lect09-第1章

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Lecture　IX













The　Primitive　Forms　of　Legal　Remedies













　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　I。













　　　　I　stated　on　a　former　occasion　（Lecture　1。　p。　8）　that　the






branch　of　law　which　we　now　call　the　Law　of　Distress　occupies　the






greatest　part　of　the　largest　Brehon　law…tract；　the　Senchus　Mor。






The　importance　thus　given　to　Distress　is　a　fact　of　much






significance；　and　in　this　and　the　following　Lecture　I　propose　to






discuss　the　questions　it　raises　and　the　conclusions　it　suggests。






　　　　The　value　of　the　precious　discovery　made　by　Niebuhr；　when　he






disinterred　in　1816　the　manuscript　of　Gaius；　does　not　solely






arise　from　the　new　light　which　was　at　once　thrown　on　the






beginnings　of　the　legal　system　which　is　the　mountain　of　the






greatest　part　of　civilised　jurisprudence。　There　are　portions　of






the　treatise　then　restored　to　the　world　which　afford　us　glimpses






of　something　older　than　law　itself；　and　which　enable　us　to






connect　with　law　the　practices　dictated　to　barbarous　men　by






impulses　which　it　has　become　the　prime　office　of　all　law　to






control。　At　the　head　of　the　passages　in　the　work　of　Gaius　which






allow　the　mind's　eye　to　penetrate　some　little　way　into　the　chaos






out　of　which　social　order　sprang；　I　place　the　fragmentary　and






imperfect　account；　given　near　the　commencement　of　the　Fourth






Book；　of　the　old　Legis　Actiones；　which　in　the　age　of　Gaius






himself　had　ceased　to　have　more　than　an　historical　and






antiquarian　interest。






　　　　Legis　Actio；　of　which　the　exact　meaning　does　not　seem　to　have






been　known　to　Gaius；　may　be　conjectured　to　have　been　the






substantive　form　of　the　verbal　expression；　legem　or　lege　agere；






and　to　have　been　equivalent　to　what　we　now　call　Procedure。　It　has






been　several　times　observed　that　among　the　Legis　Actiones　are






included　several　proceedings　which　are　not　of　the　nature　of






Actions　or　Suits；　but　are　rather　modes　of　executing　decrees。　The






fact　seems　to　be　that；　by　a　course　of　change　which　may　be　traced






in　the　history　of　Roman　law；　one　portion；　'Actio；'　of　the






venerable　phrase　'Legis　Actio'　has　been　gradually　disjoined　from






the　rest；　and　has　come　to　denote　that　stage　of　the　administration






of　justice　which　is　directly　conducted　by　the　Court；　together；　in






some　judicial　systems；　with　the　stage　immediately　preceding　it。　I






suppose　that　originally　lex；　used　of　the　assumed　written　basis　of






Roman　law；　and　legis　actio；　corresponded　roughly　to　what　many






centuries　afterwards　were　called　Substantive　and　Adjective　Law；






the　law　declaring　rights　and　duties　and　the　rules　according　to






which　the　law　declaring　rights　and　duties　is　administered。　On　the






expression　just　mentioned；　Adjective　Law；　with　which　Bentham　and






his　school　have　familiarised　us；　I　will　make　a　remark　which






applies　to　much　in　the　phraseology　and　classifications　of　the






Analytical　Jurists；　that　it　is　correct　and　convenient　according






to　the　ideas　of　their　day；　but　that；　if　used　of　very　old　law；　it






is　apt　to　lead　to　an　historical　misconception。　It　would　not　be






untrue　to　assert　that；　in　one　stage　of　human　affairs；　rights　and






duties　are　rather　the　adjective　of　procedure　than　procedure　a






mere　appendage　to　rights　and　duties。　There　have　been　times　when






the　real　difficulty　lay；　not　in　conceiving　what　a　man　was






entitled　to；　but　in　obtaining　it；　so　that　the　method；　violent　or






legal；　by　which　an　end　was　obtained　was　of　more　consequence　than






the　nature　of　the　end　itself。　As　a　fact；　it　is　only　in　the　most






recent　times　or　in　the　most　highly　developed　legal　systems　that






remedies　have　lost　importance　in　comparison　with　rights　and　have






ceased　to　affect　them　deeply　and　variously。






　　　　The　first　and　in　many　respects　the　most　interesting　of　these






ancient　modes　of　proceeding　is　the　Legis　Actio　Sacramenti；　the






undoubted　parent　of　all　the　Roman　Actions；　and　consequently　of






most　of　the　civil　remedies　now　in　use　in　the　world。　Several　years






ago　I　pointed　out　（Ancient　Law；　pp。　376；　377）　that　the　technical






formalities　appeared　plainly；　upon　inspection；　to　be　a






dramatisation　of　the　Origin　of　Justice。　'Two　armed　men；'　I　said；






'are　wrangling　about　some　disputed　property。　The　Praetor；　vir






pietate　gravis；　happens　to　be　going　by　and　interposes　to　stop　the






contest。　The　disputants　state　their　case　to　him；　and　agree　that






he　shall　arbitrate　between　them；　it　being　arranged　that　the






loser；　besides　resigning　the　subject　of　the　quarrel；　shall　pay　a






sum　of　money　to　the　umpire　as　remuneration　for　his　trouble　and






loss　of　time。'　'This　interpretation；'　I　then　added；　'would　be






less　plausible　than　it　is；　were　it　not　that；　by　a　surprising






coincidence；　the　ceremony　described　by　Gaius　as　the　imperative






course　of　proceeding　in　a　Legis　Actio　is　substantially　the　same






with　one　of　the　two　subjects　which　the　God　Hephaestus　is






Described　by　Homer　as　moulding　into　the　First　Compartment　of　the






Shield　of　Achilles。'　Singe　these　passages　were　written；　the






labours　of　more　recent　enquirers　enable　us　to　class　this　judicial






picture　of　the　origin　of　one　great　institution；　Civil　Justice；






with　other　pictorial　or　dramatic　representations　of　forgotten






practices　which；　in　various　parts　of　the　world；　survive　in　the






forms　attending　institutions　of　at　least　equal　importance。　It　may






be　seen；　for　example；　from　Mr　McLennan's　work　on　'Primitive






Marriage；'　that　a　large　part　of　mankind　still　simulate　in　their






marriage　ceremonies　the　carrying　off　the　bride　by　violence；　and






thus　preserve　the　memory　of　the　reign　of　force　which；　at　all






events　as　between　tribe　and　tribe；　preceded　everywhere　the　reign






of　law。　It　is　not　at　the　same　time　to　be　supposed　that　these






long…descended　dramas　imply　or　ever　implied　any　disrespect　for






the　institutions　with　which　they　are　associated。　In　all






probability　they　intentionally　commemorate　not　the　evil　but　the






remedy　for　the　evil：　and；　until　they　degenerate　into　meaningless






usages；　they　are　enacted；　not　in　honour　of　brute　force；　but　in






honour　of　the　institutions　which　superseded　it；　Marriage　and






Civil　Justice。






　　　　Almost　every　gesture　and　almost　every　set　of　formal　words　in






the　Legis　Actio　Sacramenti　symbolise　something　which；　in　some






part　of　the　world　or　another；　in　some　Aryan　society　or　another；






has　developed　into　an　important　institution。　The　claimant　places






his　hand　on　the　slave　or　other　subject　of　dispute；　and　this　grasp






of　the　thing　claimed；　which　is　reproduced　in　the　corresponding






procedure　of　the　ancient　Germans　and　which；　from　them；　was






continued　in　various　modified　forms　far　down　into　the　Middle






Ages；　is　an　early　example　of　that　demand　before　action　on　which






all　civilised　systems　of　law　insist。　The　wand；　which　the　claimant






held　in　his　hand；　is　stated　by　Gaius　to　have　represented　a　spear；






and　the　spear；　the　emblem　of　the　strong　man　armed；　served　as　the






symbol　of　property　held　absolutely　and　against　the　world；　not






only　in　the　Roman　but　in　several　other　Western　societies。　The






proceedings　included　a　series　of　assertions　and　reassertions　of






right　by　the　parties；　and　this　formal　dialogue　was　the　parent　of






the　Art　of　Pleading。　The　quarrel　between　plaintiff　and　defendant；






which　was　a　mere　pretence　among　the　Romans；　long　remained　a






reality　in　other　societies；　and；　though　its　theory　was　altered；






it　survived　in　the　Wager　of　Battle　which；　as　an　English






institution；　was　only　finally　abolished　in　our　fathers'　day。　The






interposition　of　the　Praetor　and　the　acceptance　of　his　mediation






expanded　into　the　Administration　of　Justice　in　the　Roman　State；






one　of　the　most　powerful　of　instrumentalities　in　the　historical






transformation　of　the　civilised　world。　The　disputants　staked　a






sum　of　money　　the　Sacramentum；　from　which　the　proceedings　took






their　name　　on　the　merits　of　their　quarrel；　and　the　stake　went






into　the　public　exchequer。　The　money　thus　wagered；　which　appears






in　a　singularly　large　number　of　archaic　legal　systems；　is　the






earliest　representative　of　those　Court…fees　which　have　been　a






more　considerable　power　in　legal　history　than　historians　of　law






are　altogether　inclined　to　admit。　The　very　spirit　in　which　a






Legis　Actio　was　conducted　was　that　which；　in　the　eyes　of　laymen；






has　been　most　characteristic　of　lawyers　in　all　historical　times。






If；　Says　Gaius。　you　sued　by　Legis　Actio　for　injury　to　your　vines；






and　called　them　vines；　you　would　fail；　you　must　call　them　trees；






because　the　text　of　the　Twelve　Tables　spoke　only　of　trees。　The






ancient　collection　of　Teutonic　legal　formulas；　known　as　the






Malberg　Gloss；　contains　provisions　of　precisely　the　same






character。　If　you　sue　for　a　bull；　you　will　miscarry　if　you






describe　him　as　a　bull；　you　must　give　him　his　ancient　juridical






designation　of　'leader　of　the　herd。'　You　must　call　the　forefinger






the　'arrow'…finger；　the　goat　the　'browser　upon　leeks。'　There　are






lawyers　alive　who　can　recollect　when　the　English　system　of






Special　Pleading；　now　just　expiring；　was　applied　upon　principles






not　remotely　akin　to　these　and　historically　descended　from　them。






　　　　The　description　given　by　Gaius　of　the　Legis　Actio　Sacramenti






is　followed　by　a　lacuna　in　the　manuscript。　It　was　once　occupied






with　an　account　of　the　Judicis　Postulatio；　which　was　evidently　a






modification　of　the　older　Sacramental　Action　by　which　this






ancient　remedy　was　adapted　to　a　particular　class　of　cases。　The






text　of　the　treatise　begins　again　with　a　description　of　the






Condictio；　which　is　said　by　Gaius　to　have　been　created；　but　which






is　believed　to　have　been　only　regulated；　by　two　Roman　statutes　of






the　sixth　century　of　Rome　　the　Lex　Silia　and　the　Lex　C