similar　objects；　consequently　the　delight　presupposes；　not　the　simple　judgement　about　it；　but　the　bearing　its　real　existence　has　upon　my　state　so　far　as　affected　by　such　an　object。　Hence　we　do　not　merely　say　of　the　agreeable　that　it　pleases；　but　that　it　gratifies。　I　do　not　accord　it　a　simple　approval；　but　inclination　is　aroused　by　it；　and　where　agreeableness　is　of　the　liveliest　type　a　judgement　on　the　character　of　the　object　is　so　entirely　out　of　place　that　those　who　are　always　intent　only　on　enjoyment　（for　that　is　the　word　used　to　denote　intensity　of　gratification）　would　fain　dispense　with　all　judgement。

　　　　　　　SS　4。　Delight　in　the　good　is　coupled　with　interest。

　　That　is　good　which　by　means　of　reason　commends　itself　by　its　mere　concept。　We　call　that　good　for　something　which　only　pleases　as　a　means；　but　that　which　pleases　on　its　own　account　we　call　good　in　itself。　In　both　cases　the　concept　of　an　end　is　implied；　and　consequently　the　relation　of　reason　to　（at　least　possible）　willing；　and　thus　a　delight　in　the　existence　of　an　object　or　action；　i。e。；　some　interest　or　other。　　　To　deem　something　good；　I　must　always　know　what　sort　of　a　thing　the　object　is　intended　to　be；　i。　e。；　I　must　have　a　concept　of　it。　That　is　not　necessary　to　enable　me　to　see　beauty　in　a　thing。　Flowers；　free　patterns；　lines　aimlessly　intertwining…technically　termed　foliage…have　no　signification；　depend　upon　no　definite　concept；　and　yet　please。　Delight　in　the　beautiful　must　depend　upon　the　reflection　on　an　object　precursory　to　some　（not　definitely　determined）　concept。　It　is　thus　also　differentiated　from　the　agreeable；　which　rests　entirely　upon　sensation。　　　In　many　cases；　no　doubt；　the　agreeable　and　the　good　seem　convertible　terms。　Thus　it　is　commonly　said　that　all　（especially　lasting）　gratification　is　of　itself　good；　which　is　almost　equivalent　to　saying　that　to　be　permanently　agreeable　and　to　be　good　are　identical。　But　it　is　readily　apparent　that　this　is　merely　a　vicious　confusion　of　words；　for　the　concepts　appropriate　to　these　expressions　are　far　from　interchangeable。　The　agreeable；　which；　as　such；　represents　the　object　solely　in　relation　to　sense；　must　in　the　first　instance　be　brought　under　principles　of　reason　through　the　concept　of　an　end；　to　be；　as　an　object　of　will；　called　good。　But　that　the　reference　to　delight　is　wholly　different　where　what　gratifies　is　at　the　same　time　called　good；　is　evident　from　the　fact　that　with　the　good　the　question　always　is　whether　it　is　mediately　or　immediately　good；　i。　e。；　useful　or　good　in　itself；　whereas　with　the　agreeable　this　point　can　never　arise；　since　the　word　always　means　what　pleases　immediately…and　it　is　just　the　same　with　what　I　call　beautiful。　　　Even　in　everyday　parlance；　a　distinction　is　drawn　between　the　agreeable　and　the　good。　We　do　not　scruple　to　say　of　a　dish　that　stimulates　the　palate　with　spices　and　other　condiments　that　it　is　agreeable　owning　all　the　while　that　it　is　not　good：　because；　while　it　immediately　satisfies　the　senses；　it　is　mediately　displeasing；　i。　e。；　in　the　eye　of　reason　that　looks　ahead　to　the　consequences。　Even　in　our　estimate　of　health；　this　same　distinction　may　be　traced。　To　all　that　possess　it；　it　is　immediately　agreeable…at　least　negatively；　i。　e。；　as　remoteness　of　all　bodily　pains。　But；　if　we　are　to　say　that　it　is　good；　we　must　further　apply　to　reason　to　direct　it　to　ends；　that　is；　we　must　regard　it　as　a　state　that　puts　us　in　a　congenial　mood　for　all　we　have　to　do。　Finally；　in　respect　of　happiness　every　one　believes　that　the　greatest　aggregate　of　the　pleasures　of　life；　taking　duration　as　well　as　number　into　account；　merits　the　name　of　a　true；　nay　even　of　the　highest；　good。　But　reason　sets　its　face　against　this　too。　Agreeableness　is　enjoyment。　But　if　this　is　all　that　we　are　bent　on；　it　would　be　foolish　to　be　scrupulous　about　the　means　that　procure　it　for　us…whether　it　be　obtained　passively　by　the　bounty　of　nature　or　actively　and　by　the　work　of　our　own　hands。　But　that　there　is　any　intrinsic　worth　in　the　real　existence　of　a　man　who　merely　lives　for　enjoyment；　however　busy　he　may　be　in　this　respect；　even　when　in　so　doing　he　serves　others…all　equally　with　himself　intent　only　on　enjoyment…as　an　excellent　means　to　that　one　end；　and　does　so；　moreover；　because　through　sympathy　he　shares　all　their　gratifications…this　is　a　view　to　which　reason　will　never　let　itself　be　brought　round。　Only　by　what