fundamental principles of the metaphysic of morals-第13章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！



regarded。　We　must　likewise；　with　Hutcheson；　class　the　principle　of

sympathy　with　the　happiness　of　others　under　his　assumed　moral　sense。



　　Amongst　the　rational　principles　of　morality；　the　ontological

conception　of　perfection；　notwithstanding　its　defects；　is　better

than　the　theological　conception　which　derives　morality　from　a　Divine

absolutely　perfect　will。　The　former　is；　no　doubt；　empty　and　indefinite

and　consequently　useless　for　finding　in　the　boundless　field　of

possible　reality　the　greatest　amount　suitable　for　us；　moreover；　in

attempting　to　distinguish　specifically　the　reality　of　which　we　are　now

speaking　from　every　other；　it　inevitably　tends　to　turn　in　a　circle　and

cannot　avoid　tacitly　presupposing　the　morality　which　it　is　to　explain；

it　is　nevertheless　preferable　to　the　theological　view；　first；

because　we　have　no　intuition　of　the　divine　perfection　and　can　only

deduce　it　from　our　own　conceptions；　the　most　important　of　which　is

that　of　morality；　and　our　explanation　would　thus　be　involved　in　a

gross　circle；　and；　in　the　next　place；　if　we　avoid　this；　the　only

notion　of　the　Divine　will　remaining　to　us　is　a　conception　made　up　of

the　attributes　of　desire　of　glory　and　dominion；　combined　with　the

awful　conceptions　of　might　and　vengeance；　and　any　system　of　morals

erected　on　this　foundation　would　be　directly　opposed　to　morality。

　　However；　if　I　had　to　choose　between　the　notion　of　the　moral　sense

and　that　of　perfection　in　general　（two　systems　which　at　least　do　not

weaken　morality；　although　they　are　totally　incapable　of　serving　as　its

foundation）；　then　I　should　decide　for　the　latter；　because　it　at

least　withdraws　the　decision　of　the　question　from　the　sensibility

and　brings　it　to　the　court　of　pure　reason；　and　although　even　here　it

decides　nothing；　it　at　all　events　preserves　the　indefinite　idea　（of

a　will　good　in　itself　free　from　corruption；　until　it　shall　be　more

precisely　defined。

　　For　the　rest　I　think　I　may　be　excused　here　from　a　detailed

refutation　of　all　these　doctrines；　that　would　only　be　superfluous

labour；　since　it　is　so　easy；　and　is　probably　so　well　seen　even　by

those　whose　office　requires　them　to　decide　for　one　of　these　theories

（because　their　hearers　would　not　tolerate　suspension　of　judgement）。

But　what　interests　us　more　here　is　to　know　that　the　prime　foundation

of　morality　laid　down　by　all　these　principles　is　nothing　but

heteronomy　of　the　will；　and　for　this　reason　they　must　necessarily　miss

their　aim。

　　In　every　case　where　an　object　of　the　will　has　to　be　supposed；　in

order　that　the　rule　may　be　prescribed　which　is　to　determine　the

will；　there　the　rule　is　simply　heteronomy；　the　imperative　is

conditional；　namely；　if　or　because　one　wishes　for　this　object；　one

should　act　so　and　so：　hence　it　can　never　command　morally；　that　is；

categorically。　Whether　the　object　determines　the　will　by　means　of

inclination；　as　in　the　principle　of　private　happiness；　or　by　means

of　reason　directed　to　objects　of　our　possible　volition　generally；　as

in　the　principle　of　perfection；　in　either　case　the　will　never

determines　itself　immediately　by　the　conception　of　the　action；　but

only　by　the　influence　which　the　foreseen　effect　of　the　action　has　on

the　will；　I　ought　to　do　something；　on　this　account；　because　I　wish　for

something　else；　and　here　there　must　be　yet　another　law　assumed　in　me

as　its　subject；　by　which　I　necessarily　will　this　other　thing；　and　this

law　again　requires　an　imperative　to　restrict　this　maxim。　For　the

influence　which　the　conception　of　an　object　within　the　reach　of　our

faculties　can　exercise　on　the　will　of　the　subject；　in　consequence　of

its　natural　properties；　depends　on　the　nature　of　the　subject；　either

the　sensibility　（inclination　and　taste）；　or　the　understanding　and

reason；　the　employment　of　which　is　by　the　peculiar　constitution　of

their　nature　attended　with　satisfaction。　It　follows　that　the　law　would

be；　properly　speaking；　given　by　nature；　and；　as　such；　it　must　be　known

and　proved　by　experience　and　would　consequently　be　contingent　and

therefore　incapable　of　being　an　apodeictic　practical　rule；　such　as　the

moral　rule　must　be。　Not　only　so；　but　it　is　inevitably　only　heteronomy；

the　will　does　not　give　itself　the　law；　but　is　given　by　a　foreign

impulse　by　means　of　a　particular　natural　constitution　of　the　subject

adapted　to　receive　it。　An　absolutely　good　will；　then；　the　principle　of

which　must　be　a　categorical　imperative；　will　be　indeterminate　as

regards　all　objects　and　will　contain　merely　the　form　of　volition

generally；　and　that　as　autonomy；　that　is　to　say；　the　capability　of　the

maxims　of　every　good　will　to　make　themselves　a　universal　law；　is

itself　the　only　law　which　the　will　of　every　rational　being　imposes

on　itself；　without　needing　to　assume　any　spring　or　interest　as　a

foundation。

　　How　such　a　synthetical　practical　a　priori　proposition　is　possible；

and　why　it　is　necessary；　is　a　problem　whose　solution　does　not　lie

within　the　bounds　of　the　metaphysic　of　morals；　and　we　have　not　here

affirmed　its　truth；　much　less　professed　to　have　a　proof　of　it　in　our

power。　We　simply　showed　by　the　development　of　the　universally　received

notion　of　morality　that　an　autonomy　of　the　will　is　inevitably

connected　with　it；　or　rather　is　its　foundation。　Whoever　then　holds

morality　to　be　anything　real；　and　not　a　chimerical　idea　without　any

truth；　must　likewise　admit　the　principle　of　it　that　is　here

assigned。　This　section　then；　like　the　first；　was　merely　analytical。

Now　to　prove　that　morality　is　no　creation　of　the　brain；　which　it

cannot　be　if　the　categorical　imperative　and　with　it　the　autonomy　of

the　will　is　true；　and　as　an　a　priori　principle　absolutely　necessary；

this　supposes　the　possibility　of　a　synthetic　use　of　pure　practical

reason；　which　however　we　cannot　venture　on　without　first　giving　a

critical　examination　of　this　faculty　of　reason。　In　the　concluding

section　we　shall　give　the　principal　outlines　of　this　critical

examination　as　far　as　is　sufficient　for　our　purpose。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　THIRD　SECTION



　　　　　　　　TRANSITION　FROM　THE　METAPHYSIC　OF　MORALS　TO　THE

　　　　　　　　　　　　　CRITIQUE　OF　PURE　PRACTICAL　REASON



　　The　Concept　of　Freedom　is　the　Key　that　explains　the　Autonomy　of

the　Will



　　The　will　is　a　kind　of　causality　belonging　to　living　beings　in　so　far

as　they　are　rational；　and　freedom　would　be　this　property　of　such

causality　that　it　can　be　efficient；　independently　of　foreign　causes

determining　it；　just　as　physical　necessity　is　the　property　that　the

causality　of　all　irrational　beings　has　of　being　determined　to　activity

by　the　influence　of　foreign　causes。

　　The　preceding　definition　of　freedom　is　negative　and　therefore

unfruitful　for　the　discovery　of　its　essence；　but　it　leads　to　a

positive　conception　which　is　so　much　the　more　full　and　fruitful。

　　Since　the　conception　of　causality　involves　that　of　laws；　according

to　which；　by　something　that　we　call　cause；　something　else；　namely

the　effect；　must　be　produced；　hence；　although　freedom　is　not　a

property　of　the　will　depending　on　physical　laws；　yet　it　is　not　for

that　reason　lawless；　on　the　contrary　it　must　be　a　causality　acting

according　to　immutable　laws；　but　of　a　peculiar　kind；　otherwise　a

free　will　would　be　an　absurdity。　Physical　necessity　is　a　heteronomy　of

the　efficient　causes；　for　every　effect　is　possible　only　according　to

this　law；　that　something　else　determines　the　efficient　cause　to

exert　its　causality。　What　else　then　can　freedom　of　the　will　be　but

autonomy；　that　is；　the　property　of　the　will　to　be　a　law　to　itself？　But

the　proposition：　〃The　will　is　in　every　action　a　law　to　itself；〃　only

expresses　the　principle：　〃To　act　on　no　other　maxim　than　that　which　can

also　have　as　an　object　itself　as　a　universal　law。〃　Now　this　is

precisely　the　formula　of　the　categorical　imperative　and　is　the

principle　of　morality；　so　that　a　free　will　and　a　will　subject　to　moral

laws　are　one　and　the　same。

　　On　the　hypothesis；　then；　of　freedom　of　the　will；　morality　together

with　its　principle　follows　from　it　by　mere　analysis　of　the　conception。

However；　the　latter　is　a　synthetic　proposition；　viz。；　an　absolutely

good　will　is　that　whose　maxim　can　always　include　itself　regarded　as

a　universal　law；　for　this　property　of　its　maxim　can　never　be

discovered　by　analysing　the　conception　of　an　absolutely　good　will。　Now

such　synthetic　propositions　are　only　possible　in　this　way：　that　the

two　cognitions　are　connected　together　by　their　union　with　a　third　in

which　they　are　both　to　be　found。　The　positive　concept　of　freedom

furnishes　this　third　cognition；　which　cannot；　as　with　physical　causes；

be　the　nature　of　the　sensible　world　（in　the　concept　of　which　we　find

conjoined　the　concept　of　something　in　relation　as　cause　to　something

else　as　effect）。　We　cannot　now　at　once　show　what　this　third　is　to

which　freedom　points　us　and　of　which　we　have　an　idea　a　priori；　nor　can

we　make　intelligible　how　the　concept　of　freedom　is　shown　to　be

legitimate　from　principles　of　pure　practical　reason　and　with　it　the

possibility　of　a　categorical　imperative；　but　some　further

preparation　is　required。



　　　　　Freedom　must　be　presupposed　as　a　Property　of　the　Will

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　of　all　Rational　Beings



　　It　is　not　enough　to　predicate　freedom　of　our　own　will；　from　Whatever

reason；　if　we　have　not　sufficient　grounds　for　predicating　the　same

of　all　rational　beings。　For　as　morality　serves　as　a　law　for　us　only

because　we　are　rational　beings；　it　must　also　hold　for　all　rational

beings；　and　as　it　must　be　deduced　simply　from　the　property　of　freedom；

it　must　be　shown　that　freedom　also　is　a　property　of　all　rational

beings。　It　is　not　enough；　then；　to　prove　it　from　certain　supposed

experiences　of　human　nature　（which　indeed　is　quite　impossible；　and

it　can　only　be　shown　a　priori）；　but　we　must　show　that　it　belongs　to

the　activity　of　all　rational　beings　endowed　with　a　will。　Now　I　say

every　being　that　cannot　act　except　under　the　idea　of　freedom　is　just

for　that　reason　in　a　practical　point　of　view　really　free；　that　is　to

say；　all　laws　which　are　inseparably　connected　with　freedom　have　the

same　force　for　him　as　if　his　will　had　been　shown　to　be　free　in

itself　by　a　proof　theoretically　conclusive。*　Now　I　affirm　that　we　must

attribute　to　every　rational　being　which　has　a　will　that　it　has　also

the　idea　of　freedom　and　acts　entirely　under　this　idea。　For　in　such　a

being　we　conceive　a　reason　that　is　practical；　that　is；　has　causality

in　reference　to　its　objects。　Now　we　cannot　possibly　conceive　a

reason　consciously　receiving　a　bias　from　any　other　quarter　with

respect　to　its　judgements；　for　then　the　subject　would　ascribe　the

determination　of　its　judgement　not　to　its　own　reason；　but　to　an

impulse。　It　must　regard　itself　as　the　author　of　its　principles

independent　of　foreign　influences。　Consequently　as　practical　reason　or

as　the　will　of　a　rational　being　it　must　regard　itself　as　free；　that　is

to　say；　the　will　of　such　a　being　cannot　be　a　will　of　its