fundamental principles of the metaphysic of morals-第11章

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rational　beings　as　ends　in　themselves；　and　also　the　special　ends　which

each　may　propose　to　himself）；　that　is　to　say；　we　can　conceive　a

kingdom　of　ends；　which　on　the　preceding　principles　is　possible。

　　For　all　rational　beings　come　under　the　law　that　each　of　them　must

treat　itself　and　all　others　never　merely　as　means；　but　in　every　case

at　the　same　time　as　ends　in　themselves。　Hence　results　a　systematic

union　of　rational　being　by　common　objective　laws；　i。e。；　a　kingdom

which　may　be　called　a　kingdom　of　ends；　since　what　these　laws　have　in

view　is　just　the　relation　of　these　beings　to　one　another　as　ends　and

means。　It　is　certainly　only　an　ideal。

　　A　rational　being　belongs　as　a　member　to　the　kingdom　of　ends　when；

although　giving　universal　laws　in　it；　he　is　also　himself　subject　to

these　laws。　He　belongs　to　it　as　sovereign　when；　while　giving　laws；

he　is　not　subject　to　the　will　of　any　other。

　　A　rational　being　must　always　regard　himself　as　giving　laws　either　as

member　or　as　sovereign　in　a　kingdom　of　ends　which　is　rendered　possible

by　the　freedom　of　will。　He　cannot；　however；　maintain　the　latter

position　merely　by　the　maxims　of　his　will；　but　only　in　case　he　is　a

completely　independent　being　without　wants　and　with　unrestricted　power

adequate　to　his　will。

　　Morality　consists　then　in　the　reference　of　all　action　to　the

legislation　which　alone　can　render　a　kingdom　of　ends　possible。　This

legislation　must　be　capable　of　existing　in　every　rational　being　and　of

emanating　from　his　will；　so　that　the　principle　of　this　will　is　never

to　act　on　any　maxim　which　could　not　without　contradiction　be　also　a

universal　law　and；　accordingly；　always　so　to　act　that　the　will　could

at　the　same　time　regard　itself　as　giving　in　its　maxims　universal　laws。

If　now　the　maxims　of　rational　beings　are　not　by　their　own　nature

coincident　with　this　objective　principle；　then　the　necessity　of　acting

on　it　is　called　practical　necessitation；　i。e。；　duty。　Duty　does　not

apply　to　the　sovereign　in　the　kingdom　of　ends；　but　it　does　to　every

member　of　it　and　to　all　in　the　same　degree。

　　The　practical　necessity　of　acting　on　this　principle；　i。e。；　duty；

does　not　rest　at　all　on　feelings；　impulses；　or　inclinations；　but

solely　on　the　relation　of　rational　beings　to　one　another；　a　relation

in　which　the　will　of　a　rational　being　must　always　be　regarded　as

legislative；　since　otherwise　it　could　not　be　conceived　as　an　end　in

itself。　Reason　then　refers　every　maxim　of　the　will；　regarding　it　as

legislating　universally；　to　every　other　will　and　also　to　every

action　towards　oneself；　and　this　not　on　account　of　any　other　practical

motive　or　any　future　advantage；　but　from　the　idea　of　the　dignity　of

a　rational　being；　obeying　no　law　but　that　which　he　himself　also　gives。

　　In　the　kingdom　of　ends　everything　has　either　value　or　dignity。

Whatever　has　a　value　can　be　replaced　by　something　else　which　is

equivalent；　whatever；　on　the　other　hand；　is　above　all　value；　and

therefore　admits　of　no　equivalent；　has　a　dignity。

　　Whatever　has　reference　to　the　general　inclinations　and　wants　of

mankind　has　a　market　value；　whatever；　without　presupposing　a　want；

corresponds　to　a　certain　taste；　that　is　to　a　satisfaction　in　the

mere　purposeless　play　of　our　faculties；　has　a　fancy　value；　but　that

which　constitutes　the　condition　under　which　alone　anything　can　be　an

end　in　itself；　this　has　not　merely　a　relative　worth；　i。e。；　value；

but　an　intrinsic　worth；　that　is；　dignity。

　　Now　morality　is　the　condition　under　which　alone　a　rational　being　can

be　an　end　in　himself；　since　by　this　alone　is　it　possible　that　he

should　be　a　legislating　member　in　the　kingdom　of　ends。　Thus

morality；　and　humanity　as　capable　of　it；　is　that　which　alone　has

dignity。　Skill　and　diligence　in　labour　have　a　market　value；　wit；

lively　imagination；　and　humour；　have　fancy　value；　on　the　other　hand；

fidelity　to　promises；　benevolence　from　principle　（not　from

instinct）；　have　an　intrinsic　worth。　Neither　nature　nor　art　contains

anything　which　in　default　of　these　it　could　put　in　their　place；　for

their　worth　consists　not　in　the　effects　which　spring　from　them；　not　in

the　use　and　advantage　which　they　secure；　but　in　the　disposition　of

mind；　that　is；　the　maxims　of　the　will　which　are　ready　to　manifest

themselves　in　such　actions；　even　though　they　should　not　have　the

desired　effect。　These　actions　also　need　no　recommendation　from　any

subjective　taste　or　sentiment；　that　they　may　be　looked　on　with

immediate　favour　and　satisfaction：　they　need　no　immediate　propension

or　feeling　for　them；　they　exhibit　the　will　that　performs　them　as　an

object　of　an　immediate　respect；　and　nothing　but　reason　is　required

to　impose　them　on　the　will；　not　to　flatter　it　into　them；　which；　in　the

case　of　duties；　would　be　a　contradiction。　This　estimation　therefore

shows　that　the　worth　of　such　a　disposition　is　dignity；　and　places　it

infinitely　above　all　value；　with　which　it　cannot　for　a　moment　be

brought　into　comparison　or　competition　without　as　it　were　violating

its　sanctity。

　　What　then　is　it　which　justifies　virtue　or　the　morally　good

disposition；　in　making　such　lofty　claims？　It　is　nothing　less　than

the　privilege　it　secures　to　the　rational　being　of　participating　in　the

giving　of　universal　laws；　by　which　it　qualifies　him　to　be　a　member

of　a　possible　kingdom　of　ends；　a　privilege　to　which　he　was　already

destined　by　his　own　nature　as　being　an　end　in　himself　and；　on　that

account；　legislating　in　the　kingdom　of　ends；　free　as　regards　all

laws　of　physical　nature；　and　obeying　those　only　which　he　himself

gives；　and　by　which　his　maxims　can　belong　to　a　system　of　universal

law；　to　which　at　the　same　time　he　submits　himself。　For　nothing　has　any

worth　except　what　the　law　assigns　it。　Now　the　legislation　itself　which

assigns　the　worth　of　everything　must　for　that　very　reason　possess

dignity；　that　is　an　unconditional　incomparable　worth；　and　the　word

respect　alone　supplies　a　becoming　expression　for　the　esteem　which　a

rational　being　must　have　for　it。　Autonomy　then　is　the　basis　of　the

dignity　of　human　and　of　every　rational　nature。

　　The　three　modes　of　presenting　the　principle　of　morality　that　have

been　adduced　are　at　bottom　only　so　many　formulae　of　the　very　same　law；

and　each　of　itself　involves　the　other　two。　There　is；　however；　a

difference　in　them；　but　it　is　rather　subjectively　than　objectively

practical；　intended　namely　to　bring　an　idea　of　the　reason　nearer　to

intuition　（by　means　of　a　certain　analogy）　and　thereby　nearer　to

feeling。　All　maxims；　in　fact；　have：

　　1。　A　form；　consisting　in　universality；　and　in　this　view　the

formula　of　the　moral　imperative　is　expressed　thus；　that　the　maxims

must　be　so　chosen　as　if　they　were　to　serve　as　universal　laws　of

nature。

　　2。　A　matter；　namely；　an　end；　and　here　the　formula　says　that　the

rational　being；　as　it　is　an　end　by　its　own　nature　and　therefore　an　end

in　itself；　must　in　every　maxim　serve　as　the　condition　limiting　all

merely　relative　and　arbitrary　ends。

　　3。　A　complete　characterization　of　all　maxims　by　means　of　that

formula；　namely；　that　all　maxims　ought　by　their　own　legislation　to

harmonize　with　a　possible　kingdom　of　ends　as　with　a　kingdom　of

nature。*　There　is　a　progress　here　in　the　order　of　the　categories　of

unity　of　the　form　of　the　will　（its　universality）；　plurality　of　the

matter　（the　objects；　i。e。；　the　ends）；　and　totality　of　the　system　of

these。　In　forming　our　moral　judgement　of　actions；　it　is　better　to

proceed　always　on　the　strict　method　and　start　from　the　general　formula

of　the　categorical　imperative：　Act　according　to　a　maxim　which　can　at

the　same　time　make　itself　a　universal　law。　If；　however；　we　wish　to

gain　an　entrance　for　the　moral　law；　it　is　very　useful　to　bring　one　and

the　same　action　under　the　three　specified　conceptions；　and　thereby

as　far　as　possible　to　bring　it　nearer　to　intuition。



　　*Teleology　considers　nature　as　a　kingdom　of　ends；　ethics　regards　a

possible　kingdom　of　ends　as　a　kingdom　nature。　In　the　first　case；　the

kingdom　of　ends　is　a　theoretical　idea；　adopted　to　explain　what

actually　is。　In　the　latter　it　is　a　practical　idea；　adopted　to　bring

about　that　which　is　not　yet；　but　which　can　be　realized　by　our　conduct；

namely；　if　it　conforms　to　this　idea。



　　We　can　now　end　where　we　started　at　the　beginning；　namely；　with　the

conception　of　a　will　unconditionally　good。　That　will　is　absolutely

good　which　cannot　be　evil…　in　other　words；　whose　maxim；　if　made　a

universal　law；　could　never　contradict　itself。　This　principle；　then；　is

its　supreme　law：　〃Act　always　on　such　a　maxim　as　thou　canst　at　the　same

time　will　to　be　a　universal　law〃；　this　is　the　sole　condition　under

which　a　will　can　never　contradict　itself；　and　such　an　imperative　is

categorical。　Since　the　validity　of　the　will　as　a　universal　law　for

possible　actions　is　analogous　to　the　universal　connexion　of　the

existence　of　things　by　general　laws；　which　is　the　formal　notion　of

nature　in　general；　the　categorical　imperative　can　also　be　expressed

thus：　Act　on　maxims　which　can　at　the　same　time　have　for　their　object

themselves　as　universal　laws　of　nature。　Such　then　is　the　formula　of　an

absolutely　good　will。

　　Rational　nature　is　distinguished　from　the　rest　of　nature　by　this；

that　it　sets　before　itself　an　end。　This　end　would　be　the　matter　of

every　good　will。　But　since　in　the　idea　of　a　will　that　is　absolutely

good　without　being　limited　by　any　condition　（of　attaining　this　or　that

end）　we　must　abstract　wholly　from　every　end　to　be　effected　（since　this

would　make　every　will　only　relatively　good）；　it　follows　that　in　this

case　the　end　must　be　conceived；　not　as　an　end　to　be　effected；　but　as

an　independently　existing　end。　Consequently　it　is　conceived　only

negatively；　i。e。；　as　that　which　we　must　never　act　against　and　which；

therefore；　must　never　be　regarded　merely　as　means；　but　must　in　every

volition　be　esteemed　as　an　end　likewise。　Now　this　end　can　be　nothing

but　the　subject　of　all　possible　ends；　since　this　is　also　the　subject

of　a　possible　absolutely　good　will；　for　such　a　will　cannot　without

contradiction　be　postponed　to　any　other　object。　The　principle：　〃So　act

in　regard　to　every　rational　being　（thyself　and　others）；　that　he　may

always　have　place　in　thy　maxim　as　an　end　in　himself；〃　is　accordingly

essentially　identical　with　this　other：　〃Act　upon　a　maxim　which；　at　the

same　time；　involves　its　own　universal　validity　for　every　rational

being。〃　For　that　in　using　means　for　every　end　I　should　limit　my

maxim　by　the　condition　of　its　holding　good　as　a　law　for　every　subject；

this　comes　to　the　same　thing　as　that　the　fundamental　principle　of

all　maxims　of　action　must　be　that　the　subject　of　all　ends；　i。e。；　the

rational　being　himself；　be　never　employed　merely　as　means；　but　as

the　supreme　condition　restricting　the　use　of　all　means；　that　is　in

every　case　as　an　end　likewise。

　　It　follows　incontestably　that；　to　whatever　laws　any　rational　being

may　be　subject；　he　being　an　end　in　himself　must　be　able　to　regard

himsel