fundamental principles of the metaphysic of morals-第8章

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law；　without　any　other　spring　of　action；　although　it　may　appear　to

be　so。　For　it　is　always　possible　that　fear　of　disgrace；　perhaps　also

obscure　dread　of　other　dangers；　may　have　a　secret　influence　on　the

will。　Who　can　prove　by　experience　the　non…existence　of　a　cause　when

all　that　experience　tells　us　is　that　we　do　not　perceive　it？　But　in

such　a　case　the　so…called　moral　imperative；　which　as　such　appears　to

be　categorical　and　unconditional；　would　in　reality　be　only　a　pragmatic

precept；　drawing　our　attention　to　our　own　interests　and　merely

teaching　us　to　take　these　into　consideration。

　　We　shall　therefore　have　to　investigate　a　priori　the　possibility　of　a

categorical　imperative；　as　we　have　not　in　this　case　the　advantage　of

its　reality　being　given　in　experience；　so　that　＇the　elucidation　of＇

its　possibility　should　be　requisite　only　for　its　explanation；　not

for　its　establishment。　In　the　meantime　it　may　be　discerned

beforehand　that　the　categorical　imperative　alone　has　the　purport　of

a　practical　law；　all　the　rest　may　indeed　be　called　principles　of　the

will　but　not　laws；　since　whatever　is　only　necessary　for　the　attainment

of　some　arbitrary　purpose　may　be　considered　as　in　itself　contingent；

and　we　can　at　any　time　be　free　from　the　precept　if　we　give　up　the

purpose；　on　the　contrary；　the　unconditional　command　leaves　the　will　no

liberty　to　choose　the　opposite；　consequently　it　alone　carries　with

it　that　necessity　which　we　require　in　a　law。

　　Secondly；　in　the　case　of　this　categorical　imperative　or　law　of

morality；　the　difficulty　（of　discerning　its　possibility）　is　a　very

profound　one。　It　is　an　a　priori　synthetical　practical　proposition；*

and　as　there　is　so　much　difficulty　in　discerning　the　possibility　of

speculative　propositions　of　this　kind；　it　may　readily　be　supposed　that

the　difficulty　will　be　no　less　with　the　practical。



　　*I　connect　the　act　with　the　will　without　presupposing　any

condition　resulting　from　any　inclination；　but　a　priori；　and

therefore　necessarily　（though　only　objectively；　i。e。；　assuming　the

idea　of　a　reason　possessing　full　power　over　all　subjective　motives）。

This　is　accordingly　a　practical　proposition　which　does　not　deduce

the　willing　of　an　action　by　mere　analysis　from　another　already

presupposed　（for　we　have　not　such　a　perfect　will）；　but　connects　it

immediately　with　the　conception　of　the　will　of　a　rational　being；　as

something　not　contained　in　it。



　　In　this　problem　we　will　first　inquire　whether　the　mere　conception　of

a　categorical　imperative　may　not　perhaps　supply　us　also　with　the

formula　of　it；　containing　the　proposition　which　alone　can　be　a

categorical　imperative；　for　even　if　we　know　the　tenor　of　such　an

absolute　command；　yet　how　it　is　possible　will　require　further

special　and　laborious　study；　which　we　postpone　to　the　last　section。

　　When　I　conceive　a　hypothetical　imperative；　in　general　I　do　not

know　beforehand　what　it　will　contain　until　I　am　given　the　condition。

But　when　I　conceive　a　categorical　imperative；　I　know　at　once　what　it

contains。　For　as　the　imperative　contains　besides　the　law　only　the

necessity　that　the　maxims*　shall　conform　to　this　law；　while　the　law

contains　no　conditions　restricting　it；　there　remains　nothing　but　the

general　statement　that　the　maxim　of　the　action　should　conform　to　a

universal　law；　and　it　is　this　conformity　alone　that　the　imperative

properly　represents　as　necessary。



　　*A　maxim　is　a　subjective　principle　of　action；　and　must　be

distinguished　from　the　objective　principle；　namely；　practical　law。　The

former　contains　the　practical　rule　set　by　reason　according　to　the

conditions　of　the　subject　（often　its　ignorance　or　its　inclinations）；

so　that　it　is　the　principle　on　which　the　subject　acts；　but　the　law

is　the　objective　principle　valid　for　every　rational　being；　and　is

the　principle　on　which　it　ought　to　act　that　is　an　imperative。



　　There　is　therefore　but　one　categorical　imperative；　namely；　this：　Act

only　on　that　maxim　whereby　thou　canst　at　the　same　time　will　that　it

should　become　a　universal　law。

　　Now　if　all　imperatives　of　duty　can　be　deduced　from　this　one

imperative　as　from　their　principle；　then；　although　it　should　remain

undecided　what　is　called　duty　is　not　merely　a　vain　notion；　yet　at

least　we　shall　be　able　to　show　what　we　understand　by　it　and　what

this　notion　means。

　　Since　the　universality　of　the　law　according　to　which　effects　are

produced　constitutes　what　is　properly　called　nature　in　the　most

general　sense　（as　to　form）；　that　is　the　existence　of　things　so　far

as　it　is　determined　by　general　laws；　the　imperative　of　duty　may　be

expressed　thus：　Act　as　if　the　maxim　of　thy　action　were　to　become　by

thy　will　a　universal　law　of　nature。

　　We　will　now　enumerate　a　few　duties；　adopting　the　usual　division　of

them　into　duties　to　ourselves　and　ourselves　and　to　others；　and　into

perfect　and　imperfect　duties。*



　　*It　must　be　noted　here　that　I　reserve　the　division　of　duties　for　a

future　metaphysic　of　morals；　so　that　I　give　it　here　only　as　an

arbitrary　one　（in　order　to　arrange　my　examples）。　For　the　rest；　I

understand　by　a　perfect　duty　one　that　admits　no　exception　in　favour　of

inclination　and　then　I　have　not　merely　external　but　also　internal

perfect　duties。　This　is　contrary　to　the　use　of　the　word　adopted　in　the

schools；　but　I　do　not　intend　to　justify　there；　as　it　is　all　one　for　my

purpose　whether　it　is　admitted　or　not。



　　1。　A　man　reduced　to　despair　by　a　series　of　misfortunes　feels　wearied

of　life；　but　is　still　so　far　in　possession　of　his　reason　that　he　can

ask　himself　whether　it　would　not　be　contrary　to　his　duty　to　himself　to

take　his　own　life。　Now　he　inquires　whether　the　maxim　of　his　action

could　become　a　universal　law　of　nature。　His　maxim　is：　〃From

self…love　I　adopt　it　as　a　principle　to　shorten　my　life　when　its　longer

duration　is　likely　to　bring　more　evil　than　satisfaction。〃　It　is

asked　then　simply　whether　this　principle　founded　on　self…love　can

become　a　universal　law　of　nature。　Now　we　see　at　once　that　a　system

of　nature　of　which　it　should　be　a　law　to　destroy　life　by　means　of

the　very　feeling　whose　special　nature　it　is　to　impel　to　the

improvement　of　life　would　contradict　itself　and；　therefore；　could

not　exist　as　a　system　of　nature；　hence　that　maxim　cannot　possibly

exist　as　a　universal　law　of　nature　and；　consequently；　would　be

wholly　inconsistent　with　the　supreme　principle　of　all　duty。

　　2。　Another　finds　himself　forced　by　necessity　to　borrow　money。　He

knows　that　he　will　not　be　able　to　repay　it；　but　sees　also　that　nothing

will　be　lent　to　him　unless　he　promises　stoutly　to　repay　it　in　a

definite　time。　He　desires　to　make　this　promise；　but　he　has　still　so

much　conscience　as　to　ask　himself：　〃Is　it　not　unlawful　and

inconsistent　with　duty　to　get　out　of　a　difficulty　in　this　way？〃

Suppose　however　that　he　resolves　to　do　so：　then　the　maxim　of　his

action　would　be　expressed　thus：　〃When　I　think　myself　in　want　of　money；

I　will　borrow　money　and　promise　to　repay　it；　although　I　know　that　I

never　can　do　so。〃　Now　this　principle　of　self…love　or　of　one's　own

advantage　may　perhaps　be　consistent　with　my　whole　future　welfare；

but　the　question　now　is；　〃Is　it　right？〃　I　change　then　the　suggestion

of　self…love　into　a　universal　law；　and　state　the　question　thus：　〃How

would　it　be　if　my　maxim　were　a　universal　law？〃　Then　I　see　at　once　that

it　could　never　hold　as　a　universal　law　of　nature；　but　would

necessarily　contradict　itself。　For　supposing　it　to　be　a　universal

law　that　everyone　when　he　thinks　himself　in　a　difficulty　should　be

able　to　promise　whatever　he　pleases；　with　the　purpose　of　not　keeping

his　promise；　the　promise　itself　would　become　impossible；　as　well　as

the　end　that　one　might　have　in　view　in　it；　since　no　one　would　consider

that　anything　was　promised　to　him；　but　would　ridicule　all　such

statements　as　vain　pretences。

　　3。　A　third　finds　in　himself　a　talent　which　with　the　help　of　some

culture　might　make　him　a　useful　man　in　many　respects。　But　he　finds

himself　in　comfortable　circumstances　and　prefers　to　indulge　in

pleasure　rather　than　to　take　pains　in　enlarging　and　improving　his

happy　natural　capacities。　He　asks；　however；　whether　his　maxim　of

neglect　of　his　natural　gifts；　besides　agreeing　with　his　inclination　to

indulgence；　agrees　also　with　what　is　called　duty。　He　sees　then　that

a　system　of　nature　could　indeed　subsist　with　such　a　universal　law

although　men　（like　the　South　Sea　islanders）　should　let　their　talents

rest　and　resolve　to　devote　their　lives　merely　to　idleness；

amusement；　and　propagation　of　their　species…　in　a　word；　to

enjoyment；　but　he　cannot　possibly　will　that　this　should　be　a　universal

law　of　nature；　or　be　implanted　in　us　as　such　by　a　natural　instinct。

For；　as　a　rational　being；　he　necessarily　wills　that　his　faculties　be

developed；　since　they　serve　him　and　have　been　given　him；　for　all　sorts

of　possible　purposes。

　　4。　A　fourth；　who　is　in　prosperity；　while　he　sees　that　others　have　to

contend　with　great　wretchedness　and　that　he　could　help　them；　thinks：

〃What　concern　is　it　of　mine？　Let　everyone　be　as　happy　as　Heaven

pleases；　or　as　be　can　make　himself；　I　will　take　nothing　from　him　nor

even　envy　him；　only　I　do　not　wish　to　contribute　anything　to　his

welfare　or　to　his　assistance　in　distress！〃　Now　no　doubt　if　such　a　mode

of　thinking　were　a　universal　law；　the　human　race　might　very　well

subsist　and　doubtless　even　better　than　in　a　state　in　which　everyone

talks　of　sympathy　and　good…will；　or　even　takes　care　occasionally　to

put　it　into　practice；　but；　on　the　other　side；　also　cheats　when　he　can；

betrays　the　rights　of　men；　or　otherwise　violates　them。　But　although　it

is　possible　that　a　universal　law　of　nature　might　exist　in　accordance

with　that　maxim；　it　is　impossible　to　will　that　such　a　principle　should

have　the　universal　validity　of　a　law　of　nature。　For　a　will　which

resolved　this　would　contradict　itself；　inasmuch　as　many　cases　might

occur　in　which　one　would　have　need　of　the　love　and　sympathy　of　others；

and　in　which；　by　such　a　law　of　nature；　sprung　from　his　own　will；　he

would　deprive　himself　of　all　hope　of　the　aid　he　desires。

　　These　are　a　few　of　the　many　actual　duties；　or　at　least　what　we

regard　as　such；　which　obviously　fall　into　two　classes　on　the　one

principle　that　we　have　laid　down。　We　must　be　able　to　will　that　a　maxim

of　our　action　should　be　a　universal　law。　This　is　the　canon　of　the

moral　appreciation　of　the　action　generally。　Some　actions　are　of　such　a

character　that　their　maxim　cannot　without　contradiction　be　even

conceived　as　a　universal　law　of　nature；　far　from　it　being　possible

that　we　should　will　that　it　should　be　so。　In　others　this　intrinsic

impossibility　is　not　found；　but　still　it　is　impossible　to　will　that

their　maxim　should　be　raised　to　the　universality　of　a　law　of　nature；

since　such　a　will　would　contradict　itself　It　is　easily　seen　that　the

former　violate　strict　or　rigorous　（inflexible）　duty；　the　latter　only

laxer　（meritorious）　duty。　Thus　it　has　been　compl