lect09-第2章

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the　sixth　century　of　Rome　　the　Lex　Silia　and　the　Lex　Calpurnia。






The　Condictio；　which　afterwards　developed　into　one　of　the　most






useful　of　the　Roman　actions；　originally　derived　its　name　from　a






notice　which　the　plaintiff　gave　the　defendant　to　appear　before






the　Praetor　in　thirty　days；　in　order　that　a　Judex　or　referee






might　be　nominated；　and　immediately　（as　I　myself　think）　on　this






notice　being　given；　the　parties　entered　into　a　'sponsio'　and






'restipulatio；'　that　is；　they　laid　a　formal　wager　（distinct　from






the　stake　called　Sacramentum）　on　the　justice　of　their　respective






contentions。　The　sum　thus　staked；　which　was　always　equal　to　a






third　of　the　amount　in　dispute；　went　in　the　end　to　the　successful






litigant；　and　not；　like　the　Sacramentum；　to　the　State。　Lawyers






wondered；　Gaius　tells　us；　that　such　an　action　should　be　needed






when　property　could　have　been　recovered　by　the　older　and






unmodified　procedure。　Many　technical　answers　to　this　question






have　been　given　by　modern　commentators　on　Roman　law；　but　we　will






see　whether　a　better　explanation　of　it　cannot　be　obtained　by






approaching　it　from　another　side。






　　　　Gaius；　leaving　the　Condictio；　proceeds　to　discuss　two　of　the






Legis　Actiones；　the　Manus　Injectio　and　the　Pignoris　Capio；　which






cannot　be　made　to　square　in　any　way　with　our　modern　conception　of






an　action。　The　Manus　Injectio　is　expressly　stated　to　have　been






originally　the　Roman　mode　of　execution　against　the　person　of　a






judgment　debtor。　It　has　considerable　historical　interest；　for　it






was　undoubtedly　the　instrument　of　the　cruelties　practised　by　the






Roman　aristocracy　on　their　defaulting　plebeian　debtors；　and　thus






it　gave　the　first　impetus　to　a　series　of　popular　movements　which






affected　the　whole　history　of　the　Roman　Commonwealth。　The






Pignoris　Capio　also；　possibly　under　a　slightly　altered　name；　was






a　mode　of　execution　in　later　times　against　property　after　decree；






but　this　was　not　its　original　purpose　as　a　Legis　Actio。　It　was　at






first　a　wholly　extra…judicial　proceeding。　The　person　who






proceeded　by　it　seized　in　certain　cases　the　goods　of　a






fellow…citizen；　against　whom　he　had　a　claim；　but　against　whom　he






had　not　instituted　a　suit。　The　power　of　seizure　could　be






exercised　by　soldiers　against　public　officers　bound　to　supply






them　with　pay；　horse；　or　forage；　and　it　could　also　be　resorted　to






by　the　seller　of　a　beast　for　sacrifice　against　a　defaulting






purchaser。。　It　was　thus　confined　to　claims　of　great　urgency　or　of






highly　sacred　obligation；　but　it　was　afterwards　extended　to






demands　for　overdue　arrears　of　public　revenue。　I　am　indebted　to






Mr　Poste　for　the　observation　that　the　ideal　institutions　of






Plato's　Laws　include　something　strongly　resembling　the　Roman






Pignoris　Capio；　and　here　again　it　is　a　remedy　for　breach　of






public　duties　connected　with　military　service　or　religious






observance。






　　　　I　take　the　Pignoris　Capio　as　the　immediate　starting…point　of






all　which　I　am　about　to　say　on　the　subject　of　Ancient　Civil






Procedure。　First　of　all　let　us　ask　whether　Gaius　himself　gives　us






any　hint　of　its　meaning　and　significance　in　the　primitive　Roman






system。　The　clue　is　slender；　but　it　seems　to　me　sufficiently






traceable　in　the　statement　that　the　Pignoris　Capio　could　be






resorted　to　in　the　absence　of　the　Praetor　and　generally　in　that






of　the　person　under　liability；　and　also　that　it　might　be　carried






out　even　when　the　Courts　were　not　sitting。






　　　　Let　us　go　back　for　a　moment　to　the　parent　Legis　Actio　　the






L。　A。　Sacramenti。　Its　venerable　forms　presuppose　a　quarrel　and






celebrate　the　mode　of　settling　it。　It　is　a　passing　arbitrator






whose　interposition　is　simulated　by　the　Praetor。　But　suppose






there　is　no　arbitrator　at　hand。　What　expedient　for　averting。






bloodshed　remains；　and　is　any　such　expedient　reflected　in　that






ancient　procedure　which；　by　the　fact　of　its　existence；　implies






that　the　shedding　of　blood　has　somehow　been　prevented？






　　　　I　dare　say　I　shall　at　the　outset　appear　to　be　making　a






trivial　remark　when　I　say　that　one　method　of　gaining　the　object






is　to　lay　a　wager。　Even　now　this　is　one　of　the　commonest　ways　of






postponing　a　dispute　as　to　a　matter　of　fact；　and　the　truth　is






that　the　tendency　to　bet　upon　results　lies　extremely　deep　in






human　nature；　and　has　grown　up　with　it　from　its　remote　infancy。






It　is　not　everybody　who；　when　his　blood　is　hot；　will　submit　to






have　a　quarrel　referred　to　a　third　person　present；　much　less　to　a






third　person　absent；　but　he　will　constantly　do　so；　if　he　lays　a






wager　on　it；　and　if；　besides　being　found　in　the　right；　he　has　a






chance　of　receiving　the　amount　staked。　And　this　I　suppose　






differing；　I　own；　from　several　high　authorities　　to　be　the　true






significance　of　the　Sponsio　and　Restipulatio；　which　we　know　to






have　been　of　the　essence　of　the　ancient　Roman　Condictio；　and　of






the　agreement　to　appear　before　the　Praetor　in　thirty　days。　The






Legis　Actio　Sacramenti　assumes　that　the　quarrel　is　at　once






referred　to　a　present　arbitrator；　the　Condictio　that　the






reference　is　to　the　decision　of　an　arbitrator　after　thirty　days'






interval；　but　meantime　the　parties　have　entered　into　a　separate






wager　on　the　merits　of　their　dispute。　We　know　that　the　liability






to　an　independent　penalty　attached　to　the　suitor　by　Condictio






even　when　it　had　become　one　of　the　most　important　Roman　actions；






and　that　it　was　still　exacted　in　the　age　of　Cicero。






　　　　There　is　yet　another　primitive　contrivance　by　which；　in　the






absence　of　a　present　arbitrator；　a　quarrel　may　be　prevented　from






issuing　in　bloodshed。　The　claimant　willing　to　go　to　arbitration






may；　in　the　absence　of　his　adversary；　or　if　he　be　the　stronger；






in　his　presence；　take　forcible　possession　of　his　moveable






property　and　detain　it　till　he　too　submits。　I　believe　this　to






have　been　the　true　primitive　office　of　the　Pignoris　Capio；　though






the　full　evidence　of　my　opinion　will　not　be　before　you　till　I






have　tracked　the　same　institution　through　the　twilight　of　other






legal　systems。　Among　the　Romans；　even　at　the　date　of　the　Twelve






Tables；　it　had　become　（to　employ　Mr　Tylor's　phrase）　a　mere






survival；　confined　to　cases　when　the　denial　of　justice　was






condemned　by　superstition　or　by　a　sense　of　the　sternest　public






emergency；　and　this　was　a　consequence　of　the　exceptionally　rapid






development　of　Roman　law　and　procedure；　and　of　the　exceptionally






early　date　at　which　the　Roman　tribunals　became　the　organs　of　the






national　sovereignty。　You　will　see　hereafter　how　much　reason






there　is　for　thinking　that　the　progress　of　most　societies　towards






a　complete　administration　of　justice　was　slow　and　gradual；　and






that　the　Commonwealth　at　first　interfered　through　its　various






organs　rather　to　keep　order　and　see　fair　play　in　quarrels　than






took　them；　as　it　now　does　always　and　everywhere；　into　its　own






hands。　To　this　period；　long　forgotten　among　the　Romans；　those






peculiar　rules　pointed　back　which　survived　along　with　the






Pignoris　Capio；　and　which　provided　for　its　exercise　out　of　court






and　during　the　judicial　vacation。






　　　　I　turn　to　the　Teutonic　societies　for　vestiges　of　a　practice






similar　to　that　which　the　Romans　called　Pignoris　Capio。　They　seem






to　be　quite　unmistakeable　in　that　portion　of　our　own　English　law






which　is　concerned　with　the　power　of　Distraint　or　Distress　and






with　the　connected　legal　remedy　known　as　Replevin。　The　examples






of　the　right　to　distrain　another　man's　property　which　are　most






familiar　to　you　are；　I　dare　say；　the　landlord's　right　to　seize






the　goods　of　his　tenant　for　unpaid　rent；　and　the　right　of　the






lawful　possessor　of　land　to　take　and　impound　stray　beasts　which






are　damaging　his　crops　or　soil。　The　process　by　which　the　latter






right　is　made　effectual　retains　far　more　of　the　ancient






institution　than　does　distress　for　rent。　For　the　peculiar　power






of　the　landlord　to　distrain　for　rent；　while　it　remains　an






extrajudicial　remedy；　has　been　converted　into　a　complete　remedy






of　its　kind　by　a　series　of　statutes　comparatively　modern。　It　has






always；　however；　been　the　theory　of　the　most　learned　English






lawyers　that　distress　is　in　principle　an　incomplete　remedy；　its






primary　object　is　to　compel　the　person　against　whom　it　is






properly　employed　to　make　satisfaction。　But　goods　distrained　for






rent　are　nowadays　not　merely　held　as　a　security　for　the






landlord's　claim；　they　are　ultimately　put　up　for　sale　with






certain　prescribed　formalities；　the　landlord　is　paid　out　of　the






proceeds；　and　the　overplus　is　returned　to　the　tenant。　Thus　the






proceeding　has　become　merely　a　special　method　by　which　payment　of






rent；　and　certain　other　payments　which　are　placed　on　the　same






footing；　are　enforced　without　the　help　of　a　Court　of　Justice。　But






the　distraint　of　cattle　for　damage　still　retains　a　variety　of






archaic　features。　It　is　not　a　complete　remedy。　The　taker　merely






keeps　the　cattle　until　satisfaction　is　made　to　him　for　the






injury；　or　till　they　are　returned　by　him　on　an　engagement　to






contest　the　right　to　distrain　in　an　action　of　Replevin。






　　　　The　practice　of　Distress　　of　taking　nams；　a　word　preserved






in　the　once　famous　law…term　withernam　　is　attested　by　records






considerably　older　than　the　Conquest。　There　is　reason　to　believe






that　anciently　it　was　resorted　to　in　many　more　cases　than　our






oldest　common…law　authorities　recognise；　but　about　the　reign　of






Henry　the　Third；　when　it　was　confined　to　certain　specific　claims






and　wrongs；　the　course　of　the　proceeding　was　as　follows：　The






person　assuming　himself　to　be　aggrieved　seized　the　goods　（which






anciently　were　almost　always　the　cattle）　of　the　person　whom　he