fundamental principles of the metaphysic of morals-第2章

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reason　in　a　common　principle；　for　it　can　ultimately　be　only　one　and

the　same　reason　which　has　to　be　distinguished　merely　in　its

application。　I　could　not；　however；　bring　it　to　such　completeness　here；

without　introducing　considerations　of　a　wholly　different　kind；　which

would　be　perplexing　to　the　reader。　On　this　account　I　have　adopted

the　title　of　Fundamental　Principles　of　the　Metaphysic　of　Morals

instead　of　that　of　a　Critical　Examination　of　the　pure　practical

reason。

　　But　in　the　third　place；　since　a　metaphysic　of　morals；　in　spite　of

the　discouraging　title；　is　yet　capable　of　being　presented　in　popular

form；　and　one　adapted　to　the　common　understanding；　I　find　it　useful　to

separate　from　it　this　preliminary　treatise　on　its　fundamental

principles；　in　order　that　I　may　not　hereafter　have　need　to　introduce

these　necessarily　subtle　discussions　into　a　book　of　a　more　simple

character。

　　The　present　treatise　is；　however；　nothing　more　than　the

investigation　and　establishment　of　the　supreme　principle　of

morality；　and　this　alone　constitutes　a　study　complete　in　itself　and

one　which　ought　to　be　kept　apart　from　every　other　moral　investigation。

No　doubt　my　conclusions　on　this　weighty　question；　which　has　hitherto

been　very　unsatisfactorily　examined；　would　receive　much　light　from　the

application　of　the　same　principle　to　the　whole　system；　and　would　be

greatly　confirmed　by　the　adequacy　which　it　exhibits　throughout；　but

I　must　forego　this　advantage；　which　indeed　would　be　after　all　more

gratifying　than　useful；　since　the　easy　applicability　of　a　principle

and　its　apparent　adequacy　give　no　very　certain　proof　of　its　soundness；

but　rather　inspire　a　certain　partiality；　which　prevents　us　from

examining　and　estimating　it　strictly　in　itself　and　without　regard　to

consequences。

　　I　have　adopted　in　this　work　the　method　which　I　think　most

suitable；　proceeding　analytically　from　common　knowledge　to　the

determination　of　its　ultimate　principle；　and　again　descending

synthetically　from　the　examination　of　this　principle　and　its　sources

to　the　common　knowledge　in　which　we　find　it　employed。　The　division

will；　therefore；　be　as　follows：



　　1　FIRST　SECTION。　Transition　from　the　common　rational　knowledge　of

morality　to　the　philosophical。



　　2　SECOND　SECTION。　Transition　from　popular　moral　philosophy　to　the

metaphysic　of　morals。



　　3　THIRD　SECTION。　Final　step　from　the　metaphysic　of　morals　to　the

critique　of　the　pure　practical　reason。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　FIRST　SECTION



　　　　　　　　　TRANSITION　FROM　THE　COMMON　RATIONAL　KNOWLEDGE

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　OF　MORALITY　TO　THE　PHILOSOPHICAL



　　Nothing　can　possibly　be　conceived　in　the　world；　or　even　out　of　it；

which　can　be　called　good；　without　qualification；　except　a　good　will。

Intelligence；　wit；　judgement；　and　the　other　talents　of　the　mind；

however　they　may　be　named；　or　courage；　resolution；　perseverance；　as

qualities　of　temperament；　are　undoubtedly　good　and　desirable　in　many

respects；　but　these　gifts　of　nature　may　also　become　extremely　bad

and　mischievous　if　the　will　which　is　to　make　use　of　them；　and　which；

therefore；　constitutes　what　is　called　character；　is　not　good。　It　is

the　same　with　the　gifts　of　fortune。　Power；　riches；　honour；　even

health；　and　the　general　well…being　and　contentment　with　one's

condition　which　is　called　happiness；　inspire　pride；　and　often

presumption；　if　there　is　not　a　good　will　to　correct　the　influence　of

these　on　the　mind；　and　with　this　also　to　rectify　the　whole　principle

of　acting　and　adapt　it　to　its　end。　The　sight　of　a　being　who　is　not

adorned　with　a　single　feature　of　a　pure　and　good　will；　enjoying

unbroken　prosperity；　can　never　give　pleasure　to　an　impartial

rational　spectator。　Thus　a　good　will　appears　to　constitute　the

indispensable　condition　even　of　being　worthy　of　happiness。

　　There　are　even　some　qualities　which　are　of　service　to　this　good　will

itself　and　may　facilitate　its　action；　yet　which　have　no　intrinsic

unconditional　value；　but　always　presuppose　a　good　will；　and　this

qualifies　the　esteem　that　we　justly　have　for　them　and　does　not

permit　us　to　regard　them　as　absolutely　good。　Moderation　in　the

affections　and　passions；　self…control；　and　calm　deliberation　are　not

only　good　in　many　respects；　but　even　seem　to　constitute　part　of　the

intrinsic　worth　of　the　person；　but　they　are　far　from　deserving　to　be

called　good　without　qualification；　although　they　have　been　so

unconditionally　praised　by　the　ancients。　For　without　the　principles　of

a　good　will；　they　may　become　extremely　bad；　and　the　coolness　of　a

villain　not　only　makes　him　far　more　dangerous；　but　also　directly　makes

him　more　abominable　in　our　eyes　than　he　would　have　been　without　it。

　　A　good　will　is　good　not　because　of　what　it　performs　or　effects；

not　by　its　aptness　for　the　attainment　of　some　proposed　end；　but　simply

by　virtue　of　the　volition；　that　is；　it　is　good　in　itself；　and

considered　by　itself　is　to　be　esteemed　much　higher　than　all　that　can

be　brought　about　by　it　in　favour　of　any　inclination；　nay　even　of　the

sum　total　of　all　inclinations。　Even　if　it　should　happen　that；　owing　to

special　disfavour　of　fortune；　or　the　niggardly　provision　of　a

step…motherly　nature；　this　will　should　wholly　lack　power　to　accomplish

its　purpose；　if　with　its　greatest　efforts　it　should　yet　achieve

nothing；　and　there　should　remain　only　the　good　will　（not；　to　be

sure；　a　mere　wish；　but　the　summoning　of　all　means　in　our　power）；　then；

like　a　jewel；　it　would　still　shine　by　its　own　light；　as　a　thing

which　has　its　whole　value　in　itself。　Its　usefulness　or　fruitfulness

can　neither　add　nor　take　away　anything　from　this　value。　It　would　be；

as　it　were；　only　the　setting　to　enable　us　to　handle　it　the　more

conveniently　in　common　commerce；　or　to　attract　to　it　the　attention

of　those　who　are　not　yet　connoisseurs；　but　not　to　recommend　it　to　true

connoisseurs；　or　to　determine　its　value。

　　There　is；　however；　something　so　strange　in　this　idea　of　the　absolute

value　of　the　mere　will；　in　which　no　account　is　taken　of　its　utility；

that　notwithstanding　the　thorough　assent　of　even　common　reason　to

the　idea；　yet　a　suspicion　must　arise　that　it　may　perhaps　really　be　the

product　of　mere　high…flown　fancy；　and　that　we　may　have　misunderstood

the　purpose　of　nature　in　assigning　reason　as　the　governor　of　our　will。

Therefore　we　will　examine　this　idea　from　this　point　of　view。

　　In　the　physical　constitution　of　an　organized　being；　that　is；　a　being

adapted　suitably　to　the　purposes　of　life；　we　assume　it　as　a

fundamental　principle　that　no　organ　for　any　purpose　will　be　found

but　what　is　also　the　fittest　and　best　adapted　for　that　purpose。　Now　in

a　being　which　has　reason　and　a　will；　if　the　proper　object　of　nature

were　its　conservation；　its　welfare；　in　a　word；　its　happiness；　then

nature　would　have　hit　upon　a　very　bad　arrangement　in　selecting　the

reason　of　the　creature　to　carry　out　this　purpose。　For　all　the

actions　which　the　creature　has　to　perform　with　a　view　to　this　purpose；

and　the　whole　rule　of　its　conduct；　would　be　far　more　surely　prescribed

to　it　by　instinct；　and　that　end　would　have　been　attained　thereby

much　more　certainly　than　it　ever　can　be　by　reason。　Should　reason

have　been　communicated　to　this　favoured　creature　over　and　above；　it

must　only　have　served　it　to　contemplate　the　happy　constitution　of

its　nature；　to　admire　it；　to　congratulate　itself　thereon；　and　to

feel　thankful　for　it　to　the　beneficent　cause；　but　not　that　it　should

subject　its　desires　to　that　weak　and　delusive　guidance　and　meddle

bunglingly　with　the　purpose　of　nature。　In　a　word；　nature　would　have

taken　care　that　reason　should　not　break　forth　into　practical　exercise；

nor　have　the　presumption；　with　its　weak　insight；　to　think　out　for

itself　the　plan　of　happiness；　and　of　the　means　of　attaining　it。　Nature

would　not　only　have　taken　on　herself　the　choice　of　the　ends；　but

also　of　the　means；　and　with　wise　foresight　would　have　entrusted　both

to　instinct。

　　And；　in　fact；　we　find　that　the　more　a　cultivated　reason　applies

itself　with　deliberate　purpose　to　the　enjoyment　of　life　and　happiness；

so　much　the　more　does　the　man　fail　of　true　satisfaction。　And　from　this

circumstance　there　arises　in　many；　if　they　are　candid　enough　to

confess　it；　a　certain　degree　of　misology；　that　is；　hatred　of　reason；

especially　in　the　case　of　those　who　are　most　experienced　in　the　use　of

it；　because　after　calculating　all　the　advantages　they　derive；　I　do　not

say　from　the　invention　of　all　the　arts　of　common　luxury；　but　even　from

the　sciences　（which　seem　to　them　to　be　after　all　only　a　luxury　of

the　understanding）；　they　find　that　they　have；　in　fact；　only　brought

more　trouble　on　their　shoulders。　rather　than　gained　in　happiness；

and　they　end　by　envying；　rather　than　despising；　the　more　common

stamp　of　men　who　keep　closer　to　the　guidance　of　mere　instinct　and　do

not　allow　their　reason　much　influence　on　their　conduct。　And　this　we

must　admit；　that　the　judgement　of　those　who　would　very　much　lower

the　lofty　eulogies　of　the　advantages　which　reason　gives　us　in　regard

to　the　happiness　and　satisfaction　of　life；　or　who　would　even　reduce

them　below　zero；　is　by　no　means　morose　or　ungrateful　to　the　goodness

with　which　the　world　is　governed；　but　that　there　lies　at　the　root　of

these　judgements　the　idea　that　our　existence　has　a　different　and　far

nobler　end；　for　which；　and　not　for　happiness；　reason　is　properly

intended；　and　which　must；　therefore；　be　regarded　as　the　supreme

condition　to　which　the　private　ends　of　man　must；　for　the　most　part；　be

postponed。

　　For　as　reason　is　not　competent　to　guide　the　will　with　certainty　in

regard　to　its　objects　and　the　satisfaction　of　all　our　wants　（which

it　to　some　extent　even　multiplies）；　this　being　an　end　to　which　an

implanted　instinct　would　have　led　with　much　greater　certainty；　and

since；　nevertheless；　reason　is　imparted　to　us　as　a　practical

faculty；　i。e。；　as　one　which　is　to　have　influence　on　the　will；

therefore；　admitting　that　nature　generally　in　the　distribution　of

her　capacities　has　adapted　the　means　to　the　end；　its　true

destination　must　be　to　produce　a　will；　not　merely　good　as　a　means　to

something　else；　but　good　in　itself；　for　which　reason　was　absolutely

necessary。　This　will　then；　though　not　indeed　the　sole　and　complete

good；　must　be　the　supreme　good　and　the　condition　of　every　other；

even　of　the　desire　of　happiness。　Under　these　circumstances；　there　is

nothing　inconsistent　with　the　wisdom　of　nature　in　the　fact　that　the

cultivation　of　the　reason；　which　is　requisite　for　the　first　and

unconditional　purpose；　does　in　many　ways　interfere；　at　least　in　this

life；　with　the　attainment　of　the　second；　which　is　always

conditional；　namely；　happiness。　Nay；　it　may　even　reduce　it　to　nothing；

without　nature　thereby　failing　of　her　purpose。　For　reason　recognizes

the　establishment　of　a　good　will　as　its　highest　practical　destination；

and　in　attaining　this　purpose　is　capable　only　of　a　satisfaction　of　its

own　proper　kind；　namely　tha