fundamental principles of the metaphysic of morals-第1章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　FUNDAMENTAL　PRINCIPLES　OF　THE　METAPHYSIC　OF　MORALS

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　by　Immanuel　Kant

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　translated　by　Thomas　Kingsmill　Abbott





　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　PREFACE



　　Ancient　Greek　philosophy　was　divided　into　three　sciences：　physics；

ethics；　and　logic。　This　division　is　perfectly　suitable　to　the　nature

of　the　thing；　and　the　only　improvement　that　can　be　made　in　it　is　to

add　the　principle　on　which　it　is　based；　so　that　we　may　both　satisfy

ourselves　of　its　completeness；　and　also　be　able　to　determine　correctly

the　necessary　subdivisions。

　　All　rational　knowledge　is　either　material　or　formal：　the　former

considers　some　object；　the　latter　is　concerned　only　with　the　form　of

the　understanding　and　of　the　reason　itself；　and　with　the　universal

laws　of　thought　in　general　without　distinction　of　its　objects。

Formal　philosophy　is　called　logic。　Material　philosophy；　however；　has

to　do　with　determinate　objects　and　the　laws　to　which　they　are　subject；

is　again　twofold；　for　these　laws　are　either　laws　of　nature　or　of

freedom。　The　science　of　the　former　is　physics；　that　of　the　latter；

ethics；　they　are　also　called　natural　philosophy　and　moral　philosophy

respectively。

　　Logic　cannot　have　any　empirical　part；　that　is；　a　part　in　which　the

universal　and　necessary　laws　of　thought　should　rest　on　grounds　taken

from　experience；　otherwise　it　would　not　be　logic；　i。e。；　a　canon　for

the　understanding　or　the　reason；　valid　for　all　thought；　and　capable　of

demonstration。　Natural　and　moral　philosophy；　on　the　contrary；　can　each

have　their　empirical　part；　since　the　former　has　to　determine　the

laws　of　nature　as　an　object　of　experience；　the　latter　the　laws　of

the　human　will；　so　far　as　it　is　affected　by　nature：　the　former；

however；　being　laws　according　to　which　everything　does　happen；　the

latter；　laws　according　to　which　everything　ought　to　happen。　Ethics；

however；　must　also　consider　the　conditions　under　which　what　ought　to

happen　frequently　does　not。

　　We　may　call　all　philosophy　empirical；　so　far　as　it　is　based　on

grounds　of　experience：　on　the　other　band；　that　which　delivers　its

doctrines　from　a　priori　principles　alone　we　may　call　pure

philosophy。　When　the　latter　is　merely　formal　it　is　logic；　if　it　is

restricted　to　definite　objects　of　the　understanding　it　is　metaphysic。

　　In　this　way　there　arises　the　idea　of　a　twofold　metaphysic…　a

metaphysic　of　nature　and　a　metaphysic　of　morals。　Physics　will　thus

have　an　empirical　and　also　a　rational　part。　It　is　the　same　with

Ethics；　but　here　the　empirical　part　might　have　the　special　name　of

practical　anthropology；　the　name　morality　being　appropriated　to　the

rational　part。

　　All　trades；　arts；　and　handiworks　have　gained　by　division　of

labour；　namely；　when；　instead　of　one　man　doing　everything；　each

confines　himself　to　a　certain　kind　of　work　distinct　from　others　in　the

treatment　it　requires；　so　as　to　be　able　to　perform　it　with　greater

facility　and　in　the　greatest　perfection。　Where　the　different　kinds

of　work　are　not　distinguished　and　divided；　where　everyone　is　a

jack…of…all…trades；　there　manufactures　remain　still　in　the　greatest

barbarism。　It　might　deserve　to　be　considered　whether　pure　philosophy

in　all　its　parts　does　not　require　a　man　specially　devoted　to　it；　and

whether　it　would　not　be　better　for　the　whole　business　of　science　if

those　who；　to　please　the　tastes　of　the　public；　are　wont　to　blend　the

rational　and　empirical　elements　together；　mixed　in　all　sorts　of

proportions　unknown　to　themselves；　and　who　call　themselves　independent

thinkers；　giving　the　name　of　minute　philosophers　to　those　who　apply

themselves　to　the　rational　part　only…　if　these；　I　say；　were　warned　not

to　carry　on　two　employments　together　which　differ　widely　in　the

treatment　they　demand；　for　each　of　which　perhaps　a　special　talent　is

required；　and　the　combination　of　which　in　one　person　only　produces

bunglers。　But　I　only　ask　here　whether　the　nature　of　science　does　not

require　that　we　should　always　carefully　separate　the　empirical　from

the　rational　part；　and　prefix　to　Physics　proper　（or　empirical　physics）

a　metaphysic　of　nature；　and　to　practical　anthropology　a　metaphysic

of　morals；　which　must　be　carefully　cleared　of　everything　empirical；　so

that　we　may　know　how　much　can　be　accomplished　by　pure　reason　in　both

cases；　and　from　what　sources　it　draws　this　its　a　priori　teaching；

and　that　whether　the　latter　inquiry　is　conducted　by　all　moralists

（whose　name　is　legion）；　or　only　by　some　who　feel　a　calling　thereto。

　　As　my　concern　here　is　with　moral　philosophy；　I　limit　the　question

suggested　to　this：　Whether　it　is　not　of　the　utmost　necessity　to

construct　a　pure　thing　which　is　only　empirical　and　which　belongs　to

anthropology？　for　that　such　a　philosophy　must　be　possible　is　evident

from　the　common　idea　of　duty　and　of　the　moral　laws。　Everyone　must

admit　that　if　a　law　is　to　have　moral　force；　i。e。；　to　be　the　basis　of

an　obligation；　it　must　carry　with　it　absolute　necessity；　that；　for

example；　the　precept；　〃Thou　shalt　not　lie；〃　is　not　valid　for　men

alone；　as　if　other　rational　beings　had　no　need　to　observe　it；　and　so

with　all　the　other　moral　laws　properly　so　called；　that；　therefore；　the

basis　of　obligation　must　not　be　sought　in　the　nature　of　man；　or　in　the

circumstances　in　the　world　in　which　he　is　placed；　but　a　priori

simply　in　the　conception　of　pure　reason；　and　although　any　other

precept　which　is　founded　on　principles　of　mere　experience　may　be　in

certain　respects　universal；　yet　in　as　far　as　it　rests　even　in　the

least　degree　on　an　empirical　basis；　perhaps　only　as　to　a　motive；

such　a　precept；　while　it　may　be　a　practical　rule；　can　never　be

called　a　moral　law。

　　Thus　not　only　are　moral　laws　with　their　principles　essentially

distinguished　from　every　other　kind　of　practical　knowledge　in　which

there　is　anything　empirical；　but　all　moral　philosophy　rests　wholly

on　its　pure　part。　When　applied　to　man；　it　does　not　borrow　the　least

thing　from　the　knowledge　of　man　himself　（anthropology）；　but　gives　laws

a　priori　to　him　as　a　rational　being。　No　doubt　these　laws　require　a

judgement　sharpened　by　experience；　in　order　on　the　one　hand　to

distinguish　in　what　cases　they　are　applicable；　and　on　the　other　to

procure　for　them　access　to　the　will　of　the　man　and　effectual　influence

on　conduct；　since　man　is　acted　on　by　so　many　inclinations　that；　though

capable　of　the　idea　of　a　practical　pure　reason；　he　is　not　so　easily

able　to　make　it　effective　in　concreto　in　his　life。

　　A　metaphysic　of　morals　is　therefore　indispensably　necessary；　not

merely　for　speculative　reasons；　in　order　to　investigate　the　sources　of

the　practical　principles　which　are　to　be　found　a　priori　in　our　reason；

but　also　because　morals　themselves　are　liable　to　all　sorts　of

corruption；　as　long　as　we　are　without　that　clue　and　supreme　canon　by

which　to　estimate　them　correctly。　For　in　order　that　an　action　should

be　morally　good；　it　is　not　enough　that　it　conform　to　the　moral　law；

but　it　must　also　be　done　for　the　sake　of　the　law；　otherwise　that

conformity　is　only　very　contingent　and　uncertain；　since　a　principle

which　is　not　moral；　although　it　may　now　and　then　produce　actions

conformable　to　the　law；　will　also　often　produce　actions　which

contradict　it。　Now　it　is　only　a　pure　philosophy　that　we　can　look　for

the　moral　law　in　its　purity　and　genuineness　（and；　in　a　practical

matter；　this　is　of　the　utmost　consequence）：　we　must；　therefore；

begin　with　pure　philosophy　（metaphysic）；　and　without　it　there　cannot

be　any　moral　philosophy　at　all。　That　which　mingles　these　pure

principles　with　the　empirical　does　not　deserve　the　name　of

philosophy　（for　what　distinguishes　philosophy　from　common　rational

knowledge　is　that　it　treats　in　separate　sciences　what　the　latter

only　comprehends　confusedly）；　much　less　does　it　deserve　that　of

moral　philosophy；　since　by　this　confusion　it　even　spoils　the　purity　of

morals　themselves；　and　counteracts　its　own　end。

　　Let　it　not　be　thought；　however；　that　what　is　here　demanded　is

already　extant　in　the　propaedeutic　prefixed　by　the　celebrated　Wolf

to　his　moral　philosophy；　namely；　his　so…called　general　practical

philosophy；　and　that；　therefore；　we　have　not　to　strike　into　an

entirely　new　field。　just　because　it　was　to　be　a　general　practical

philosophy；　it　has　not　taken　into　consideration　a　will　of　any

particular　kind…　say　one　which　should　be　determined　solely　from　a

priori　principles　without　any　empirical　motives；　and　which　we　might

call　a　pure　will；　but　volition　in　general；　with　all　the　actions　and

conditions　which　belong　to　it　in　this　general　signification。　By　this

it　is　distinguished　from　a　metaphysic　of　morals；　just　as　general

logic；　which　treats　of　the　acts　and　canons　of　thought　in　general；　is

distinguished　from　transcendental　philosophy；　which　treats　of　the

particular　acts　and　canons　of　pure　thought；　i。e。；　that　whose

cognitions　are　altogether　a　priori。　For　the　metaphysic　of　morals　has

to　examine　the　idea　and　the　principles　of　a　possible　pure　will；　and

not　the　acts　and　conditions　of　human　volition　generally；　which　for　the

most　part　are　drawn　from　psychology。　It　is　true　that　moral　laws　and

duty　are　spoken　of　in　the　general　moral　philosophy　（contrary　indeed　to

all　fitness）。　But　this　is　no　objection；　for　in　this　respect　also　the

authors　of　that　science　remain　true　to　their　idea　of　it；　they　do　not

distinguish　the　motives　which　are　prescribed　as　such　by　reason　alone

altogether　a　priori；　and　which　are　properly　moral；　from　the

empirical　motives　which　the　understanding　raises　to　general

conceptions　merely　by　comparison　of　experiences；　but；　without　noticing

the　difference　of　their　sources；　and　looking　on　them　all　as

homogeneous；　they　consider　only　their　greater　or　less　amount。　It　is　in

this　way　they　frame　their　notion　of　obligation；　which；　though　anything

but　moral；　is　all　that　can　be　attained　in　a　philosophy　which　passes　no

judgement　at　all　on　the　origin　of　all　possible　practical　concepts；

whether　they　are　a　priori；　or　only　a　posteriori。

　　Intending　to　publish　hereafter　a　metaphysic　of　morals；　I　issue　in

the　first　instance　these　fundamental　principles。　Indeed　there　is

properly　no　other　foundation　for　it　than　the　critical　examination　of　a

pure　practical　Reason；　just　as　that　of　metaphysics　is　the　critical

examination　of　the　pure　speculative　reason；　already　published。　But

in　the　first　place　the　former　is　not　so　absolutely　necessary　as　the

latter；　because　in　moral　concerns　human　reason　can　easily　be　brought

to　a　high　degree　of　correctness　and　completeness；　even　in　the

commonest　understanding；　while　on　the　contrary　in　its　theoretic　but

pure　use　it　is　wholly　dialectical；　and　in　the　second　place　if　the

critique　of　a　pure　practical　reason　is　to　be　complete；　it　must　be

possible　at　the　same　time　to　show　its　identity　with　the　speculative

reason　in　a　common　principle；　for　it　can　ultimately　be　only　one　and

the　same　reason　which　has　to　be　distinguished　merely　i