fundamental principles of the metaphysic of morals-第7章

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a　practical　part；　consisting　of　problems　expressing　that　some　end　is

possible　for　us　and　of　imperatives　directing　how　it　may　be　attained。

These　may；　therefore；　be　called　in　general　imperatives　of　skill。

Here　there　is　no　question　whether　the　end　is　rational　and　good；　but

only　what　one　must　do　in　order　to　attain　it。　The　precepts　for　the

physician　to　make　his　patient　thoroughly　healthy；　and　for　a　poisoner

to　ensure　certain　death；　are　of　equal　value　in　this　respect；　that　each

serves　to　effect　its　purpose　perfectly。　Since　in　early　youth　it　cannot

be　known　what　ends　are　likely　to　occur　to　us　in　the　course　of　life；

parents　seek　to　have　their　children　taught　a　great　many　things；　and

provide　for　their　skill　in　the　use　of　means　for　all　sorts　of　arbitrary

ends；　of　none　of　which　can　they　determine　whether　it　may　not　perhaps

hereafter　be　an　object　to　their　pupil；　but　which　it　is　at　all　events

possible　that　he　might　aim　at；　and　this　anxiety　is　so　great　that

they　commonly　neglect　to　form　and　correct　their　judgement　on　the　value

of　the　things　which　may　be　chosen　as　ends。

　　There　is　one　end；　however；　which　may　be　assumed　to　be　actually

such　to　all　rational　beings　（so　far　as　imperatives　apply　to　them；

viz。；　as　dependent　beings）；　and；　therefore；　one　purpose　which　they　not

merely　may　have；　but　which　we　may　with　certainty　assume　that　they

all　actually　have　by　a　natural　necessity；　and　this　is　happiness。　The

hypothetical　imperative　which　expresses　the　practical　necessity　of

an　action　as　means　to　the　advancement　of　happiness　is　assertorial。

We　are　not　to　present　it　as　necessary　for　an　uncertain　and　merely

possible　purpose；　but　for　a　purpose　which　we　may　presuppose　with

certainty　and　a　priori　in　every　man；　because　it　belongs　to　his

being。　Now　skill　in　the　choice　of　means　to　his　own　greatest　well…being

may　be　called　prudence；*　in　the　narrowest　sense。　And　thus　the

imperative　which　refers　to　the　choice　of　means　to　one's　own　happiness；

i。e。；　the　precept　of　prudence；　is　still　always　hypothetical；　the

action　is　not　commanded　absolutely；　but　only　as　means　to　another

purpose。



　　*The　word　prudence　is　taken　in　two　senses：　in　the　one　it　may　bear

the　name　of　knowledge　of　the　world；　in　the　other　that　of　private

prudence。　The　former　is　a　man's　ability　to　influence　others　so　as　to

use　them　for　his　own　purposes。　The　latter　is　the　sagacity　to　combine

all　these　purposes　for　his　own　lasting　benefit。　This　latter　is

properly　that　to　which　the　value　even　of　the　former　is　reduced；　and

when　a　man　is　prudent　in　the　former　sense；　but　not　in　the　latter；　we

might　better　say　of　him　that　he　is　clever　and　cunning；　but；　on　the

whole；　imprudent。



　　Finally；　there　is　an　imperative　which　commands　a　certain　conduct

immediately；　without　having　as　its　condition　any　other　purpose　to　be

attained　by　it。　This　imperative　is　categorical。　It　concerns　not　the

matter　of　the　action；　or　its　intended　result；　but　its　form　and　the

principle　of　which　it　is　itself　a　result；　and　what　is　essentially　good

in　it　consists　in　the　mental　disposition；　let　the　consequence　be

what　it　may。　This　imperative　may　be　called　that　of　morality。

　　There　is　a　marked　distinction　also　between　the　volitions　on　these

three　sorts　of　principles　in　the　dissimilarity　of　the　obligation　of

the　will。　In　order　to　mark　this　difference　more　clearly；　I　think

they　would　be　most　suitably　named　in　their　order　if　we　said　they　are

either　rules　of　skill；　or　counsels　of　prudence；　or　commands　（laws）

of　morality。　For　it　is　law　only　that　involves　the　conception　of　an

unconditional　and　objective　necessity；　which　is　consequently

universally　valid；　and　commands　are　laws　which　must　be　obeyed；　that

is；　must　be　followed；　even　in　opposition　to　inclination。　Counsels；

indeed；　involve　necessity；　but　one　which　can　only　hold　under　a

contingent　subjective　condition；　viz。；　they　depend　on　whether　this

or　that　man　reckons　this　or　that　as　part　of　his　happiness；　the

categorical　imperative；　on　the　contrary；　is　not　limited　by　any

condition；　and　as　being　absolutely；　although　practically；　necessary；

may　be　quite　properly　called　a　command。　We　might　also　call　the　first

kind　of　imperatives　technical　（belonging　to　art）；　the　second

pragmatic*　（to　welfare）；　the　third　moral　（belonging　to　free　conduct

generally；　that　is；　to　morals）。



　　*It　seems　to　me　that　the　proper　signification　of　the　word

pragmatic　may　be　most　accurately　defined　in　this　way。　For　sanctions

are　called　pragmatic　which　flow　properly　not　from　the　law　of　the

states　as　necessary　enactments；　but　from　precaution　for　the　general

welfare。　A　history　is　composed　pragmatically　when　it　teaches　prudence；

i。e。；　instructs　the　world　how　it　can　provide　for　its　interests　better；

or　at　least　as　well　as；　the　men　of　former　time。



　　Now　arises　the　question；　how　are　all　these　imperatives　possible？

This　question　does　not　seek　to　know　how　we　can　conceive　the

accomplishment　of　the　action　which　the　imperative　ordains；　but

merely　how　we　can　conceive　the　obligation　of　the　will　which　the

imperative　expresses。　No　special　explanation　is　needed　to　show　how

an　imperative　of　skill　is　possible。　Whoever　wills　the　end；　wills

also　（so　far　as　reason　decides　his　conduct）　the　means　in　his　power

which　are　indispensably　necessary　thereto。　This　proposition　is；　as

regards　the　volition；　analytical；　for；　in　willing　an　object　as　my

effect；　there　is　already　thought　the　causality　of　myself　as　an

acting　cause；　that　is　to　say；　the　use　of　the　means；　and　the　imperative

educes　from　the　conception　of　volition　of　an　end　the　conception　of

actions　necessary　to　this　end。　Synthetical　propositions　must　no

doubt　be　employed　in　defining　the　means　to　a　proposed　end；　but　they　do

not　concern　the　principle；　the　act　of　the　will；　but　the　object　and　its

realization。　E。g。；　that　in　order　to　bisect　a　line　on　an　unerring

principle　I　must　draw　from　its　extremities　two　intersecting　arcs；　this

no　doubt　is　taught　by　mathematics　only　in　synthetical　propositions；

but　if　I　know　that　it　is　only　by　this　process　that　the　intended

operation　can　be　performed；　then　to　say　that；　if　I　fully　will　the

operation；　I　also　will　the　action　required　for　it；　is　an　analytical

proposition；　for　it　is　one　and　the　same　thing　to　conceive　something　as

an　effect　which　I　can　produce　in　a　certain　way；　and　to　conceive　myself

as　acting　in　this　way。

　　If　it　were　only　equally　easy　to　give　a　definite　conception　of

happiness；　the　imperatives　of　prudence　would　correspond　exactly　with

those　of　skill；　and　would　likewise　be　analytical。　For　in　this　case

as　in　that；　it　could　be　said：　〃Whoever　wills　the　end；　wills　also

（according　to　the　dictate　of　reason　necessarily）　the　indispensable

means　thereto　which　are　in　his　power。〃　But；　unfortunately；　the

notion　of　happiness　is　so　indefinite　that　although　every　man　wishes　to

at。　it；　yet　he　never　can　say　definitely　and　consistently　what　it　is

that　he　really　wishes　and　wills。　The　reason　of　this　is　that　all　the

elements　which　belong　to　the　notion　of　happiness　are　altogether

empirical；　i。e。；　they　must　be　borrowed　from　experience；　and

nevertheless　the　idea　of　happiness　requires　an　absolute　whole；　a

maximum　of　welfare　in　my　present　and　all　future　circumstances。　Now

it　is　impossible　that　the　most　clear…sighted　and　at　the　same　time　most

powerful　being　（supposed　finite）　should　frame　to　himself　a　definite

conception　of　what　he　really　wills　in　this。　Does　he　will　riches；　how

much　anxiety；　envy；　and　snares　might　he　not　thereby　draw　upon　his

shoulders？　Does　he　will　knowledge　and　discernment；　perhaps　it　might

prove　to　be　only　an　eye　so　much　the　sharper　to　show　him　so　much　the

more　fearfully　the　evils　that　are　now　concealed　from　him；　and　that

cannot　be　avoided；　or　to　impose　more　wants　on　his　desires；　which

already　give　him　concern　enough。　Would　he　have　long　life？　who

guarantees　to　him　that　it　would　not　be　a　long　misery？　would　he　at

least　have　health？　how　often　has　uneasiness　of　the　body　restrained

from　excesses　into　which　perfect　health　would　have　allowed　one　to

fall？　and　so　on。　In　short；　he　is　unable；　on　any　principle；　to

determine　with　certainty　what　would　make　him　truly　happy；　because　to

do　so　he　would　need　to　be　omniscient。　We　cannot　therefore　act　on　any

definite　principles　to　secure　happiness；　but　only　on　empirical

counsels；　e。g。　of　regimen；　frugality；　courtesy；　reserve；　etc。；　which

experience　teaches　do；　on　the　average；　most　promote　well…being。

Hence　it　follows　that　the　imperatives　of　prudence　do　not；　strictly

speaking；　command　at　all；　that　is；　they　cannot　present　actions

objectively　as　practically　necessary；　that　they　are　rather　to　be

regarded　as　counsels　（consilia）　than　precepts　precepts　of　reason；　that

the　problem　to　determine　certainly　and　universally　what　action　would

promote　the　happiness　of　a　rational　being　is　completely　insoluble；　and

consequently　no　imperative　respecting　it　is　possible　which　should；

in　the　strict　sense；　command　to　do　what　makes　happy；　because　happiness

is　not　an　ideal　of　reason　but　of　imagination；　resting　solely　on

empirical　grounds；　and　it　is　vain　to　expect　that　these　should　define

an　action　by　which　one　could　attain　the　totality　of　a　series　of

consequences　which　is　really　endless。　This　imperative　of　prudence

would　however　be　an　analytical　proposition　if　we　assume　that　the　means

to　happiness　could　be　certainly　assigned；　for　it　is　distinguished　from

the　imperative　of　skill　only　by　this；　that　in　the　latter　the　end　is

merely　possible；　in　the　former　it　is　given；　as　however　both　only

ordain　the　means　to　that　which　we　suppose　to　be　willed　as　an　end；　it

follows　that　the　imperative　which　ordains　the　willing　of　the　means

to　him　who　wills　the　end　is　in　both　cases　analytical。　Thus　there　is　no

difficulty　in　regard　to　the　possibility　of　an　imperative　of　this

kind　either。

　　On　the　other　hand；　the　question　how　the　imperative　of　morality　is

possible；　is　undoubtedly　one；　the　only　one；　demanding　a　solution；　as

this　is　not　at　all　hypothetical；　and　the　objective　necessity　which

it　presents　cannot　rest　on　any　hypothesis；　as　is　the　case　with　the

hypothetical　imperatives。　Only　here　we　must　never　leave　out　of

consideration　that　we　cannot　make　out　by　any　example；　in　other　words

empirically；　whether　there　is　such　an　imperative　at　all；　but　it　is

rather　to　be　feared　that　all　those　which　seem　to　be　categorical　may

yet　be　at　bottom　hypothetical。　For　instance；　when　the　precept　is：

〃Thou　shalt　not　promise　deceitfully〃；　and　it　is　assumed　that　the

necessity　of　this　is　not　a　mere　counsel　to　avoid　some　other　evil；　so

that　it　should　mean：　〃Thou　shalt　not　make　a　lying　promise；　lest　if

it　become　known　thou　shouldst　destroy　thy　credit；〃　but　that　an

action　of　this　kind　must　be　regarded　as　evil　in　itself；　so　that　the

imperative　of　the　prohibition　is　categorical；　then　we　cannot　show　with

certainty　in　any　example　that　the　will　was　determined　merely　by　the

law；　without　any　other　spring　of　action；　although　it　may　appear　to

be　so。　For　i